| Internet-Draft | DNS SIG Zero RRs | January 2026 |
| Eastlake, et al. | Expires 31 July 2026 | [Page] |
This document specifies use of the SIGZERO and SIG(0) Domain Name System (DNS) Resource Records (RRs) to provide public key based authentication of DNS requests and transactions. This document obsoletes RFC 2931.¶
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[[[ META COMMENTS: Comments within triple square brackets like this are discussion points or alternatives/options for the content of this draft. They are NOT text to be included in the final document. ]]]¶
This document specifies use of the Domain Name System (DNS) SIGZERO and SIG(0) Resource Records (RRs) to provide public key based authenticate of DNS requests and transactions. SIGZERO is patterned after the TSIG [RFC8945] and RRSIG [RFC4034] RRs. Use of SIGZERO is RECOMMENDED for this purpose.¶
As discussed below, use of the SIG RR for this purpose is NOT RECOMMENDED. When a SIG RR is so used, it has a "type covered" field value of zero, and is called a "SIG(0)" RR.¶
The term "SIG Zero" is used in this document to refer to both the SIGZERO RR and the SIG(0) RR.¶
General familiarity with DNS terminology [RFC9499] is assumed.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
The SIGZERO and SIG(0) (SIG Zero) Meta-RRs provide authentication and integrity protection for DNS transactions and requests that is not provided by the DNSSEC security specified in [RFC4034] and [RFC4035]. The authenticated data origin services of DNSSEC security provide either protected data resource records (RRs) or authenticatable denial of their existence. Those services provide no protection for the following:¶
As Meta-RRs, SIGZERO and SIG(0) are not stored in zones. They accompany DNS messages in the Additional Information section of the message. See Section 7.1 for a discussion of forwarding them in the case of a recursive server.¶
Transaction authentication can provide cryptographic assurance to a resolver that it is at least getting the DNS response message from the server and that the received message is in response to the request it sent. This is accomplished by adding either a TSIG RR [RFC8945] or, as specified herein, a SIG Zero RR, at the end of the additional information section of the response which authenticates the concatenation of the corresponding resolver request and the server's response.¶
Requests can also be authenticated by including a SIG Zero RR at the end of the request's additional information section. The method of signing requests as specified herein is primarily intended for authenticating dynamic update requests [RFC3007], use in the Service Registration Protocol (SRP) for DNS-Based Service Discovery [RFC9665], TKEY requests [rfc2930bis], or other requests specified in the future that require authentication.¶
The private keys used in public key based request security belong to the host composing the DNS request message or other entity composing the request or to a zone to be affected by the request. The corresponding public key(s) can be stored in and retrieved from the DNS for verification as KEY RRs with a protocol byte of 3 or 255 (ANY).¶
A TSIG [RFC8945] RR can also be used for request and transaction authentication. There are significant differences between TSIG and SIG Zero.¶
Because TSIG involves secret keys available at both the requester and server the presence of such a key can imply that the other party understands TSIG and likely has the same key installed. Furthermore, TSIG uses keyed hash authentication codes which are relatively inexpensive to compute. Thus, it is common to authenticate DNS requests with TSIG and to authenticate DNS transactaions with TSIG if the corresponding request is authenticated.¶
SIGZERO and SIG(0) on the other hand, uses public key authentication, where the public keys can be stored in DNS as KEY RRs and a private key is held by the signer. Existence of such a KEY RR does not necessarily imply that SIGZERO or SIG(0) is implemented or enabled. In addition, they involve relatively expensive public key cryptographic operations and their verification involves obtaining and verifying the corresponding KEY which can itself be an expensive operation. Indeed, a policy of using SIGZERO or SIG(0) on all requests and verifying it before responding would, for some configurations, lead to a deadly embrace with the attempt to obtain and verify the KEY needed to authenticate the request resulting in additional requests accompanied by a SIGZERO or SIG(0) leading to further requests accompanied by a SIGZERO or SIG(0), etc. Furthermore, omitting these RRs when not required on requests halves the number of public key operations required by the transaction.¶
For these reasons, SIG Zero RRs SHOULD only be used on requests when necessary to authenticate that the requester has some required privilege or identity. SIG Zero on transactions is defined in such a way as to not require a SIG Zero on the corresponding request and still provide transaction protection.¶
Which SIG Zeros are required to be authenticated by a server or requester should be a local configuration option.¶
The SIGZERO RR was designed for this application and its use is RECOMMENDED. SIG(0) is an alternative use of the older SIG RR originally specified in [RFC2535] and is NOT RECOMMENDED. Four reasons for this preference are given below.¶
A request or response may contain any one of the following:¶
It MUST NOT have both a TSIG and a SIG(0) and MUST NOT have more than one TSIG or more than one SIG(0). It MUST NOT have a TSIG or SIG(0) along with a SIGZERO. A request with these prohibited combinations MUST be rejected with FORMERR and a response with such a combination is ignored.¶
[[[ This section preserves the current restrictions on multiple TSIGs and/or SIG(0)s. Should this be further liberalized? ]]]¶
The format of the SIGZERO and SIG(0) RRs are specified in the subsections below. All multi-octet integers in these RRs are sent in network byte order (see Section 2.3.2 of [RFC1035]).¶
The fields of the SIGZERO Meta-RR are described below.¶
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ / Owner Name = Signer's Name | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | TYPE = TBD | CLASS = 0x00FF (ALL) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | TTL (MUST be zero) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | RDLENGTH | / +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ RDATA / / / +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
(Most of these fields are similar or identical to the field in the TSIG [RFC8945] or RRSIG [RFC4034] RR with same field name.)¶
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Algorithm | State | Original ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Error | Fudge |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
| Time Signed +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | Signature Size |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Key Tag | /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Signature /
/ /
/ /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Other Length | /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Other Data /
/ /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The Time Signed and the Fudge form a time bracket, that is, the Time Signed plus/minus the Fudge. Signatures received outside that bracket are considered invalid. In IP networks, the value of Fudge should normally not be more than 5 minutes.¶
[[[ Should it be permissible to omit Other Length if it is zero? Should the Other Length / Other Data construct copied from TSIG and TKEY be replaced by TLVs which are more flexible? ]]]¶
The structure of the SIG(0) resource record (RR) is the same as the structure of the RRSIG RR in [RFC4034] Section 4 except as provided below.¶
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ / Owner Name (not used) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | TYPE = 24 | CLASS = 0x00FF (ALL) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | TTL (MUST be zero) | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | RDLENGTH | / +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ RDATA / / / +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The type of the SIG RR is 24. For SIG(0) RRs, the owner name, CLASS, TTL, and original TTL, and Labels fields are meaningless. To conserve space, the owner name SHOULD be root (a single zero octet). The TTL field MUST be zero. The Labels field MUST be zero. The CLASS field MUST be 255 (ANY), These fields are ignored on receipt. A TTL of zero decreases the risk that a DNS implementation that does not understand SIG(0) will cache such an RR. The RDATA for a SIG(0) RR consists of a number of fields as described below and shown in Figure 4.¶
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type Covered | Algorithm | Labels |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Original TTL |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Signature Expiration |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Signature Inception |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Key Tag | /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Signer's Name /
/ /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ /
/ Signature /
/ /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The Inception and Expiration times in SIG(0)s are for the purpose of limiting replay attacks. They form a time bracket and messages received outside that bracket are ignored. In IP networks, this time bracket SHOULD NOT normally extend further than 5 minutes into the past and 5 minutes into the future.¶
For transaction SIG(0)s, there MUST be a KEY RR associated with the signer name with the public key corresponding to the private key used to calculate the signature. For general transaction authentication and integrity, the signer field is a name of the originating host; for example, the host domain name used may be the inverse IP address mapping name for an IP address of the host if the relevant KEY is stored there. For SIG(0)s on requests requiring authentication, the signer relates to the authority being requested such as authority to update a zone.¶
When SIG(0) authentication on a response is desired, the SIG(0) MUST be considered the highest priority of any additional information for inclusion in the response. If the SIG(0) RR cannot be added without causing the message to be truncated, the server MUST alter the response so that a SIG(0) can be included, set the TC bit, and return RCODE 0 (NOERROR). The client should at this point retry the request using an available transport that does not have UDP packet size restrictions.¶
This section specifies the data over which request and transaction SIG Zeros are calculated. Note that in the case of more than one SIGZERO RR, there is no significance to their order and a SIGZERO RR does not sign any other SIGZERO RR in that DNS message.¶
A DNS request may be optionally signed by including one or more SIGZERO RRs at the end of the request additional information section. These RRs are calculated for and sign the "data" consisting of the following:¶
That is¶
data = (SIGZERO RR) |
(message with Message ID replaced and without SIG Zero RRs)
¶
where "|" is concatenation and RR is a SIGZERO RR with the signature field set to zero.¶
A DNS request may be optionally signed by including a single SIG(0) RR) at the end of the request additional information section. This RR is calculated for and signs the "data" consisting of the following:¶
That is¶
data = (SIG(0) RDATA) | (request without SIG(0))¶
where "|" is concatenation and RDATA is the RDATA of a SIG(0) being calculated omitting the signature itself.¶
A SIGZERO can be used to secure a transacation consisting of a response and the request that produced it. Such a transaction signature, to be included in the response, is calculated over data consisting of¶
data = (SIGZERO RR) | (request message with SIG Zeros) | (response message without SIG Zeros)¶
where "|" is concatenation and RDATA is the RDATA of a SIGZERO being calculated omitting the signature itself.¶
Successful verification of a response SIGZERO by the requesting resolver shows that the query and response were not tampered with in transit, that the response corresponds to the intended query, and that the response comes from the queried server.¶
A SIG(0) can be used to secure a transacation consisting of a response and the request that produced it. Such a transaction signature is calculated by using a "data" consisting of¶
data = (SIG(0) RDATA) | request message | (response message without SIG Zeros)¶
where "|" is concatenation and RDATA is the RDATA of a SIG(0) being calculated omitting the signature itself.¶
Successful verification of a response SIG Zero by the requesting resolver shows that the query and response were not tampered with in transit, that the response corresponds to the intended query, and that the response comes from the queried server.¶
In the case of a DNS message split into multiple packets via a stream transport (e.g. TCP, DoT, etc.), a SIG Zero on the first data packet is calculated with "data" as above but using data only from the first packet. For each subsequent packet, it is calculated as follows:¶
data = ( (SIG(0) RDATA) or (SIGZERO RR) ) |
(DNS payload without SIG Zeros) | previous packet
¶
where "|" is concatenations, RDATA and RR are as above, and previous packet is the previous DNS payload including DNS header but not any preceding headers such as TCP or IP and including a SIG(0) RR if one was present but not any SIGZERO RRs.¶
This does not apply to fragmented UDP where the message is just signed once at the end and then fragmented.¶
Except where needed to authenticate an update, TKEY, or similar privileged request, servers are not required to check a request SIG Zero.¶
If the time when a SIG Zero on a request is received is outside the interval indicated (by the Inception and Expiration Times for a SIG(0) or the Time Signed and Fudge for a SIGZERO), the BADTIME error is returned. If this applies to a response, the response is ignored.¶
If one or more SIG Zero RRs are at the end of the additional information section of a response, they are transaction signatures covering the response and the request that produced that response.¶
If a response's SIG Zero check succeeds, such a transaction authentication does NOT directly authenticate the validity of any data RRs in the message. However, it can authenticate that they were sent by the queried server and have not been altered in transit. (Only an RRSIG RR [RFC4034] signed by the zone or a key tracing its authority to the zone or to resolver configuration can directly authenticate data RRs, depending on resolver policy.) If a resolver or server does not implement transaction and/or request SIG Zeros, it MUST ignore them without error where they are optional and treat them as failing where they are required.¶
A server acting as a forwarding (recursive) server of a DNS message SHOULD check for the existence of SIG Zero RRs. If it implements SIG Zero RRs but cannot verify a SIG Zero RR, the server MUST include that RR when forwarding the message. If a SIG Zero passes all checks and verifies, the forwarding server SHOULD remove it and MUST, if possible, add a SIG Zero of its own to the destination or the next forwarder. If no transaction security is available to the destination and the message is a request, and if the corresponding response has the AD flag (see [RFC4035]) set, the forwarder MUST clear the AD flag before adding a SIG Zero to the response and returning the result to the host from which it received the request.¶
The transit of a DNS request between the originating client and final server through one or more forwarding servers and the similar handling of its response introduces additiional potential failure points. Thus, when practical, requests with a SIG Zero RR should be sent directly to the final server that will verify that SIG Zero.¶
Private keys used to create SIG Zero RRs are very sensitive information and all available steps should be taken to protect them on every host on which they are stored. Such hosts may need to be physically protected. If they are multi-user machines, great care should be taken so that unprivileged users have no access to private keying material.¶
The inclusion of the SIG Zero Inception and Expiration Time and the SIGZERO Time Signed and Fudge under the signature improves resistance to replay attacks.¶
IANA is requested to assign a SIGZERO RRTYPE number in the "Resource Record (RR) TYPEs" registry [DNSparams] as requested in Appendix A. [Value 248 is suggested] The resulting entry would be as follows:¶
| TYPE | Value | Meaning | Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| SIGZERO | TBD | Public key request or transaction signature. | [this document] |
A. Submission Date: tbd
B.1 Submission Type: [X] New RRTYPE [ ] Modification to RRTYPE
B.2 Kind of RR: [ ] Data RR [X] Meta-RR
C. Contact Information for submitter (will be publicly posted):
Name: Donald Eastlake Email Address: d3e3e3@gmail.com
International telephone number: +1-508-333-2270
Other contact handles:
D. Motivation for the new RRTYPE application.
SIG(0) has been found to have a number of deficiencies which are
fixed in the specification for this new RRTYPE.
E. Description of the proposed RR type.
See draft-eastlake-dnssd-rfc2931bis-sigzero
F. What existing RRTYPE or RRTYPEs come closest to filling that need
and why are they unsatisfactory? The SIG RR (RFC 2536) with type
covered of zero. Deficincies are list in
draft-eastlake-dnssd-rfc2931bis-sigzero
G. What mnemonic is requested for the new RRTYPE (optional)?
SIGZERO
H. Does the requested RRTYPE make use of any existing IANA registry
or require the creation of a new IANA subregistry in DNS
Parameters?
Does not create any new registries and does not add entries to
existing registries other than the allocation of the RRTYPE.
I. Does the proposal require/expect any changes in DNS
servers/resolvers that prevent the new type from being processed
as an unknown RRTYPE (see RFC 3597)?
It can be ignored but then you do not get its security benefits.
J. Comments: See draft-eastlake-dnssd-rfc2931bis-sigzero
¶
RFC Editor: Please delete this section before publication.¶
The comments and suggestions of the following are gratefully acknowledged:¶
tbd¶
The comments and suggestions of the following persons were incorporated into [RFC2931], which was the previous version of this document, and are gratefully acknowledged:¶
Olafur Gudmundsson, Ed Lewis, Erik Nordmark, Brian Wellington.¶