Subject: [Ietf-krb-wg] Camellia State

From: Sam Hartman <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 20 Jul 2011 11:59:09 -0400

I wanted to give a brief update on where we are.

A few weeks ago I issued a call for adoption of Greg Hudson's
camellia-cts-cmac draft.  In response to some comments from our AD, I
explicitly asked anyone who supported doing work on Camellia at all to
step forward.
Since then we've been having a discussion.

There are two questions before us:

1) Do we as a WG want to work on a Kerberos Camellia draft?

2) If so, is this the starting point we want?

We're not asking the question of whether Camellia should be specified
for use with Kerberos. For practical purposes that's already decided
unless someone comes forward with strong objections. Assigning a
Kerberos encryption type requires expert review; an informational
document sent through the RFC editor will be sufficient. It's my
understanding that Ken Raeburn, the expert for this registry, has
already reviewed and approved Greg's draft.
So, we're focused on issues like whether the WG has something to add to
the process and on whether we want to publish Camellia for Kerberos on
the standards track.

I've received a request to dedicate meeting time to this issue. So,
we're going to put off any decisions until after the meeting.q At that
point, the chairs will get together, read the mail, probably consult
with our AD, and issue a decision.
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From: "Henry B. Hotz" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2011 18:36:41 -0700

Much was made of having Camellia as what I would call a "hot backup" if AES were found to have a problem.  IMO it's at least as likely that we'll find a problem with the checksum algorithms as the encryption algorithms.  I find it attractive that the enctype uses CMAC instead of HMAC/SHA-1.

I'm not sure how the idea of a "hot backup" translates into standards/informational/etc.  I do think it needs to be available in most implementations to qualify as a "hot backup", and it needs to be possible for an especially paranoid, and prepared, organization to switch over with nothing more than a few lines in config files.

>From a deployment standpoint I'd rather see fewer enctypes pushed out.  I would oppose, for example, pursuing both camellia-cts-cmac and an AES-with-sha-xx proposal.  It's possible I would prefer a camellia-with-sha-3 kind of enctype to either.  Is it worth waiting or soliciting other alternatives?

I'm generally in favor of GH's draft for both 1 and 2.  Just trying to provoke more discussion.

> with our AD, and issue a decision.

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