Reviewer: Ivaylo Petrov
Review result: has nits

I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat
these comments just like any other last call comments.

Comments:
1. The security considerations section seems generally good to me. The most important new risk is of leakage of sensitive network topology and capacity information and that seems important indeed. I could not understand how that interacts with transitivity. 
2. The draft states that a bandwidth value of zero is valid. While the draft specifies that the behavior in this case is determined by local policy, this could lead to unexpected forwarding behavior if not handled consistently across a network. I wonder if this could be a potential vector for a denial of service attack.
3. Ambiguity in Section 3.3.1: In the section on re-advertisement with a next-hop change, it says the implementation "MAY remove the Link Bandwidth Extended Community or MAY re-advertise it unchanged or regenerate it as its default behavior". This feels like a lot of options, and it could lead to inconsistent behavior between implementations. It would be better to recommend a single default behavior and allow for configuration to override it.

Nits:
1. Authors email addresses are work related, which is not recommended.
2. s/IEEE floating point format/IEEE 754 floating point format/