Internet-Draft ATP-Test-Vectors November 2026
Bates Expires 6 May 2027 [Page]
Workgroup:
Independent Submission
Internet-Draft:
draft-bates-atp-test-vectors-01
Published:
Intended Status:
Informational
Expires:
Author:
D. Bates
SVT Robotics

ATP Core Test Vectors

Abstract

This document publishes golden test vectors for the Agent Transaction Protocol (ATP). The vectors cover canonicalization (RFC 8785 JCS), nodeId computation, and Ed25519 signature generation and verification. ATP Core conformance requires that conformant implementations pass all vectors in this document for canonicalization, nodeId computation, and Ed25519 signature verification.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 6 May 2027.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

[ATP-CORE] specifies a deterministic identity and signature model for agent-action nodes. Two independent implementations presented with the same node content are required to compute byte-identical canonical forms, byte-identical nodeId values, and to verify each other's Ed25519 signatures.

This document publishes a starter set of test vectors so that interoperability claims can be substantiated mechanically rather than by inspection. Each vector is computed and recorded in this document; an implementation passes a vector if and only if it produces the exact byte sequence and hex value recorded for that vector.

The vectors in this -01 release cover the minimum required for ATP Core conformance: canonicalization fixtures, nodeId computation across representative node shapes, and one Ed25519 sign/verify vector with deterministic key material. Future revisions will add fixtures for validation modes, the validation result format in Section 13.6 of [ATP-CORE], profile-field canonicalization (strict and permissive), parent-state handling, and adversarial cases (large numbers, surrogate pairs, deeply nested structures).

2. Conventions

Some lines in this document are too long to fit within the 72-column limit of Internet-Draft text. Those lines are folded using the single backslash strategy of RFC 8792. Backslash characters at the end of a line are not part of the vector; unfold before comparing.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

All canonical byte sequences in this document are presented as UTF-8 text. All hash and signature outputs are presented as lowercase ASCII hexadecimal characters (%x30-39 / %x61-66) unless explicitly stated otherwise. ATP Core defines ABNF lexical productions for nodeId, parents entries, timestamps, and payload hashes (timestamp format and lexical token rules in [ATP-CORE]); values MUST match those productions exactly, with no surrounding whitespace or newline.

3. Canonicalization Vectors (RFC 8785 JCS)

These vectors verify that an implementation's canonicalizer matches RFC 8785 JSON Canonicalization Scheme [RFC8785]. They are intentionally minimal so that any conformant JCS implementation produces identical output.

3.1. Vector C1 -- empty object

Input:

{}

Canonical bytes (UTF-8):

{}

Length: 2 bytes.

3.2. Vector C2 -- object with key reordering

Input:

{"b": 1, "a": 2}

Canonical bytes (UTF-8):

{"a":2,"b":1}

Length: 13 bytes.

3.3. Vector C3 -- null-valued field omission per ATP Core Section 9

Input:

{"a": 1, "b": null}

Canonical bytes (UTF-8) per ATP Section 9 of [ATP-CORE] (null fields omitted):

{"a":1}

Length: 7 bytes.

Note: Strict RFC 8785 JCS would preserve "b":null. ATP Section 9 of [ATP-CORE] modifies this rule and requires null-valued fields to be omitted. Profiles MAY override the omission rule per Section 9 of [ATP-CORE].

3.4. Vector C4 -- array order preservation

Input:

{"items": [3, 1, 2]}

Canonical bytes (UTF-8):

{"items":[3,1,2]}

Array order MUST be preserved as declared.

3.5. Vector C5 -- nested object key sorting

Input:

{"outer": {"z": 1, "a": 2}, "alpha": 3}

Canonical bytes (UTF-8):

{"alpha":3,"outer":{"a":2,"z":1}}

Both top-level and nested keys MUST be sorted.

4. nodeId Computation Vectors

These vectors verify the full nodeId formula:

nodeId = SHA256(canonical(node_without_signature))

Each vector presents a node, the exact canonical bytes produced by ATP Section 9 of [ATP-CORE] + RFC 8785 JCS, and the resulting SHA-256 hash in lowercase hex. The signature field is intentionally absent from the input -- implementations MUST exclude it from canonicalization per Section 10.1 of [ATP-CORE].

4.1. Vector V1 -- minimum-viable request node

Input node (no actor, no profile, no outputHash, empty parents -- represents an autonomous root request):

{
  "timestamp": "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "scope": "test-scope-001",
  "issuer":  {"issuerId": "test-issuer", "keyId": "test-key-1"},
  "agent":   {"agentId": "test-agent",   "version": "1.0.0"},
  "action":  {
    "type": "atp:request",
    "inputHash": "sha256:000000000000000000000000000000000000000\
0000000000000000000000000"
  },
  "parents": []
}

Canonical bytes (UTF-8):

{"action":{"inputHash":"sha256:000000000000000000000000000000000\
0000000000000000000000000000000","type":"atp:request"},"agent":{\
"agentId":"test-agent","version":"1.0.0"},"issuer":{"issuerId":"\
test-issuer","keyId":"test-key-1"},"parents":[],"scope":"test-sc\
ope-001","timestamp":"2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"}

Expected nodeId:

77d803c2d67e6cbe893172e5676e52b8f1bb80910bcbe1ca4c9aa5273f46ce70

4.2. Vector V2 -- completion node with actor and parent reference

Input node (completion of V1, actor present, references V1 as parent):

{
  "timestamp": "2026-01-01T00:00:01Z",
  "scope": "test-scope-001",
  "issuer":  {"issuerId": "test-issuer", "keyId": "test-key-1"},
  "agent":   {"agentId": "test-agent",   "version": "1.0.0"},
  "actor":   {"actorId": "psn:0000-test-actor", "authContext": "\
test:none"},
  "action":  {
    "type": "atp:completion",
    "inputHash":  "sha256:00000000000000000000000000000000000000\
00000000000000000000000000",
    "outputHash": "sha256:11111111111111111111111111111111111111\
11111111111111111111111111"
  },
  "parents": ["77d803c2d67e6cbe893172e5676e52b8f1bb80910bcbe1ca4\
c9aa5273f46ce70"]
}

Canonical bytes (UTF-8):

{"action":{"inputHash":"sha256:000000000000000000000000000000000\
0000000000000000000000000000000","outputHash":"sha256:1111111111\
111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111","type":"\
atp:completion"},"actor":{"actorId":"psn:0000-test-actor","authC\
ontext":"test:none"},"agent":{"agentId":"test-agent","version":"\
1.0.0"},"issuer":{"issuerId":"test-issuer","keyId":"test-key-1"}\
,"parents":["77d803c2d67e6cbe893172e5676e52b8f1bb80910bcbe1ca4c9\
aa5273f46ce70"],"scope":"test-scope-001","timestamp":"2026-01-01\
T00:00:01Z"}

Expected nodeId:

881b552dd7d4a8598abe44ceab49257bb63b5e6420eeaf949ac2657b5495ae5e

4.3. Vector V3 -- same content as V1 with mis-ordered keys

This vector verifies that canonicalization produces identical output regardless of input key order. Implementations MUST produce the same canonical bytes and the same nodeId for V3 as for V1.

Input node (logically equivalent to V1, all keys in reverse-ish order):

{
  "scope": "test-scope-001",
  "agent":   {"version": "1.0.0", "agentId": "test-agent"},
  "action":  {
    "inputHash": "sha256:000000000000000000000000000000000000000\
0000000000000000000000000",
    "type": "atp:request"
  },
  "issuer":  {"keyId": "test-key-1", "issuerId": "test-issuer"},
  "timestamp": "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z",
  "parents": []
}

Canonical bytes (UTF-8):

{"action":{"inputHash":"sha256:000000000000000000000000000000000\
0000000000000000000000000000000","type":"atp:request"},"agent":{\
"agentId":"test-agent","version":"1.0.0"},"issuer":{"issuerId":"\
test-issuer","keyId":"test-key-1"},"parents":[],"scope":"test-sc\
ope-001","timestamp":"2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"}

Expected nodeId:

77d803c2d67e6cbe893172e5676e52b8f1bb80910bcbe1ca4c9aa5273f46ce70

(Identical to V1; this is the conformance signal.)

4.4. Vector V4 -- fan-in decision with two parents

Input node (decision synthesis with parents=[V1, V2], signed by a different issuer):

{
  "timestamp": "2026-01-01T00:00:02Z",
  "scope": "test-scope-001",
  "issuer":  {"issuerId": "test-issuer-2", "keyId": "test-key-2"\
},
  "agent":   {"agentId": "synth-agent", "version": "1.0.0"},
  "action":  {
    "type": "atp:decision",
    "inputHash":  "sha256:22222222222222222222222222222222222222\
22222222222222222222222222",
    "outputHash": "sha256:33333333333333333333333333333333333333\
33333333333333333333333333"
  },
  "parents": [
    "77d803c2d67e6cbe893172e5676e52b8f1bb80910bcbe1ca4c9aa5273f4\
6ce70",
    "881b552dd7d4a8598abe44ceab49257bb63b5e6420eeaf949ac2657b549\
5ae5e"
  ]
}

Canonical bytes (UTF-8):

{"action":{"inputHash":"sha256:222222222222222222222222222222222\
2222222222222222222222222222222","outputHash":"sha256:3333333333\
333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333","type":"\
atp:decision"},"agent":{"agentId":"synth-agent","version":"1.0.0\
"},"issuer":{"issuerId":"test-issuer-2","keyId":"test-key-2"},"p\
arents":["77d803c2d67e6cbe893172e5676e52b8f1bb80910bcbe1ca4c9aa5\
273f46ce70","881b552dd7d4a8598abe44ceab49257bb63b5e6420eeaf949ac\
2657b5495ae5e"],"scope":"test-scope-001","timestamp":"2026-01-01\
T00:00:02Z"}

Expected nodeId:

25abc84ddbd4ca932502e83e92050f00b1ecb70b4e3cf071d5823b3d3d23de4c

Parent array order is canonicalization-significant per Section 8 of [ATP-CORE]: V1 before V2 produces a different nodeId than V2 before V1 would. Implementations MUST preserve declared parent order.

4.5. Vector V5 -- node with profile field

This vector verifies that the profile field participates in canonicalization and nodeId computation per Section 10.1 of [ATP-CORE] and Section 19.4 of [ATP-CORE] (Profile Framework; profile-field canonicalization).

Note: The profile value urn:ietf:params:atp:profile:test:1.0 is used only to test canonicalization; it is not a registered identifier, and ATP defines no urn:ietf:params namespace. Published golden bytes are retained for comparability with the -00 vectors. New emissions use absolute https profile identifiers as specified in Section 19.1 of [ATP-CORE].

Input node:

{
  "timestamp": "2026-01-01T00:00:03Z",
  "scope": "test-scope-001",
  "issuer":  {"issuerId": "test-issuer", "keyId": "test-key-1"},
  "agent":   {"agentId": "test-agent",   "version": "1.0.0"},
  "action":  {
    "type": "atp:request",
    "inputHash": "sha256:444444444444444444444444444444444444444\
4444444444444444444444444"
  },
  "parents": [],
  "profile": "urn:ietf:params:atp:profile:test:1.0"
}

Canonical bytes (UTF-8):

{"action":{"inputHash":"sha256:444444444444444444444444444444444\
4444444444444444444444444444444","type":"atp:request"},"agent":{\
"agentId":"test-agent","version":"1.0.0"},"issuer":{"issuerId":"\
test-issuer","keyId":"test-key-1"},"parents":[],"profile":"urn:i\
etf:params:atp:profile:test:1.0","scope":"test-scope-001","times\
tamp":"2026-01-01T00:00:03Z"}

Expected nodeId:

2356e89a5e787e9312287dfa4b3440d823b7fac59e401f060d42757e8f452803

If an implementation produces a different nodeId for V5, the most likely cause is that the profile field has been excluded from canonicalization. ATP Section 10.1 of [ATP-CORE] requires it to be included whenever present.

5. Ed25519 Signature Vector

This section publishes one Ed25519 sign/verify vector using deterministic key material. ATP Section 10.3 of [ATP-CORE] requires that the signature be computed over the nodeId as the 32-octet SHA-256 digest itself (not its hexadecimal encoding). The signature is encoded as base64 with padding per RFC 4648 Section 4.

5.1. Test Key Material

The vectors in this document use a fixed Ed25519 keypair derived from a deterministic 32-byte seed. Implementations MUST use the same seed to reproduce these vectors. This key material is for test use only and MUST NOT be used in production deployments.

Message (hex, 32 bytes):
  aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
aa

Signature (hex, 64 bytes):
  3f4d9fb756aba9bca11cfac15d65d82441dbf6f69adc9ba527b506c3379855\
50
  0a2ef1a4e471323f2e8c8d190868e4f5ef303bef1e3e57e1988b1b46d83d55\
09

Signature (base64 with padding):
  aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\
aa
Figure 1: S1 Signature Material

A conformant implementation MUST:

  1. Reproduce the public key bytes from the seed.
  2. Reproduce the signature bytes from the seed and message.
  3. Verify the signature against the public key and message and return success.
  4. Reject the signature if any byte of the message, signature, or public key is altered.

Ed25519 is deterministic per [RFC8032] Section 5.1.6: signing the same message under the same key MUST produce the same signature bytes. Implementations that produce different signature bytes for this vector are not interoperable with [ATP-CORE].

6. Implementation Notes

6.1. Canonicalization Edge Cases Not Covered in -01

This release deliberately uses simple JSON values (strings, integers, arrays of strings, plain objects) that all conformant RFC 8785 implementations handle identically. The following edge cases are not covered in -00 and will be added in subsequent revisions:

  • Floating-point and exponent-form numbers (RFC 8785's ECMAScript number serialization rules).
  • Unicode surrogate-pair handling and codepoints in the supplementary planes.
  • Strings containing escapes for control characters not in the basic ASCII range.
  • Very large nested structures (depth > 16, breadth > 256 keys).
  • Empty arrays and empty strings as values.

Implementations passing the -01 vectors satisfy the floor for ATP Core conformance per Section 13.7 of [ATP-CORE]. Implementations claiming broader RFC 8785 conformance SHOULD additionally pass the test data published by [JCS-TESTDATA].

6.2. Canonicalization Library Choices

Implementations MAY use any RFC 8785 conformant canonicalization library. The reference implementation by the RFC 8785 author is available in multiple languages at [JCS-TESTDATA] and provides additional test data covering the edge cases listed above.

ATP Core does not endorse a specific implementation. The deterministic-output guarantee of Section 9 of [ATP-CORE] makes the choice immaterial provided the chosen library is RFC 8785 conformant.

6.3. Reproducing the Vectors

The vectors in this document are reproducible from the inputs shown. A conformant implementation given the same input MUST produce the canonical bytes and nodeId exactly as recorded. The Python script that generated these vectors is available alongside the published draft for cross-checking.

7. Negative and Accept Vectors (Alpha ID Sync)

Vector identifiers below are taken from vectors/atp-core-test-vectors.json on branch alpha/draft-01-code at commit 412fdd8. The Core draft's worked examples use examples/appendix-a/bundle.json from that same commit (byte-identical to the earlier 8b5b411 pin for that bundle).

Reject (one or more vectors per MUST), Alpha IDs: J1/J2 duplicate member name; J3 unpaired surrogate; H1/H6 bare-hex hash; H2/H7 uppercase-hex hash; H3/H8 unknown hash prefix; T3 lowercase "t"; T4 lowercase "z"; T7 "+00:00" offset; T6 fractional seconds; T5 space instead of T; T8 seconds = 60; T9 invalid date (2026-02-30); T10 non-ASCII digits (Arabic-Indic year digits); P1 parents absent; P4 parents not an array; P2 parents entry not 64 lowercase ASCII hex (uppercase); P5 parents entry wrong length; P6 parents entry with trailing newline; N1 hex-string signing; N5 non-canonical S (S >= L); N6/N7 non-canonical A or R (y >= p); N8 small-order A; N9 small-order R; J4 integer above 2^53-1 (9007199254740993); J5 overflow / non-finite (1e400); J7 underflow of a non-zero literal (1e-400); N10 missing base64 padding; N11 embedded line break in signature; N12 trailing line break; N13 leading space; N14 trailing space; N15 URL-safe base64 characters; N16 extra padding; N17 signature length 87; N18 signature length 89; N19 non-canonical trailing bits (86th character Q to R).

Accept: C6 nested null removed; C11 null array element kept; C12 object emptied to {} kept; P3 empty parents array; H4/H5 valid sha256: hash form; T1/T2 valid timestamps; J6 ordinary decimal 1.5; J8 literal zero with extreme exponent (0e-400); J9 subnormal non-zero double (5e-324); R2/R12 tip mode never reports lineageIncomplete; R7/R11 parent present but fails yields child lineageIncomplete (full / redacted); R4 withheld parent MUST NOT by itself yield lineageIncomplete.

8. Security Considerations

The test key material in Section 5.1 is deterministic and public. It MUST NOT be used to sign production ATP nodes. Doing so would expose those nodes to forgery by anyone who has read this document.

These vectors are integrity tests, not security tests. Passing them confirms that an implementation produces correct deterministic output for the inputs shown. It does not, by itself, establish that the implementation is free of cryptographic implementation bugs that would only manifest on different inputs (timing side channels in Ed25519 signing, malleability in canonicalizer parsing, hash-truncation bugs in nodeId computation, and similar). Implementations SHOULD additionally adopt the security practices recommended by the underlying primitive specifications [RFC8032] [RFC8785].

9. IANA Considerations

This document has no IANA actions.

10. References

10.1. Normative References

[ATP-CORE]
D. Bates, "Agent Transaction Protocol (ATP)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-bates-atp-01, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bates-atp/>.
[RFC2119]
S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8032]
S. Josefsson, I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
[RFC8174]
B. Leiba, "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", RFC 8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8785]
A. Rundgren, B. Jordan, S. Erdtman, "JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8785>.

10.2. Informative References

[JCS-TESTDATA]
A. Rundgren et al., "JSON Canonicalization Scheme -- multi-language reference implementations and test data", , <https://github.com/cyberphone/json-canonicalization>.

Author's Address

David A. Bates
SVT Robotics