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  <front>
    <title abbrev="ECDSA-PoP">Schnorr-Type Proofs of Possession for ECDSA Device Binding</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-cllz-cfrg-ecdsa-pop-01"/>
    <author fullname="Sofia Celi">
      <organization>Brave Software / University of Bristol</organization>
      <address>
        <email>cherenkov@riseup.net</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Anja Lehmann">
      <organization>Hasso Plattner Institute, University of Potsdam</organization>
      <address>
        <email>anja.lehmann@hpi.de</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Shai Levin">
      <organization>Chalmers University of Technology / University of Gothenburg</organization>
      <address>
        <email>shai.levin@chalmers.se</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Alexandros Zacharakis">
      <organization>Hasso Plattner Institute, University of Potsdam</organization>
      <address>
        <email>alexandros.zacharakis@hpi.de</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="17"/>
    <area>IRTF</area>
    <workgroup>Crypto Forum Research Group</workgroup>
    <keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 148?>

<t>This document specifies a Schnorr-type, circuit-free zero-knowledge proof of possession (PoP) of an ECDSA signature produced under a committed public key over the NIST P-256 (secp256r1) curve.
The PoP lets a credential holder prove, in zero knowledge, that it can produce a fresh ECDSA signature under a device public key without revealing that key, thereby providing device binding for privacy-preserving credentials whose presentation must remain unlinkable.</t>
      <t>The construction is built exclusively from Sigma protocols as it decomposes the ECDSA verification equation into a scalar-multiplication relation and a point-addition relation over P-256, each proved with a dedicated Sigma protocol over a companion ("Tom") curve whose scalar field equals the base field of P-256.
It is designed to be expressed using the interfaces of the CFRG Sigma-protocols specification and to serve as the device-binding sub-proof of the modular BBS / JSON Web Proofs construction.
SNARK-based realizations of the same relation are out of scope.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        The latest revision of this draft can be found at <eref target="https://levanin.github.io/cllz-cfrg-ecdsa-pop/draft-cllz-cfrg-ecdsa-pop.html"/>.
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-cllz-cfrg-ecdsa-pop/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        Crypto Forum Research Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:cfrg@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/cfrg/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cfrg/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/levanin/cllz-cfrg-ecdsa-pop"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 157?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>Anonymous credentials enable privacy-preserving authentication: a holder presents an issuer-attested credential to a relying party while revealing only the minimum necessary information and remaining unlinkable across presentations. BBS signatures are a leading basis for such credentials and are being adopted in several standardization efforts <xref target="BBS"/><xref target="BLIND-BBS"/><xref target="W3CBBS"/>. These efforts are of relevance to the European Union Digital Identity (EUDI) wallet <xref target="EUDI-ARF"/>, which is mandated to implement user authentication with strong privacy guarantees, including selective disclosure and unlinkability.</t>
      <t>A central requirement for credentials used in digital-identity deployments is non-transferability: a credential must be usable only by its legitimate holder, and not be shared, or copied. The standard way to enforce this is device binding. The credential is tied to a key held in a secure element (SE) on the user's device, and at presentation time the holder produces a fresh signature -- a proof of possession (PoP) -- under the corresponding secret key, which never leaves the SE. Because the key is non-exportable, the credential cannot be used without the device that holds it.</t>
      <t>The EUDI architecture mandates device binding to a secure element, but consumer-device secure elements are, in practice, restricted to ECDSA over P-256 and do not expose the pairing-friendly operations required by native anonymous-credential device binding. The lack of an efficient and robust device-binding mechanism for anonymous credentials on legacy hardware was a key reason such credentials were not used in the initial EUDI deployment, which instead relies on batch-issued one-time-use credentials <xref target="DEROSA"/>.</t>
      <t>Here, we address the gap by specifying how to prove possession of an ECDSA signature under a committed device public key, so that ECDSA device binding can be composed with a pairing-based credential layer such as BBS. Our solution is based on Schnorr-type proofs, providing a robust, well-understood approach that avoids the implementation and interoperability challenges of circuit-based constructions.</t>
      <section anchor="scope">
        <name>Scope</name>
        <t>This document specifies only the <em>Schnorr-type</em> (Sigma-protocol-based) PoP.
This is the most conservative construction in <xref target="PAPER"/>: it uses no arithmetic circuits and no general-purpose proof system, relying solely on Sigma protocols and Pedersen commitments.
SNARK / circuit-based realizations of the same statement (the "foreign-field" and "native circuit" constructions of <xref target="PAPER"/>, and the Committed Schnorr reduction used by them) are explicitly out of scope.</t>
        <t>The proof is interactive as described, and is made non-interactive with the Fiat-Shamir transform (<xref target="fiat-shamir"/>).
Sigma protocols are composed using the interfaces of <xref target="SIGMA"/>, and the non-interactive transform and its codec are taken from the companion specification <xref target="FIAT-SHAMIR"/>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="relationship-to-other-specifications">
        <name>Relationship to Other Specifications</name>
        <t>This document is designed to compose with two CFRG / IETF efforts:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><xref target="SIGMA"/> (Sigma protocols).
The sub-protocols specified here are Sigma protocols and are described, where possible, using the <tt>Group</tt>, <tt>LinearRelation</tt>, and <tt>SigmaProtocol</tt> abstractions of <xref target="SIGMA"/>.
In particular, the point-addition proof of <xref target="point-addition"/> is a batch of linear relations whose group bases include commitments drawn from the statement, and is therefore expressible through the <tt>LinearRelation</tt> interface; the scalar-multiplication proof of <xref target="scalar-mult"/> is a custom <tt>SigmaProtocol</tt> (a bit-challenge proof run with parallel repetition) that internally invokes the point-addition proof.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><xref target="MODULAR-BBS"/> (modular BBS sub-proofs).
The PoP specified here is intended to instantiate the <tt>ecdsa-p256-db</tt> device-binding sub-proof of <xref target="MODULAR-BBS"/>, which exposes the holder's P-256 public key as four committed BBS messages carrying its 128-bit limbs (at indices <tt>[0, 1, 2, 3]</tt>) and binds the sub-proof to a challenge derived from the presentation headers.
<xref target="integration"/> describes this binding.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conventions-and-definitions">
      <name>Conventions and Definitions</name>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      <?line -18?>

<t>The following terms are used throughout.</t>
      <dl>
        <dt>ECDSA curve (P-256):</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The curve secp256r1 / NIST P-256 <xref target="FIPS186-5"/><xref target="SEC1"/>.
<tt>G_p</tt> denotes its group of points (prime order <tt>n_p</tt>), <tt>P</tt> a fixed generator, <tt>F_q</tt> its base field, and <tt>F_np</tt> its scalar field.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Tom curve (Tom-256):</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>A curve forming a "2-chain" with P-256: its scalar field equals the base field <tt>F_q</tt> of P-256 (see <xref target="ZKATTEST"/>).
<tt>G_t</tt> denotes its group of points.
Arithmetic over <tt>F_q</tt> -- i.e. arithmetic on P-256 coordinates -- is therefore <em>native</em> in the scalar field of <tt>G_t</tt>, which is what makes the Sigma-protocol proofs efficient.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Credential curve:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The pairing-friendly curve used by the credential layer (e.g., BLS12-381 for BBS), with scalar field <tt>F_s</tt>.
Commitments produced by the credential layer live over this curve.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Pedersen commitment:</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>For a group <tt>G</tt> with independent generators <tt>(g, h)</tt> (and, for vectors, <tt>(g_1,...,g_k, h)</tt>), the commitment to message <tt>m</tt> with randomness <tt>rho</tt> is <tt>Commit(m; rho) = m*g + rho*h</tt> (resp. <tt>sum_i m_i*g_i + rho*h</tt>).
Pedersen commitments used here are perfectly hiding and computationally binding under the discrete-log assumption in <tt>G</tt>.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
      <t>Throughout, lowercase letters denote scalars and uppercase letters denote group elements.
<tt>x*P</tt> denotes scalar multiplication and <tt>A + B</tt> denotes group addition.
<tt>H(.)</tt> is a hash into <tt>F_np</tt> (SHA-256 reduced mod <tt>n_p</tt>, as in ECDSA), and <tt>F: G_p -&gt; F_np</tt> is the ECDSA conversion function mapping a point to the integer reduction mod <tt>n_p</tt> of its x-coordinate.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="overview">
      <name>Overview</name>
      <t>In this system there are three parties: a holder, who holds a credential and possesses an ECDSA-based device key pair; an issuer, who issues credentials; and a verifier, who verifies credentials and their binding to devices.
The holder has a device ECDSA key pair (<tt>private_key = x</tt>, <tt>public_key = Q</tt>), where <tt>Q = x*P</tt> over P-256. This public key is included in the holder's credential (e.g., as a committed BBS message).
The public key <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be carried into the credential as a committed message via blind issuance (<xref target="BLIND-BBS"/>), that is, in hidden form, so that the issuer signs over <tt>Q</tt> without learning it. This case requires the additional functionality described in <xref target="transfer"/>.
When presenting a credential, the verifier supplies a fresh <tt>nonce</tt>. The holder uses the secure element to produce an ECDSA signature over <tt>nonce</tt> with the device key pair, then proves in zero knowledge that it knows a valid signature under the committed key <tt>Q</tt>, without revealing <tt>Q</tt>.</t>
      <t>In order to instantiate this functionality, we rewrite how ECDSA signatures (which are of the form <tt>(r, s)</tt>) look like.
As shown in <xref target="ZKATTEST"/>, an ECDSA signature on a message <tt>msg</tt> can be rewritten as a pair <tt>(K, z)</tt> with <tt>r = F(K)</tt>, and <tt>z = r^{-1} * s mod n_p</tt>.
The verification then reduces to checking (where <tt>P</tt> is a fixed generator):</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
z*K = H(msg) * r^{-1} * P + Q
]]></artwork>
      <t>Because the signature is fresh and single-use, the value <tt>K</tt> <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be revealed without harming unlinkability; only the long-lived device public key <tt>Q</tt> must stay hidden.
The purpose now is to prove that one knows a valid signature of the form above without revealing the underlying <tt>Q</tt> (this is the purpose of our PoP).
By setting:</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
alpha = H(nonce) * F(K)^{-1}  mod n_p          (a public scalar)
Hpt   = alpha * P                              (a public P-256 point)
]]></artwork>
      <t>the statement to be proved becomes: knowledge of a scalar <tt>z</tt> and an opening of the commitment to <tt>Q</tt> such that</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
z*K = Hpt + Q                                  (Eq. POP)
]]></artwork>
      <t>The computation is over P-256. <tt>K</tt>, <tt>Hpt</tt> are public; <tt>z</tt> and <tt>Q</tt> are secret.</t>
      <t>The PoP for (Eq. POP) can be interpreted as three functionalities, each run between prover (holder) and verifier (relying party):</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>Commitment transfer (<xref target="transfer"/>).
Transfer the commitment to <tt>Q</tt> from the credential curve to the Tom curve, where P-256 coordinate arithmetic is native.
After this step <tt>Q = (x, y)</tt> is committed as two Tom Pedersen commitments <tt>C_x = Commit(x; rho_x)</tt> (to the <tt>x</tt> coordinate), <tt>C_y = Commit(y; rho_y)</tt> (to the <tt>y</tt> coordinate).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Reduction to curve operations (<xref target="rok-group"/>).
Set <tt>Z = z*K</tt> and commit to it to generate <tt>C_Z</tt>. Then, split Eq. POP into two statements: i. a scalar-multiplication statement (<tt>Z = z*K</tt>) and ii. a point-addition statement (<tt>Z = Hpt + Q</tt>).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Curve-operation proofs.
Prove the two statements with the Sigma protocols of <xref target="scalar-mult"/> (scalar multiplication, <tt>SM</tt>) and <xref target="point-addition"/> (point addition, <tt>PA</tt>), run in parallel.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>Symbolically, with <tt>x</tt> denoting parallel (AND) composition and <tt>o</tt> sequential composition of functionalities (see <xref target="RoK"/>), our PoP is:</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
PoP = ( SM x PA ) o group o transfer
]]></artwork>
      <t>Each functionality is an honest-verifier zero-knowledge reduction.
This composition in the reduction of knowledge framework is then made non-interactive by applying the Fiat-Shamir transform (<xref target="fiat-shamir"/>), deriving every verifier challenge from the transcript; the exact per-challenge transcript inputs remain to be specified (see <xref target="fiat-shamir"/>).
The result is a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for (Eq. POP).</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="parameters-and-encodings">
      <name>Parameters and Encodings</name>
      <section anchor="curves-and-generators">
        <name>Curves and Generators</name>
        <t>An instantiation of this PoP fixes:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>the ECDSA curve P-256, with generator <tt>P</tt>, group order <tt>n_p</tt>, base field <tt>F_q</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the Tom curve Tom-256 with group <tt>G_t</tt> whose scalar field is <tt>F_q</tt>, with two independent Pedersen generators <tt>(G_t, H_t)</tt>;</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>the credential-layer commitment scheme (e.g., Pedersen over BLS12-381) and its generators, as fixed by the credential profile (e.g. <xref target="MODULAR-BBS"/>).</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The generators <tt>(G_t, H_t)</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be sampled verifiably (e.g., via hash-to-curve from fixed domain-separation strings) so that no party knows their relative discrete logarithm.
The concrete instantiation of such parameters should be resolved by future standardisation efforts.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="encoding">
        <name>Committing to a P-256 Public Key</name>
        <t>A P-256 public key is a point <tt>Q = (x, y)</tt> in <tt>F_q^2</tt>.
Because the credential-layer commitment commits to scalars of the credential curve (<tt>F_s</tt>), each coordinate is encoded as a fixed number of limbs in <tt>F_s</tt>, and the limbs are committed with Pedersen.</t>
        <t>This document adopts the approach of <xref target="PAPER"/>, where each of <tt>x</tt> and <tt>y</tt> is split into two 128-bit little-endian limbs, i.e.</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
x = x_0 + 2^128 * x_1,   0 <= x_i < 2^128
]]></artwork>
        <t>and likewise for <tt>y</tt>.
This matches the four 128-bit limb commitments (at indices <tt>[0, 1, 2, 3]</tt>) now used by the <tt>ecdsa-p256-db</tt> device binding of <xref target="MODULAR-BBS"/>, which adopted this layout to align with <xref target="PAPER"/>.
The 128-bit limb size guarantees 112 bits of security for the transfer of <xref target="transfer"/> -- sufficient for this application -- and is chosen for efficiency and for interoperability with <xref target="MODULAR-BBS"/>; the proofs below are otherwise agnostic to the limb size (see <xref target="transfer"/>).</t>
        <t>The credential layer is responsible, at issuance, for guaranteeing that (a) each limb lies in its declared range and (b) <tt>(x, y)</tt> is a valid P-256 point.
This PoP assumes those facts hold a priori and does not re-prove them.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="transfer">
      <name>Commitment Transfer</name>
      <t>The PoP operates over the Tom curve, but the credential layer commits <tt>Q</tt> over the credential curve.
The transfer step re-expresses the commitment to <tt>Q</tt> as commitments over Tom-256, preserving the committed value.
Following <xref target="PAPER"/>, it is structured as a <em>reduction of knowledge</em> (<xref target="RoK"/>): a public-coin interactive reduction that maps a committed statement under the credential-curve scheme to the <em>same</em> statement under the Tom-curve scheme, after which the curve-operation proofs of <xref target="rok-group"/> take over.</t>
      <t>Let <tt>Commit</tt> be the credential-curve commitment scheme and <tt>Commit~</tt> the Tom-curve scheme.
Generically, for each committed value <tt>m_i</tt> with credential-curve commitment <tt>C_i</tt>, the prover produces a fresh Tom commitment <tt>C~_i = Commit~(m_i; rho~_i)</tt> and proves, with a public-coin proof of knowledge <tt>EQ</tt>, the relation</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
R_eq = { (C_i, C~_i ; m_i, rho_i, rho~_i) :
            C_i  = Commit (m_i; rho_i)  AND
            C~_i = Commit~(m_i; rho~_i) }
]]></artwork>
      <t>i.e. that <tt>C_i</tt> and <tt>C~_i</tt> open to the same value.
All instances of <tt>EQ</tt> run in parallel.</t>
      <t>For Pedersen-to-Pedersen transfer across the credential and Tom curves, <tt>EQ</tt> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be instantiated with a cross-group equality-of-opening proof for small-integer messages (the technique of <xref target="OKMZ"/>); the limb encoding of <xref target="encoding"/> guarantees the small-message precondition.</t>
      <section anchor="protocol">
        <name>Protocol</name>
        <t>Unrolling the reduction of <xref target="PAPER"/> with <tt>EQ</tt> instantiated by the cross-group proof of <xref target="OKMZ"/> gives the following per-limb, public-coin protocol.
It is run in parallel over all committed limbs, sharing a single challenge <tt>c</tt>.
Write <tt>(g, h)</tt> for the credential-curve Pedersen generators and <tt>(G_t, H_t)</tt> for the Tom generators (<xref target="encoding"/>), and let <tt>b_m</tt>, <tt>b_c</tt>, <tt>b_f</tt> be the <xref target="OKMZ"/> message-bound, challenge, and slack widths, with</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
b_m + b_c + b_f  <  log2( min(|F_s|, |F_q|) )
]]></artwork>
        <t>so that every value below stays an integer in both scalar fields (no wraparound).</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
Prover P                                  Verifier V
  inputs: m_i, rho_i  (0 <= m_i < 2^b_m)  inputs: C_i = m_i*g + rho_i*h

  # 1. new commitment: reduce the statement to Tom
  rho~_i <- F_q
  C~_i = m_i*G_t + rho~_i*H_t
                 ---            C~_i            --->

  # 2. announcement: bounded masks in both groups
  k_i  <- { 0, ..., 2^(b_m + b_c + b_f) - 1 }
  t_i  <- F_s;   t~_i <- F_q
  A_i  = k_i*g   + t_i*h
  A~_i = k_i*G_t + t~_i*H_t
                 ---         A_i, A~_i          --->
                 <---   c <- {0,...,2^b_c - 1}  ---
  # 3. bounded response (z_i over the integers)
  z_i  = k_i  + c*m_i
  s_i  = t_i  + c*rho_i        (in F_s)
  s~_i = t~_i + c*rho~_i       (in F_q)
  if z_i outside the admissible range R: abort and restart
                 ---       z_i, s_i, s~_i       --->

Verifier checks (per limb i):
  (1)  z_i*g   + s_i*h    == A_i  + c*C_i   # open, cred curve
  (2)  z_i*G_t + s~_i*H_t == A~_i + c*C~_i  # open, Tom curve
  (3)  z_i in R                             # range: no wraparound
]]></artwork>
        <t>The abort in step 3 is the rejection sampling of <xref target="OKMZ"/>; the admissible range <tt>R</tt> and the exact bound widths are those of <xref target="OKMZ"/>, to which implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> conform.
On acceptance, both parties use Pedersen homomorphism to fold the per-limb Tom commitments <tt>C~_i</tt>, weighted by the appropriate powers of <tt>2^b_m</tt>, into the two single-scalar coordinate commitments</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
C_x = Commit~(x; rho_x),    C_y = Commit~(y; rho_y)
]]></artwork>
        <t>These two commitments, together denoted <tt>C_Q</tt>, are the output statement of the reduction and the committed form of <tt>Q</tt> used by the remaining proofs.</t>
        <t>This document adopts 128-bit limbs (and the parameters <tt>b_m = 128, b_c = 112, b_f = 8</tt>) for the transfer, as in <xref target="PAPER"/>: this minimizes the number of cross-group instances, and with the <xref target="OKMZ"/> parameters achieves 112-bit security.
Smaller limbs (e.g. 64-bit) work equally well -- they leave more headroom below <tt>min(|F_s|, |F_q|)</tt> and so can reach higher soundness -- at the cost of proportionally more cross-group instances; profiles with stricter requirements <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> adjust the limb size and repetition accordingly.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="rok-group">
      <name>Reduction to Curve Operations</name>
      <t>After transfer, the statement is (Eq. POP) with <tt>Q</tt> committed over Tom as <tt>C_Q</tt>, <tt>K</tt> and <tt>Hpt</tt> public.
The <tt>group</tt> reduction introduces the point <tt>Z = z*K</tt> and splits (Eq. POP) into independent scalar-multiplication and point-addition statements.</t>
      <t>Inputs:</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
statement: (C_Q, K, Hpt)   witness: (z, Q, rho_Q)
relation:  z*K = Hpt + Q
]]></artwork>
      <t>Protocol:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>P computes <tt>Z = z*K</tt>, samples randomness <tt>rho_Z</tt>, and sends <tt>C_Z = Commit~(Z; rho_Z)</tt> (a Tom commitment to the P-256 point <tt>Z</tt>).</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Both parties compute <tt>C_H = Commit~(Hpt; 0)</tt>, the (deterministic, zero-randomness) commitment to the public point <tt>Hpt</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The reduction outputs two statements:  </t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>Scalar multiplication: <tt>statement_SM = (C_Z, K)</tt>, <tt>witness_SM = (Z, rho_Z, z)</tt>, asserting <tt>Z = z*K</tt>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Point addition: <tt>statement_PA = (C_Q, C_H, C_Z)</tt>, <tt>witness_PA</tt> the openings of the three commitments, asserting <tt>Q + Hpt = Z</tt> (equivalently <tt>Z = Hpt + Q</tt>, Eq. POP).</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>Note that <tt>C_Q = (C_x, C_y)</tt> is a pair of coordinate commitments; the point-addition proof of <xref target="point-addition"/> operates per coordinate.
Likewise <tt>C_Z</tt> and <tt>C_H</tt> are coordinate-commitment pairs.</t>
      <t>The two output statements are then proved in a parallel composition: <tt>SM x PA</tt>.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="scalar-mult">
      <name>Scalar-Multiplication Proof</name>
      <t>This section specifies the Sigma protocol <tt>SM</tt> proving the relation</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
R_SM = { ((C_Z, K) ; Z, rho_Z, z) :
            C_Z = Commit~(Z; rho_Z)  AND  Z = z*K }
]]></artwork>
      <t>where <tt>K</tt> is a public P-256 point, <tt>z</tt> a secret scalar, and <tt>Z</tt> a P-256 point committed over Tom.</t>
      <t><tt>SM</tt> is the scalar-multiplication proof of CDLS <xref target="CDLS"/>, used here with one modification from <xref target="PAPER"/>: the original protocol additionally committed to the scalar, whereas here <tt>z</tt> is a free (uncommitted) witness, which improves efficiency.</t>
      <t>It is a bit-challenge Schnorr-type proof: a single execution uses a one-bit verifier challenge and has knowledge-soundness error <tt>1/2</tt>.
To reach error <tt>2^-lambda</tt>, <tt>lambda</tt> independent executions are run in parallel (<tt>lambda = 128</tt> is <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>).
In one execution, the prover derives from its witness an auxiliary ("combined") instance using fresh randomness, sends the corresponding commitments, the verifier replies with a challenge bit, and the prover opens one of two related committed instances according to that bit; the point relation among the committed instances is established by invoking the point-addition proof internally.
The per-execution protocol is that of <xref target="CDLS"/> (Construction for <tt>R_SM</tt>), with the scalar treated as a free witness as noted above.</t>
      <section anchor="protocol-1">
        <name>Protocol</name>
        <t>The following is one execution, between prover <tt>P</tt> and verifier <tt>V</tt>; <tt>lambda</tt> such executions run in parallel and share a single Fiat-Shamir transcript (<xref target="fiat-shamir"/>).
<tt>F_np</tt> is the scalar field of P-256, and <tt>Commit~</tt> the Tom commitment scheme of <xref target="transfer"/>.
As in <xref target="rok-group"/> and <xref target="point-addition"/>, each <tt>Commit~</tt> to a P-256 point is a pair of coordinate commitments -- one to the <tt>x</tt> and one to the <tt>y</tt> coordinate -- so <tt>C_Z</tt>, <tt>C'</tt>, and <tt>C''</tt> are coordinate-commitment pairs, and the openings (<tt>rho_Z</tt>, <tt>rho'</tt>, <tt>rho''</tt>, <tt>tau</tt>) and check (2) are taken per coordinate.</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
Prover P                                        Verifier V
  inputs: Z, z, rho_Z   (Z = z*K)               inputs: C_Z, K

  # sample a fresh "combined" instance
  omega <- F_np \ {0, z, 2z}
  Z'  = omega*K                  # public-scalar multiples of K
  Z'' = (omega - z)*K
  rho', rho'' <- Tom randomness
  C'  = Commit~(Z';  rho')
  C'' = Commit~(Z''; rho'')

  # point-addition instance over the committed points,
  # asserting  Z + Z'' = Z' :
  #   statement_PA = (C_Z, C'', C')
  #   witness_PA   = (Z, rho_Z, Z'', rho'', Z', rho')
  # PA is run with the C[2]-opening dropped (see {{point-addition}})
  msg_1 = announcement of PA on statement_PA
                 ---     C', C'', msg_1     --->
                 <---       b <- {0,1}      ---
  msg_2 = response of PA under challenge b
  if b = 0:  (alpha, tau) = (omega,       rho')
  if b = 1:  (alpha, tau) = (omega - z,   rho'')
                 ---   alpha, tau, msg_2    --->

Verifier checks:
  (1)  PA on (C_Z, C'', C') accepts the transcript (msg_1, b, msg_2)
  (2)  if b = 0:  C'  == Commit~(alpha*K; tau)
       if b = 1:  C'' == Commit~(alpha*K; tau)
]]></artwork>
        <t>Because <tt>Z' = omega*K</tt> and <tt>Z'' = (omega - z)*K</tt> are public-scalar multiples of <tt>K</tt>, the committed points satisfy <tt>Z + Z'' = z*K + (omega - z)*K = omega*K = Z'</tt>; the point-addition proof <tt>PA</tt> (<xref target="point-addition"/>) establishes this relation among <tt>C_Z</tt>, <tt>C''</tt>, <tt>C'</tt>, and is run here with the one-bit challenge <tt>b</tt>, which it shares with the opening (its announcement and response are <tt>msg_1</tt> and <tt>msg_2</tt>).
Inside this composition <tt>PA</tt> drops its <tt>C[2]</tt> opening proof (the equation flagged <tt>omit in SM</tt> in <xref target="point-addition"/>), since the opening of <tt>C_Z</tt> is recovered from the two openings revealed across the <tt>b = 0</tt> and <tt>b = 1</tt> transcripts.
The exclusion of <tt>{0, z, 2z}</tt> when sampling <tt>omega</tt> keeps <tt>Z</tt>, <tt>Z'</tt>, <tt>Z''</tt> non-identity and pairwise non-opposite, so the non-degeneracy precondition of <xref target="point-addition"/> holds.
An extractor with accepting responses for both <tt>b = 0</tt> and <tt>b = 1</tt> recovers <tt>alpha_0 = omega</tt> and <tt>alpha_1 = omega - z</tt>, hence <tt>z = alpha_0 - alpha_1</tt> and the opening of <tt>C_Z</tt> as <tt>Z = z*K</tt>; revealing only one opening per execution gives (statistical) honest-verifier zero knowledge.</t>
        <t>When expressed via <xref target="SIGMA"/>, <tt>SM</tt> is a custom <tt>SigmaProtocol</tt> (not a plain <tt>LinearRelation</tt>): its challenge is a single bit and the protocol is run as <tt>lambda</tt> parallel repetitions.
Its zero-knowledge simulator follows the standard simulation for bit-challenge Sigma protocols (sample the challenge bit, then produce a consistent commitment and response).</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="point-addition">
      <name>Point-Addition Proof</name>
      <t>This section specifies the Sigma protocol <tt>PA</tt> proving the relation</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
R_PA = { ((C_1, C_2, C_3) ; P_1, P_2, P_3, openings) :
            C_i = Commit~(P_i; rho_i)  AND  P_1 + P_2 = P_3 }
]]></artwork>
      <t>over Tom commitments to the affine coordinates of <tt>P_1 = (a_x, a_y)</tt>, <tt>P_2 = (b_x, b_y)</tt>, <tt>P_3 = (t_x, t_y)</tt>, under the promise <tt>P_1 != +-P_2</tt> and <tt>P_1, P_2 != identity</tt> (guaranteed by the callers in this document).
Each <tt>C_i</tt> is a pair of coordinate commitments; we write <tt>C_1 = (C[1], C[2])</tt>, <tt>C_2 = (C[3], C[4])</tt>, <tt>C_3 = (C[5], C[6])</tt>, committing to <tt>a_x, a_y, b_x, b_y, t_x, t_y</tt> respectively, all over Tom with generators <tt>(G, H) = (G_t, H_t)</tt>.</t>
      <section anchor="affine-addition-constraints">
        <name>Affine Addition Constraints</name>
        <t>For <tt>P_3 = P_1 + P_2</tt> with <tt>tau = (b_y - a_y) / (b_x - a_x)</tt> over <tt>F_q</tt>, the affine addition law is equivalent to the three constraints</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
(C1)   tau * (b_x - a_x) = b_y - a_y
(C2)   tau^2             = a_x + b_x + t_x
(C3)   tau * (a_x - t_x) = a_y + t_y
]]></artwork>
        <t>together with <tt>b_x - a_x != 0</tt> (which enforces <tt>P_1 != +-P_2</tt>).
<tt>PA</tt> proves knowledge of openings of the coordinate commitments and of a commitment to <tt>tau</tt> satisfying (C1)-(C3).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="protocol-2">
        <name>Protocol</name>
        <t><tt>PA</tt> is the linear relation of <xref target="SIGMA"/> instantiated over Tom-256:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
Relation PA(H, C[1], ..., C[6], C_tau):
  Witness: tau, rtau, inv_f1, aux_f1, e1, e2, f3, rf3, e3, ay, r2
  Equations:
    C_tau = tau * G + rtau * H                  # slope commitment
    G = inv_f1 * (C[3] - C[1]) + aux_f1 * H     # C[3] - C[1] opens
                                                # to b_x - a_x != 0
    C[4] - C[2] = tau * (C[3] - C[1]) + e1 * H  # (C1)
    C[1] + C[3] + C[5] = tau * C_tau + e2 * H   # (C2), squaring
    C[1] - C[5] = f3 * G + rf3 * H              # factor of (C3)
    C[2] + C[6] = f3 * C_tau + e3 * H           # (C3)
    C[2] = ay * G + r2 * H                      # omit in SM
]]></artwork>
        <t><tt>G</tt> is the Tom-256 generator, <tt>H</tt> the auxiliary Pedersen generator.</t>
        <t>Note that any witness with <tt>inv_f1 = 0</tt> would satisfy <tt>G = aux_f1 * H</tt> and thus reveal the discrete logarithm of <tt>G</tt> base <tt>H</tt>. Assuming this is not known, <tt>inv_f1 != 0</tt>, and <tt>C[3] - C[1]</tt> opens to <tt>f1 = 1 / inv_f1 != 0</tt>, hence <tt>b_x - a_x != 0</tt> and <tt>P_1 != +-P_2</tt>.</t>
        <t>The prover holds <tt>a_x</tt>, <tt>a_y</tt>, <tt>b_x</tt>, <tt>b_y</tt>, <tt>t_x</tt>, <tt>t_y</tt> and <tt>r_1</tt>, ..., <tt>r_6</tt>; the verifier holds <tt>C[1]</tt>, ..., <tt>C[6]</tt>. The prover completes the instance with one element of its own:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
tau = (b_y - a_y) / (b_x - a_x)
rtau <-$ F_q;   C_tau = tau * G + rtau * H
]]></artwork>
        <t>and runs the <xref target="SIGMA"/> prover with the witness</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
inv_f1 = 1 / (b_x - a_x)     aux_f1 = -(r_3 - r_1) / (b_x - a_x)
e1 = (r_4 - r_2) - (r_3 - r_1) * tau
e2 = (r_1 + r_3 + r_5) - rtau * tau
f3 = a_x - t_x   rf3 = r_1 - r_5   e3 = (r_2 + r_6) - rtau * f3
ay = a_y         r2  = r_2
]]></artwork>
        <t>The verifier rebuilds the instance from <tt>C[1]</tt>, ..., <tt>C[6]</tt> and the received <tt>C_tau</tt>, then runs the <xref target="SIGMA"/> verifier; no checks beyond it are needed.
<tt>PA</tt> has no Fiat-Shamir challenge of its own; see <xref target="fiat-shamir"/>.</t>
        <t>When <tt>PA</tt> is run inside <tt>SM</tt> (<xref target="scalar-mult"/>), the equation <tt>C[2] = ay * G + r2 * H</tt> is unnecessary (Optimisation 3 of <xref target="PAPER"/>) and is therefore omitted, together with the scalar witnesses <tt>ay</tt>, <tt>r2</tt>.
It <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be kept when <tt>PA</tt> runs alongside <tt>SM</tt> in the <tt>SM x PA</tt> composition of <xref target="rok-group"/>.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="fiat-shamir">
      <name>Non-Interactive Proofs (Fiat-Shamir)</name>
      <t>The interactive protocols above are public-coin and are made non-interactive with the Fiat-Shamir transform specified in the companion document <xref target="FIAT-SHAMIR"/>, applied to the Sigma protocols composed via <xref target="SIGMA"/>: each verifier challenge -- the equality-proof challenge of <xref target="transfer"/>, the bit-challenge <tt>b</tt> of <xref target="scalar-mult"/>, and the challenge of <xref target="point-addition"/> -- is derived by absorbing, into the <xref target="FIAT-SHAMIR"/> codec (duplex sponge), a transcript that includes a protocol/version domain separator, the ciphersuite identifier, the full statement, and all prior prover messages.
<tt>SM</tt> and <tt>PA</tt> are composed in parallel (<xref target="rok-group"/>) under a single hash call: the commitment-phase messages of both are absorbed, and the <tt>lambda</tt> bits <tt>b</tt> of <tt>SM</tt> and the challenge of <tt>PA</tt> are all derived from that one call.</t>
      <t>Implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use the codec and challenge-derivation of <xref target="FIAT-SHAMIR"/> and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include the following in the Fiat-Shamir transcript:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>a fixed domain-separation label for this PoP and its version;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>the public statement of (Eq. POP): <tt>K</tt>, <tt>nonce</tt> (or <tt>Hpt</tt>), and the committed key <tt>C_Q</tt> (and, after transfer, the Tom commitments);</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>for the bound presentation context, the challenge octets supplied by the calling protocol (see <xref target="integration"/>).</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>The exact Fiat-Shamir binding for the composed protocol is not yet fixed by this document.
In particular, the precise inputs absorbed before each challenge -- the domain separator, the credential- and Tom-curve commitments and announcements of the transfer (<xref target="transfer"/>), the prover messages of <tt>SM</tt> and <tt>PA</tt>, and the <xref target="OKMZ"/> bound parameters -- remain to be specified, and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be pinned down (consistent with <xref target="FIAT-SHAMIR"/>) before this profile is interoperable.
The move structure of the sub-protocols is normative; the exact byte-level Fiat-Shamir inputs and complete composed protocol specification are deferred to a future revision.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="integration">
      <name>Integration with Modular BBS</name>
      <t>When used as the <tt>ecdsa-p256-db</tt> sub-proof of <xref target="MODULAR-BBS"/>:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>The holder's P-256 public key occupies four committed BBS messages carrying its 128-bit limbs, encoded as in <xref target="encoding"/>.
The sub-proof carries <tt>alg = "ecdsa-p256-db"</tt> and takes no inputs beyond the base sub-proof fields; its <tt>i</tt> field <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be <tt>[0, 1, 2, 3]</tt>, naming the four indices that hold these limbs.
The BBS core proof (<tt>CoreProofGen</tt>) exposes the four messages as Pedersen commitments over the credential curve; these are the inputs <tt>C_i</tt> to the transfer of <xref target="transfer"/>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The four messages <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be populated at issuance as committed messages using blind BBS issuance (<xref target="BLIND-BBS"/>): the holder sends the issuer a commitment to its device public key (with the holder-held blinding scalar) and a proof of its correctness, and the issuer blindly signs without learning <tt>Q</tt>.
This keeps the device secret key bound to the holder's secure element and unknown to the issuer, and the issuance-time commitment to <tt>Q</tt> is reused as the transfer input above.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The message signed by the secure element is not transmitted; both parties recompute it as <tt>db_msg = "JWP-BBS-DB-CHAL" || presentation_header_octets</tt>, where <tt>"JWP-BBS-DB-CHAL"</tt> is the literal ASCII string.
Because <tt>db_msg</tt> binds <tt>presentation_header_octets</tt> (which carries the <tt>nonce</tt> and <tt>aud</tt>), it is fresh per presentation.
<tt>db_msg</tt> is the ECDSA message of the PoP: it plays the role of <tt>nonce</tt> in <xref target="overview"/>, so <tt>alpha</tt> and <tt>Hpt</tt> are formed from <tt>H(db_msg)</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The <tt>proof</tt> bytes are the serialized non-interactive PoP (<xref target="fiat-shamir"/>): a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of <tt>(Q, (r, s))</tt> such that the four commitments at the indices in <tt>i</tt> open to the 128-bit limbs of <tt>Q</tt>, and <tt>(r, s)</tt> is a valid ECDSA P-256 signature on <tt>db_msg</tt> under <tt>Q</tt>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The verifier accepts iff the four indices in <tt>i</tt> are all committed in the core proof and the sub-proof verifies against the four commitments and the locally recomputed <tt>db_msg</tt>.
This meets the <xref target="MODULAR-BBS"/> requirement that a sub-proof bind to commitments attested by the core proof, since the transfer of <xref target="transfer"/> ties the Tom commitments <tt>C_Q</tt> to the credential-curve commitments produced by <tt>CoreProofGen</tt>.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>The PoP itself is agnostic to the credential scheme: any scheme that can expose a Pedersen commitment to the device public key over a curve supported by the transfer of <xref target="transfer"/> can use this sub-proof.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="implementation-status">
      <name>Implementation Status</name>
      <ul empty="true">
        <li>
          <t>Note to the RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>A public, benchmarked reference implementation of the complete Schnorr-type PoP specified here -- the <tt>( SM x PA ) o group o transfer</tt> composition of <xref target="overview"/>, including the <xref target="OKMZ"/> style commitment transfer of <xref target="transfer"/> and the Tom-256 scalar-multiplication and point-addition proofs -- is available at <eref target="https://github.com/hpicrypto/ecdsa_pops">https://github.com/hpicrypto/ecdsa_pops</eref>.
It is written in Rust and underlies the measurements reported in <xref target="PAPER"/>.</t>
      <t><xref target="PAPER"/> gives three realizations of the same ECDSA-device-binding relation -- the Schnorr-type proof specified in this document and two circuit-based variants that are out of scope here (see <xref target="scope"/>) -- and earlier variants of the Schnorr-type approach appear in <xref target="UBIQUE"/>.
The repository above is the specific implementation that matches this document's Schnorr-type protocol and parameter choices, except that its <tt>PA</tt> proves <tt>b_x - a_x != 0</tt> with the non-zero gadget of <xref target="CDLS"/> rather than the single equation of <xref target="point-addition"/>.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <dl>
        <dt>Knowledge soundness.</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The composed protocol is a proof of knowledge for (Eq. POP) (see <xref target="PAPER"/> for the analysis in the reductions-of-knowledge framework).
<tt>SM</tt> has soundness error <tt>2^-lambda</tt> after <tt>lambda</tt> parallel repetitions; <tt>PA</tt> has the <tt>2^-lambda</tt> soundness error of a Sigma protocol over <tt>F_q</tt>.
At the moment, we set <tt>lambda = 128</tt>, but since the commitment linking protocol <xref target="transfer"/> achieves 112 bits of soundness for our proposed parameters, we may update to <tt>lambda = 112</tt> in future revisions.
Soundness of the overall PoP additionally relies on the binding of all Pedersen commitments, i.e. on the discrete-log assumption in both the credential curve and the Tom curve, and on the small-message soundness precondition of the transfer proof (<xref target="transfer"/>).</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Zero knowledge / unlinkability.</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Each sub-protocol is honest-verifier zero-knowledge; with Fiat-Shamir over a random oracle the composition is non-interactive zero-knowledge.
The device public key <tt>Q</tt> is the only long-lived value and remains perfectly hidden by the Pedersen commitments, so presentations are unlinkable.
The ephemeral value <tt>K</tt> is fresh per signature and per presentation; revealing it does not link presentations.
Implementations <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use fresh randomness for every commitment and every proof; reuse of the per-execution randomness in <tt>SM</tt>, of commitment randomizers, or of the per-presentation <tt>nonce</tt> can leak the secret key or link presentations.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Secure-element trust.</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>This PoP assumes the device secret key never leaves the secure element and that the element produces signatures only on inputs presented to it; the holder cannot extract the key.
Revealing <tt>K</tt> as part of the statement is sound for proof of possession only under the honest-secure-element assumption discussed in <xref target="PAPER"/>.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Choice of the Tom curve.</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>Using the Tom curve introduces a discrete-log assumption over an additional, less-studied curve.
Deployments unwilling to take this assumption should use a circuit-based realization instead (out of scope here).
<tt>(G_t, H_t)</tt> and all credential-curve generators <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be nothing-up-my-sleeve / verifiably random so no party knows discrete-log relations among them.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Non-degeneracy.</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>The point-addition proof is sound only under <tt>P_1 != +-P_2</tt> and <tt>P_1, P_2 != identity</tt>.
The callers in this document guarantee these: <tt>SM</tt> excludes the degenerate scalars when forming its auxiliary instances (per <xref target="CDLS"/>), and the <tt>group</tt> reduction fixes the operands structurally.
Other callers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> establish these preconditions independently.</t>
        </dd>
        <dt>Post-quantum.</dt>
        <dd>
          <t>As with all discrete-log Sigma protocols, these proofs provide (statistical) zero-knowledge against unbounded adversaries but are not sound against quantum adversaries.</t>
        </dd>
      </dl>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document has no IANA actions of its own.
It defines the construction behind the <tt>ecdsa-p256-db</tt> sub-proof algorithm whose registration is requested by <xref target="MODULAR-BBS"/> in that document's sub-proof algorithm registry; this document does not create a new registry.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="SIGMA">
          <front>
            <title>Sigma Proofs for Linear Relations</title>
            <author fullname="Michele Orrù" initials="M." surname="Orrù">
              <organization>CNRS</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Cathie Yun" initials="C." surname="Yun">
              <organization>Apple, Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document describes Sigma Protocols for proving knowledge of
   preimages of linear maps in prime-order elliptic curve groups.  These
   are sometimes also called _Maurer Proofs_, or _proofs of knowledge of
   a preimage of a group homomorphism_.

   Examples include zero-knowledge proofs for discrete logarithm
   relations, ElGamal encryptions, Pedersen commitments, and range
   proofs.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-irtf-cfrg-sigma-protocols-04"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="FIAT-SHAMIR">
          <front>
            <title>Fiat-Shamir Transformation</title>
            <author fullname="Michele Orrù" initials="M." surname="Orrù">
              <organization>CNRS</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Cathie Yun" initials="C." surname="Yun">
              <organization>Apple, Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document describes the Fiat-Shamir transformation, which allows
   making a public-coin protocol non-interactive by means of a
   cryptographic hash function.

   It specifies how the hash function is employed, how prover messages
   are encoded as hash-function input, and how verifier messages are
   decoded from the hash function's output, as well as the serialization
   and deserialization of the non-interactive argument string.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-irtf-cfrg-fiat-shamir-04"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="MODULAR-BBS" target="https://c2bo.github.io/draft-bormann-jwp-modular-bbs/draft-bormann-jwp-modular-bbs.html">
          <front>
            <title>BBS and Modular Sub-proofs with JSON Web Proofs</title>
            <author initials="C." surname="Bormann" fullname="Christian Bormann">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="B." surname="Zundel" fullname="Brent Zundel">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2025"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-bormann-jwp-modular-bbs"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SEC1" target="https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Version 2.0</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2009"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="FIPS186-5" target="https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-5">
          <front>
            <title>Digital Signature Standard (DSS)</title>
            <author>
              <organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2023"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="FIPS" value="PUB 186-5"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="PAPER">
          <front>
            <title>Device Binding for Anonymous Credentials on Legacy Phones</title>
            <author fullname="Sofia Celi">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Anja Lehmann">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Shai Levin">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Alexandros Zacharakis">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2025"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="BBS">
          <front>
            <title>The BBS Signature Scheme</title>
            <author fullname="Tobias Looker" initials="T." surname="Looker">
              <organization>MATTR</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Vasilis Kalos" initials="V." surname="Kalos">
              <organization>MATTR</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Andrew Whitehead" initials="A." surname="Whitehead">
              <organization>Portage</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Mike Lodder" initials="M." surname="Lodder">
              <organization>CryptID</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Greg M. Bernstein" initials="G. M." surname="Bernstein">
              <organization>Grotto Networking</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="29" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document describes the BBS Signature scheme, a secure, multi-
   message digital signature protocol, supporting proving knowledge of a
   signature while selectively disclosing any subset of the signed
   messages.  Concretely, the scheme allows for signing multiple
   messages whilst producing a single, constant size, digital signature.
   Additionally, the possessor of a BBS signatures is able to create
   zero-knowledge, proofs of knowledge of a signature, while selectively
   disclosing subsets of the signed messages.  Being zero-knowledge, the
   BBS proofs do not reveal any information about the undisclosed
   messages or the signature itself, while at the same time,
   guaranteeing the authenticity and integrity of the disclosed
   messages.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures-14"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="BLIND-BBS">
          <front>
            <title>Blind BBS Signatures</title>
            <author fullname="Vasilis Kalos" initials="V." surname="Kalos">
              <organization>MATTR</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Greg M. Bernstein" initials="G. M." surname="Bernstein">
              <organization>Grotto Networking</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="30" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines an extension to the BBS Signature scheme that
   supports blind digital signatures, i.e., signatures over messages not
   known to the Signer.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-irtf-cfrg-bbs-blind-signatures-05"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="W3CBBS" target="https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-di-bbs/">
          <front>
            <title>Data Integrity BBS Cryptosuites v1.0</title>
            <author>
              <organization>World Wide Web Consortium (W3C)</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2025"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RoK">
          <front>
            <title>Algebraic Reductions of Knowledge</title>
            <author fullname="Abhiram Kothapalli">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Bryan Parno">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2023"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="CRYPTO" value="2023"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="CDLS">
          <front>
            <title>CDLS: Proving Knowledge of Committed Discrete Logarithms with Soundness</title>
            <author initials="S." surname="Celi" fullname="Sofia Celi">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="S." surname="Levin" fullname="Shai Levin">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="J." surname="Rowell" fullname="Joe Rowell">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2024"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="AFRICACRYPT" value="2024"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ZKATTEST">
          <front>
            <title>ZKAttest: Ring and Group Signatures on top of existing ECDSA keys</title>
            <author initials="A." surname="Faz-Hernandez" fullname="Armando Faz-Hernandez">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="W." surname="Ladd" fullname="Watson Ladd">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="D." surname="Maram" fullname="Deepak Maram">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2021"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="SAC" value="2021"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="OKMZ">
          <front>
            <title>Beyond the Circuit: How to Minimize Foreign Arithmetic in ZKP Circuits</title>
            <author initials="M." surname="Orrù" fullname="Michele Orrù">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="G." surname="Kadianakis" fullname="George Kadianakis">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="M." surname="Maller" fullname="Mary Maller">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="G." surname="Zaverucha" fullname="Greg Zaverucha">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2025"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="CiC" value="2025"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="LSZ" target="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-19567-8_3">
          <front>
            <title>Vision: A Modular Framework for Anonymous Credential Systems</title>
            <author initials="A." surname="Lehmann" fullname="Anja Lehmann">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="A." surname="Sidorenko" fullname="Andrey Sidorenko">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="A." surname="Zacharakis" fullname="Alexandros Zacharakis">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2026"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="SSR" value="2025"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="UBIQUE">
          <front>
            <title>BBS+ Device Binding via ECDSA (EUDI Innovation Competition prototype)</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Ubique</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2024"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="EUDI-ARF" target="https://eudi.dev/2.4.0/">
          <front>
            <title>EU Digital Identity Wallet -- Architecture and Reference Framework</title>
            <author>
              <organization>European Commission</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="DEROSA" target="https://github.com/eu-digital-identity-wallet/eudi-doc-architecture-and-reference-framework/discussions/211/#discussioncomment-9882388">
          <front>
            <title>Discussion comment on Cryptographers' Feedback on the EU Digital Identity's ARF #211</title>
            <author initials="P. D." surname="Rosa" fullname="Paolo De Rosa">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2024"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 631?>

<section numbered="false" anchor="note-on-authorship">
      <name>Note on Authorship</name>
      <t>The authors are listed in alphabetical order by surname and contributed equally to this work; the ordering does not denote a lead or corresponding author.
The document name uses the authors' combined initials ("cllz") rather than any single surname.
The "et al." form that appears in running headers is an artifact of the RFC document format and carries no such connotation here.</t>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>This specification is derived from the construction and analysis in <xref target="PAPER"/>.
The Schnorr-type proof of possession formalizes and optimizes the ECDSA-device-binding approach of <xref target="UBIQUE"/> and the CDLS / zkAttest proofs of <xref target="CDLS"/> and <xref target="ZKATTEST"/>, composed through the modular credential framework of <xref target="LSZ"/> and the reductions-of-knowledge framework of <xref target="RoK"/>.
We would like to especially thank Michele Orrù for his contributions to the draft, namely an optimisation of the PA protocol and its expression via the <xref target="SIGMA"/> interface.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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