| Internet-Draft | MOQ Subscriber Advantage | November 2026 |
| Bisht | Expires 19 May 2027 | [Page] |
This document describes subscriber behavior that may produce sustained advantages in service outcomes or disproportionate resource consumption at shared Media over QUIC (MoQ) relays. AI-assisted optimization is a motivating scenario; observations alone cannot establish whether AI was used or caused a disparity. The document outlines contextual measurement, privacy safeguards, and a proposed extension for authorization-bound resource budgets with explicit accounting and recovery behavior. It builds on existing MoQ authorization and relay denial-of-service work. This informational document defines no new MoQ messages, token claims, registries, or standardized detection algorithm.¶
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
Discussion of this document takes place on the Media Over QUIC Working Group mailing list (moq@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/moq/.¶
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/altanai/draft-altanai-moq-ai-subscriber-advantage.¶
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Media over QUIC Transport (MoQT) [MoQTransport] supports delivery of tracks through relays that serve multiple subscribers. Endpoints can optimize track selection, request timing, subscription filters, and relative priority. These choices may be made by an AI model, a conventional adaptive algorithm, or fixed application rules.¶
Operators may wish to identify sustained differences in resource use or service outcomes among comparable subscribers. A disparity can be useful for capacity planning, service assurance, or a review of relay policy. It is not by itself evidence of misconduct, an unfair policy, or use of AI. Higher quality can be a legitimate result of a better path, authorized service treatment, or more efficient application behavior.¶
This document develops two related questions: how to observe such patterns while limiting subscriber data exposure, and how a future resource-budget profile could associate explicit usage limits with existing authorization mechanisms. The latter extends the original detection scope and is presented as design considerations for further work, rather than a completed token or enforcement specification.¶
A subscriber endpoint can hold multiple subscriptions. A subscription is a relationship for receiving one track; it is distinct from a MoQT session, which can carry multiple subscriptions and fetches. Separate subscriber endpoints commonly use separate sessions. The object and session model is defined by [MoQTransport].¶
For this document, a comparison cohort is a group of observations matched for content, service policy, observation interval, and relevant path conditions. A candidate advantage is a sustained disparity in resource use or delivery outcomes within such a cohort. The designation identifies a measurement for review and does not establish its cause.¶
A resource budget is a proposed policy describing an allowed amount, rate, or concurrency of a defined resource. An accounting domain is the set of sessions and relay instances over which that budget applies. An accounting reference identifies the shared usage state within that domain and validity period; it need not expose an account identity to an analytics system.¶
In scope are observable signals, interpretation of those signals, privacy-conscious processing, resource-budget design considerations, and relationships to existing MoQ and SIP mechanisms. Out of scope are AI-versus-human attestation, universal definitions of fairness, monetary penalties, standardized machine-learning algorithms or thresholds, and new token encodings or protocol error codes. The illustrative policies below are not interoperability requirements.¶
Shared relay resources include CPU, subscription state, buffer memory, cache capacity, backend services, and upstream and downstream bandwidth. The incremental cost of a request depends on the implementation and whether suitable upstream subscriptions or cached objects already exist. Subscription aggregation can reduce upstream work. Substantial media delivery following a small request is normal protocol operation and is not sufficient evidence of abuse or harmful amplification.¶
Candidate concerns include:¶
Repeated creation and cancellation of subscriptions, or frequent updates, causing processing and state-management costs.¶
Request patterns that increase fetch work, cache turnover, or egress, subject to the relay's caching and aggregation behavior.¶
Buffer accumulation from slow consumption or join-time delivery.¶
A session consuming a disproportionate share of a constrained relay resource under the operator's allocation policy.¶
These concerns overlap with the threat analysis and operational guidance in [RelayDoS]. This document emphasizes contextual comparison and privacy considerations, together with an exploratory connection between usage measurement and explicit resource authorization.¶
Subscriber priority influences transmission ordering among subscriptions and fetch responses within the same MoQT session. A subscriber requesting priority 0 does not thereby acquire a protocol-defined rank above a subscriber in another session. Relays are advised not to copy downstream subscriber priorities directly to upstream subscriptions; upstream priorities depend on relay policy [MoQTransport].¶
Frequent priority updates may consume parsing and scheduling resources. Effects on other subscribers depend on shared-resource contention and implementation policy. A priority value, a priority change, or an improved delivery outcome alone does not demonstrate an unfair advantage. A subscriber priority adjustment also does not implement a relay-wide resource restriction across independent sessions.¶
The following signals are candidates rather than mandatory metrics. They are available only where a deployment can measure or attribute them. Content or timing metadata can itself be sensitive even when media payloads remain encrypted.¶
| Signal | Interpretation and context |
|---|---|
| Subscription lifecycle activity | Count creations, cancellations, and updates over a defined interval; distinguish useful adaptation, retries, and pathological churn. |
| Track and filter changes | Compare changes relative to available content and group boundaries without retaining unnecessary viewing histories. |
| Priority updates | Measure update frequency and work; priority values are relative within a session. |
| FETCH and SUBSCRIBE mix | Account for historical delivery, repair, and duplicate requests; define what the byte count includes. |
| Resource consumption | Measure attributable egress, buffered bytes, or control-processing work; identify shared costs that cannot be assigned to one subscriber. |
| Delivery outcomes | Measure request-to-first-object or relay-observed delivery delay using defined endpoints and clocks; do not equate these with playback quality. |
| Cache and upstream effects | Use available hit, miss, eviction, and upstream-work counters while accounting for sharing among subscribers. |
[MoQMetrics] provides related measurement work. This document does not redefine its metrics or assume that every candidate signal is already standardized.¶
Choose a cohort and a measurement interval before interpreting a disparity. Relevant context includes track variant and bitrate, subscription duration, publisher timing, authorized service class, cache state, path latency, congestion, and the relay's allocation policy. Normalize measurements by active time or useful delivered content where appropriate, and state the limits of attribution and sampling.¶
Persistence over several intervals can distinguish a sustained pattern from a short transition, but does not demonstrate causality. An analyzer should be able to return an inconclusive result when the cohort is too small or required context is missing. Controlled experiments with known client implementations can study AI-assisted behavior; relay telemetry alone cannot reliably label arbitrary endpoints as AI or non-AI.¶
A possible deployment separates forwarding, budget accounting, and privacy-limited analysis. These are logical components and may be co-located. Existing token schemes provide the authorization foundation; resource-budget interpretation and accounting require further design.¶
Grant issuer -- authorization --> Subscriber
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token + request
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v
Publisher ---- media objects ---> Relay
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resource-use measurements
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v
Budget ledger
/ \
limited signals limit decision
/ \
Privacy guard Relay policy
| response
v
Authorized review
¶
The issuer grants permissions. The relay validates the presented authorization and maintains or consults usage state. The analytics path receives the minimum information needed for comparison and review, subject to the privacy process below. A comparison flag and a verified budget violation are separate inputs to operator decisions.¶
The following deployment safeguards elaborate aggregation and minimal retention. They are design guidance and do not establish a formal anonymity guarantee. General privacy considerations are discussed in [RFC6973]. Related AI-preference binding work [AIPrefRealtime] can inform treatment of expressed processing preferences; a preference signal does not itself anonymize data or authorize unrelated use.¶
Define purpose and permitted processing. Identify the measurement purpose, permitted fields, applicable preferences, and authorized recipients. Relay visibility of a field does not establish permission to retain or disclose it for every analytics purpose.¶
Minimize collection. Prefer counters and necessary control metadata. Avoid media-payload inspection, direct account identifiers in analytics, and AI-versus-human labels inferred from traffic.¶
Scope pseudonyms. Use short-lived identifiers specific to an analysis domain and interval. If a re-identification mapping is needed, keep it separately protected. A linkable token is pseudonymous, not anonymous, even if it does not contain a subscriber's name.¶
Aggregate with context. Prefer interval and cohort statistics. Coarsen or suppress small groups or detailed combinations that could reveal an individual. Minimum cohort sizes and any stronger privacy guarantees need to be defined by the deployment or a future profile.¶
Limit and audit review. Report the interval, cohort size, disparity, and measurement caveats. Restrict detailed inspection to authorized reviewers and record that access. A comparison flag alone does not establish a policy violation or justify automatic punishment.¶
Expire detailed records. Define retention periods for events, pseudonym mappings, usage state, and review records according to their respective purposes. Delete or aggregate records when those purposes end. A future profile needs explicit retention and deletion behavior.¶
Budget accounting may require continuity across sessions or token renewals. That continuity should remain within the stated accounting domain and budget period. Analytics pseudonym rotation does not reset usage counters. Conversely, maintaining a budget does not justify a permanent identifier shared across unrelated operators. Privacy Pass work [PrivacyPass] is relevant to privacy-conscious authorization; maintaining shared quotas and preventing repeated issuance from resetting usage require an explicit design under the chosen token scheme.¶
All values in this section are illustrative. They are neither measured results nor standardized thresholds.¶
Consider seven subscriptions to the same live track, active for ten minutes, under the same service policy and similar measured path conditions. Suppose subscriber A has 88 MB/min of relay egress compared with a peer median of 37 MB/min, and a median relay-observed delivery delay of 104 ms compared with 181 ms. The egress counter includes repeat and historical delivery as well as live objects; it does not count unique content alone.¶
An analyzer could report the sustained difference for review. It would still need to examine fetches, duplicate delivery, caching, publisher behavior, and measurement quality. Higher egress and lower delay do not prove that A caused another subscriber's delay, used AI, or exceeded an authorized budget. An explicit policy violation requires separate evidence against that policy.¶
MoQ transport and metrics: [MoQTransport] supplies the object, subscription, priority, and authorization framework. [MoQMetrics] provides related measurement work. This document does not replace transport flow control or congestion control [RFC9000].¶
MoQ relay DoS: [RelayDoS] already discusses cost tracking, per-client or per-identity limits, buffering, and resource isolation. The comparative measurement and privacy guidance here complements that work. Authorization and budget semantics should be developed in coordination with the relevant MoQ authorization work.¶
Common Access Tokens and Privacy Pass: [C4M] and [PrivacyPass] provide existing authorization approaches. The resource-budget design needs further comparison with their capabilities, including the underlying Common Access Token specification. Token-based permission alone is not claimed as a new contribution.¶
SIP overload and authorized priority: [RFC6357], [RFC7339], and [RFC7415] address SIP signaling overload; [RFC6357] discusses capacity allocation among upstream neighbors. [RFC4412] permits policy-authorized resource priority. These are useful precedents but operate at different scopes from per-subscriber MoQ relay analysis.¶
RTP congestion control: [RFC8836] and [RFC8888] concern media congestion-control requirements and feedback. They do not themselves define the cohort comparison or authorization-bound relay budget considered here.¶
SIP deployments may face related questions around shared call-control or media resources. A SIP proxy and a media relay do not necessarily observe the same events. A SIP-specific design would require a separate measurement model and is not specified by this document.¶
Behavioral metadata can expose viewing patterns, correlate sessions, and support identity inference. Pseudonyms and aggregates do not eliminate those risks. Cohort size, granularity, retention, recipient access, and correlation across purposes all affect exposure. The privacy process above describes proposed safeguards, not a proof of anonymity.¶
A malicious client could distribute requests across sessions or tokens to avoid isolated limits. A malicious or faulty accounting component could overstate consumption and deny legitimate service. Shared ledgers and revalidation endpoints can themselves become overload targets. Budget enforcement therefore needs explicit trust boundaries, protected accounting state, bounded processing, recovery behavior, and auditable operator decisions. Local operator controls may still be needed during accounting failures or legitimate flash crowds.¶
An advantage signal is not an authorization credential and does not establish AI use or intent. A service-class claim does not reserve physical capacity unless the deployment separately provides such a service. This document does not change MoQT or QUIC security properties, and its examples do not authorize disclosure of subscriber identity or cross-operator reputation records.¶
This document has no IANA actions.¶