SECDIR
            review of draft-ietf-roll-security-threats-01




 




 




 

I
        reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
        ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by
        the IESG.

  

These comments
        were written primarily for the benefit of the security area
        directors.

  

Document
        editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any
        other last call comments. This is a review of the revised
        version of the -00 draft that I reviewed on 1/17/13.










I am 

very


        disappointed
        to see that essentially all of the comments that I made, many of
        which were
        easy to address, were ignored. Only my edits of typos seem to
        have been incorporated.




 




-

  
          

3.3: the term
        sleep node is still used but not defined.




-

  
          

3.4: several
        terms used here (misappropriated, legitimacy, and truthfulness)
        still represent
        poor choices of terminology, and should be fixed




-

  
          

4.1.1:
        sniffing should still be replaced with passive wiretapping,
        everywhere




-

  
          

4.2: the
        authors did not fix the definition of traffic analysis




-

  
          

4.2.2:
        “misappropriation”, again




-

  
          

4.3.1:
        overload attack mentioned, w/o definition




-

  
          

4.3.2: selective
        forwarding, wormhole and sinkhole attacks are mentioned, w/o
        definitions, still




-

  
          

5.1.1: still
        incorrect assertions re countering deliberate exposure, i.e., no
        mention of
        authorization




-

  
          

5.1.2: device
        compromise is not usually considered as part of passive
        wiretapping attacks




-

  
          

5.1.3: TA
        still mischaracterized as “may be passive”




-

  
          

5.1.4: I suggested
        that anti-tamper should be out of scope for this document




-

  
          

5.2.2: a
        trivial, brief discussion that is not helpful




-

  
          

5.2.3: still
        an oversimplified symmetric vs. asymmetric cryptographic
        discussion, and the
        authors did not update the text to a more recent cite that I
        provided




 




 




I
        have chosen to not continue because it appears that NONE of the
        specific comments
        I made have been addressed, based on a quick look at the -00 vs.
        -01 diff file.