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<rfc ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-atwood-mls-didwebvh-credential-00" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true">
  <front>
    <title abbrev="MLS did:webvh Credential">User-Controlled Device Authorization for MLS using did:webvh Credentials</title>

    <author fullname="Mark Atwood">
      <organization>Review Commit, LLC</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <city>Seattle</city>
          <region>WA</region>
          <country>US</country>
        </postal>
        <email>mark@reviewcommit.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <date year="2026" month="November" day="14"/>

    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>Messaging Layer Security</workgroup>
    <keyword>MLS</keyword> <keyword>MIMI</keyword> <keyword>credential</keyword> <keyword>DID</keyword> <keyword>did:webvh</keyword>

    <abstract>


<?line 86?>

<t>In Messaging Layer Security (MLS), whoever operates the Authentication
Service (AS) decides which devices belong to a user. When providers
federate MLS groups, as the More Instant Messaging Interoperability
(MIMI) work does, every member of a group must accept devices vouched for
by every other member's provider. Any one provider can therefore add a
device under one of its users' names to any group that user is in.
Other members cannot prevent this; at best they detect it after the
device has joined.</t>

<t>This document defines an MLS credential type in which the user, not the
provider, authorizes each device. The credential carries the user's
did:webvh log: a hash-chained, signed history of the user's device keys
that any member can verify offline. It also defines group rules that make
every member reach the same validity decision and that propagate device
revocation through ordinary Commits.</t>



    </abstract>

    <note title="About This Document" removeInRFC="true">
      <t>
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-atwood-mls-didwebvh-credential/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        Messaging Layer Security Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:mls@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/mls/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/mls/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/MarkAtwood/mls-didwebvh-credential"/>.</t>
    </note>


  </front>

  <middle>


<?line 104?>

<section anchor="introduction"><name>Introduction</name>

<section anchor="motivation"><name>Why This Document Exists</name>

<t>MLS <xref target="RFC9420"/> delegates identity to an Authentication Service.
<xref section="5.3.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9420"/> says a credential is valid when "the AS
verifies that the credential's presented identifiers are correctly
associated with the signature_key field in the member's LeafNode". The
two credential types RFC 9420 defines both put that decision in the
hands of a single authority: a "basic" credential is a bare assertion,
and an "x509" credential is valid if a trusted certificate authority
signed it.</t>

<t>Within one provider, this is the provider's own risk; federation extends
it to every member of a shared group. In MIMI <xref target="I-D.ietf-mimi-protocol"/>, users of several providers share
one MLS group, and each provider acts as the AS for its own users. A
member on provider B accepts Alice's devices because provider A says
they are Alice's. If provider A is compromised or compelled, it can issue
a credential binding an attacker's signature key to Alice's identity. The
attacker's client joins as one of Alice's devices, receives every epoch
secret, and reads all content. <xref section="8.4.3.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9750"/> calls
this a "ghost user". The same technique has been proposed as an
exceptional-access mechanism <xref target="GHOST"/>; federation removes the need for
the cooperation of the service the target chose.</t>

<t>The attack is already known. <xref section="8.4.3.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9750"/> describes
it: a compromised AS "could validate a signature key pair (or generate a
new one) for an attacker", who could then "join a group as if it were
another of the user's clients", and "these attacks could be very
difficult to detect". <xref target="I-D.mahy-mimi-identity"/> observes that users
must "blindly trust their instant messaging service not to add and
remove participants" and that "this problem is exacerbated when these
systems federate or try to interoperate." This document proposes a way to
prevent it.</t>

<t>MLS's forward secrecy and post-compromise security do not help: the
ghost is a member by the protocol's own rules.</t>

<t>Interoperability obligations are likely to increase the number of groups
that span providers. Article 7 of the Digital Markets Act <xref target="DMA"/>, for
example, requires designated gatekeepers to interoperate with other
providers on request.</t>

<t>The mitigations <xref section="8.4.3.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9750"/> recommends detect the
attack rather than prevent it:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Key transparency "would allow for detection of surreptitiously
created false credentials". It needs every client to audit every
contact's keys, and MIMI does not require it.</t>
  <t>Out-of-band comparison of the per-epoch <spanx style="verb">authentication_secret</spanx>
depends on users comparing values for every member, which few do in
large groups.</t>
  <t>Showing every membership change to users depends on users noticing an
extra device among many.</t>
</list></t>

<t>In each case the ghost device has already received epoch secrets by the
time anyone could notice. Proposals for credentials also keep a single
authority:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>X.509 credentials move the authority to a certificate authority, which
is chosen or operated by the provider or the user's organization, not
by the user.</t>
  <t>SD-JWT and SD-CWT credentials <xref target="I-D.mahy-mls-sd-cwt-credential"/> add
selective disclosure but still rely on one issuer's signature.</t>
  <t>An earlier draft <xref target="I-D.barnes-mls-addl-creds"/> used Decentralized
Identifiers (DIDs) <xref target="DID-CORE"/>, but only the
did:jwk method, which has no history and no way to authorize devices.</t>
  <t><xref target="I-D.mahy-mimi-identity"/> surveys certificate hierarchies, webs of
trust, cross-signing and Verifiable Credentials for MIMI, but does not
define a mechanism.</t>
  <t>The key transparency protocol <xref target="I-D.ietf-keytrans-protocol"/> makes
bindings auditable, but, as above, detects a ghost device after it has
joined.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="what-this-document-fixes"><name>What This Document Fixes</name>

<t>This document takes the decision about which devices belong to a user
away from the provider and gives it to keys the user controls. A
provider that holds no update key cannot authorize a device.</t>

<texttable title="Trust model before and after">
      <ttcol align='left'>Question</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>RFC 9420 with MIMI today</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>With this credential</ttcol>
      <c>Who can add a device to Alice's identity?</c>
      <c>Alice's provider's AS, or anyone who compromises or compels it</c>
      <c>Only a holder of one of Alice's did:webvh update keys</c>
      <c>How does another member verify Alice's device?</c>
      <c>Trusts the AS signature</c>
      <c>Verifies Alice's signed, hash-chained log, offline</c>
      <c>Can a provider add a device without Alice's keys?</c>
      <c>Yes. Other members can detect it only after the device has joined</c>
      <c>It cannot authorize a new key. It can still replay a revoked device's old KeyPackages to a group that has not seen the revocation (<xref target="stale-log"/>)</c>
      <c>How is a revoked device removed from a group?</c>
      <c>Application policy; no protocol rule</c>
      <c>The Commit that carries Alice's newer log <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> remove it</c>
      <c>Can two members disagree about a credential's validity?</c>
      <c>Yes, if their AS policies differ</c>
      <c>No: credential validity depends only on the credential and the group's state (<xref target="deterministic-validation"/>)</c>
      <c>Does validation make network requests?</c>
      <c>Possibly (AS, certificate status checks)</c>
      <c>Never</c>
</texttable>

<t>The provider keeps its roles as transport, KeyPackage directory and,
optionally, host of the user's did:webvh log. None of those roles lets
it change which devices are Alice's.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="what-this-document-does-not-fix"><name>What This Document Does Not Fix</name>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>First contact. This document does not say how Bob learns which DID is
Alice's. Once Bob has pinned it, substitution is detectable
(<xref target="first-contact"/>). Discovery is out of scope.</t>
  <t>Custody. If the provider holds Alice's update keys, it can authorize
devices and this credential adds nothing (<xref target="custody"/>).</t>
  <t>Metadata. The Delivery Service (DS) and the MIMI hub still see group membership and
timing. This credential reveals more device history to them, not less
(<xref target="privacy"/>).</t>
  <t>Ordering, censorship and hub trust. A hub can still delay or drop
Commits, including Commits that remove a revoked device.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="conventions-and-definitions"><name>Conventions and Definitions</name>

<t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>

<?line -18?>

<t>This document uses the terms from <xref target="RFC9420"/> and <xref target="DIDWEBVH"/>. In
addition:</t>

<dl>
  <dt>DID controller:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The user who holds the update keys of a did:webvh DID and whose devices
its DID document lists.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Log:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The did:webvh DID Log, the <spanx style="verb">did.jsonl</spanx> file defined in <xref target="DIDWEBVH"/>.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Version number:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The integer before the dash in a log entry's <spanx style="verb">versionId</spanx>.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Head:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The last entry of a log carried in a credential.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Prefix:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>Log A is a prefix of log B if B has at least as many entries as A and
the <spanx style="verb">versionId</spanx> values of B's first entries equal those of A's entries,
in order. Byte equality of the logs is not required.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Newest log:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>Of several logs, the one whose head has the highest version number.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>SCID:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The self-certifying identifier of a did:webvh DID: the value of the
<spanx style="verb">scid</spanx> parameter of the log's first entry. It does not change when the
DID moves to a different host.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Recorded head of S:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>For an SCID S, the entry for S in the group's <spanx style="verb">did_webvh_heads</spanx>
GroupContext extension (<xref target="heads-extension"/>): the highest log version
the group has accepted for S, and the keys that version authorizes.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Authorized key:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>An Ed25519 public key given by a verification method in a DID document
that meets all of the following: its <spanx style="verb">type</spanx> is <spanx style="verb">Multikey</spanx> and its
<spanx style="verb">controller</spanx> is the document's <spanx style="verb">id</spanx>; its <spanx style="verb">publicKeyMultibase</spanx> begins
with <spanx style="verb">z</spanx> and base58btc-decodes to exactly 34 bytes, the prefix 0xed
0x01 followed by a 32-byte public key in the format of <xref target="RFC8032"/>;
and it is in the document's <spanx style="verb">authentication</spanx> verification
relationship, either embedded there or referenced by identifier
(<xref target="DID-CORE"/>, <xref target="W3C-CID"/>). A relative reference is resolved against
the document's <spanx style="verb">id</spanx> as <xref target="DID-CORE"/> specifies. A reference that does
not resolve to a verification method in the same document, and a
verification method that fails any of these conditions, authorizes no
key; neither makes the document invalid.</t>
  </dd>
</dl>

</section>
<section anchor="overview"><name>Overview</name>

<t>The user's DID document is the list of the user's devices. Each device
has its own MLS signature key, and each such key is listed in the DID
document as an authorized key. Adding a device means appending a log
entry that lists its key. That entry must be signed by an update key. So
the provider cannot add a device unless it holds an update key.</t>

<t>This document uses did:webvh only as a specified format for a
self-certifying, signed, hash-chained key log. It uses no DID
resolution, DID URL dereferencing, Verifiable Credentials or resolver
infrastructure.</t>

<t>Each device's LeafNode carries a credential containing the user's whole
log, up to a head that authorizes that device's key. Members verify the
log with no network access. Members do not consult the published log
location, a resolver, witnesses or watchers during validation.</t>

<t>Revocation works through the group itself. When Alice revokes a device,
one of her remaining devices appends an entry that drops the revoked
key, then sends a Commit whose UpdatePath carries the new log. The group
records the newest head it has accepted for each SCID in a GroupContext
extension, and that record never moves backwards. The rules in
<xref target="group-rules"/> require the Commit that raises the record to remove
every leaf whose key the new head no longer authorizes. Every member
checks the same rules against the same tree and GroupContext, so they
all accept or reject the Commit alike.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="credential"><name>The did:webvh Credential</name>

<t>This document adds a new credential type, <spanx style="verb">did_webvh</spanx>, to the
<spanx style="verb">Credential</spanx> structure from <xref section="5.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9420"/>:</t>

<figure><sourcecode type="tls-presentation"><![CDATA[
struct {
    opaque did_log<V>;
    opaque witness_file<V>;
} DIDWebVHCredential;

struct {
    CredentialType credential_type;
    select (Credential.credential_type) {
        case basic:
            opaque identity<V>;
        case x509:
            Certificate certificates<V>;
        case did_webvh:
            DIDWebVHCredential did_webvh;
    };
} Credential;
]]></sourcecode></figure>

<dl>
  <dt><spanx style="verb">did_log</spanx>:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The DID Log in the <spanx style="verb">did.jsonl</spanx> format of <xref target="DIDWEBVH"/>, from the first
entry through the head, with no entries omitted and none after the
head. It <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be longer than 1,048,576 bytes.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt><spanx style="verb">witness_file</spanx>:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The <spanx style="verb">did-witness.json</spanx> content defined in <xref target="DIDWEBVH"/>, holding the
witness proofs for the carried entries. It <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be empty if no carried
entry has active witnesses, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be longer than 1,048,576
bytes.</t>
  </dd>
</dl>

<t>The size limits are fixed so that every member applies the same limit.
A limit that differed between implementations would let one member
accept a credential that another rejects.</t>

<t>This document supports only cipher suites whose signature scheme is
Ed25519, such as MLS_128_DHKEMX25519_AES128GCM_SHA256_Ed25519 (0x0001)
and MLS_128_DHKEMX25519_CHACHA20POLY1305_SHA256_Ed25519 (0x0003). A
<spanx style="verb">did_webvh</spanx> credential in a group using any other cipher suite <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be
rejected.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="validation"><name>Validation</name>

<t>A <spanx style="verb">did_webvh</spanx> credential <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be validated at each event listed in
<xref section="5.3.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9420"/>. Validation has three parts: verifying the
log (<xref target="log-verification"/>), binding the log to the LeafNode
(<xref target="leaf-binding"/>), and checking it against the rest of the group
(<xref target="group-rules"/>). A credential that fails any check <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be rejected,
together with the message or object that introduced it.</t>

<section anchor="log-verification"><name>Log Verification</name>

<t>The verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify <spanx style="verb">did_log</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">witness_file</spanx> with the Read
(Resolve) verification steps of <xref target="DIDWEBVH"/>, with these changes:</t>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t>The verifier treats <spanx style="verb">did_log</spanx> as the complete published log and
<spanx style="verb">witness_file</spanx> as the complete witness file. It <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> fetch either
from the network, and <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> consult watchers or resolver caches.
The DID being resolved is the <spanx style="verb">id</spanx> of the head's DID document.</t>
  <t>The <spanx style="verb">method</spanx> parameter of the first entry <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be <spanx style="verb">did:webvh:1.0</spanx>,
and no later entry may set <spanx style="verb">method</spanx> to any other value. A log that
does <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be rejected, so that every member applies one set of rules.</t>
  <t>The verifier <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> compare <spanx style="verb">versionTime</spanx> with its own clock. All
other <spanx style="verb">versionTime</spanx> checks still apply, including that values strictly
increase. The <spanx style="verb">ttl</spanx> parameter has no effect on validation.</t>
  <t>Witness proofs <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be verified as <xref target="DIDWEBVH"/> specifies for every
entry that has active witnesses. Proofs in <spanx style="verb">witness_file</spanx> for
versionIds not in <spanx style="verb">did_log</spanx> are ignored.</t>
  <t>After every entry has been processed, the active value of the
<spanx style="verb">deactivated</spanx> parameter <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be false, and no entry may follow an
entry that sets it to true.</t>
  <t>Every carried entry <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> verify. The option <xref target="DIDWEBVH"/> gives
resolvers to treat a log as valid up to its first invalid entry is
not used.</t>
  <t>The verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> apply the profile in <xref target="webvh-profile"/>.</t>
</list></t>

<t>Change 3 is needed because <xref target="DIDWEBVH"/> rejects entries more than a
tolerance into the future relative to "the resolver's current time".
Clocks differ between members, so applying that check would let members
disagree about validity. Strict ordering of <spanx style="verb">versionTime</spanx> values does
not depend on the clock and is kept.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="webvh-profile"><name>did:webvh Profile</name>

<t><xref target="DIDWEBVH"/> leaves some choices to implementations. Members that chose
differently could disagree about a credential's validity, so this
document fixes them:</t>

<dl>
  <dt>Encoding:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t><spanx style="verb">did_log</spanx> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be UTF-8 JSON Lines: one JSON object per line, each
line ending in a single LF (0x0A), with no blank lines and nothing
after the last LF. Each log entry, and <spanx style="verb">witness_file</spanx>, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be I-JSON
<xref target="RFC7493"/>; in particular, an object with duplicate member names is
rejected. <spanx style="verb">versionTime</spanx> values <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have the form
<spanx style="verb">YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SSZ</spanx>. The version number <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> have leading zeros.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Parameters:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>A parameter whose value is <spanx style="verb">null</spanx> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be rejected, although
<xref target="DIDWEBVH"/> lets resolvers accept it.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Proofs:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The <spanx style="verb">proof</spanx> member of each entry <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be an array containing exactly
one proof. The <spanx style="verb">created</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">expires</spanx> properties of log and witness
proofs are not compared with any clock.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Witnesses:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>A witness proof that fails verification is ignored. An entry's witness
requirement is met only if valid proofs from at least the threshold
number of distinct witnesses cover it.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Portability:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The portability rules of <xref target="DIDWEBVH"/>, including that <spanx style="verb">portable</spanx> can
only be set in the first entry and that a moved DID lists its previous
DID in <spanx style="verb">alsoKnownAs</spanx>, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be checked for every entry.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Domain:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The DID string <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> match the method-specific identifier syntax of
<xref target="DIDWEBVH"/> using only ASCII letters, digits, hyphens and dots. No
internationalized domain name processing is performed.</t>
  </dd>
</dl>

</section>
<section anchor="leaf-binding"><name>Binding to the LeafNode</name>

<t>The <spanx style="verb">signature_key</spanx> of the LeafNode containing the credential <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> equal
the 32-byte public key of an authorized key in the head's DID document.</t>

<t>The SCID of the log is the credential's identity. The DID string can
change if the controller moves the DID, but the SCID cannot.</t>

<t>A <spanx style="verb">did_webvh</spanx> credential <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> appear in the <spanx style="verb">external_senders</spanx>
GroupContext extension. A GroupContextExtensions proposal that would
put one there <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be rejected.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="heads-extension"><name>The Heads Extension</name>

<t>A client that lists <spanx style="verb">did_webvh</spanx> in the <spanx style="verb">credentials</spanx> field of its
LeafNode <spanx style="verb">capabilities</spanx> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> list <spanx style="verb">did_webvh_heads</spanx> in the <spanx style="verb">extensions</spanx>
field and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> implement the rules in <xref target="group-rules"/>. A GroupContext
that contains <spanx style="verb">did_webvh_heads</spanx> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> also contain a
<spanx style="verb">required_capabilities</spanx> extension that lists <spanx style="verb">did_webvh_heads</spanx> in
<spanx style="verb">extension_types</spanx> and <spanx style="verb">did_webvh</spanx> in <spanx style="verb">credential_types</spanx>
(<xref section="11.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9420"/>), so that every member enforces the rules.
A group whose tree contains a <spanx style="verb">did_webvh</spanx> credential <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry the
<spanx style="verb">did_webvh_heads</spanx> GroupContext extension, and a group that carries it
<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> remove it:</t>

<figure><sourcecode type="tls-presentation"><![CDATA[
struct {
    opaque scid<V>;
    opaque version_id<V>;
    SignaturePublicKey authorized_keys<V>;
} DIDWebVHHead;

struct {
    DIDWebVHHead heads<V>;
} DIDWebVHHeads;
]]></sourcecode></figure>

<dl>
  <dt><spanx style="verb">scid</spanx>:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The SCID, as the ASCII value of the first entry's <spanx style="verb">scid</spanx> parameter.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt><spanx style="verb">version_id</spanx>:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The <spanx style="verb">versionId</spanx> of the recorded head.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt><spanx style="verb">authorized_keys</spanx>:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>The 32-byte public keys of every authorized key in the recorded head's
DID document, each as a <spanx style="verb">SignaturePublicKey</spanx>, sorted in ascending
lexicographic order of the key bytes (not of their encoding), with no
duplicates.</t>
  </dd>
</dl>

<t><spanx style="verb">heads</spanx> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> contain an entry for each SCID that appears in a leaf of
the ratchet tree. It also keeps the entry for every SCID the group has
recorded before, even when no leaf with that SCID remains: an entry is
never removed. At most one entry has a given <spanx style="verb">scid</spanx>. Entries are sorted
in ascending lexicographic byte order of <spanx style="verb">scid</spanx>, a shorter value that is
a prefix of a longer one sorting first.</t>

<t>The extension lets the group remember a revocation after every leaf
that carried the revoking log has left, and after every device of that
user has left. Without it, the newest log the group knew about could
leave with the last device that carried it, and an older log would make
a revoked key valid again. Because the extension
is part of the GroupContext, a new member receives it in the Welcome,
and it feeds the key schedule.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="group-rules"><name>Group Consistency Rules</name>

<section anchor="when-the-rules-apply"><name>When the Rules Apply</name>

<t>When a member receives a KeyPackage, an Add proposal or an Update
proposal, it verifies the log (<xref target="log-verification"/>) and the binding to
the LeafNode (<xref target="leaf-binding"/>) only. The group rules depend on every
proposal in a Commit, so they are checked once per Commit, against the
ratchet tree and GroupContext that result from applying all of the
Commit's proposals and its UpdatePath. A member joining through a
Welcome or an external Commit checks them against the tree and
GroupContext it receives.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="expected-heads"><name>Expected Heads</name>

<t>For each SCID S that appears in a leaf of the resulting tree, let R be
the reference entry for S: the entry for S in the previous epoch's
<spanx style="verb">did_webvh_heads</spanx>, if any. Let L be the newest log among the resulting
tree's credentials with SCID S. The expected entry for S is computed as
follows:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>If R exists and L's head version number is not greater than R's, the
expected entry is R.</t>
  <t>If R exists and L's head version number is greater than R's, L <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
contain an entry whose <spanx style="verb">versionId</spanx> is R's <spanx style="verb">version_id</spanx>; a Commit for
which it does not <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be rejected. The expected entry has L's head
<spanx style="verb">versionId</spanx> and the authorized keys of L's head DID document.</t>
  <t>If R does not exist, the expected entry has L's head <spanx style="verb">versionId</spanx> and
the authorized keys of L's head DID document.</t>
</list></t>

<t>For each SCID S that has an entry in the previous epoch's
<spanx style="verb">did_webvh_heads</spanx> but appears in no leaf of the resulting tree, the
expected entry is that previous entry, unchanged.</t>

<t>The <spanx style="verb">did_webvh_heads</spanx> extension in the resulting GroupContext <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
contain exactly the expected entries. A Commit that changes the expected
value <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> therefore include a GroupContextExtensions proposal that sets
it. A Commit that only removes leaves never changes the expected value.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="rules"><name>Rules</name>

<t>The following <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> hold for the resulting tree and GroupContext. A
Commit, Welcome or GroupInfo for which any of them fails <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be
rejected.</t>

<dl>
  <dt>Extension matches:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t><spanx style="verb">did_webvh_heads</spanx> contains exactly the expected entries.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Consistency with the reference entry:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>Every credential with SCID S whose head version number is at least R's
contains an entry whose <spanx style="verb">versionId</spanx> is R's <spanx style="verb">version_id</spanx>. Every
credential with SCID S whose head is newer than R's is a prefix of L.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Authorization:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>Every leaf with SCID S has a <spanx style="verb">signature_key</spanx> in the <spanx style="verb">authorized_keys</spanx>
of the recorded head of S.</t>
  </dd>
</dl>

<t>A Commit that raises the recorded head of S to a version that no longer
authorizes some of S's leaves therefore has to remove those leaves in
the same Commit. Some consequences follow from <xref target="RFC9420"/> without
further rules:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>A committer whose own key the new head does not authorize cannot send
that Commit, because a Commit cannot remove its committer
(<xref section="12.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9420"/>). Another member has to commit it, for
example by committing an Update proposal, sent by one of the user's
other devices, that carries the new log.</t>
  <t>An external Commit cannot carry a GroupContextExtensions proposal, so
it is valid only if it leaves <spanx style="verb">did_webvh_heads</spanx> unchanged. A device
can rejoin by external Commit only if its key is already authorized by
the recorded head and its log is not newer than the recorded head. A
client whose SCID has no entry in <spanx style="verb">did_webvh_heads</spanx>, which includes
every new user, cannot join by external Commit and has to be added by
an existing member (<xref target="open-issues"/>).</t>
</list></t>

<t>A member joining by Welcome has no previous epoch, so it cannot compute
the expected entries. It instead checks that <spanx style="verb">did_webvh_heads</spanx> has an
entry for each SCID in the tree, in sorted order with no duplicates, and
the consistency and authorization rules, taking R for each SCID from the
GroupContext it receives. It also checks that no leaf's head version
number is greater than the recorded version for its SCID. For each
recorded head that some leaf's log contains as its head, it also checks
that <spanx style="verb">authorized_keys</spanx> matches that DID document. For an entry that no
leaf carries, including the entry of an SCID with no leaves, the joiner
relies on the GroupContext, which the existing members agreed on through
the key schedule.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="successor-credentials"><name>Successor Credentials</name>

<t>For the replacement check in <xref section="5.3.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9420"/>, a <spanx style="verb">did_webvh</spanx>
credential is a valid successor to an earlier <spanx style="verb">did_webvh</spanx> credential if
it has the same SCID and the earlier credential's log is a prefix of the
new one.</t>

<t>A leaf whose credential carries an older head than the recorded head
stays valid as long as its key is in the recorded <spanx style="verb">authorized_keys</spanx>.
Devices do not need to update their credentials each time another device
of the same user is added.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="reference-identifiers"><name>Reference Identifiers</name>

<t><xref section="5.3.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9420"/> has the application compare presented
identifiers with reference identifiers. For this credential, the
presented identifier is the SCID. Applications <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> pin the SCID for
each contact the first time it is learned, <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> compare it on every
later credential for that contact, and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> alert the user if the SCID
for a contact changes. Applications <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> display the DID string from
the head, because the SCID alone means nothing to a person.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="operation"><name>Operation</name>

<section anchor="adding-a-device"><name>Adding a Device</name>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t>The new device generates an MLS signature key pair.</t>
  <t>A holder of a key authorized to sign the next entry <xref target="DIDWEBVH"/>
appends a log entry whose DID
document lists the new key as an authorized key. If witnesses are
active, the holder collects the threshold of witness proofs.</t>
  <t>The holder <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> publish the updated log and witness file at the
location <xref target="DIDWEBVH"/> defines, so that new contacts can learn the DID.
Group members do not need the published copy.</t>
  <t>The new device publishes KeyPackages whose credential carries the
updated log.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="revoking-a-device"><name>Revoking a Device</name>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t>A holder of a key authorized to sign the next entry appends an entry
whose DID document no longer lists the revoked key.</t>
  <t>For every group the user belongs to, one of the user's remaining
devices sends a Commit whose UpdatePath LeafNode carries the new log,
together with Remove proposals for the revoked device's leaves and a
GroupContextExtensions proposal that updates <spanx style="verb">did_webvh_heads</spanx>. The
rules in <xref target="group-rules"/> make the Remove mandatory.</t>
</list></t>

<t>The revocation reaches a group when one of the controller's own devices
commits to it, not when a resolver notices. <xref target="stale-log"/> covers the
case where none of the controller's devices is in the group.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="custody"><name>Custody of Update Keys</name>

<t>This credential moves authority to whoever holds the <spanx style="verb">updateKeys</spanx>.
Update keys <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be held only on the user's devices and in offline
recovery storage, and the provider <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> hold them. A deployment in
which the provider holds update keys gives the provider the same power
the AS has today. A member cannot detect such a deployment from the
credential.</t>

<t>Controllers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> enable pre-rotation by setting <spanx style="verb">nextKeyHashes</spanx>, and
<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include among the committed hashes, in every entry, the hash of a
recovery key kept offline. Controllers <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> commit the hash of a
key that has already been revealed.
Under pre-rotation, each entry must be signed by a key whose hash the
previous entry committed to, so an attacker needs one of those
committed next keys, not just a key that has already been used.
Controllers <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> make every device an update key: any device that
holds one can add or revoke all the others. Keys listed in
<spanx style="verb">authentication</spanx> <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be used only as MLS device keys, and update keys
<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> appear in <spanx style="verb">authentication</spanx>, because every authorized key
there is accepted as a device.</t>

<t>Two update-key holders that append entries at the same time fork the
log, which <xref target="DIDWEBVH"/> names as a known risk. A group that has recorded
one branch rejects the other. The device whose entry lost can recover by
appending a new entry to the winning branch. If different groups have
recorded different branches, though, no later log can satisfy both
groups, and the user has to be removed from one of them and added back
once its record is gone. Controllers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> therefore send every update
through a single writer, or use witnesses with a threshold greater than
half the number of witnesses. <xref target="DIDWEBVH"/> forbids a witness from
signing two children of the same parent entry, but two disjoint sets of
witnesses that each meet a lower threshold can approve different
children.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="negotiation-and-mandating-the-credential"><name>Negotiation and Mandating the Credential</name>

<t>A client that supports this credential type lists <spanx style="verb">did_webvh</spanx> in the
<spanx style="verb">credentials</spanx> field of its LeafNode <spanx style="verb">capabilities</spanx>. A group, or a MIMI
room through its policy, can require this credential type for every
member by listing it in the <spanx style="verb">required_capabilities</spanx> GroupContext
extension and rejecting other credential types.</t>

<t>In a group that also admits <spanx style="verb">basic</spanx> or <spanx style="verb">x509</spanx> credentials, those leaves
keep the trust model of their AS, and the gap in <xref target="motivation"/>
remains for them. Applications <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> indicate to users which members
are authenticated by a <spanx style="verb">did_webvh</spanx> credential.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="open-issues"><name>Open Issues</name>

<t>RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication.</t>

<t>The author would like the working group's view on these questions:</t>

<t><list style="numbers" type="1">
  <t>Extension or component. Carrying the record as a component of the
<spanx style="verb">app_data_dictionary</spanx> extension <xref target="I-D.ietf-mls-extensions"/>, updated
by AppDataUpdate proposals, would let an external Commit or an
external sender update it. That would allow new users to join by
external Commit, which this document does not, and would avoid a
GroupContextExtensions proposal in every Commit that changes the
record.</t>
  <t>ReInit and branching. Neither carries the record into the new group,
so a revocation known to the old group can be lost. A ReInit could be
required to carry <spanx style="verb">did_webvh_heads</spanx> in its extensions.</t>
  <t>Revocation without a controller's device. A newer log reaches a group
only through a leaf that carries it. A proposal that carries a newer
log as evidence would let any member raise the record, and would give
a way to propagate deactivation.</t>
  <t>Other signature schemes. Supporting cipher suites whose signature
scheme is not Ed25519, such as 0x0002 with P-256, would admit
deployments that need them.</t>
  <t>Cost of GroupContextExtensions. Because a GroupContextExtensions
proposal replaces the whole extension list and only one is allowed
per Commit, a pending GroupContextExtensions proposal from another
party cannot be combined with a change to the record.</t>
  <t>Record growth. Entries are never removed, so the record grows with
every user who has ever been a member. A way to retire entries
without losing revocations, for example after the user's log has been
deactivated, may be needed for long-lived groups.</t>
  <t>Encoding without DIDs. The mechanism does not depend on DIDs. What it
needs is a key the user holds that authorizes each device, and a
signed, hash-chained history of those authorizations, so that every
member can verify additions and revocations offline. did:webvh is
one existing encoding of that history. The same property could be
built from IETF work instead: a CWT or SD-CWT credential issued by
the user's key <xref target="I-D.mahy-mls-sd-cwt-credential"/>, with the history
as a sequence of signed statements in the style of
<xref target="RFC9943"/>; a log format defined directly in
TLS presentation language; or the user's devices acting as one
virtual client <xref target="I-D.ietf-mls-virtual-clients"/>, so that only an
existing device can add another. In each case, key transparency
<xref target="I-D.ietf-keytrans-protocol"/> would complement this design, not
replace it. It detects a device the provider adds, where this design
prevents one, and it can cover first contact. The author would like
the working group's view on which encoding to use.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="security-considerations"><name>Security Considerations</name>

<section anchor="provider-issued-devices"><name>Provider-Issued Devices</name>

<t>A provider without an update key cannot produce a log entry that
authorizes a new key, because every entry needs an <spanx style="verb">eddsa-jcs-2022</spanx>
signature by an authorized update key <xref target="DIDWEBVH"/>. It also cannot present
an altered history, because entries are hash-chained and the SCID is
derived from the first entry. Whoever hosts the published log has no
more power than the provider: members never read the published log
during validation.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="pervasive-monitoring"><name>Pervasive Monitoring</name>

<t><xref target="RFC7258"/> states that "pervasive monitoring is a technical attack that
should be mitigated in the design of IETF protocols, where possible",
and calls for protocols that make it "significantly more expensive or
infeasible". Adding a ghost device targets one user, but the capability
exists in every room. A single compromised or compelled provider can use
it in every room that contains one of its users, without any change
visible in the MLS protocol. Federation adds every
other provider's users to the set of people exposed to that one
provider.</t>

<t>In groups that require the <spanx style="verb">did_webvh</spanx> credential, this document removes
that capability for existing identities: a provider cannot authorize a
new device under a user's SCID while the group holds that SCID's record.
A provider that wants to add a device to a user's identity needs one of
the user's update keys, and any entry it creates stays in a log that
every member of the group holds. This document does not stop a party
that can add members from adding a different identity, or from
substituting a DID at first contact (<xref target="first-contact"/>).</t>

</section>
<section anchor="update-key-compromise"><name>Update Key Compromise</name>

<t>An attacker who can sign a valid next entry can add a device, or
revoke the user's honest devices and so get them removed from groups by
the rules in <xref target="group-rules"/>. With pre-rotation active, that requires
one of the keys committed in <spanx style="verb">nextKeyHashes</spanx>, not merely a key already
used. Either action leaves an entry in a log that every member of each
affected group holds. The user's own devices <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> alert the user when
a log entry appears that none of the user's devices created.</t>

<t>If the attacker branches from an entry older than a group's recorded
head, the group rejects the branch. If the attacker extends the current
head, the group accepts the extension, because it is indistinguishable
from an honest update. Detection then rests on the user's devices.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="stale-log"><name>Withheld or Stale Logs</name>

<t><xref target="DIDWEBVH"/> lists "truncation or withholding of log entries" as an
attack on resolvers: a host presents an older valid prefix of the log to
hide a revocation. This credential has no resolver, so the host has
nothing to withhold from. The newest log reaches a group when any of the
controller's devices sends a Commit.</t>

<t>Once a group has accepted a revoking log, the recorded head keeps the
revoked key out even after the device that committed it leaves, and
after every device of that user has left, because entries are never
removed.</t>

<t>The remaining exposure is a group that never saw the revocation. That
includes a group that contains a revoked device of the controller but
none of the controller's other devices, and any group to which the
provider, acting as KeyPackage directory, delivers one of the revoked
device's old KeyPackages. Nobody in such a group has the newer log, so
the revoked device stays until someone removes it. Clients <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>
remember the highest log version they have verified for
each SCID, across all groups, and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> refuse to add a KeyPackage
whose log is older, which mirrors the cache-and-compare mitigation in
<xref target="DIDWEBVH"/>. This check is local, so it guides what a client proposes,
not what the group accepts. Applications <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> also let a controller's
device that is not in a group send the newer log to that group's
members, for example through the MIMI hub. Detecting revocations without
any device of the controller present needs an external freshness
mechanism such as key transparency <xref target="I-D.ietf-keytrans-protocol"/>,
which is out of scope.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="first-contact"><name>First Contact</name>

<t>The SCID protects a contact once it has been pinned. It does not protect
the first lookup, when an attacker who controls discovery can give Bob a
DID it created itself. Applications <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> offer out-of-band comparison
of the SCID, for example by QR code, as they do today for safety numbers.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="delivery-service-and-hub"><name>Delivery Service and Hub</name>

<t>A DS or MIMI hub cannot forge or alter a <spanx style="verb">did_webvh</spanx> credential. It can
delay or drop the Commit that carries a revocation, which extends the
window during which a revoked device remains a member. This credential
does not change the hub's ability to censor.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="deterministic-validation"><name>Deterministic Validation</name>

<t>MLS assumes that all members agree on which credentials are valid. If
they disagree, they disagree about the membership of the group. This
document removes the inputs under its control that could differ between
members: network fetches, the verifier's clock, implementation-specific
size limits, the choices <xref target="DIDWEBVH"/> leaves open (<xref target="webvh-profile"/>),
and did:webvh versions other than 1.0. Credential validity is then a
function of the credential bytes, the ratchet tree and the previous
epoch's GroupContext. Two inputs remain outside this document: the
reference-identifier check of <xref section="5.3.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9420"/>, which is
application policy (<xref target="reference-identifiers"/>), and the <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>
LeafNode <spanx style="verb">lifetime</spanx> check of <xref section="7.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9420"/>, which uses the
clock.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="resource-use"><name>Resource Use</name>

<t>A log grows by one entry for each device change. Each leaf carries the
whole log, so a user with many devices in a large group adds repeated
copies to the tree. Each leaf can carry up to 2 MiB (log and witness
file), so the ratchet tree in a Welcome or GroupInfo of a large group can
be very large, and a joiner validates every leaf's log, each entry with
its own signature verification. Implementations <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> verify a log
shared by several leaves once. The <spanx style="verb">did_webvh_heads</spanx> record grows by
one entry for each user who has ever been a member and is never
pruned. The 1,048,576-byte limits bound the cost
of a malicious log. This document defines no way to compact a log.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="privacy"><name>Privacy Considerations</name>

<t>Every member of a group, and any DS or hub that can see LeafNodes,
learns the controller's whole device history: how many devices the
controller has had, when each was added and removed, the domain hosting
the DID, and any witnesses. So does anyone who can fetch the user's
KeyPackages from a directory. A basic or X.509 credential reveals much
less.</t>

<t>The SCID is a stable identifier across groups and providers, so it lets
those parties correlate a user's memberships. Users who need separate
identities in different contexts need separate DIDs.</t>

<t>Validation makes no network requests, so it does not tell the log host
or any resolver who is checking whom.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="iana-considerations"><name>IANA Considerations</name>

<t>RFC Editor: please replace "RFC XXXX" with the RFC number of this
document.</t>

<t>IANA is requested to add the following entry to the "MLS Credential
Types" registry defined in <xref section="17.5" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9420"/>:</t>

<texttable title="New MLS credential type">
      <ttcol align='left'>Value</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Name</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Recommended</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Reference</ttcol>
      <c>TBD1 (suggested value 0x0008)</c>
      <c>did_webvh</c>
      <c>N</c>
      <c>RFC XXXX</c>
</texttable>

<t>IANA is also requested to add the following entry to the "MLS Extension
Types" registry defined in <xref section="17.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9420"/>:</t>

<texttable title="New MLS extension type">
      <ttcol align='left'>Value</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Name</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Message(s)</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Recommended</ttcol>
      <ttcol align='left'>Reference</ttcol>
      <c>TBD2 (suggested value 0x0013)</c>
      <c>did_webvh_heads</c>
      <c>GC</c>
      <c>N</c>
      <c>RFC XXXX</c>
</texttable>

</section>


  </middle>

  <back>


<references title='References' anchor="sec-combined-references">

    <references title='Normative References' anchor="sec-normative-references">



<reference anchor="RFC9420">
  <front>
    <title>The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) Protocol</title>
    <author fullname="R. Barnes" initials="R." surname="Barnes"/>
    <author fullname="B. Beurdouche" initials="B." surname="Beurdouche"/>
    <author fullname="R. Robert" initials="R." surname="Robert"/>
    <author fullname="J. Millican" initials="J." surname="Millican"/>
    <author fullname="E. Omara" initials="E." surname="Omara"/>
    <author fullname="K. Cohn-Gordon" initials="K." surname="Cohn-Gordon"/>
    <date month="July" year="2023"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>Messaging applications are increasingly making use of end-to-end security mechanisms to ensure that messages are only accessible to the communicating endpoints, and not to any servers involved in delivering messages. Establishing keys to provide such protections is challenging for group chat settings, in which more than two clients need to agree on a key but may not be online at the same time. In this document, we specify a key establishment protocol that provides efficient asynchronous group key establishment with forward secrecy (FS) and post-compromise security (PCS) for groups in size ranging from two to thousands.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9420"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9420"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC8032">
  <front>
    <title>Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)</title>
    <author fullname="S. Josefsson" initials="S." surname="Josefsson"/>
    <author fullname="I. Liusvaara" initials="I." surname="Liusvaara"/>
    <date month="January" year="2017"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document describes elliptic curve signature scheme Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA). The algorithm is instantiated with recommended parameters for the edwards25519 and edwards448 curves. An example implementation and test vectors are provided.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8032"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8032"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC7493">
  <front>
    <title>The I-JSON Message Format</title>
    <author fullname="T. Bray" initials="T." role="editor" surname="Bray"/>
    <date month="March" year="2015"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>I-JSON (short for "Internet JSON") is a restricted profile of JSON designed to maximize interoperability and increase confidence that software can process it successfully with predictable results.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7493"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7493"/>
</reference>


<reference anchor="DIDWEBVH" target="https://identity.foundation/didwebvh/v1.0/">
  <front>
    <title>The did:webvh DID Method v1.0</title>
    <author >
      <organization>Decentralized Identity Foundation</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="September" day="23"/>
  </front>
<refcontent>spec-v1.0 source at commit 91f3cba, https://github.com/decentralized-identity/didwebvh</refcontent></reference>
<reference anchor="W3C-CID" target="https://www.w3.org/TR/2025/REC-cid-1.0-20250515/">
  <front>
    <title>Controlled Identifiers v1.0</title>
    <author >
      <organization>W3C</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2025" month="May" day="15"/>
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="DID-CORE" target="https://www.w3.org/TR/2022/REC-did-core-20220719/">
  <front>
    <title>Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) v1.0</title>
    <author >
      <organization>W3C</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2022" month="July" day="19"/>
  </front>
</reference>


<reference anchor="RFC2119">
  <front>
    <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
    <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
    <date month="March" year="1997"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC8174">
  <front>
    <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
    <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
    <date month="May" year="2017"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
</reference>




    </references>

    <references title='Informative References' anchor="sec-informative-references">



<reference anchor="RFC7258">
  <front>
    <title>Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack</title>
    <author fullname="S. Farrell" initials="S." surname="Farrell"/>
    <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
    <date month="May" year="2014"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>Pervasive monitoring is a technical attack that should be mitigated in the design of IETF protocols, where possible.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="188"/>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7258"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7258"/>
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC9750">
  <front>
    <title>The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) Architecture</title>
    <author fullname="B. Beurdouche" initials="B." surname="Beurdouche"/>
    <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
    <author fullname="E. Omara" initials="E." surname="Omara"/>
    <author fullname="S. Inguva" initials="S." surname="Inguva"/>
    <author fullname="A. Duric" initials="A." surname="Duric"/>
    <date month="April" year="2025"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) protocol (RFC 9420) provides a group key agreement protocol for messaging applications. MLS is designed to protect against eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery, and to provide forward secrecy (FS) and post-compromise security (PCS).</t>
      <t>This document describes the architecture for using MLS in a general secure group messaging infrastructure and defines the security goals for MLS. It provides guidance on building a group messaging system and discusses security and privacy trade-offs offered by multiple security mechanisms that are part of the MLS protocol (e.g., frequency of public encryption key rotation). The document also provides guidance for parts of the infrastructure that are not standardized by MLS and are instead left to the application.</t>
      <t>While the recommendations of this document are not mandatory to follow in order to interoperate at the protocol level, they affect the overall security guarantees that are achieved by a messaging application. This is especially true in the case of active adversaries that are able to compromise clients, the Delivery Service (DS), or the Authentication Service (AS).</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9750"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9750"/>
</reference>


<reference anchor="I-D.mahy-mimi-identity">
   <front>
      <title>More Instant Messaging Interoperability (MIMI) Identity Concepts</title>
      <author fullname="Rohan Mahy" initials="R." surname="Mahy">
         <organization>Rohan Mahy Consulting Services</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="6" month="July" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document explores the problem space in instant messaging (IM)
   identity interoperability when using end-to-end encryption, for
   example with the MLS (Message Layer Security) Protocol.  It also
   describes naming schemes for different types of IM identifiers.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-mahy-mimi-identity-05"/>
   
</reference>


<reference anchor="I-D.ietf-mimi-protocol">
   <front>
      <title>More Instant Messaging Interoperability (MIMI) using HTTPS and MLS</title>
      <author fullname="Richard Barnes" initials="R." surname="Barnes">
         <organization>Cisco</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Matthew Hodgson" initials="M." surname="Hodgson">
         <organization>The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C.</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Konrad Kohbrok" initials="K." surname="Kohbrok">
         <organization>Phoenix R&amp;D</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Rohan Mahy" initials="R." surname="Mahy">
         <organization>Rohan Mahy Consulting Services</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Travis Ralston" initials="T." surname="Ralston">
         <organization>The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C.</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Raphael Robert" initials="R." surname="Robert">
         <organization>Phoenix R&amp;D</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document specifies the More Instant Messaging Interoperability
   (MIMI) transport protocol, which allows users of different messaging
   providers to interoperate in group chats (rooms), including to send
   and receive messages, share room policy, and add participants to and
   remove participants from rooms.  MIMI describes messages between
   providers, leaving most aspects of the provider-internal client-
   server communication up to the provider.  MIMI integrates the
   Messaging Layer Security (MLS) protocol to provide end-to-end
   security assurances, including authentication of protocol
   participants, confidentiality of messages exchanged within a room,
   and agreement on the state of the room.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-mimi-protocol-07"/>
   
</reference>


<reference anchor="I-D.ietf-keytrans-protocol">
   <front>
      <title>Key Transparency Protocol</title>
      <author fullname="Brendan McMillion" initials="B." surname="McMillion">
         </author>
      <author fullname="Felix Linker" initials="F." surname="Linker">
         </author>
      <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   While there are several established protocols for end-to-end
   encryption, relatively little attention has been given to securely
   distributing the end-user public keys for such encryption.  As a
   result, these protocols are often still vulnerable to eavesdropping
   by active attackers.  Key Transparency is a protocol for distributing
   sensitive cryptographic information, such as public keys, in a way
   that reliably either prevents interference or detects that it
   occurred in a timely manner.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-keytrans-protocol-06"/>
   
</reference>


<reference anchor="I-D.mahy-mls-sd-cwt-credential">
   <front>
      <title>Messaging Layer Security Credentials using Selective Disclosure JSON and CBOR Web Tokens</title>
      <author fullname="Rohan Mahy" initials="R." surname="Mahy">
         <organization>Rohan Mahy Consulting Services</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="1" month="November" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) protocol contains Credentials used
   to authenticate an MLS client with a signature key pair.  Selective
   Disclosure CBOR Web Tokens (SD-CWT) and Selective Disclosure JSON Web
   Tokens (SD-JWT) define token formats where the holder can selectively
   reveal claims about itself with strong integrity protection and
   cryptographic binding to the holder&#x27;s key.  This document defines MLS
   credentials for both these token types.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-mahy-mls-sd-cwt-credential-03"/>
   
</reference>


<reference anchor="I-D.barnes-mls-addl-creds">
   <front>
      <title>Additional MLS Credentials</title>
      <author fullname="Richard Barnes" initials="R." surname="Barnes">
         <organization>Cisco</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Suhas Nandakumar" initials="S." surname="Nandakumar">
         <organization>Cisco</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="4" month="March" year="2024"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This specification defines two new kinds of credentials for use
   within the Message Layer Security (MLS) credential framework:
   UserInfo Verifiable Credentials and multi-credentials.  UserInfo
   Verifiable Credentials allow clients to present credentials that
   associate OpenID Connect attributes to a signature key pair held by
   the client.  Multi-credentials allow clients to present authenticated
   attributes from multiple sources, or to present credentials in
   different formats to support groups with heterogeneous credential
   support.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-barnes-mls-addl-creds-01"/>
   
</reference>


<reference anchor="I-D.ietf-mls-extensions">
   <front>
      <title>The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) Extensions</title>
      <author fullname="Raphael Robert" initials="R." surname="Robert">
         <organization>Phoenix R&amp;D</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) protocol is an asynchronous group
   authenticated key exchange protocol.  MLS provides a number of
   capabilities to applications, as well as several extension points
   internal to the protocol.  This document provides a consolidated
   application API, guidance for how the protocol&#x27;s extension points
   should be used, and a few concrete examples of both core protocol
   extensions and uses of the application API.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-mls-extensions-11"/>
   
</reference>

<reference anchor="RFC9943">
  <front>
    <title>An Architecture for Trustworthy and Transparent Digital Supply Chains</title>
    <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
    <author fullname="A. Delignat-Lavaud" initials="A." surname="Delignat-Lavaud"/>
    <author fullname="C. Fournet" initials="C." surname="Fournet"/>
    <author fullname="Y. Deshpande" initials="Y." surname="Deshpande"/>
    <author fullname="S. Lasker" initials="S." surname="Lasker"/>
    <date month="June" year="2026"/>
    <abstract>
      <t>Traceability in supply chains is a growing security concern. While Verifiable Data Structures (VDSs) have addressed specific issues, such as equivocation over digital certificates, they lack a universal architecture for all supply chains. This document defines such an architecture for single-issuer signed statement transparency. It ensures extensibility and interoperability between different transparency services as well as compliance with various auditing procedures and regulatory requirements.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9943"/>
  <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9943"/>
</reference>


<reference anchor="I-D.ietf-mls-virtual-clients">
   <front>
      <title>MLS Virtual Clients</title>
      <author fullname="Joël" initials="" surname="Joël">
         <organization>AWS</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Konrad Kohbrok" initials="K." surname="Kohbrok">
         <organization>Phoenix R&amp;D</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Brendan McMillion" initials="B." surname="McMillion">
         </author>
      <author fullname="Marta Mularczyk" initials="M." surname="Mularczyk">
         <organization>AWS</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Raphael Robert" initials="R." surname="Robert">
         <organization>Phoenix R&amp;D</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document describes a method that allows multiple MLS clients to
   emulate a virtual MLS client.  A virtual client allows multiple
   emulator clients to jointly participate in an MLS group under a
   single leaf.  Depending on the design of the application, virtual
   clients can help hide metadata and improve performance.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-mls-virtual-clients-02"/>
   
</reference>


<reference anchor="GHOST" target="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/principles-more-informed-exceptional-access-debate">
  <front>
    <title>Principles for a More Informed Exceptional Access Debate</title>
    <author initials="I." surname="Levy" fullname="Ian Levy">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <author initials="C." surname="Robinson" fullname="Crispin Robinson">
      <organization></organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2018" month="November" day="29"/>
  </front>
<refcontent>Lawfare</refcontent></reference>
<reference anchor="DMA" target="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj">
  <front>
    <title>Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets Act)</title>
    <author >
      <organization>European Union</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2022" month="September" day="14"/>
  </front>
<refcontent>OJ L 265, 12.10.2022</refcontent></reference>


    </references>

</references>


<?line 890?>

<section anchor="design-rationale"><name>Design Rationale</name>

<dl>
  <dt>Why not an SD-JWT or SD-CWT credential:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>A token needs an issuer, and an issuer is the single authority this
document removes. The did:webvh log certifies itself.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Why not resolve the DID during validation:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>Resolution brings back the stale-log attack, tells the log host who is
checking whom, and lets members who resolve at different times
disagree.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Why the DID document lists device keys directly:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>A separate signed statement binding a device to the DID would be a
second format to validate. Using the <spanx style="verb">authentication</spanx> relationship
means a device is authorized exactly when the user's log says so.</t>
  </dd>
  <dt>Why only did:webvh 1.0 and Ed25519:</dt>
  <dd>
    <t>Every additional method or version is another set of rules that all
members must apply identically. Ed25519 matches the mandatory-to-implement
MLS cipher suite and needs no conversion between key formats. Other
methods and other signature schemes can be specified in future
documents (<xref target="open-issues"/>).</t>
  </dd>
</dl>

</section>


  </back>

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