Internet-Draft MIMI Provider Authentication November 2026
Atwood Expires 19 May 2027 [Page]
Workgroup:
More Instant Messaging Interoperability
Internet-Draft:
draft-atwood-mimi-provider-auth-00
Published:
Intended Status:
Standards Track
Expires:
Author:
M. Atwood
Review Commit, LLC

Provider Authentication for More Instant Messaging Interoperability (MIMI)

Abstract

The MIMI protocol requires each provider to authenticate the provider that sends it a request. It specifies mutually authenticated TLS for this, but not where the client certificates come from or which trust anchors check them. The public Web PKI has stopped issuing such certificates. This document defines how MIMI providers authenticate each other without it. The mechanism every provider implements is a key published in DNS under the provider's domain, used to sign each request with HTTP Message Signatures. DANE client certificates, client certificates from configured PKIX trust anchors, and locally configured trust lists are defined as additional mechanisms that a provider can accept by local policy.

About This Document

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-atwood-mimi-provider-auth/.

Discussion of this document takes place on the More Instant Messaging Interoperability Working Group mailing list (mailto:mimi@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/mimi/. Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/mimi/.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/MarkAtwood/ietf-mimi-provider-auth.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 19 May 2027.

▲

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

In the MIMI protocol [I-D.ietf-mimi-protocol], providers send each other HTTPS requests: to fetch key material, to submit messages to a room's hub, and for the hub to fan messages out to the other providers in the room. Every one of those requests is acted on because of who sent it. A hub accepts a Commit because it came from a provider whose users are in the room. A follower accepts a notification because it came from the room's hub. If the source of a request is not authenticated, any host on the Internet can claim to be any provider.

Section 4.1 of [I-D.ietf-mimi-protocol] says the TLS connection "MUST be mutually authenticated" and that the certificates "MUST authenticate the source and target provider domains". It does not say who issues the source provider's client certificate or which trust anchors the target uses to check it. Section 3 explains why the answer cannot be "the public Web PKI". As a result, every deployment today either runs a private CA and asks each peer to install it, or does not authenticate peers at all. Neither is open federation, and neither interoperates without out-of-band setup that the protocol does not describe.

This document fills that gap. It defines:

Section 12 proposes replacement text for Section 4.1 of [I-D.ietf-mimi-protocol].

2. Conventions and Definitions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

This document uses the terms "provider", "hub" and "follower" as defined in [I-D.ietf-mimi-protocol].

Source provider:

The provider that sends a MIMI protocol request.

Target provider:

The provider that receives it.

Source domain:

The domain name of the source provider, as named in the request's From header field (Section 4.1 of [I-D.ietf-mimi-protocol]).

Authenticated domain:

The domain name that a mechanism in this document proves the request came from.

3. The Web PKI Has Left the Federation

The obvious source of a provider's client certificate used to be the public CA that issues its server certificate. For years those CAs added the id-kp-clientAuth extended key usage to server certificates as a matter of course, and servers presented them as client certificates to their peers. SMTP with mutual TLS, XMPP server-to-server federation, and a long list of HTTP APIs relied on this. It was never a promise. It was a side effect, and it has now been removed.

The Chrome Root Program decides which CAs Chrome trusts, and so, in practice, which CAs can sell a server certificate. Version 1.8 of its policy [CRP] states the goal plainly: "to align all PKI hierarchies included in the Chrome Root Store on the principle of serving only TLS server authentication use cases". It then sets dates:

The enforcement is worth reading twice. Chrome does not forbid a CA from issuing client certificates. It only stops trusting the CA's server certificates if it does. Since server certificates are the CA's business, that is not a choice. Let's Encrypt removed the client-authentication EKU from its default profile on 11 February 2026 and retired its last profile offering it on 8 July 2026 [LE-CLIENTAUTH]. The other public CAs are following the same calendar.

None of this was aimed at MIMI, or at SMTP, or at XMPP. Those protocols were not consulted so much as noticed, the way a road crew notices whatever happens to be parked on the road. The policy is coherent from the point of view of a browser: a root store with exactly one purpose is easier to run, and every change to it now breaks only browsers. It is not a PKI that any other protocol should build on, and its operator has said so in writing.

So a MIMI provider cannot obtain a publicly trusted client certificate. What remains is a private CA, installed by hand at every peer, which turns an open federation into a set of bilateral agreements. This document takes the other road. A provider already proves control of its domain to get a server certificate, and a domain-validated certificate is issued on the strength of DNS. The provider can publish a key in that same DNS and leave the CA out of the client side entirely.

4. Overview

The source provider always sends its domain in the From header field (Section 4.1 of [I-D.ietf-mimi-protocol]). The target provider runs the mechanisms it accepts, in an order it chooses. A mechanism either produces an authenticated domain or fails. The request is authenticated if some mechanism's authenticated domain equals the source domain.

Table 1: Provider authentication mechanisms
Mechanism Credential Where the trust comes from DNSSEC Section
DNS keys RFC 9421 request signature DNS, under the source domain Optional Section 5
DANE TLS client certificate TLSA record, under the source domain Required Section 6
PKIX TLS client certificate Trust anchors the receiver configures No Section 7
Trust lists Signature or client certificate Per-peer configuration No Section 8
Other Agreed between providers Agreed between providers - Section 9

Every provider MUST implement both signing and verification for the DNS key mechanism. This is the only requirement that exists for interoperability: without one mechanism that every provider implements, two providers that each conform could have no mechanism in common. Implementing it does not oblige a provider to accept it. Which mechanisms a provider accepts, from which peers, is local policy (Section 10).

Responses are not signed. The source provider authenticates the target provider through the TLS server certificate, as with any HTTPS request.

5. DNS-Published Keys with HTTP Message Signatures

5.1. Key Records

A provider publishes each signing key as a DNS TXT record [RFC1035] at the owner name:

<selector>._mimi.<provider-domain>

The selector is a single DNS label chosen by the provider. It MUST NOT begin with an underscore. A provider MAY publish several keys under different selectors, for rotation or for separate servers.

The record data is a list of tag-value pairs. If the record consists of several character-strings, they are concatenated without separators before parsing, as in DKIM [RFC6376]. The syntax, in ABNF [RFC5234]:

key-record = %s"v=MIMI1" *( *WSP ";" *WSP tag ) *WSP [";"] *WSP
tag        = tag-name *WSP "=" *WSP tag-value
tag-name   = ALPHA *( ALPHA / DIGIT / "_" )
tag-value  = *( %x21-3A / %x3C-7E )   ; any VCHAR except ";"
WSP        = SP / HTAB

The version tag v=MIMI1 MUST come first. A record that does not begin with it is not a MIMI key record and is ignored. This specification defines two further tags:

k:

The key type. This document defines ed25519, an Ed25519 public key [RFC8032]. Verifiers MUST support ed25519. Other key types MAY be defined later.

p:

The public key, in base64 with padding. For ed25519 it is the 32-byte public key. An empty value means the key under this selector has been revoked.

Verifiers MUST ignore tags they do not recognize, so that later specifications can add tags.

An example, using the Ed25519 test key from Appendix B.1.4 of [RFC9421]:

s1._mimi.a.example. 3600 IN TXT (
    "v=MIMI1; k=ed25519; "
    "p=JrQLj5P/89iXES9+vFgrIy29clF9CC/oPPsw3c5D0bs=" )

5.2. Signing Requests

The source provider signs each MIMI protocol request with HTTP Message Signatures [RFC9421]. The signature:

  • MUST cover the derived components @method and @target-uri, and the from header field. Covering from binds the signature to the source domain; without it, a valid signature from one provider could be attached to a request that claims to come from another.

  • MUST cover the content-digest field [RFC9530] if the request has content. The Content-Digest field SHOULD use sha-256.

  • MUST include the created parameter and the keyid parameter, whose value is the selector of the key that made the signature.

  • SHOULD include the tag parameter with the value mimi, so that a verifier can find the MIMI signature on a request that carries others.

  • MAY cover other components and include other parameters, such as expires or nonce.

The signer MAY include the alg parameter. If present, it MUST match the key type in the key record (ed25519 for k=ed25519).

The @target-uri is the URL the source provider requests, taken from the target provider's directory (Section 5.1 of [I-D.ietf-mimi-protocol]).

Appendix A shows a complete signed request.

5.3. Verifying Requests

To verify a request, the target provider:

  1. Takes the source domain from the From header field.

  2. Selects a signature from the Signature-Input field whose tag parameter is mimi, or, if there is none, any signature that covers the components listed in Section 5.2. A verifier MAY limit how many signatures it tries.

  3. Checks that the signature covers the components required by Section 5.2 and has created and keyid parameters.

  4. Checks created. Verifiers SHOULD reject a signature created more than 300 seconds in the past or more than 60 seconds in the future. They MAY configure other limits. If expires is present and has passed, the signature MUST be rejected.

  5. Queries TXT records at <keyid>._mimi.<source-domain>, and uses the first record that is a MIMI key record (Section 5.1). If there is none, or its p tag is empty, verification fails.

  6. If the request has content, checks that Content-Digest matches it [RFC9530].

  7. Verifies the signature over the signature base [RFC9421] with the public key.

If all steps succeed, the authenticated domain is the source domain.

A verifier SHOULD use a DNSSEC-validating resolver [RFC4033] when one is available. If validation of the key record's response is "bogus", verification fails. A verifier MAY, by local policy, require the response to be "secure".

A verifier MAY cache key records for their DNS TTL. It SHOULD NOT cache a negative or failed lookup for longer than the negative-caching TTL, so that a newly published key works promptly.

5.4. Key Rotation and Revocation

To rotate keys, a provider publishes the new key under a new selector, waits at least the TTL of the record, starts signing with the new selector, and then removes the old record. To revoke a key at once, it replaces the old record's p value with an empty value; this takes effect as caches expire. A short TTL on key records shortens both delays.

6. DANE Client Certificates

A provider that prefers TLS-layer authentication MAY present a client certificate that is authenticated by a DANE TLSA record, as specified in [I-D.ietf-dance-client-auth]. It uses Format 1 of that specification, with the service label _mimi:

_mimi._client.<provider-domain>

The TLSA record data and its matching rules are as in [RFC6698] and [RFC7671]. The source domain's zone MUST be DNSSEC-signed, and the target provider MUST treat the TLSA records as usable only if their validation status is "secure"; that is what DANE's security rests on.

The target provider requests a client certificate in the TLS handshake. It may not know the source domain until it reads the From header field of the first request. It then looks up the TLSA records for that domain and checks the client certificate against them. If they match, the authenticated domain is the source domain. The source provider MAY send the DANE Client Identity TLS extension defined in [I-D.ietf-dance-client-auth] so that the target can fetch the records during the handshake.

7. PKIX Client Certificates from Configured Trust Anchors

Some providers operate where a PKIX hierarchy that still issues client certificates is required or already deployed: government PKIs, sector and enterprise PKIs, and federation operators that run a CA for their members. Such a provider MAY present a client certificate from that hierarchy, which is the mechanism Section 4.1 of [I-D.ietf-mimi-protocol] describes today.

The certificate MUST contain a subjectAltName dNSName that is the provider domain. If it contains an extended key usage extension, that extension MUST include id-kp-clientAuth.

The target provider validates the certificate path per [RFC5280] against trust anchors it configures for this purpose, applying whatever certificate policy constraints its deployment requires. It matches the provider domain against the certificate as a DNS-ID per [RFC9525]; it does not use the subject common name. If both succeed, the authenticated domain is the matched DNS name.

A target provider SHOULD NOT use a public Web PKI root store, such as the one its operating system or TLS library ships for server authentication, as the trust anchors for this mechanism. The CAs in those stores no longer issue client certificates (Section 3), and the ones that still might are the ones the store is about to drop.

8. Trust Lists

A target provider MAY configure, per peer domain, the keys or certificates it accepts from that peer:

The authenticated domain is the peer domain the entry is configured for. This is how most deployments authenticate peers today, and it remains useful for private federations and testing. It requires out-of-band setup for every peer, so a provider that relies only on it cannot reach providers it has not been configured for.

9. Other Mechanisms

Providers MAY authenticate each other with other mechanisms that they have agreed on, whether bilaterally, within a federation, or by following another specification. This document does not describe such mechanisms and does not need to. A provider that accepts one treats it like any mechanism in this document: it produces an authenticated domain, and the rules in Section 10 apply to it, including that the authenticated domain equal the source domain.

Using another mechanism with some peers does not change the requirement in Section 4 to implement the DNS key mechanism, which is how a provider reaches peers it has agreed nothing with.

10. Local Policy

Each target provider decides which mechanisms it accepts, in which order, and whether the choice differs per peer. Some examples:

A target provider MAY accept a request without authentication during a transition, for example to log which peers would fail before it starts refusing them. This is outside this specification, and such a provider gets none of the protection in Section 13.

Whatever mechanism is used, the authenticated domain MUST equal the source domain. This matters especially for the TLS-layer mechanisms: an HTTP connection authenticated with one provider's client certificate MUST NOT be used to authenticate a request whose From header field names another provider. Without this check, a provider with any valid credential could impersonate any other.

Authentication says only which provider sent the request. Whether that provider is allowed to make it, for example whether a notification really comes from the room's hub, is decided by [I-D.ietf-mimi-protocol] and by the room's policy.

11. Errors

If no accepted mechanism authenticates the source domain, the target provider answers with status 403 (Forbidden) [RFC9110]. It MAY include an Accept-Signature field (Section 5.1 of [RFC9421]) describing the signature it requires, and MAY include a problem details body [RFC9457] saying why authentication failed.

Status 401 (Unauthorized) is not used, because [RFC9110] requires a 401 response to carry a WWW-Authenticate challenge, and none of these mechanisms is an HTTP authentication scheme.

A target provider SHOULD NOT say in its response which mechanisms it tried or why each one failed beyond what the source provider needs to fix its configuration.

12. Replacement Text for the MIMI Protocol

This section proposes replacing the last paragraph of Section 4.1 of [I-D.ietf-mimi-protocol] ("The TLS connection underlying the HTTPS connection MUST be mutually authenticated...") with:

It also replaces the reference to [RFC6125], which [RFC9525] obsoletes. The second sentence of the paragraph in Section 9 of [I-D.ietf-mimi-protocol] that relies on "mutually-authenticated TLS" would change to refer to provider authentication generally.

13. Security Considerations

13.1. DNS as the Root of Trust

Without DNSSEC, the DNS key mechanism is as strong as the target provider's view of DNS for the source domain. An attacker who can forge DNS responses to the target, or who controls the source domain's delegation, can substitute a key. This is the same exposure DKIM has. It is also the exposure domain-validated certificates have: a CA validates domain control through DNS or through HTTP to an address DNS gave it. An attacker who controls DNS for a domain can get a public server certificate for it. The DNS key mechanism removes the CA from the client side; it does not remove a protection that the Web PKI provided.

With DNSSEC, the key is authenticated by the zone's signature, and an off-path attacker cannot forge it. Deployments that need that assurance can require it (Section 5.3) or use DANE (Section 6).

13.2. Replay

A signature is valid for any copy of the request within the created window. An attacker who records a signed request can replay it in that window, to the same target, provided the attacker can see the request at all; it is sent over TLS. Signers MAY include a nonce parameter and verifiers MAY track nonces for the window. Most MIMI requests are either idempotent or carry MLS messages that the hub will reject the second time, which limits the damage.

13.3. Key Compromise

A provider whose signing key is compromised revokes it as described in Section 5.4. Until caches expire, the attacker can sign requests as the provider. The record's TTL bounds that time.

13.4. Downgrade Between Mechanisms

An attacker cannot downgrade a target provider from a mechanism it requires to one it does not accept, since the target decides alone. A target that accepts several mechanisms is as strong as the weakest of them for any peer it accepts them from.

13.5. Same-Connection Impersonation

See the requirement in Section 10 that the authenticated domain equal the source domain on every request, including requests on a connection whose client certificate was already accepted.

14. Privacy Considerations

Key lookups tell the target provider's DNS resolver, and anyone who can observe its queries, which source providers the target provider hears from. This is the same information the source provider's TLS connection already reveals to a network observer, and it is about providers, not users. Caching reduces it.

15. IANA Considerations

15.1. Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names

IANA is requested to add the following entry to the "Underscored and Globally Scoped DNS Node Names" registry [RFC8552]:

Table 2: Underscored node name
RR Type _NODE NAME Reference
TXT _mimi RFC XXXX

15.2. Service Name

IANA is requested to register the following in the "Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry" [RFC6335], for the DANE client identity owner name in Section 6:

Service Name:

mimi

Transport Protocol:

tcp

Assignee:

IESG

Contact:

IETF Chair

Description:

More Instant Messaging Interoperability (MIMI) protocol

Reference:

RFC XXXX

Port Number:

none

16. References

16.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-dance-client-auth]
Huque, S. and V. Dukhovni, "TLS Client Authentication via DANE TLSA records", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-dance-client-auth-17, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dance-client-auth-17>.
[I-D.ietf-mimi-protocol]
Barnes, R., Hodgson, M., Kohbrok, K., Mahy, R., Ralston, T., and R. Robert, "More Instant Messaging Interoperability (MIMI) using HTTPS and MLS", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-mimi-protocol-07, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-mimi-protocol-07>.
[RFC1035]
Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1035>.
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC4033]
Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4033>.
[RFC5234]
Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5234>.
[RFC5280]
Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.
[RFC6698]
Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6698>.
[RFC7671]
Dukhovni, V. and W. Hardaker, "The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Protocol: Updates and Operational Guidance", RFC 7671, DOI 10.17487/RFC7671, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7671>.
[RFC8032]
Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032, DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8032>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8552]
Crocker, D., "Scoped Interpretation of DNS Resource Records through "Underscored" Naming of Attribute Leaves", BCP 222, RFC 8552, DOI 10.17487/RFC8552, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8552>.
[RFC9110]
Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110, DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110>.
[RFC9421]
Backman, A., Ed., Richer, J., Ed., and M. Sporny, "HTTP Message Signatures", RFC 9421, DOI 10.17487/RFC9421, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9421>.
[RFC9525]
Saint-Andre, P. and R. Salz, "Service Identity in TLS", RFC 9525, DOI 10.17487/RFC9525, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9525>.
[RFC9530]
Polli, R. and L. Pardue, "Digest Fields", RFC 9530, DOI 10.17487/RFC9530, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9530>.

16.2. Informative References

[CRP]
Google, "Chrome Root Program Policy, Version 1.8", , <https://googlechrome.github.io/chromerootprogram/crp/policy>.
[LE-CLIENTAUTH]
Let's Encrypt, "Ending TLS Client Authentication Certificate Support in 2026", , <https://letsencrypt.org/2025/05/14/ending-tls-client-authentication/>.
[RFC6125]
Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6125>.
[RFC6335]
Cotton, M., Eggert, L., Touch, J., Westerlund, M., and S. Cheshire, "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry", BCP 165, RFC 6335, DOI 10.17487/RFC6335, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6335>.
[RFC6376]
Crocker, D., Ed., Hansen, T., Ed., and M. Kucherawy, Ed., "DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures", STD 76, RFC 6376, DOI 10.17487/RFC6376, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6376>.
[RFC7942]
Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205, RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7942>.
[RFC8792]
Watsen, K., Auerswald, E., Farrel, A., and Q. Wu, "Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and RFCs", RFC 8792, DOI 10.17487/RFC8792, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8792>.
[RFC9457]
Nottingham, M., Wilde, E., and S. Dalal, "Problem Details for HTTP APIs", RFC 9457, DOI 10.17487/RFC9457, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9457>.

Appendix A. Example Signed Request

The source provider a.example sends a notification to b.example. The content (example MIMI notify body, shown as text for brevity) stands in for a real MIMI message. The key is the one shown in Section 5.1, whose private part is the Ed25519 test key from Appendix B.1.4 of [RFC9421].

NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

POST /v1/notify/a.example/r/clubhouse HTTP/1.1
Host: b.example
From: mimi@a.example
Content-Type: application/mimi-protocol
Content-Digest: \
  sha-256=:ltvFi/ijqMH79/ThrwZ/JykItjIYFA06v8rfqBdj7dY=:
Signature-Input: mimi=("@method" "@target-uri" "content-digest" \
  "from");created=1794700800;keyid="s1";tag="mimi"
Signature: mimi=:OBXnNmTPY+Gcxbn+BKcfqCpK7GrkCGO+Ab0/PS956byMzzcArSV\
  EeJWA95WiYjfLJ9vMsEaCRab3geIFr5FpCw==:

example MIMI notify body

The signature base is:

NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792

"@method": POST
"@target-uri": https://b.example/v1/notify/a.example/r/clubhouse
"content-digest": sha-256=:ltvFi/ijqMH79/ThrwZ/JykItjIYFA06v8rfqBdj7dY=:
"from": mimi@a.example
"@signature-params": ("@method" "@target-uri" "content-digest" "from")\
  ;created=1794700800;keyid="s1";tag="mimi"

The target provider b.example reads a.example from From, looks up s1._mimi.a.example, and verifies the Ed25519 signature over this base. Ed25519 signatures are deterministic, so an implementation can check its signer against these bytes.

Appendix B. Open Issues

Appendix C. Implementation Status

(Boilerplate as per Section 2.1 of [RFC7942]:)

This section records the status of known implementations of the protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942]. The description of implementations in this section is intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may exist.

According to [RFC7942], "this will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature. It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as they see fit".

mimid (Review Commit, LLC): an open-source MIMI provider. It implements RFC 9421 signing and verification with the profile in Section 5.2, with keys from trust lists (Section 8). The DNS key mechanism, PKIX and DANE client certificates are being implemented. It signs every outbound request and can either refuse or log unauthenticated inbound requests.

Author's Address

Mark Atwood
Review Commit, LLC
Seattle, WA
United States of America