<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"
     docName="draft-abbas-vrp-offer-verification-00"
     category="info"
     ipr="trust200902"
     submissionType="IETF"
     tocInclude="true"
     sortRefs="true"
     symRefs="true"
     version="3">

  <front>
    <title abbrev="VRP Offer Verification">The Vacation Rental Protocol (VRP): Host-Domain Discovery and Verification of Signed Stay Offers</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-abbas-vrp-offer-verification-00"/>
    <author fullname="Rouiada Abbas" initials="R." surname="Abbas">
      <organization>Vacation Rental Protocol</organization>
      <address>
        <email>hello@vacationrentalprotocol.com</email>
        <uri>https://vacationrentalprotocol.com</uri>
      </address>
    </author>
    <!-- Planned submission date. Check it on the day of submission and set
         it to that day; xml2rfc warns when it is more than 3 days from the
         day it runs. -->
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="15"/>
    <keyword>vacation rental</keyword>
    <keyword>signed offers</keyword>
    <keyword>well-known URI</keyword>
    <keyword>Ed25519</keyword>
    <keyword>agentic commerce</keyword>
    <keyword>seller verification</keyword>

    <abstract>
      <t>The Vacation Rental Protocol (VRP) lets an AI agent or other
      client verify, directly from a vacation-rental host's own domain and
      with no intermediary, that a stay offer was signed by a key that
      domain publishes, has not been altered, and is within its stated
      lifetime.  The signed offer carries the host domain's own statements
      of availability and exact price for the stay asked for.  A valid
      signature proves the provenance and integrity of those statements;
      it does not guarantee that the stay is in fact available.  A host
      domain publishes a discovery document at a well-known URI, an
      Ed25519 key set, and signed stay offers (compact JSON Web
      Signatures).  Verification requires no central registry, issuer,
      accreditation program, or gatekeeper: control of the host domain is
      the root of trust.</t>
      <t>This document specifies the discovery document, key publication
      and rotation, the signed verified stay offer, and the verification
      procedure, including fail-closed behavior and a three-state
      verification model.  It also describes the existing provisional
      registration of the "vacation-rental.json" well-known URI
      suffix.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>

  <middle>

    <section anchor="intro">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>When an AI agent or other client presents a vacation-rental stay
      offer to a guest, the guest relies on three things: that the offer
      comes from the host's own domain, that the price shown is the price
      that domain stated, and that the booking URL is on that domain.
      This document specifies how a client checks each of the three.  A
      signature that verifies against the key set the host domain
      publishes shows that a key published by that domain signed exactly
      these terms, the price among them, and that they have not been
      altered.  Separate checks confirm that the offer names the domain
      whose discovery document the client fetched
      (<xref target="safe-to-quote"/>) and that the booking URL is on that
      domain (<xref target="booking-url"/>).  A valid signature proves the
      provenance and integrity of those statements; it does not guarantee
      that the stay is in fact available.</t>
      <t>VRP does this for one concrete vertical, vacation rentals,
      with deliberately boring machinery: a well-known discovery document
      (<xref target="discovery"/>), a published Ed25519 key set
      (<xref target="jwks"/>), and stay offers signed as compact JSON Web
      Signatures over the host's own domain (<xref target="offer"/>).  A
      verifier fetches, verifies, and quotes - or fails closed
      (<xref target="verification"/>).</t>

      <section anchor="scope">
        <name>Scope and Non-Goals</name>
        <t>VRP v0.1 defines how a host-owned vacation-rental domain
        publishes discovery metadata, signing keys, and signed verified
        stay offers so that clients can verify provenance, freshness,
        exact price, and the direct booking URL.</t>
        <t>VRP is not an online travel agency (OTA), marketplace, central
        registry, traffic proxy, payment processor, or central key
        issuer.  VRP is a no-gatekeeper protocol: verification
        <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> require any specific vendor, a
        VRP-operated trusted-issuer registry, a host accreditation
        program, a certification company, or a central discovery
        index.</t>
        <t>VRP may compose with adjacent agent-commerce standards for
        checkout, payment mandates, tool bindings, or inter-agent
        negotiation; those runtime flows are out of scope for this
        document.</t>
      </section>
    </section>

    <section anchor="conventions">
      <name>Conventions and Terminology</name>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>",
      "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>",
      "<bcp14>SHALL NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>",
      "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
      "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and
      "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
      described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/>
      when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      <dl newline="false" spacing="normal">
        <dt>Node:</dt>
        <dd>A host-owned HTTPS origin that publishes VRP resources.  Each
        node is one origin describing one vacation-rental site; there is
        no multi-publisher or shared-host case.</dd>
        <dt>Host domain:</dt>
        <dd>The host-owned domain a node is served from
        (<xref target="host-owned-domain"/>), carried as
        <tt>canonical_domain</tt> in VRP documents.</dd>
        <dt>Node URL:</dt>
        <dd>An absolute <tt>https</tt> URL on the host domain or
        <tt>www.</tt> followed by it (<xref target="node-url"/>).</dd>
        <dt>Discovery document:</dt>
        <dd>The JSON resource at the node's well-known URI
        (<xref target="discovery"/>).</dd>
        <dt>Verified stay offer:</dt>
        <dd>A stay quote signed by the node as a compact JSON Web
        Signature (<xref target="offer"/>).</dd>
        <dt>Verifier:</dt>
        <dd>An AI agent or other client that fetches and validates VRP
        resources.</dd>
        <dt>Quote:</dt>
        <dd>Presenting an offer's price, availability, or booking URL to
        a user as host-verified information.</dd>
      </dl>
    </section>

    <section anchor="discovery">
      <name>Discovery Document</name>
      <t>A VRP node publishes a site-wide discovery document at:</t>
      <sourcecode type="text">
https://{host-domain}/.well-known/vacation-rental.json
</sourcecode>
      <t>A client that already knows a host's domain issues this single
      request to discover that the origin is a bookable vacation-rental
      node and how to interact with it, in the site-wide pattern
      <xref target="RFC8615"/> is intended for.  The model mirrors other
      site-wide well-known configuration resources: probe one URL,
      receive a structured configuration, with no per-host
      hard-coding.</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>Applicable scheme: <tt>https</tt> only.</li>
        <li>Media type: <tt>application/json</tt> <xref target="RFC8259"/>.</li>
        <li>One origin per node.</li>
      </ul>

      <section anchor="discovery-required">
        <name>Required Fields</name>
        <dl newline="false" spacing="normal">
          <dt><tt>protocol</tt>:</dt>
          <dd><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be the string
          <tt>vacation-rental-protocol</tt>.</dd>
          <dt><tt>protocol_version</tt>:</dt>
          <dd><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be <tt>0.1</tt> for this version.</dd>
          <dt><tt>canonical_domain</tt>:</dt>
          <dd><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> match the host-owned domain being
          verified, which is the domain this document is fetched from
          (<xref target="host-owned-domain"/>).</dd>
          <dt><tt>jwks_url</tt>:</dt>
          <dd><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> point to the host-domain JWKS
          (<xref target="jwks"/>), and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be a node URL
          (<xref target="node-url"/>).</dd>
          <dt><tt>verified_stay_offer_endpoint</tt>:</dt>
          <dd><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> point to the host-domain verified stay
          offer endpoint (<xref target="offer"/>), and
          <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be a node URL (<xref target="node-url"/>).</dd>
        </dl>
      </section>

      <section anchor="host-owned-domain">
        <name>Host-Owned Domain</name>
        <t>A VRP node is a domain registered for the host, never a name
        under another party's domain.  <tt>canonical_domain</tt>
        <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> meet all of the following:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal">
          <li>It is lowercase ASCII, with internationalized labels in
          A-label (<tt>xn--</tt>) form, and has no trailing dot.</li>
          <li>It equals its own registrable domain as computed by the
          Public Suffix List algorithm <xref target="PSL"/> using only
          the rules in the list's ICANN section, each rule compared in
          A-label form; where no ICANN rule matches, the algorithm's
          default rule <tt>*</tt> applies.  The list's PRIVATE section
          does not count: it lists domains under which a company hands
          out names to its customers.</li>
          <li>Its top-level domain is not a brand or closed top-level
          domain, under which every name belongs to the top-level
          domain's operator.  These are: every top-level domain whose
          ICANN registry agreement includes Specification 13, marked
          <tt>"specification13": true</tt> in ICANN's gTLD list
          <xref target="ICANN-GTLDS"/>; and <tt>booking</tt> and
          <tt>hotels</tt>, whose registry operator is Booking.com B.V.
          This list changes only by a recorded decision of the
          specification's maintainers.</li>
        </ol>
        <t>A name under a platform, catalog, marketplace, OTA, site
        builder or operator domain is never a <tt>canonical_domain</tt>,
        whoever operates that domain.  <tt>example.com</tt> and
        <tt>example.co.uk</tt> are host-owned domains;
        <tt>www.example.com</tt>, <tt>villa.platform.example</tt>,
        <tt>villa.booking</tt> and <tt>villa.amazon</tt> are not.  A
        verifier that holds no copy of the ICANN section of the Public
        Suffix List, or of ICANN's gTLD list, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat
        the node as unknown (<xref target="three-state"/>).</t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="node-url">
        <name>Node URL</name>
        <t>A node URL is an absolute <tt>https</tt> URL whose host is
        <tt>canonical_domain</tt> or <tt>www.</tt> followed by
        <tt>canonical_domain</tt>, with no userinfo (no user name or
        password) and no port other than the <tt>https</tt> default.
        Hosts are compared after URL parsing, which lowercases them.</t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="fetching">
        <name>Fetching</name>
        <t>The domain a discovery document, a JWKS or an offer is fetched
        from is the host of the URL the verifier requested.  A verifier
        requests the discovery document at
        <tt>https://{domain}/.well-known/vacation-rental.json</tt> for
        the domain it is verifying, which the document's
        <tt>canonical_domain</tt> then has to match.  A verifier
        <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> follow a redirect only when its target is a
        node URL of that domain; it <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> follow any
        other redirect, and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat what it would have
        fetched as unknown (<xref target="three-state"/>).</t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="discovery-recommended">
        <name>Recommended Fields</name>
        <t>A node <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> also publish:</t>
        <dl newline="false" spacing="normal">
          <dt><tt>node_id</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>A stable node identifier.</dd>
          <dt><tt>capabilities</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>Supported operations (for example
          <tt>signed_verified_stay_offer</tt>,
          <tt>live_availability</tt>, <tt>exact_total_price</tt>,
          <tt>direct_booking_url</tt>).</dd>
          <dt><tt>endpoints</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>Additional operation URLs.</dd>
          <dt><tt>operator</tt>:</dt>
          <dd><bcp14>MAY</bcp14> carry <tt>name</tt>, <tt>role</tt>, and
          <tt>key_custody</tt>.  <tt>key_custody</tt> declares who holds
          the node's Ed25519 signing key: <tt>platform</tt> (an operator
          holds and operates the key on the host's behalf - offers are
          signed under the host's domain identity and remain
          independently verifiable against <tt>jwks_url</tt>, but the
          host does not hold the key itself) or <tt>self</tt> (the host
          self-custodies the key).  When the field is absent, custody is
          unspecified, and a verifier <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> assume
          self-custody.  This lets a verifier reason about exactly what a
          valid signature guarantees: provenance and integrity in both
          cases, host self-sovereignty only when <tt>self</tt>.</dd>
        </dl>
        <t>Clients <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore unknown fields.</t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="discovery-trust">
        <name>Trust Model of the Discovery Document</name>
        <t>Trust is not derived from the well-known location; presence at
        the well-known URI confers no authority.  Authoritative offers
        are signed on the host's own domain and verify standalone against
        the node's published keys, independent of any central party.  A
        client <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> verify signatures and
        <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> treat the discovery document itself as
        proof of any claim: the document is advisory metadata only.</t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="discovery-alias">
        <name>Transition Alias</name>
        <t>For transition compatibility a node <bcp14>MAY</bcp14>
        additionally serve the same document at the longer alias path
        <tt>/.well-known/vacation-rental-protocol.json</tt>.  Clients
        <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use <tt>vacation-rental.json</tt>.</t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="node-page">
        <name>Node Page Identification</name>
        <t>A VRP node is found and verified through its discovery
        document and its signed offers.  The pages a guest or an AI
        model reads are not part of that chain.  The rules below make
        the protocol visible there too.  In this version they are
        <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>; (a) and (b) are intended to become
        <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> in the next major version, the migration
        path being these two tags.  For the page served at
        <tt>https://{canonical_domain}/</tt>:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="(%c)">
          <li>The document head <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> contain
          <tt>&lt;link rel="protocol" href="https://vacationrentalprotocol.com/"&gt;</tt>.</li>
          <li>The document body <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> contain a visible
          hyperlink carrying <tt>rel="protocol"</tt> whose <tt>href</tt>
          is on the origin <tt>https://vacationrentalprotocol.com</tt>
          (the root, or <tt>/verify?host={canonical_domain}</tt>) and
          whose link text contains the string <tt>VRP</tt>.</li>
          <li>The response <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> carry the HTTP header
          <tt>Link: &lt;https://vacationrentalprotocol.com/&gt;;
          rel="https://vacationrentalprotocol.com/rel/protocol"</tt>.</li>
          <li>schema.org JSON-LD on the page <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> mark
          the lodging with <tt>"additionalType":
          "https://vacationrentalprotocol.com/terms#VRPVacationRental"</tt>.</li>
          <li>The page <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> describe the property as a
          VRP vacation rental in its own language.</li>
        </ol>
        <t>The <tt>href</tt> in (a) and (b) <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
        point to an implementation, an operator, or any origin other
        than <tt>https://vacationrentalprotocol.com</tt>: the link names
        the standard, never a vendor.  The HTML keyword
        <tt>protocol</tt> and the extension relation type
        <tt>https://vacationrentalprotocol.com/rel/protocol</tt> denote
        the same relation.</t>
      </section>
    </section>

    <section anchor="jwks">
      <name>Signing Keys (JWKS)</name>
      <t>A VRP node publishes an Ed25519 public key set
      <xref target="RFC7517"/> at:</t>
      <sourcecode type="text">
https://{host-domain}/.well-known/jwks.json
</sourcecode>
      <t>Keys used for signing verified stay offers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
      use <xref target="RFC8037"/>:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li><tt>kty</tt>: <tt>OKP</tt></li>
        <li><tt>crv</tt>: <tt>Ed25519</tt></li>
        <li><tt>alg</tt>: <tt>EdDSA</tt></li>
        <li><tt>kid</tt>: stable key identifier</li>
        <li><tt>x</tt>: base64url-encoded Ed25519 public key</li>
      </ul>
      <t>Such keys <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> also set <tt>use</tt> to
      <tt>sig</tt> and include <tt>verify</tt> in <tt>key_ops</tt>.</t>
      <t>Because there is no central issuer, the JWKS is the only
      revocation authority: a key is valid exactly while it appears in
      the node's JWKS.</t>

      <section anchor="rotation">
        <name>Rotation</name>
        <t>To rotate, a node <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> publish the new key
        alongside the old one in its JWKS and sign new offers with the
        new key's <tt>kid</tt>.  It <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> retain the old
        key in the JWKS until every offer signed with it has passed its
        <tt>valid_until</tt>, so the retention overlap equals the maximum
        offer lifetime.  A node <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use a <tt>kid</tt>
        that encodes a date and sequence (for example
        <tt>example.com-2026-05-18-01</tt>) so operators can order keys;
        a verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat <tt>kid</tt> as opaque and
        <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> infer trust, recency, or status from its
        value.</t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="refresh">
        <name>Refresh on Miss</name>
        <t>If a verifier receives an offer whose <tt>kid</tt> is not
        present in its cached JWKS, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> re-fetch the
        node's JWKS before acting, and only treat the offer as
        unverifiable if the <tt>kid</tt> is still absent.  This makes a
        rotation take effect immediately and decouples rotation from the
        cache bound below, so the cache bound governs revocation latency
        alone.  To avoid amplification, a verifier <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>
        rate-limit or coalesce refresh-on-miss per domain, so a stream of
        offers bearing unknown <tt>kid</tt>s cannot drive it into
        excessive JWKS fetches against the node.</t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="revocation">
        <name>Revocation and Cache Bound</name>
        <t>A key's presence in the JWKS is the entire trust signal: an
        offer verifies only against a key that is in the JWKS now.
        Removing a key makes every offer signed with it unverifiable,
        regardless of when it was signed; there is no retroactive
        "historically valid" exemption.</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>Routine rotation avoids breakage through timing: retain the
          outgoing key until its outstanding offers have passed
          <tt>valid_until</tt>, then remove it.</li>
          <li>Compromise requires immediate removal.  This also
          invalidates the operator's own legitimate offers signed with
          that key - intentionally, because a verifier cannot distinguish
          the operator's offers from an attacker's when they share the
          same key.  Legitimate stays are re-signed with the new key.</li>
        </ul>
        <t>Offer freshness (<xref target="freshness"/>) does not bound a
        compromise: an attacker holding the leaked private key can mint
        fresh offers with a future <tt>valid_until</tt>.  The only thing
        that stops a conforming verifier from honoring them is the key
        being absent from the JWKS it holds.  Therefore:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>A verifier <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> cache a node's JWKS for
          longer than 5 minutes.  A node's <tt>Cache-Control</tt>
          <xref target="RFC9111"/> may only shorten this window, never
          extend it.  This bound is the revocation latency: a compromised
          key is fully de-trusted by conforming verifiers within the
          cache window after it is removed from the JWKS.</li>
          <li>A node <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> serve <tt>jwks.json</tt> with
          a short <tt>Cache-Control</tt> (for example
          <tt>max-age=300</tt> or less).  The JWKS is a small,
          CDN-cacheable document, so frequent re-fetching is
          inexpensive.</li>
        </ul>
        <t>Three distinct controls, not to be conflated: freshness
        (<tt>valid_until</tt>) bounds how long an offer is quotable;
        refresh-on-miss gives immediate discovery of the current key set
        (rotation); the JWKS cache cap bounds how long a revoked key is
        still accepted (revocation latency).  They are independent - none
        substitutes for another.</t>
      </section>
    </section>

    <section anchor="offer">
      <name>Verified Stay Offer</name>

      <section anchor="offer-request">
        <name>Offer Request</name>
        <t>The verified stay offer endpoint accepts at least:</t>
        <dl newline="false" spacing="normal">
          <dt><tt>check_in</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>Arrival date, <tt>YYYY-MM-DD</tt>.</dd>
          <dt><tt>check_out</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>Departure date, <tt>YYYY-MM-DD</tt>.</dd>
          <dt><tt>guests</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>Integer guest count.</dd>
        </dl>
        <t>The endpoint returns a signed verified stay offer envelope;
        the signed payload contains the quotable facts.</t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="offer-payload">
        <name>Signed Payload</name>
        <t>The signature format is compact JWS <xref target="RFC7515"/>
        using EdDSA over an Ed25519 key published in the host-domain
        JWKS.  The signed payload <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include:</t>
        <ul spacing="compact">
          <li><tt>kind</tt>: the string <tt>verified_stay_offer</tt></li>
          <li><tt>protocol_version</tt>: <tt>0.1</tt></li>
          <li><tt>canonical_domain</tt></li>
          <li><tt>node_id</tt></li>
          <li><tt>generated_at</tt></li>
          <li><tt>valid_until</tt></li>
          <li><tt>request</tt> (the echoed stay parameters)</li>
          <li><tt>property</tt></li>
          <li><tt>availability</tt></li>
          <li><tt>price</tt></li>
          <li><tt>booking</tt></li>
          <li><tt>agent_permission</tt></li>
        </ul>
        <t>The stay asked for.  <tt>request</tt> is the stay the offer
        is for, as it was asked for at the offer endpoint
        (<xref target="offer-request"/>): <tt>check_in</tt> and
        <tt>check_out</tt> are dates in <tt>YYYY-MM-DD</tt> form, and
        <tt>guests</tt> is an integer of at least 1.</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li><tt>check_in</tt> and <tt>check_out</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
          be dates that exist in the calendar (<xref target="RFC3339"/>
          <tt>full-date</tt>), and <tt>check_out</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
          be later than <tt>check_in</tt>.</li>
          <li>A node <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> sign an offer for dates that
          break these rules, or whose <tt>check_in</tt> is earlier than
          the current date at the property.  It answers with an error
          instead.</li>
          <li><tt>check_in</tt>, <tt>check_out</tt>, <tt>guests</tt> and
          <tt>language</tt> are the requester's words, echoed back; they
          are not statements by the host.  <tt>check_in_weekday</tt>,
          <tt>check_out_weekday</tt> and <tt>nights</tt>, when present,
          are the node's own, computed from the two dates.  A node
          <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> copy into the signed payload any value
          from the request other than those four.
          <tt>request.language</tt>, when present, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
          be a BCP 47 <xref target="RFC5646"/> language tag made of a
          language subtag (two or three letters), optionally a script
          subtag (four letters) and optionally a region subtag (two
          letters or three digits), joined by hyphens; letter case does
          not matter, as in BCP 47.  It <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> name a
          language the node writes the offer in.</li>
        </ul>
        <t>Lifetime.  <tt>generated_at</tt> and <tt>valid_until</tt> are
        UTC date-times (<xref target="RFC3339"/> <tt>date-time</tt>,
        ending in <tt>Z</tt>).  A node <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> set
        <tt>generated_at</tt> to the time it signs the offer.
        <tt>valid_until</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be later than
        <tt>generated_at</tt> and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be more than
        900 seconds (15 minutes) after it.  The two values are compared
        as written, fractions of a second included.</t>
        <t>The signed payload <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> also include
        host-verified direct-source facts, so that a verifier can verify
        (not just read) the node's commercial positioning:</t>
        <dl newline="false" spacing="normal">
          <dt><tt>source_authority</tt>:</dt>
          <dd><tt>model: host_verified_direct_source</tt>,
          <tt>is_official_source_for_property</tt>,
          <tt>intermediary: none</tt>, <tt>payment_recipient: host</tt>,
          <tt>booking_model: direct_with_host</tt>,
          <tt>booking_commission_pct: 0</tt>.  A reselling marketplace
          cannot truthfully sign these.</dd>
          <dt><tt>price.no_add_on_fees</tt>:</dt>
          <dd><tt>true</tt> asserts the quoted total has no add-on
          booking, service, or cleaning fees (the displayed price is the
          total paid).  This describes the node's own fee structure and
          is never a comparison with any other channel.</dd>
          <dt><tt>price.minor_unit</tt>:</dt>
          <dd>The unit of every amount in <tt>price</tt>
          (<tt>public_total</tt>, <tt>agent_total</tt>, <tt>total</tt>,
          each <tt>breakdown[].nightly_rate</tt>, each
          <tt>adjustments[].amount</tt>, the <tt>reconciliation</tt>
          sums).  <tt>true</tt>: integers in the currency's minor unit
          (cents): <tt>29100</tt> is 291.00 EUR.  <tt>false</tt>: whole
          currency units: <tt>8930</tt> is 8 930 SEK.  The offer schema
          of this protocol version <xref target="VRP-SPEC"/> requires the
          flag, and it applies to the whole <tt>price</tt> object; a
          consumer reads it before it quotes, converts or displays an
          amount.</dd>
        </dl>
      </section>

      <section anchor="booking-url">
        <name>Direct Booking URL</name>
        <t>The signed payload's <tt>booking</tt> object carries the
        direct booking URL the verifier routes the user to, and
        <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include <tt>direct_booking_url</tt>.  It is
        the only booking action a VRP verifier may take for the offer
        (<xref target="safe-to-quote"/>).</t>
        <t>Structure:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li><tt>direct_booking_url</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be an
          absolute <tt>https</tt> URL.</li>
          <li>Its host <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be the offer's
          <tt>canonical_domain</tt>, or <tt>www.</tt> followed by it, and
          no other name, with no userinfo and no port other than the
          <tt>https</tt> default.  It <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> point at any
          other host: another name under the node's domain, another
          node's domain, a name under a platform, catalog, marketplace or
          operator domain, an OTA, a link shortener or a redirector.  A
          verifier that cannot confirm that it is a node URL
          (<xref target="node-url"/>) <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat the direct
          booking URL as unknown (<xref target="three-state"/>) and
          <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> route booking to it.</li>
          <li>The URL <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> encode the quoted stay so the
          booking page opens pre-filled for the same stay.  The
          <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> query parameters are
          <tt>checkIn</tt> (<tt>YYYY-MM-DD</tt>, matching
          <tt>request.check_in</tt>), <tt>checkOut</tt>
          (<tt>YYYY-MM-DD</tt>, matching <tt>request.check_out</tt>), and
          <tt>guests</tt> (integer, matching <tt>request.guests</tt>).</li>
          <li>The URL <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> include an offer reference
          identifier (for example an <tt>offer</tt> query parameter) so
          the node can correlate the click with the signed offer it
          issued.  The reference identifier, when present,
          <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be required by a verifier to validate
          the offer and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be treated as a
          substitute for verifying the JWS signature.</li>
          <li>The URL <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> include additional host-specific
          query parameters.  A verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore
          unrecognized query parameters and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> treat
          their presence as a verification failure.</li>
        </ul>
        <t>Integrity: <tt>direct_booking_url</tt> is a field inside the
        signed offer payload.  Its integrity derives solely from the
        compact JWS over that payload: if the JWS verifies against the
        host-domain JWKS, the direct booking URL is exactly the URL the
        host signed.  There is no separate signature over the URL, and a
        verifier <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> accept a
        <tt>direct_booking_url</tt> delivered outside, or modified after,
        the signed payload.  A <tt>direct_booking_url</tt> whose
        enclosing offer fails signature verification is unknown and
        <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used.</t>
        <t>Lifecycle: the direct booking URL is actionable only while the
        enclosing offer is fresh, that is, while <tt>valid_until</tt>
        holds:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>While the offer is fresh, a verifier <bcp14>MAY</bcp14>
          present and route the user to <tt>direct_booking_url</tt>
          subject to the safe-to-quote rules
          (<xref target="safe-to-quote"/>).</li>
          <li>Once <tt>valid_until</tt> has passed, the offer is stale.
          The verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat the direct booking URL
          as unknown and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> present its associated
          price as current or claim the stay is bookable on the strength
          of the stale offer.  The verifier <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> fetch a
          fresh signed offer for the user's dates and guest count before
          routing a booking action.</li>
          <li>After expiry, the host node <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> continue to
          serve the same URL, <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> re-quote (return a new
          signed offer, which may carry a different price, availability,
          or <tt>direct_booking_url</tt>), or <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> return
          an unavailable or non-quotable offer.  Following an expired
          <tt>direct_booking_url</tt> is therefore an unverified action:
          the host, not the protocol, decides what the URL does after
          expiry.</li>
          <li>A host node <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> ensure that following
          <tt>direct_booking_url</tt> after expiry fails closed for the
          guest - for example by re-quoting on the landing page rather
          than silently honoring a stale price.  VRP does not guarantee
          that a price observed in an expired offer is still
          available.</li>
        </ul>
      </section>

      <section anchor="refund-schedule">
        <name>Computable Refund Schedule (Optional)</name>
        <t>A node <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> publish its cancellation refund
        terms inside the signed offer as <tt>rules.refund_schedule</tt>:
        an array of rows
        <tt>{ "hours_before_checkin": n, "refund_percent": p }</tt> with
        <tt>n</tt> a non-negative integer and <tt>p</tt> an integer from
        0 to 100.</t>
        <t>The schedule is computable, not descriptive.  A verifier
        evaluates it as a pure predicate with no platform context:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal">
          <li>Compute <tt>H = floor((check-in moment - cancellation
          time) / 1 hour)</tt>: whole hours, floored.  Flooring makes
          fractional boundaries resolve in the node's favor;
          implementations <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> substitute other
          rounding.</li>
          <li>Sort rows by <tt>hours_before_checkin</tt> descending.  The
          first row with <tt>hours_before_checkin &lt;= H</tt> applies;
          the guest receives that row's <tt>refund_percent</tt> of the
          paid total.</li>
          <li>No matching row - including any cancellation after the
          check-in moment, where <tt>H</tt> is negative - means 0
          percent.</li>
        </ol>
        <t>A row with <tt>hours_before_checkin: 0</tt> therefore means
        "this percent up to the check-in moment itself".  An empty array
        is a valid, honest schedule meaning "no refund at any point".  An
        absent or null field means the node has not published computable
        terms: the answer is unknown, and a verifier
        <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> invent, infer, or default a refund
        promise.</t>
        <t>Because the schedule is signed inside the offer, it is
        verifiable, not merely attested: the guest's agent can prove
        after the fact exactly which refund terms were in force at quote
        time, regardless of what the node's pages say later.  Nodes and
        verifiers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> relay the rows verbatim to guests -
        as hours/percent terms, never re-labelled into named tiers
        ("flexible", "moderate", and similar), which this field
        replaces.</t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="payment-reserved">
        <name>Reserved: Agent-Native Payment Rails</name>
        <t>VRP v0.1 defines exactly one payment path:
        <tt>direct_booking_url</tt>, settled by the host's own payment
        processor.  The optional <tt>booking.payment_options</tt> field
        is reserved for a future agent-native payment-rail binding and is
        not defined in v0.1: its shape, settlement, refund handling, and
        reconciliation are intentionally left open.  A node
        <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> omit it; a verifier <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>
        treat its presence as a defined, honorable payment path.</t>
        <t>Two invariants will hold whenever the binding is defined, and
        constrain it now: the payee is the host's own (never an
        intermediary or marketplace), and payment rails
        <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> gate discovery, verification, or offer
        retrieval (<xref target="scope"/>).</t>
      </section>
    </section>

    <section anchor="verification">
      <name>Verification</name>

      <section anchor="freshness">
        <name>Freshness</name>
        <t>Verifiers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat an offer as non-quotable
        if <tt>valid_until</tt> is missing, malformed, or expired.</t>
        <t>Verifiers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> also treat an offer as
        non-quotable if <tt>generated_at</tt> is missing or malformed, if
        <tt>generated_at</tt> is more than 60 seconds later than the
        verifier's current time, or if <tt>valid_until</tt> is not later
        than <tt>generated_at</tt> or is more than 900 seconds after it
        (<xref target="offer-payload"/>).  The 60 seconds allow for
        clocks that are not exactly in step; they do not lengthen the
        lifetime.</t>
        <t>Verifiers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> fetch a fresh offer for the
        user's specific dates and guest count before presenting a final
        price or booking URL.</t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="safe-to-quote">
        <name>Safe-to-Quote Rules</name>
        <t>A verifier <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> quote an offer as an
        official host-domain verified offer unless all of the following
        are true:</t>
        <ul spacing="compact">
          <li>The discovery document is fetched from the host-owned
          domain (<xref target="host-owned-domain"/>), and its
          <tt>canonical_domain</tt> is that domain.</li>
          <li>The discovery document declares
          <tt>protocol: "vacation-rental-protocol"</tt>.</li>
          <li>The discovery document declares
          <tt>protocol_version: "0.1"</tt>.</li>
          <li>The JWKS contains an Ed25519 verification key matching the
          JWS.</li>
          <li>The compact JWS verifies against the host-domain JWKS.</li>
          <li>The signed payload matches the returned offer.</li>
          <li>The signed payload's <tt>canonical_domain</tt> is the
          domain the discovery document was fetched from.</li>
          <li><tt>valid_until</tt> is present and fresh.</li>
          <li><tt>generated_at</tt> and <tt>valid_until</tt> meet
          <xref target="offer-payload"/> and <xref target="freshness"/>:
          <tt>valid_until</tt> is later than <tt>generated_at</tt> and at
          most 900 seconds after it, and <tt>generated_at</tt> is not
          more than 60 seconds later than the verifier's current
          time.</li>
          <li><tt>request.check_in</tt> and <tt>request.check_out</tt>
          are dates that exist, <tt>request.check_out</tt> is later than
          <tt>request.check_in</tt>, and <tt>request.check_in</tt> is not
          earlier than the day before the verifier's current date in
          UTC.  The local date anywhere is at most one day behind the
          UTC date, so a <tt>check_in</tt> earlier than that has passed
          everywhere; the node itself applies the property's own date
          (<xref target="offer-payload"/>).</li>
          <li><tt>request.check_in</tt>, <tt>request.check_out</tt> and
          <tt>request.guests</tt> are the dates and the guest count the
          verifier asked for.</li>
          <li><tt>request.language</tt>, when present, has the form
          <xref target="offer-payload"/> gives.</li>
          <li><tt>availability.available</tt> is true.</li>
          <li><tt>price.exact</tt> is true.</li>
          <li>A direct booking URL is present.</li>
          <li><tt>agent_permission.may_quote_as_official_direct_offer</tt>
          is true.</li>
        </ul>
        <t>Verifiers <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>:</t>
        <ul spacing="compact">
          <li>Invent discounts, savings, promo codes, OTA comparisons, or
          price reductions.</li>
          <li>Say the stay is bookable unless
          <tt>availability.available</tt> is true and agent permission
          allows quoting.</li>
          <li>Quote a final total unless <tt>price.exact</tt> is true in
          the signed offer.</li>
          <li>Route booking action anywhere except the signed direct
          booking URL.</li>
          <li>Present a value from <tt>request</tt> as something the
          host stated (<xref target="offer-payload"/>).</li>
        </ul>
      </section>

      <section anchor="fail-closed">
        <name>Fail-Closed Behavior</name>
        <t>Verifiers and clients <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> fail closed.  If
        signature verification, the offer's binding to the fetched
        domain and to the stay asked for
        (<xref target="safe-to-quote"/>), freshness and lifetime
        (<xref target="offer-payload"/>, <xref target="freshness"/>),
        the dates, exact price, availability, the direct booking URL, or
        citation permission cannot be verified, the offer
        <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be quoted as official or bookable.</t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="three-state">
        <name>Three-State Verification</name>
        <t>Verifiers and clients interacting with VRP nodes
        <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> distinguish three states for any required
        endpoint or field:</t>
        <dl newline="false" spacing="normal">
          <dt>Affirmed:</dt>
          <dd>Present, signed where required, fresh, schema-valid, and
          explicitly true or present.  May be cited.</dd>
          <dt>Negated:</dt>
          <dd>Present, signed where required, fresh, schema-valid, and
          explicitly false.  May be cited as false.</dd>
          <dt>Unknown:</dt>
          <dd>Absent, unsigned, stale, unreachable, schema-invalid,
          malformed, expired, or otherwise unverifiable.
          <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be cited as true or false.</dd>
        </dl>
        <t>Unreachable is not the same as negated.  A timeout, DNS
        failure, HTTP failure, blocked fetch, invalid JSON, missing
        field, failed signature check, stale <tt>valid_until</tt>, or
        schema mismatch means unknown.  Inference from unknown to either
        affirmed or negated is a protocol violation.  Verifiers
        <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> tell the user that the value could not be
        verified and fetch a fresh signed offer before making booking,
        availability, price, or official-source claims.</t>
      </section>

      <section anchor="classes">
        <name>Verifiability Classes</name>
        <t>VRP data falls into exactly three classes, and a surface
        <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> present a lower class as a higher one:</t>
        <dl newline="false" spacing="normal">
          <dt>Verifiable:</dt>
          <dd>Fields signed inside the offer's compact JWS: price
          (including <tt>exact</tt> and <tt>no_add_on_fees</tt>),
          <tt>availability</tt>, <tt>valid_until</tt>,
          <tt>source_authority</tt>, and
          <tt>rules.refund_schedule</tt>.  Tampering with any of them
          invalidates the same signature.</dd>
          <dt>Attested:</dt>
          <dd>Host-declared tri-state claims (amenities, policies)
          published in the node's discovery document and optionally as a
          <tt>VRPPropertyAttestedClaimsCredential</tt> (defined in
          Section 5.5 of the portable attestations specification in the
          protocol repository <xref target="VRP-SPEC"/>).  Actionable as
          the host's explicit
          statement - including negations ("cats are not allowed") - but
          not cryptographically bound to a specific purchase moment.
          Absence is unknown, never a yes or a no.</dd>
          <dt>Reputational:</dt>
          <dd>Review aggregates, stay history, and similar evidence about
          past experience.  A verifier <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> cite it
          (accurately attributed and time-bounded) but
          <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> present it as a promise, a term, or a
          fact about the current offer.</dd>
        </dl>
        <t>Determining the class of a field is mechanical, never
        editorial: the class follows from where the value was read, not
        from how any surface phrases it.  Read from inside the offer JWS
        payload (after signature verification): verifiable.  Read from
        the discovery document's claims or an attestation credential:
        attested.  Read from review data: reputational.  A value that
        appears in more than one place carries the class of the surface
        it was actually read from: reading an amenity from the discovery
        document never inherits the offer's signature, even when the same
        value also happens to appear inside a signed offer.  If a host
        asserts something outside the
        signed payload - in prose, marketing copy, or an unsigned field -
        a renderer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> treat it as attested at best,
        regardless of wording: language like "verified", "guaranteed", or
        "signed" attached to an unsigned value is a class violation, not
        a promotion.</t>
      </section>
    </section>

    <section anchor="security">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>Root of trust.  The root of trust is control of the host
      domain: the key set is whatever the host domain serves.  Rotation
      and revocation (<xref target="jwks"/>) protect the case where a
      signing key leaks while the domain remains under the operator's
      control.  They do not protect against compromise of the domain
      itself - an attacker who can serve the domain's <tt>jwks.json</tt>
      can publish their own keys, and no key-level mechanism can detect
      that.  Domain-level security (DNS, TLS, hosting) is out of scope
      for VRP and is the operator's responsibility.</t>
      <t>Key compromise.  Freshness does not bound a key compromise; the
      JWKS cache bound (<xref target="revocation"/>) is the revocation
      latency.  Immediate removal of a compromised key also invalidates
      the operator's own offers signed with it; this is intentional,
      since signatures from the operator and the attacker are
      indistinguishable under the same key.</t>
      <t>Enforcement honesty.  VRP cannot force a verifier to cache for
      a bounded time.  The cache bound is a requirement on conforming
      verifiers; there is no protocol backstop against a non-conforming
      verifier that caches a revoked key indefinitely.  The bound is a
      conformance requirement, not a guarantee the protocol can
      enforce.</t>
      <t>Booking-path integrity.  The constraints on
      <tt>direct_booking_url</tt> (<xref target="booking-url"/>) - host
      pinned to the signed <tt>canonical_domain</tt>, no third-party
      domains, shorteners, or redirectors, integrity solely from the
      enclosing JWS - exist to prevent a tampered or substituted offer
      from routing a guest's booking, and its payment, to an attacker.</t>
      <t>Amplification.  <xref target="refresh"/> asks verifiers to
      rate-limit or coalesce refresh-on-miss per domain, so that a stream
      of offers bearing unknown key identifiers cannot be used to drive
      traffic against a node's JWKS endpoint.</t>
      <t>What a valid signature proves.  A signature that verifies
      against the host domain's JWKS proves that a key the domain
      publishes signed exactly these terms: provenance and integrity of
      the offer.  Who holds the private key can be declared per node in
      <tt>operator.key_custody</tt>.  With <tt>self</tt>, the host holds
      it.  With <tt>platform</tt>, an operator holds and uses it on the
      host's behalf; the signature then proves that the domain's
      published key signed, not that the host itself held the key.  A
      verifier does not assume self-custody when <tt>key_custody</tt> is
      absent.</t>
      <t>Domain binding.  A valid signature proves which domain's key
      signed, not which domain the offer is about.  If the node at one
      domain signs an offer whose <tt>canonical_domain</tt> names
      another domain, the signature verifies against the signing node's
      JWKS; only the check that the offer names the domain it was
      fetched from (<xref target="safe-to-quote"/>) stops a verifier from
      presenting it as the other domain's offer.</t>
      <t>The stay asked for.  A genuine offer for other dates or another
      guest count verifies like any other offer from the node.  Only the
      comparison with what the verifier asked for
      (<xref target="safe-to-quote"/>) stops a verifier from quoting it
      for the wrong stay.</t>
      <t>Echoed request fields.  A node signs whatever it copies from
      the request.  If it copied free text, anyone could get a
      host-signed sentence of their own choosing by asking for it.
      <xref target="offer-payload"/> therefore limits what is copied to
      the stay and a language tag, and
      <xref target="safe-to-quote"/> forbids presenting either as the
      host's words.</t>
      <t>Offer lifetime.  A leaked key mints fresh offers whatever the
      lifetime, but an offer the node itself signed stays quotable after
      a price or availability change for at most its lifetime.
      <xref target="offer-payload"/> caps that at 900 seconds, and the
      check on <tt>generated_at</tt> (<xref target="freshness"/>) keeps a
      start time in the future from stretching it.</t>
      <t>Concentration under platform custody.  An operator that holds
      the signing keys of many nodes is one point of compromise for all
      of them.  Rotation and revocation work per node: removing a
      compromised key from one node's JWKS de-trusts it for that node,
      within the cache bound.  A key that several nodes publish is
      de-trusted only where it is removed.</t>
      <t>Host-owned domains.  Only a domain registered for the host can
      be a node (<xref target="host-owned-domain"/>).  A company that
      hands out names under its own domain, as the Public Suffix List's
      PRIVATE section records, cannot make those names VRP nodes, and
      neither can the operator of a brand or closed top-level domain.
      ICANN's gTLD list marks brand top-level domains (Specification 13)
      but not every closed one; <xref target="host-owned-domain"/>
      therefore names the closed top-level domains it stops beyond that
      list, and a closed top-level domain that is neither marked nor
      named is excluded by the rule's wording but not yet by a
      program.</t>
      <t>Fail-closed verification.  Whatever cannot be verified is
      unknown, never affirmed or negated
      (<xref target="fail-closed"/>, <xref target="three-state"/>), so a
      timeout, a malformed response or a failed signature check cannot
      be turned into a quote.</t>
      <t>Transport.  The discovery document is served over
      <tt>https</tt> only.  <tt>jwks_url</tt>,
      <tt>verified_stay_offer_endpoint</tt> and
      <tt>direct_booking_url</tt> are node URLs, so <tt>https</tt> on the
      node's own domain (<xref target="node-url"/>), and a verifier
      follows a redirect only to a node URL
      (<xref target="fetching"/>).</t>
      <t>Tamper evidence.  A node <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> record
      signed-artifact hashes and key-rotation events in a public
      append-only transparency log (in the style of
      <xref target="RFC6962"/>), giving a tamper-evident - not immutable
      - history useful for after-the-fact disputes about whether an offer
      was signed by a then-valid key.</t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="privacy">
      <name>Privacy Considerations</name>
      <t>The discovery document and the JWKS describe the site and its
      keys; they are public, machine-readable, site-wide metadata.  The
      discovery document <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> contain guest personal
      data or secrets.  The JWKS carries public keys only
      (<xref target="jwks"/>); this document states no separate rule for
      it.</t>
      <t>A verified stay offer echoes the requested dates and guest
      count.  Offers are short-lived by design (<tt>valid_until</tt>),
      and verification is unauthenticated: fetching the discovery
      document, the JWKS, or an offer requires no verifier identity, so
      nodes learn no more about the requesting user than any web server
      learns from an HTTP request.</t>
      <t>The optional offer reference identifier in
      <tt>direct_booking_url</tt> (<xref target="booking-url"/>) lets a
      node correlate a booking-page visit with the signed offer it
      issued.  It is not required for verification.  This document sets
      no limit on how long such correlation data is kept; that is the
      host's decision.</t>
      <t>The <tt>checkIn</tt>, <tt>checkOut</tt> and <tt>guests</tt>
      query parameters that <xref target="booking-url"/> recommends put
      the quoted dates and guest count into <tt>direct_booking_url</tt>,
      so they reach browser history and server logs wherever the URL is
      followed.</t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="iana">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document requests no action from IANA.  The
      <tt>vacation-rental.json</tt> well-known URI suffix is already
      registered in the "Well-Known URIs" registry
      <xref target="RFC8615"/>.  The entry, as the registry read on
      2026-11-13:</t>
      <dl newline="false" spacing="normal">
        <dt>URI suffix:</dt>
        <dd>vacation-rental.json</dd>
        <dt>Reference:</dt>
        <dd>https://vacationrentalprotocol.com/spec/well-known-uri-v0.1</dd>
        <dt>Status:</dt>
        <dd>provisional</dd>
        <dt>Change controller:</dt>
        <dd>Rouiada Abbas</dd>
        <dt>Date registered:</dt>
        <dd>2026-08-19</dd>
      </dl>
      <t><xref target="discovery"/> of this document describes the same
      resource as the registered reference.  The registration request is
      recorded at
      <eref target="https://github.com/protocol-registries/well-known-uris/issues/93"/>.</t>
      <t>Existing deployments additionally serve the same resource at
      the transition alias suffix
      <tt>vacation-rental-protocol.json</tt>, which is not registered;
      clients <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> use <tt>vacation-rental.json</tt>
      (<xref target="discovery-alias"/>).</t>
      <t>The suffix names a descriptive discovery resource for one
      vertical (a vacation-rental node's site-wide configuration), in the
      naming style of other descriptive well-known resources; it is
      deliberately not a claim on the generic term
      "vacation-rental".</t>
    </section>

  </middle>

  <back>
    <references>
      <name>References</name>
      <references>
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author initials="S." surname="Bradner" fullname="Scott Bradner"/>
            <date year="1997" month="March"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author initials="B." surname="Leiba" fullname="Barry Leiba"/>
            <date year="2017" month="May"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8615" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8615">
          <front>
            <title>Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)</title>
            <author initials="M." surname="Nottingham" fullname="Mark Nottingham"/>
            <date year="2019" month="May"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8615"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8615"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7515" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Signature (JWS)</title>
            <author initials="M." surname="Jones" fullname="Michael B. Jones"/>
            <author initials="J." surname="Bradley" fullname="John Bradley"/>
            <author initials="N." surname="Sakimura" fullname="Nat Sakimura"/>
            <date year="2015" month="May"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7515"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7515"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7517" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Key (JWK)</title>
            <author initials="M." surname="Jones" fullname="Michael B. Jones"/>
            <date year="2015" month="May"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7517"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7517"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8037" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8037">
          <front>
            <title>CFRG Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) and Signatures in JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)</title>
            <author initials="I." surname="Liusvaara" fullname="Ilari Liusvaara"/>
            <date year="2017" month="January"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8037"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8037"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8259" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259">
          <front>
            <title>The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format</title>
            <author initials="T." surname="Bray" fullname="Tim Bray" role="editor"/>
            <date year="2017" month="December"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="90"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8259"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8259"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5646" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5646">
          <front>
            <title>Tags for Identifying Languages</title>
            <author initials="A." surname="Phillips" role="editor"/>
            <author initials="M." surname="Davis" role="editor"/>
            <date year="2009" month="September"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="47"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5646"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC3339" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339">
          <front>
            <title>Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps</title>
            <author initials="G." surname="Klyne" fullname="Graham Klyne"/>
            <author initials="C." surname="Newman" fullname="Chris Newman"/>
            <date year="2002" month="July"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3339"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3339"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references>
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC6962" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6962">
          <front>
            <title>Certificate Transparency</title>
            <author initials="B." surname="Laurie" fullname="Ben Laurie"/>
            <author initials="A." surname="Langley" fullname="Adam Langley"/>
            <author initials="E." surname="Kasper" fullname="Emilia Kasper"/>
            <date year="2013" month="June"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6962"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6962"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9111" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9111">
          <front>
            <title>HTTP Caching</title>
            <author initials="R." surname="Fielding" fullname="Roy T. Fielding" role="editor"/>
            <author initials="M." surname="Nottingham" fullname="Mark Nottingham" role="editor"/>
            <author initials="J." surname="Reschke" fullname="Julian Reschke" role="editor"/>
            <date year="2022" month="June"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="98"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9111"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9111"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7942" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942">
          <front>
            <title>Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section</title>
            <author initials="Y." surname="Sheffer" fullname="Yaron Sheffer"/>
            <author initials="A." surname="Farrel" fullname="Adrian Farrel"/>
            <date year="2016" month="July"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="205"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7942"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7942"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="PSL" target="https://publicsuffix.org/list/">
          <front>
            <title>Public Suffix List</title>
            <author><organization>Mozilla Foundation</organization></author>
            <date year="2026"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ICANN-GTLDS" target="https://www.icann.org/resources/registries/gtlds/v2/gtlds.json">
          <front>
            <title>gTLD Registry Agreements (machine-readable list)</title>
            <author><organization>ICANN</organization></author>
            <date year="2026"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DID-WEB" target="https://w3c-ccg.github.io/did-method-web/">
          <front>
            <title>did:web Method Specification</title>
            <author>
              <organization>W3C Credentials Community Group</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2023"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="VRP-SPEC" target="https://vacationrentalprotocol.com">
          <front>
            <title>Vacation Rental Protocol - Specification v0.1 (public draft)</title>
            <author initials="R." surname="Abbas" fullname="Rouiada Abbas"/>
            <date year="2026"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>

    <section anchor="example-discovery">
      <name>Example Discovery Document</name>
      <sourcecode type="json">
{
  "protocol": "vacation-rental-protocol",
  "protocol_version": "0.1",
  "canonical_domain": "example-host.invalid",
  "node_id": "example-host.invalid",
  "jwks_url": "https://example-host.invalid/.well-known/jwks.json",
  "verified_stay_offer_endpoint":
    "https://example-host.invalid/api/verified-stay-offer",
  "capabilities": {
    "signed_verified_stay_offer": true,
    "live_availability": true,
    "exact_total_price": true,
    "direct_booking_url": true
  },
  "operator": {
    "name": "Example Host Platform",
    "role": "infrastructure_provider",
    "key_custody": "platform"
  }
}
</sourcecode>
    </section>

    <section anchor="example-jwks">
      <name>Example JWKS</name>
      <sourcecode type="json">
{
  "keys": [
    {
      "kty": "OKP",
      "crv": "Ed25519",
      "kid": "example-host.invalid-2026-01-01-01",
      "use": "sig",
      "alg": "EdDSA",
      "key_ops": ["verify"],
      "x": "11qYAYLef_SPCb5r0x4n1uDZuQYgD4GZB8F6kS1v9KQ"
    }
  ]
}
</sourcecode>
      <t>Nodes may additionally publish the same verification keys via
      <tt>did:web</tt> <xref target="DID-WEB"/>; the JWKS remains the
      revocation authority for offer verification.</t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="impl-status" removeInRFC="true">
      <name>Implementation Status</name>
      <t>This section records the status of known implementations of the
      protocol defined by this specification, per
      <xref target="RFC7942"/>.</t>
      <t>At the time of writing (November 2026), the protocol repository
      <xref target="VRP-SPEC"/> lists a reference implementation (a
      verifier, and a production node that serves the discovery document
      at the well-known URI, the Ed25519 JWKS, and signed verified stay
      offers with direct booking URLs); a signing node developed and
      operated by a party with no affiliation to the reference
      implementer, whose operator has been one of the maintainers of the
      protocol repository since October 2026; and a verifier developed by
      a party unrelated to the reference implementer, which checks the
      offer signature against the published key and the offer's expiry
      time.  The repository also keeps a draft implementation report,
      prepared for the decision on a later version of the protocol and
      measured against requirements of VRP v0.1.  For the requirements
      assessed, the report records implementation results with dated
      measurements or source references, and identifies gaps in
      independent implementation.  Machine-readable JSON Schemas for the
      discovery document,
      JWKS, and signed offer, together with executable conformance
      vectors (including negative cases: tampered signature, expired
      window, malformed attestations), are published in the same
      repository.  Specification text is dedicated to the public domain
      (CC0 1.0); reference code and conformance vectors are
      Apache-2.0.</t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="ack" numbered="false">
      <name>Acknowledgements</name>
      <t>Thanks to the developers of the independent signing node and of
      the independent verifier listed in the protocol repository.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
</rfc>
