The RADIUS Extensions (radext) Working Group is responsible for maintaining 
the RADIUS protocol, including defining extensions or making modifications 
to the RADIUS protocol and related specifications, as needed. The WG is also 
responsible for publishing best practices or other guidance, as needed, 
to encourage the security, privacy, stability and reliability of RADIUS deployments.

The radext WG will coordinate with other working groups, standards bodies 
(such as the WBA), eduroam, and other organizations that define RADIUS-related standards 
or operate RADIUS services. The radext WG will publish minor RADIUS extensions, 
best-practices documents and clarifications, as needed to support the work of those organizations.

To ensure backward compatibility with existing RADIUS implementations, 
as well as compatibility between RADIUS and Diameter, all documents produced must specify 
means of interoperation with legacy RADIUS. Any non-backwards compatibility changes 
with existing RADIUS RFCs, including RFCs 2865-2869, 3162, 3575, 3579, 3580, 4668-4673, 
4675, 5080, 5090, 5176, 6158, 6929, 8044 and the RadSec RFC (when published) must be justified. 
Transport profiles should be compatible with RFC 3539, with any non-backwards 
compatibility changes justified.


Work Items

The immediate goals of the RADEXT working group are to:

* Define and publish minor extensions to RADIUS, such as new attribute definitions, 
  needed by external organizations or other IETF WGs.

* Define best practices for RADIUS roaming, and roaming consortia.

* Improve operations for multi-hop RADIUS networks, including:

  ** loop detection and prevention.

  ** a multi-hop Status-Server equivalent with ability to Trace the proxy steps 
     a RADIUS message will follow.

  ** improve client-server signaling, and replace non-security requirements to 
     "silently discard" of packets with explicit signaling that a packet 
     (or a set of packets) cannot be processed.

  ** improve signaling of reasons for Access-Reject, including the ability to signal 
     explicit refusal of certain authentications. Information from operators shows 
     that anywhere from 20% to 90% of authentications are for accounts which are always rejected.