Hello, I have been selected to do a routing directorate "early" review of this draft: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-idr-deprecate-as-set-confed-set-16. The routing directorate will, on request from the working group chair, perform an "early" review of a draft before it is submitted for publication to the IESG. The early review can be performed at any time during the draft's lifetime as a working group document. The purpose of the early review depends on the stage that the document has reached. While the WG LC for this draft has been done, RtgDir review has not been requested at that time. Therefore, the purpose of this review (as clarified by Susan Hares who is the IDR WG shepherd for this draft) is to determine whether the document is ready to be published. Please consider my comments along with the other working group last call comments. For more information about the Routing Directorate, please see https://wiki.ietf.org/en/group/rtg/RtgDir. Document: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-idr-deprecate-as-set-confed-set-16. Reviewer: Alexander ("Sasha") Vainshtein Review Date: 03-Dec-24 Intended Status: Standards Track Summary: No issues found. This document is ready to proceed to the IESG. Comments: This document brings to a long due conclusion the process that has started 14 years ago and, so far, resulted in publication of RFC 6472 (a.k.a. BCP 172) when non-usage of AS_SET and AS_CONFED_SET path segment types has been defined as Best Current Practice. With approval of this document, usage of AS_SET and AS_CONFED_SET path segment types would become strictly prohibited: * BGP Update messages containing such paths segments will be treated as erroneous * "Treat-as-withdraw" approach will be applied to these Update messages. Benefits of the proposed change include: * Simplification of BGP design and implementation * Disambiguation of the origin AS of the route and simplification of various BGP security mechanisms. Section 4 of the draft briefly describes the problems usage of AS_SET and AS_CONFED_SET path segment types creates for different BGP security mechanisms. Section 5 of the draft provides detailed analysis of impact of deprecation of AS_SET and AS_CONFED_SET path segment types on BGP aggregation mechanisms. To the nest of my understanding, Section 6 of the draft addresses all specific operational issues pertaining to these mechanisms. Appendix C clarifies that the next hop of an aggregated route MUST be the "null destination". The metadata for this draft correctly reflects its impact on other RFCs. I have not checked the draft for nits. Hopefully, these notes will be useful. Regards, Sasha Regards, Sasha Disclaimer This e-mail together with any attachments may contain information of Ribbon Communications Inc. and its Affiliates that is confidential and/or proprietary for the sole use of the intended recipient. Any review, disclosure, reliance or distribution by others or forwarding without express permission is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and then delete all copies, including any attachments.