Subject: Re: [OPSEC] Fwd: Security Assessment of the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)

From: Joel Jaeggli <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 13 Feb 2009 19:27:16 -0800

Keith Moore wrote:
> Marshall Eubanks wrote:
>> If I am reading this correctly the UK Centre for the Protection of
>> National Infrastructure
>> wants the IETF (or some other body) to produce a "companion document to
>> the IETF specifications that discusses the security aspects and
>> implications of the protocols, identifies the existing vulnerabilities,
>> discusses the possible countermeasures, and analyses their respective
>> effectiveness."
> 
> It's difficult to imagine that these things could be adequately captured
> in a static document, for TCP or any other protocol, because new threats
> and countermeasures continue to be identified decades after the base
> protocol is well-settled.  Maybe something like an expanded version of
> the RFC Editor's errata pages would be more appropriate?

One might imagine an informational document which was routinely
obsoleted by future iterations. Keeping it tractable is a product of
necessarily limiting the scope.

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From: Keith Moore <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 14 Feb 2009 03:12:41 -0500

> necessarily limiting the scope.

I fear that our RFC approval and publication process has become so
onerous that it imposes a significant barrier for dissemination of such
information.

Keith

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From: Jari Arkko <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 14 Feb 2009 13:23:08 +0200

Keith, Joel,

>> necessarily limiting the scope.
I am in favor of publishing things like these in informational RFCs. And 
no, we should not shoot for completeness, for obvious reasons.

Jari

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From: TSG <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 14 Feb 2009 07:26:59 -0800

Joel Jaeggli wrote:
> obsoleted by future iterations. 

Unfortunately this isnt new information - the liabilities of IP have 
been well identified and understood for years like the BGP4 flap as well.

What the IETF still seems to fail to grasp is that it is responsible for 
its actions so its not taking security and the ability to produce 
reliable evidence of anything over a network transport are key factors 
and need to be built into any IETF endorsement that is issued in the 
form of a standard or standards-track effort.

I also would suggest that the IETF be willing to support other protocols 
besides IP based - hell XNS was way more secure than IP is by its very 
design.

Its not that TCP/IP is bad - its just that it wasnt designed as an 
evidentiary-grade data transport and that is nowadays a real issue.

> Keeping it tractable is a product of
I dont think so.  Building an analysis scope which is defined to meet 
the evidence needs today would address this requirement and only need to 
be updated periodically to meet those changing evidence models.