Internet-Draft Interoperable Execution Finality November 2026
Das Expires 20 May 2027 [Page]
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Author:
S. Das
Independent Inventor

Interoperable Execution-Finality Authority Across Heterogeneous Computing Platforms: Protected Effect Semantics, Cross-Device Authority Continuity, and Resource-Side Enforcement

Abstract

Computation is not authority to act. An operating system may authenticate an application, a device may recognize a permission, a cloud service may accept a token, an AI agent may hold a tool credential and a remote application may receive a command, yet none of these facts shows that the consequential operation actually executed is still within the originating authority, scope, current policy and resource state. This document describes an informational architecture for preserving an equivalent protected authorization relationship across heterogeneous platforms such as Android, iOS, macOS, Windows, Linux, cloud services, trusted hardware, edge devices and autonomous agents, whose native permission models and enforcement mechanisms differ. Qualified native evidence is translated into a protected canonical effect descriptor, scoped non-bearer enablement is created, and a receiving Finality Sink reconstructs the actual pending operation and enforces authority at a covered boundary. The document covers enforcement-capability qualification, cross-device ownership with source fencing, receipt-gated continuation, protected reauthorization, recovery and an honest account of what each mechanism can and cannot control.

Source, Patent Basis and Notices

Foundational reference: PCT/IB2026/055615 ("Mothership"), filed 4 June 2026 and published 16 July 2026 as WO 2026/150382 A2. Where to read the full PCT filing: search "Sangam Das" on WIPO PATENTSCOPE; search PCT/IB2026/055615 (pctib202655615); or read the PCT file directly in Technical Disclosure Commons at https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/12542/.

Technical source of this document: an Indian provisional specification titled "Systems and Methods for Cross-Platform Interoperable Execution-Finality Control, Protected Authority Continuity, and Consequence Enforcement Across Heterogeneous Operating Systems, Devices, and Autonomous Computing Environments", supplied as a 3,577-page document with 40 distinct numbered embodiments and 60 claims, electronically signed 25 October 2026. The applicant identifies the application as 202631127058, filed 25 October 2026. The PDF text is not a certified Patent Office acknowledgment, so the number and date are applicant-identified and are not independently verified. See [[ipr]] and [[app-j]].

The IPR disclosure for this document will be made at the appropriate time in accordance with IETF guidelines.

Human-Originated Invention: the underlying invention is attributed to the human inventor Sangam Kumar Das. AI-Assisted Technical Preparation: this text was prepared with AI assistance and may contain errors; identifiers, dates, standards references and product statements must be verified against primary sources. Non-Endorsement: this is an individual proposal, not an IETF standard; company and product references are prospective research environments only, and no adoption, endorsement, partnership, copying, infringement or implementation is asserted. Security Limitation: protection applies only to effect paths actually covered; no universal operating-system privilege, instantaneous cross-domain revocation, global exactly-once execution, complete physical safety or zero-latency validation is presumed.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 May 2027.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Interoperability between computing platforms is usually described as the ability to exchange data or requests. A different and harder question is whether two or more environments can preserve an equivalent protected authorization relationship for a consequential operation when their permission models, application isolation, hardware security, execution interfaces and trust assumptions differ.

The architecture answers that question without assuming uniform kernels or identical security APIs. Heterogeneous platforms translate qualified authority into operation-specific effect semantics, and a participating resource boundary independently enforces those semantics.

This document is understandable without reading the patent. Appendices map the mechanisms to the source specification and to examiner terminology; they are non-normative.

2. Problem Statement

A native permission on one platform and a native permission on another with a similar name may not mean the same thing. A credential accepted by a cloud service says who is calling, not which operation is about to take effect. When an unfinished operation moves from a phone to a cloud service, copying its state does not tell anyone whether the old device is still able to act. When a tool is updated, its effect semantics may change while its name stays the same. These problems are about authority for actual effects, not about transport or authentication.

The central question is how to keep protected authority meaningful across platforms, and how to say plainly where it stops.

3. Scope and Non-Goals

4. Terminology

BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] terms are used only where a requirement is intentionally stated.

Candidate Act

A proposed consequential operation held in a Non-Effective State.

Canonical Effect Descriptor

A versioned, typed representation of the material actual operation.

Finality Sink

The component at an actual resource boundary that reconstructs the pending operation and permits or withholds the effect.

Scoped non-bearer finality enablement

Operation-specific, sink-bound permission whose possession alone confers no authority.

Enforcement Qualification Record

A record of what a platform security mechanism can actually observe, block or consume.

Authority epoch

A monotonic generation used for ownership, revocation or policy.

Source fencing

Evidence or mechanism that prevents a previous owner from effecting the operation.

5. Cross-Platform Trust Model

The foundational sequence is: originating authority, Candidate Act, Non-Effective State, heterogeneous evidence translation, protected canonical effect descriptor, independent protected validation, scoped non-bearer finality enablement, receiving Finality Sink reconstruction, current authority and coverage check, protected consumption, actual consequence, and qualified outcome evidence. See Figure 2.

Source operating system

Controls the request origin; can prove what it observes, not what a remote sink will do.

Adapter

Translates native evidence; must itself be qualified; can mistranslate.

Protected Enforcement Domain

Holds authority, policy, revocation and consumption state; trusted only within its stated environment.

Finality Sink

Controls the effect at its boundary; cannot control paths it does not cover.

Outcome observer

Provides evidence within its observation capability.

An unauthorized action can still bypass the architecture through any effect path that does not pass a covered sink, through a compromised privileged host, or through a credential copy outside the broker. The draft therefore ties every assurance to the component that can provide it.

6. Heterogeneous Authorization Semantics

Platform permission names are not treated as semantically equivalent. An adapter produces an effect-specific claim and records whether the claim is equivalent to, narrower than, or incompatible with the canonical semantics (Figure 6). A native entitlement is advice; it is not final authority for an operation.

Syntactic interoperability (the fields parse) differs from semantic equivalence (the operation means the same). The former never implies the latter.

7. Candidate Acts and Non-Effective State

A Candidate Act identifies the proposed operation and binds its action class, resource, destination, parameters, source authority and effect constraints. The Non-Effective State keeps the consequence from taking effect while conditions remain unsatisfied. Forms include protected queues, withheld credentials, uncommitted transactions and isolated command buffers. A simulated hold is insufficient if another effective route remains available. Where mandatory enforcement is unavailable, the defined condition is non-effective, not silently weakened.

8. Source Authority and Delegation

The original authority, principal, delegated scope and restrictions are recorded. Delegation across providers keeps a cryptographic lineage in which scope can only narrow (Figure 12). A forged or expanded delegation fails lineage verification. Source authentication is not the same as actual effect authority.

Embodiments E7, E28 and E29 address delegation continuity, transitive attenuation and approval quorums.

9. Platform-Specific Evidence Adapters

Adapters translate qualified native-platform security information into the protected common representation. For each platform below, the table-like list states what established controls provide, what additional binding is needed, and what is not assumed.

9.1. Android

Established native controls

Application UID isolation, app permissions, Keystore and hardware-backed keys, StrongBox where available, managed/enterprise device services, app-controlled tool dispatchers, server-side resource enforcement, authorised accessibility interfaces, device state and security updates.

Additional binding needed for effect-specific cross-platform authority

Native permissions describe what an app may ask the platform to do; they do not describe the specific consequential operation. A binding of permission, operation-specific canonical descriptor and a resource-side check is needed.

Not assumed

An ordinary Android application has no unrestricted system-wide mediation; enforcement is limited to effects routed through the app dispatcher or a participating resource-side gateway.

9.2. iOS, iPadOS and macOS

Established native controls

App sandbox, entitlements, Keychain, Secure Enclave, app-controlled effectuation, system-approved extensions, managed apps or enterprise interfaces, server-side enforcement, app-to-app and device-to-device communication, current platform security state.

Additional binding needed for effect-specific cross-platform authority

The same operation-specific binding is needed; platform identity of the app is not authority for a particular effect.

Not assumed

No private kernel hooks, no universal app interception and no access to other apps credentials are assumed.

9.3. Windows

Established native controls

Process and service identities, AppContainer and isolation mechanisms, security principals, credential protection, TPM-backed keys, protected service brokers, endpoint management, privileged execution interfaces.

Additional binding needed for effect-specific cross-platform authority

A broker or service can hold authority, but binding it to the exact pending effect and to a revocation generation is an addition.

Not assumed

Security principals do not by themselves limit what an authorised principal does with a credential it can export.

9.4. Linux

Established native controls

Process credentials, namespaces, LSMs, seccomp, capabilities, cgroups, containers, hardware-backed keys, service-mesh and workload identity, privileged resource controllers.

Additional binding needed for effect-specific cross-platform authority

Kernel controls restrict processes; they do not know an operation-level canonical effect. A resource controller or sink must reconstruct the operation.

Not assumed

Application-level code cannot independently resist a fully compromised kernel.

9.5. Cloud and embedded

Established native controls

Cloud IAM, resource-native API authorization, managed identity, confidential computing, HSM/KMS, secure and measured boot, device command controllers, firmware security, trusted peripherals, remote attestation, resource-gateway enforcement.

Additional binding needed for effect-specific cross-platform authority

Cloud IAM authorizes API principals; the additional binding is operation-specific, sink-reconstructed and consumed once under protected state.

Not assumed

Where a direct credential path to the resource remains, a gateway does not control the effect.

10. Canonical Effect Descriptors

The Canonical Effect Descriptor is versioned and typed. Candidate fields: descriptor version; original operation and Candidate Act identifiers; originating principal; requesting workload; source and receiving platform; parent task; delegation chain; effect class; effective resource identity; destination or beneficiary; material parameters; allowed transformations; source authority; scope; policy, revocation and resource generations; designated Finality Sink; required evidence; enforcement-coverage reference; validity conditions; protected usage conditions. Mandatory fields depend on the effect; not every application carries all fields.

Canonicalization must address Unicode normalization, binary addresses, object ordering, numeric precision, timestamps, resource aliases, URL normalization, redirects, nested operations, unknown critical fields, schema evolution, units, localized strings and application-specific semantics. Unknown critical fields cause rejection. A valid hash of an incorrectly built descriptor does not prove the actual operation has the intended meaning (Figure 7).

Illustrative JSON (not a mandatory encoding):

{
  "v": 1,
  "op": "op-7f3a",
  "candidate_act": "ca-19",
  "effect_class": "payment.transfer",
  "resource": "acct:EXAMPLE-1",
  "beneficiary": "acct:EXAMPLE-2",
  "params": {"amount": "100.00", "ccy": "EUR"},
  "source_platform": "android",
  "recv_platform": "linux",
  "authority_gen": 12,
  "revocation_gen": 4,
  "sink": "sink-pay-01",
  "critical": ["resource","beneficiary","params"]
}
Figure 1: Illustrative canonical effect descriptor

11. Enforcement-Capability Qualification

A security mechanism may provide authentication, authorization advice, logging, observation, notification, isolation, revocation notification, restricted credential use, operation-specific blocking, actual resource-side refusal, protected authority consumption or trusted state verification. These capabilities are not interchangeable. A monitoring API is not a blocking interface because its name contains security; a sandbox does not control an external service that accepts the agent's credentials; a credential broker does not control other copies of credentials (Figure 8, Figure 9).

An Enforcement Qualification Record contains: platform; security component; controlled resource; operation class; available observation; ability to block; current component generation; required trust assumption; known alternate effect routes; qualification status; and the event that requires revalidation. Status values are qualified, partially qualified, unresolved and disqualified. Where mandatory blocking is unavailable, the options are to move enforcement to a participating resource-side gateway, to restrict supported effects, or to withhold the protected operation. The claimed protection property is not silently weakened.

12. Protected Enforcement Domains

The Protected Enforcement Domain maintains applicable authority, evidence, policy versions, revocation, consumption counters and technical conditions. An Extended Verification Module Interface supports optional checks on semantic identity, privacy, conflicts, device state, resource limits, evidence, delegation or prior-effect dependencies. A Protected Authority Controller creates, derives or activates scoped finality enablement; a Finality Gate combines mandatory predicates. Domain separation is by control, not by location alone.

13. Scoped Finality Enablement

Enablement is operation-specific, sink-bound and non-bearer: possessing it does not authorize arbitrary use (Figure 13). It is bound to the descriptor, the designated sink, current generations and a protected usage condition. A sink that cannot verify the binding refuses.

Local authority and the destination sink are distinct (Figure 10). A credential broker can hold the credential, but downstream enforcement must still check the operation (Figure 11).

14. Receiving-Platform Finality Sinks

The sink independently obtains or reconstructs the actual pending operation, checks its correspondence to the descriptor and to current sink-local state, and permits or withholds the effect through a controlled enforcement boundary. A sink that only logs is not a sink. A sink controls only effects that pass through it; effect-path discovery and a coverage controller report which routes are covered.

15. Authority Consumption

Authorization is consumed under protected monotonic state (Figure 15). A crash between consumption and effect leaves the outcome indeterminate; it is recorded as unknown and is not blindly retried. Authority and revocation epochs are checked at effect time (Figure 14).

16. Cross-Device Ownership and Migration

The stages are: identify the unfinished operation; establish the current source owner; authenticate the target; verify eligibility; determine effect-capable source routes; prepare transferable computational context; distinguish computational state from finality authority; establish a protected ownership-transition generation; verify source fencing; reconstruct the destination effect scope; establish destination-specific protected authority; verify the actual pending operation at the destination; prevent stale source effectuation; preserve consumed or unresolved effect state; reconcile partial migration failure (Figure 16, Figure 17).

Negative scenarios include a suspended or disconnected source, both sides active, snapshot restoration reviving an old worker, a source that retains an API credential, a hardware queue that remains executable, weaker destination trust, an effect before transfer completes, revocation during transfer, a delayed callback to the source, destination retry of an unresolved operation, and accidental merging of two pending operations.

Invariant: no duplicated, unauthorized execution authority may arise merely from copying or restoring computational state. Instant global revocation across disconnected devices is not assumed.

17. Revocation and Offline Operation

Revocation propagates across domains and invalidates dependent authority; offline authority is bounded by explicit leases and clock uncertainty (Figure 18). Cached permission after revocation, epoch rollback and incorrect lease expiry are threats listed in Appendix E. Delayed revocation is a stated limitation, not a solved problem.

18. Common Workflow CW-1

CW-1 is the modular protected architecture with actual-operation reconstruction, independent protected authority, non-bypassable consequence enforcement and optional advanced mechanisms. Components: Requesting Computational Entity (constructs requests, holds no finality authority automatically); Candidate Act Constructor; Non-Effective Holding Mechanism; Protected Enforcement Domain; Extended Verification Module Interface; Protected Authority Controller; Finality Gate; Finality Sink; Protected State and Evidence Store; Optional Effect Observer; Optional Interim Effectuation Validator; Effectuation-Path Coverage Controller. No implementation need contain every optional module.

19. Receipt-Gated Workflow CW-2

CW-2 divides an operation into bounded phases. The first phase is independently authorized; a bounded real effect occurs through a participating sink; qualified evidence is obtained; an authorized Interim Effectuation Validator evaluates it; the accepted receipt becomes a required causal condition for the next phase; the successor sink independently checks the receipt-dependent authority. Missing, stale, replayed, unqualified or contradicted evidence does not enable the successor effect (Figure 19, Figure 20).

20. Reauthorization Workflow CW-3

CW-3 covers original task scope, cumulative actual effect, material scope deviation, independent security signals, false positives, conflicting evidence, risk-adaptive suspension, reauthorization eligibility, the exact changed consequence, human or authorized automated approval, protected authority generation, current policy and revocation, limited renewed authority, sink-side verification, repeated deviations, recovery and audit (Figure 21).

A human approval or automated reauthorization cannot override unrelated mandatory protections: approval to continue a robotic operation does not establish physical safety, actuator identity or valid prior-effect evidence. An approval screen, a confirmation prompt or an alert acknowledgment is insufficient unless the resulting permission is bound to the actual effect.

21. Present-Day Implementability (CW-IMP-1)

The source's supplementary implementation material (CW-IMP-1) explains how existing technologies can support selected functions: protected application dispatchers, credential brokers, secure enclaves, TEEs, HSMs, secure elements, transactional databases, authenticated receipts, hardware command gates, server-side resource controllers, attestation services, runtime policy engines, monotonic state, recovery journals, isolated services and protected device communication. These provide building blocks; the additional enforcement relationships (operation reconstruction at the sink, operation-bound enablement, source fencing) are what the architecture adds. For every assurance, the component able to provide it is named in Appendix D and in the mechanism list in Section 23. Application code cannot resist a fully compromised kernel; an iOS app has no arbitrary system-wide interception; an Android app cannot mediate all device or app operations; cross-platform non-bypassability is not claimed unless all relevant paths are controlled.

22. Tool Runtime and Agent Handoff

Tool installation, update and runtime changes are consequential transitions: authority bound to a prior generation does not carry over without revalidation (Figure 24). Tool outputs are data, not instruction authority. Cross-provider handoff keeps delegation lineage; moving agent context does not move effect authority. Nested tool invocation attenuates authority. Embodiments E10, E20, E24, E25, E26, E27, E28 and E34 apply.

Tool names that look equivalent may carry different permissions or effects; compatibility is validated per contract version before authority is accepted.

23. Hardware and Cloud Enforcement

For each enforcement alternative the entries state: effects it can control; what an attacker can bypass; whether protected state survives crashes; whether it can prevent replay; whether it can verify current revocation; whether authority is transferable; whether it can attest its enforcement generation; and what happens when it is unavailable. Not every implementation is hardware-rooted, and software-only separation from a fully compromised privileged host is not claimed.

23.1. Application-level enforcement

Effects it can control

Only effects routed through the application dispatcher.

Attacker bypass

A compromised or modified application, or any direct credential path.

State survives crashes

Only if the application journals durably.

Prevents replay

Only with a durable counter.

Verifies current revocation

Only by querying a service.

Authority transferable

Only by explicit transfer protocol.

Attests its enforcement generation

No, unless backed by an attestable component.

If unavailable

Effects through the dispatcher stop; other paths are unaffected.

23.2. Privileged OS service

Effects it can control

Effects mediated by the service on that host.

Attacker bypass

A compromised kernel or direct driver access.

State survives crashes

Depends on service storage.

Prevents replay

Yes, if state is monotonic.

Verifies current revocation

If it can reach the revocation source.

Authority transferable

Not inherently.

Attests its enforcement generation

Possible with platform attestation.

If unavailable

Mediated effects stop; the rest is outside control.

23.3. Managed device gateway

Effects it can control

Effects of managed devices routed through it.

Attacker bypass

Unmanaged devices and alternate networks.

State survives crashes

Yes if stored in the gateway.

Prevents replay

Yes.

Verifies current revocation

Yes when online.

Authority transferable

Gateway-held authority can be moved.

Attests its enforcement generation

Partly.

If unavailable

Managed effects stop; others unaffected.

23.4. Remote resource controller

Effects it can control

Effects at the resource it fronts.

Attacker bypass

Paths to the resource that bypass the controller.

State survives crashes

Yes if transactional.

Prevents replay

Yes.

Verifies current revocation

Yes when it can reach revocation state.

Authority transferable

Resource-bound, not transferable.

Attests its enforcement generation

Possible.

If unavailable

The resource refuses by default; availability falls.

23.5. Hardware security module

Effects it can control

Cryptographic operations it holds keys for.

Attacker bypass

Effects outside the key use.

State survives crashes

Yes, in the module.

Prevents replay

Via monotonic counters.

Verifies current revocation

Not by itself.

Authority transferable

Keys may be non-transferable.

Attests its enforcement generation

Yes.

If unavailable

Key use stops.

23.6. Secure element

Effects it can control

Operations the element signs or authorizes.

Attacker bypass

Everything not routed through it.

State survives crashes

Yes.

Prevents replay

Via counters.

Verifies current revocation

Not by itself.

Authority transferable

Typically bound to a device.

Attests its enforcement generation

Yes.

If unavailable

Key use stops.

23.7. TPM-backed authority

Effects it can control

Operations needing keys sealed to platform state.

Attacker bypass

Effects not gated by those keys.

State survives crashes

Yes for sealed state.

Prevents replay

Via counters.

Verifies current revocation

No.

Authority transferable

Bound to platform.

Attests its enforcement generation

Yes (measured state).

If unavailable

Sealed secrets become unusable.

23.8. Confidential computing

Effects it can control

Computation inside the protected environment.

Attacker bypass

Effects emitted after leaving it.

State survives crashes

Depends on storage design.

Prevents replay

Possible.

Verifies current revocation

Not by itself.

Authority transferable

Depends.

Attests its enforcement generation

Yes, for the environment.

If unavailable

Environment attestation fails closed.

23.9. Trusted execution environment

Effects it can control

Operations run in the trusted world.

Attacker bypass

The normal world and unrelated paths.

State survives crashes

Depends.

Prevents replay

Possible.

Verifies current revocation

Not by itself.

Authority transferable

Depends.

Attests its enforcement generation

Yes.

If unavailable

Trusted operations stop.

23.10. Protected virtual machine

Effects it can control

Effects the VM boundary mediates.

Attacker bypass

Host-level compromise and paths outside the VM.

State survives crashes

Depends.

Prevents replay

Possible.

Verifies current revocation

Not by itself.

Authority transferable

Migration needs fencing.

Attests its enforcement generation

Depends.

If unavailable

VM-mediated effects stop.

23.11. Hardware command buffer

Effects it can control

Queued device commands.

Attacker bypass

Direct register or alternate queue access.

State survives crashes

Depends on device.

Prevents replay

Depends.

Verifies current revocation

No.

Authority transferable

Not transferable.

Attests its enforcement generation

Device-dependent.

If unavailable

Queued commands are withheld.

23.12. GPU or accelerator command control

Effects it can control

Commands through the controlled queue.

Attacker bypass

Alternate queues or drivers.

State survives crashes

Depends.

Prevents replay

Depends.

Verifies current revocation

No.

Authority transferable

No.

Attests its enforcement generation

Device-dependent.

If unavailable

Controlled commands stop.

23.13. Network egress controller

Effects it can control

Traffic crossing the egress point.

Attacker bypass

Alternate egress paths.

State survives crashes

Depends.

Prevents replay

Yes for counters.

Verifies current revocation

Yes if connected.

Authority transferable

Not transferable.

Attests its enforcement generation

Possible.

If unavailable

Egress blocks; connectivity falls.

23.14. Secure display and user confirmation

Effects it can control

What the user sees and confirms.

Attacker bypass

Differences between displayed and executed operation.

State survives crashes

N/A.

Prevents replay

Single-use confirmation tokens.

Verifies current revocation

N/A.

Authority transferable

No.

Attests its enforcement generation

Platform dependent.

If unavailable

No confirmation, no operation.

23.15. Physical actuator controller

Effects it can control

Commands to the actuator.

Attacker bypass

Direct wiring or an uncontrolled controller.

State survives crashes

Yes if non-volatile.

Prevents replay

Yes.

Verifies current revocation

No.

Authority transferable

No.

Attests its enforcement generation

Possible.

If unavailable

Actuation withheld; safety state must be defined separately.

24. Failure and Recovery

Unknown completion stays unknown. Replay of consumed authority is refused. Recovery is a new Candidate Act with its own authority; compensation is separately authorized. Partial multi-resource effects are contained and reconciled without promising atomicity (Figure 26, Figure 31). Irreversible effects are checked for hazard before effect and, if unsafe, contained (Figure 27). Evidence from a possibly compromised observer is checked by independent attestation (Figure 28).

25. Embodiment Clusters

Six clusters group the embodiments. Embodiment numbering E1 to E40 follows the source; the second full section labelled Embodiment 31 is a repeated version, not a forty-first embodiment (Appendix J).

25.1. Cluster A: Effect Conflict, Quorums and Cumulative Resources

Embodiments: E1, E5, E11, E13, E22, E29.

A quorum approval is not automatically authority to execute. A resource fairness decision is not automatically a valid execution capability. Individually permissible operations may become impermissible when jointly applied; examples are cloud resource allocation, network reconfiguration and payment budgets.

  • E1: Protected cross-agent effect-conflict arbitration with atomic reservations and sink-bound fencing
  • E5: Cryptographically verifiable, assistant-neutral resource allocation and protected eligible-demand completeness
  • E11: Concurrent-effect reconciliation, version-bound reservations and sink-local commit validation
  • E13: Multi-agent consensus, quorum integrity and non-delegable finality authorization
  • E22: Multi-resource budgets, delegated quotas and cumulative consequential limits
  • E29: Independent approval quorums and protected consensus-to-effect separation

25.2. Cluster B: Receipts, Evidence and Outcome Truth

Embodiments: E2, E4, E15, E16, E38, E40.

A signature is not truth, and a dispatch acknowledgment is not actual completion. Independent validator identity, observation coverage, consumed authorization and indeterminate outcomes must each be represented.

  • E2: Identity-bound Interim Effectuation Validation and receipt-constituted causal continuation
  • E4: Cross-domain actual-consequence witnessing and qualified remote-effect evidence
  • E15: Cross-domain evidence commitments, non-bearer authority and sink-local monotonic consumption
  • E16: Crash-consistent finality journaling, one-time authorization and indeterminate outcome handling
  • E38: Evidence integrity, compromised observers and independent attestation reconstruction
  • E40: End-to-end effect provenance, protected authority consumption, cross-embodiment closure and formal verification

25.3. Cluster C: Semantic, Privacy and Resource Identity

Embodiments: E3, E6, E8, E19, E21, E24, E32, E34.

The visible object, the named tool and the identifier may not identify the actual effective resource after rebinding, redirect or contract change. Human approval is meaningful only when bound to the actual operation.

  • E3: User-referenced semantic object correspondence and authenticated presentation-state binding
  • E6: Semantic action-contract evolution and effect-compatibility validation
  • E8: Correlation-aware cumulative privacy exposure and compositional disclosure constraints
  • E19: Computer-use and transaction-bound human-approval finality
  • E21: Actual resource identity, aliases, redirects and dynamic namespace rebinding
  • E24: Tool-output and instruction provenance through model-driven execution
  • E32: Data, memory and persistent-knowledge provenance across agent sessions
  • E34: Tool and resource identity continuity across dynamic service discovery

25.4. Cluster D: Authority Across Devices and Organizations

Embodiments: E7, E9, E17, E18, E27, E30, E31, E35, E39.

Moving computational state does not establish transfer of effect authority. Loss of source-device communication does not prove the source has been fenced. Offline validity and delayed revocation must be explicit.

  • E7: Cross-provider delegated agent authority continuity and cryptographic delegation lineage
  • E9: Cross-device execution-authority ownership, hardware epochs and source fencing
  • E17: Temporal authority, lease expiration, clock uncertainty and delayed-effect control
  • E18: Cross-domain revocation propagation and dependent authority invalidation
  • E27: Distributed agent handoff, workload migration and non-resurrectable in-flight effects
  • E30: Resource-owner changes, competing administrative authority and revocation races
  • E31: Credential and administrative authority rotation, protected key custody and generation fencing
  • E35: Degraded connectivity, offline effect authority and delayed revocation
  • E39: Conflicting policies and authority precedence among multiple principals and resource owners

25.5. Cluster E: Tool Execution, Sandboxes and Runtime Changes

Embodiments: E10, E14, E20, E23, E25, E26, E28, E33.

Blocking one API route does not prevent an independent direct-credential route. Runtime or policy changes require mandatory revalidation, and a tool output is not an instruction authority.

  • E10: Model, algorithm and runtime-generation drift with effectuation-time revalidation
  • E14: Effectuation-path discovery, bypass detection and enforcement-coverage revalidation
  • E20: Multi-step tool-chain and workflow dependency-bound execution authority
  • E23: Credential and secret-use finality with non-exportable broker-controlled authority
  • E25: Agent sandbox privilege transitions and consequential operations escaping sandbox boundaries
  • E26: Tool installation, updates and runtime lifecycle authority continuity
  • E28: Nested multi-agent tool invocation chains and transitive authority attenuation
  • E33: Policy and configuration evolution, dependency impact and non-self-authorizing mutations

25.6. Cluster F: Recovery and Irreversible Effects

Embodiments: E12, E16, E18, E27, E35, E36, E37.

Unknown completion, replay and partial multi-resource effects must stay visible. Compensation is a separately authorized Candidate Act. No universal rollback or distributed atomicity is promised.

  • E12: Autonomous recovery, compensating effects and non-replayable recovery authority
  • E16: Crash-consistent finality journaling, one-time authorization and indeterminate outcome handling
  • E18: Cross-domain revocation propagation and dependent authority invalidation
  • E27: Distributed agent handoff, workload migration and non-resurrectable in-flight effects
  • E35: Degraded connectivity, offline effect authority and delayed revocation
  • E36: Multi-resource transactions, partial commits and independently authorized compensation
  • E37: Irreversible effects, consequence-bound hazard checks and non-compensable operation containment

26. Worked Examples

The 17 worked examples follow the chain: original authority, Candidate Act, platform-native inputs, canonical effect, protected verification, destination Finality Sink, outcome evidence, failure and recovery. They are illustrations, not test results.

26.1. Example A: Android app requests an operation on a protected iOS-associated service.

Original authority

Android app permission; user intent

Candidate Act

Candidate Act held non-effective

Platform-native inputs

Android UID and Keystore evidence

Canonical effect

Canonical descriptor: service, resource, parameters

Protected verification

Descriptor validated; scoped enablement

Destination Finality Sink

iOS-side sink reconstructs request and consumes enablement

Outcome evidence

Sink-side evidence of the effect

Failure and recovery

If the sink cannot reconstruct: refuse; unknown outcome stays UNRESOLVED

26.2. Example B: iOS task delegated to an Android device while authority stays bounded.

Original authority

iOS user authority

Candidate Act

Candidate Act at the delegate

Platform-native inputs

Delegation lineage

Canonical effect

Descriptor with attenuated scope

Protected verification

Lineage verified

Destination Finality Sink

Android sink checks bounded scope

Outcome evidence

Receipt

Failure and recovery

Scope expansion: refuse

26.3. Example C: Windows cloud-management app requests a Linux server configuration change.

Original authority

Windows service identity

Candidate Act

Config change Candidate Act

Platform-native inputs

Principal and device evidence

Canonical effect

Descriptor: host, file, diff

Protected verification

Policy and revocation checked

Destination Finality Sink

Linux resource controller reconstructs the change

Outcome evidence

Controller evidence

Failure and recovery

Controller unreachable: stay non-effective

26.4. Example D: Agent migrates from phone to cloud with an unresolved financial transaction.

Original authority

Phone-held authority

Candidate Act

Pending Candidate Act

Platform-native inputs

Source state and fencing evidence

Canonical effect

Descriptor of the payment

Protected verification

New ownership generation

Destination Finality Sink

Cloud sink verifies destination authority

Outcome evidence

Outcome evidence for the first attempt

Failure and recovery

Unknown outcome: do not retry blindly

26.5. Example E: Source device retains a credential after migration.

Original authority

Source authority

Candidate Act

Pending act

Platform-native inputs

Credential custody evidence

Canonical effect

Descriptor bound to generation

Protected verification

Generation fenced

Destination Finality Sink

Sink rejects old generation

Outcome evidence

Rejection event

Failure and recovery

Credential exported: sink refuses it

26.6. Example F: Tool permissions differ between providers though names match.

Original authority

Provider A tool contract

Candidate Act

Candidate Act

Platform-native inputs

Contract versions

Canonical effect

Descriptor with contract identifier

Protected verification

Compatibility validation fails

Destination Finality Sink

Sink refuses

Outcome evidence

Refusal

Failure and recovery

Incompatible: withhold

26.7. Example G: Model-generated instruction exports a sensitive file to a redirected destination.

Original authority

Task authority

Candidate Act

Export Candidate Act

Platform-native inputs

Instruction provenance

Canonical effect

Descriptor with effective destination

Protected verification

Provenance and destination check

Destination Finality Sink

Egress sink checks actual destination

Outcome evidence

Refusal

Failure and recovery

Redirect: refuse

26.8. Example H: Resource alias changes between approval and effect.

Original authority

Human approval

Candidate Act

Candidate Act

Platform-native inputs

Aliased referent at approval

Canonical effect

Descriptor with resolved identity

Protected verification

Revalidate at effect time

Destination Finality Sink

Sink resolves alias

Outcome evidence

Evidence of resolution

Failure and recovery

Changed referent: refuse

26.9. Example I: App changes request parameters after approval.

Original authority

Approval

Candidate Act

Candidate Act

Platform-native inputs

Approved parameters

Canonical effect

Approved descriptor

Protected verification

Digest binds parameters

Destination Finality Sink

Sink reconstructs parameters

Outcome evidence

Mismatch evidence

Failure and recovery

Different parameters: refuse

26.10. Example J: Signed receipt falsely claims a remote effect.

Original authority

First-phase authority

Candidate Act

Phase 1 act

Platform-native inputs

Receipt

Canonical effect

Descriptor of phase 1

Protected verification

Validator checks signer capability

Destination Finality Sink

Successor sink refuses continuation

Outcome evidence

Unverified receipt recorded

Failure and recovery

Receipt outside observation capability: not accepted

26.11. Example K: First bounded effect succeeded but independent receipt unavailable.

Original authority

Phase 1 authority

Candidate Act

Phase 2 act held

Platform-native inputs

No receipt

Canonical effect

Phase 2 descriptor

Protected verification

Receipt required

Destination Finality Sink

Successor sink holds

Outcome evidence

Pending record

Failure and recovery

Remain non-effective until receipt or reauthorization

26.12. Example L: Human reauthorizes a changed action but a physical safety condition is unsatisfied.

Original authority

Reauthorization

Candidate Act

Revised Candidate Act

Platform-native inputs

Approval and hazard evidence

Canonical effect

Descriptor with hazard fields

Protected verification

Hazard check fails

Destination Finality Sink

Actuator gate refuses

Outcome evidence

Refusal

Failure and recovery

Approval does not override safety

26.13. Example M: Credential broker protected while an alternate unrestricted key remains.

Original authority

Broker authority

Candidate Act

Candidate Act

Platform-native inputs

Broker and key inventory

Canonical effect

Descriptor

Protected verification

Coverage controller flags alternate key

Destination Finality Sink

Sink only controls brokered path

Outcome evidence

Coverage report

Failure and recovery

Claim limited; alternate path disclosed

26.14. Example N: Disconnected device exercises stale authority.

Original authority

Cached authority

Candidate Act

Offline act

Platform-native inputs

Offline limits and clock bounds

Canonical effect

Descriptor with lease

Protected verification

Limits exceeded

Destination Finality Sink

Sink refuses

Outcome evidence

Refusal

Failure and recovery

Offline past limit: refuse

26.15. Example O: Two agents collectively exceed a protected budget.

Original authority

Agent grants

Candidate Act

Two acts

Platform-native inputs

Budget state

Canonical effect

Descriptors with budget refs

Protected verification

Atomic reservation: second fails

Destination Finality Sink

Sink applies reservation

Outcome evidence

Reservation record

Failure and recovery

Second request refused

26.16. Example P: Tool update changes effect semantics mid-workflow.

Original authority

Workflow authority

Candidate Act

Next step act

Platform-native inputs

Tool generation

Canonical effect

Descriptor with generation

Protected verification

Mismatch triggers revalidation

Destination Finality Sink

Sink compares generation

Outcome evidence

Revalidation record

Failure and recovery

Stop at the step boundary

26.17. Example Q: Physical command is irreversible and cannot safely be compensated.

Original authority

Operator authority

Candidate Act

Candidate Act

Platform-native inputs

Hazard and state evidence

Canonical effect

Descriptor with irreversibility flag

Protected verification

Pre-effect hazard check passes or fails

Destination Finality Sink

Actuator controller gate

Outcome evidence

Effect observation

Failure and recovery

If unsafe: contain; no compensation promised

27. Interoperability Requirements

Where an implementation claims interoperability under this profile, it should carry the fields marked mandatory for the effect class, reject unknown critical fields, use qualified adapters, record qualification status, and treat unavailable enforcement as non-effective. It must not claim protection for effect paths that are not covered. No universal encoding is mandated; CBOR [RFC8949] and JSON are illustrative choices.

Records are listed in Appendix D.

28. Security Considerations

Guidance follows [RFC3552]. The architecture does not protect against effects through uncovered paths, a compromised privileged host when enforcement runs on that host, or false evidence from an unqualified source. A cryptographic signature or zero-trust label does not by itself prevent any listed threat; each threat in Appendix E names the check that is required. Enforcement qualification records themselves are an attack surface and need freshness and integrity. Resource exhaustion by forcing unresolved states is possible and needs bounded handling.

29. Privacy Considerations

Considerations in [RFC6973] apply. Separate valid disclosures may collectively create an unauthorized aggregate disclosure under a policy, so cumulative exposure budgets are tracked (E8). Agent memory, context compression and persistent knowledge carry provenance (E32). A privacy-preserving log does not by itself stop a release; disclosure control must identify the real egress or destination boundary. Execution evidence can itself leak information, so audit minimization and selective disclosure are needed.

30. Performance and Deployment

No performance results are claimed. Three paths are distinguished: a fast path (local protected finality checks and current protected-state admission), a warm path (independent policy or semantic validation, resource identity resolution, authority verification, evidence qualification) and a recovery path (reconciliation, revocation propagation, migration, unresolved outcomes, reauthorization). There is no per-token validation, no model-inference interruption, and no remote validator call for harmless operations; enforcement sits at real consequential boundaries. Protected precomputation and local gates can reduce latency. Cross-domain consensus has inherent cost, and behaviour during disconnection must be explicit.

A validation plan should measure p50, p95, p99 and p99.9 latency, throughput, memory, energy and battery impact, validator availability, protected-state persistence and recovery correctness on the target hardware.

31. Prior Art and Existing Standards

For each mechanism: it already provides authentication, binding or attestation; the remaining problem is keeping authority meaningful for an actual effect across heterogeneous platforms; the additional mechanisms described are operation-specific descriptors, qualification records, sink reconstruction, consumption and fencing; whether the literature already provides substantially the same relationship was not checked here; evidence for any improvement would need testing.

Table 1
Established mechanism What it provides and what remains
OAuth [RFC6749], token exchange [RFC8693], rich authorization requests [RFC9396], DPoP [RFC9449] Authorize and bind callers and requests; they do not reconstruct the operation at the sink or consume authority per effect.
RATS [RFC9334], EAT [RFC9711], TPM, HSM, Secure Enclave, Android Keystore, Arm CCA, Intel TDX, AMD SEV-SNP, secure and measured boot Attest environments and hold keys; attestation shows the environment, not each effect.
Android, Apple, Windows and Linux security models Isolate and authorize processes; no cross-platform effect semantics.
MCP, A2A, agent SDKs, tool gateways, service meshes, policy enforcement points Orchestrate and gate calls; coverage and operation semantics vary.
Fencing tokens, leases, generation counters, idempotency keys, journals, outbox, consensus, sagas Known distributed-systems techniques reused here; none is claimed as new in isolation.

The examiner discussion (objective technical problem, motivation to combine, reasonable expectation of success, functional interdependence, hindsight) is in Appendix F and is non-normative.

32. IANA Considerations

This document has no IANA actions.

33. Intellectual Property Rights

Human inventor: Sangam Kumar Das. Current patent source: Indian provisional application identified by the applicant as 202631127058, reported filed 25 October 2026, technical title as stated in the note at the start. The source is a 3,577-page PDF with 40 distinct numbered embodiments and 60 formal claims. These details are applicant-identified and must be checked against the official acknowledgment.

Foundational application: PCT/IB2026/055615, filed 4 June 2026, published 16 July 2026 as WO 2026/150382 A2 ([PCT-055615]; WIPO PATENTSCOPE https://patentscope.wipo.int/). The 25 October filing is part of the earlier human-invented DAS Protocols research programme; its cross-platform mechanisms are to be differentiated from the foundational architecture and assessed on their specific features. Related public Internet-Drafts are [REL-FOUND], [REL-IEV] and [REL-CBEA]; newer revisions were not checked. Publication on the Datatracker is not adoption, patent examination or validation.

The IPR disclosure for this document will be made at the appropriate time in accordance with IETF guidelines and BCP 78 and BCP 79 ([RFC8179]). A patent statement inside a draft does not replace an official IETF IPR disclosure. No royalty-free, FRAND or other licensing commitment is made here.

34. Normative References

[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP 14, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", RFC 8174, BCP 14, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

35. Informative References

[IN-127058]
Das, S., "Indian provisional application 202631127058 (applicant-identified)", Applicant-identified; not a certified registry record., , <https://ipindia.gov.in/>.
[PCT-055615]
Das, S., "PCT/IB2026/055615 (WO 2026/150382 A2)", Filed 4 June 2026; published 16 July 2026. Verify on PATENTSCOPE., , <https://patentscope.wipo.int/>.
[REL-AGENT]
Das, S., "Agent Execution Finality (title as supplied; verify)", Identifier as supplied; verify on the Datatracker. Not fetched., Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-agent-execution-finality, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/>.
[REL-CBEA]
Das, S., "Consequence-Bound Execution Authority", Identifier as supplied; verify on the Datatracker. Not fetched., Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-consequence-bound-execution-authority, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/>.
[REL-FOUND]
Das, S., "Execution Finality Foundations", Identifier as supplied; verify on the Datatracker. Not fetched., Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-execution-finality-foundations, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/>.
[REL-IEV]
Das, S., "Receipt-Gated Independent Effect Verification (title as supplied; verify)", Identifier as supplied; verify on the Datatracker. Not fetched., Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-das-receipt-gated-iev, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/>.
[RFC3552]
Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security Considerations", RFC 3552, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552>.
[RFC6749]
Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC 6749, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC6973]
Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J., Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.
[RFC8179]
Bradner, S. and J. Contreras, "Intellectual Property Rights in IETF Technology", RFC 8179, BCP 79, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8179>.
[RFC8693]
Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8693>.
[RFC8949]
Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)", RFC 8949, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.
[RFC9334]
Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and W. Pan, "Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture", RFC 9334, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9334>.
[RFC9396]
Lodderstedt, T., Richer, J., and B. Campbell, "OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests", RFC 9396, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9396>.
[RFC9449]
Fett, D., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Lodderstedt, T., Jones, M., and D. Waite, "OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP)", RFC 9449, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9449>.
[RFC9711]
Lundblad, L., Mandyam, G., O'Donoghue, J., and C. Wallace, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", RFC 9711, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9711>.
[TDC-12542]
Das, S., "Technical Disclosure Commons record 12542 (PCT file; title not verified)", Not fetched; verify., , <https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/12542/>.

Appendix A. Appendix A: Embodiments E1-E40

The 40 distinct embodiments follow the source's numbering. Start pages are pages of the supplied 3,577-page PDF, approximate where the source repeats headings (E1 and E2 headings recur near pages 364 and 378). The second full section labelled Embodiment 31 (about pages 2650-2734) is a repeated version and is not counted as an embodiment. Clusters A-F are those of Section 25; an embodiment may belong to more than one cluster.

Table 2
No. Technical subject Cluster Start page Workflow
E1 Protected cross-agent effect-conflict arbitration with atomic reservations and sink-bound fencing A 248 CW-1
E2 Identity-bound Interim Effectuation Validation and receipt-constituted causal continuation B 295 CW-1, CW-2
E3 User-referenced semantic object correspondence and authenticated presentation-state binding C 363 CW-1
E4 Cross-domain actual-consequence witnessing and qualified remote-effect evidence B 492 CW-1
E5 Cryptographically verifiable, assistant-neutral resource allocation and protected eligible-demand completeness A 555 CW-1
E6 Semantic action-contract evolution and effect-compatibility validation C 666 CW-1
E7 Cross-provider delegated agent authority continuity and cryptographic delegation lineage D 723 CW-1
E8 Correlation-aware cumulative privacy exposure and compositional disclosure constraints C 787 CW-1
E9 Cross-device execution-authority ownership, hardware epochs and source fencing D 859 CW-1
E10 Model, algorithm and runtime-generation drift with effectuation-time revalidation E 926 CW-1
E11 Concurrent-effect reconciliation, version-bound reservations and sink-local commit validation A 994 CW-1
E12 Autonomous recovery, compensating effects and non-replayable recovery authority F 1063 CW-1
E13 Multi-agent consensus, quorum integrity and non-delegable finality authorization A 1140 CW-1
E14 Effectuation-path discovery, bypass detection and enforcement-coverage revalidation E 1221 CW-1
E15 Cross-domain evidence commitments, non-bearer authority and sink-local monotonic consumption B 1309 CW-1
E16 Crash-consistent finality journaling, one-time authorization and indeterminate outcome handling B,F 1384 CW-1
E17 Temporal authority, lease expiration, clock uncertainty and delayed-effect control D 1465 CW-1
E18 Cross-domain revocation propagation and dependent authority invalidation D,F 1541 CW-1
E19 Computer-use and transaction-bound human-approval finality C 1625 CW-1
E20 Multi-step tool-chain and workflow dependency-bound execution authority E 1683 CW-1
E21 Actual resource identity, aliases, redirects and dynamic namespace rebinding C 1758 CW-1
E22 Multi-resource budgets, delegated quotas and cumulative consequential limits A 1830 CW-1
E23 Credential and secret-use finality with non-exportable broker-controlled authority E 1897 CW-1
E24 Tool-output and instruction provenance through model-driven execution C 2019 CW-1
E25 Agent sandbox privilege transitions and consequential operations escaping sandbox boundaries E 2092 CW-1
E26 Tool installation, updates and runtime lifecycle authority continuity E 2169 CW-1
E27 Distributed agent handoff, workload migration and non-resurrectable in-flight effects D,F 2246 CW-1
E28 Nested multi-agent tool invocation chains and transitive authority attenuation E 2318 CW-1
E29 Independent approval quorums and protected consensus-to-effect separation A 2398 CW-1
E30 Resource-owner changes, competing administrative authority and revocation races D 2480 CW-1
E31 Credential and administrative authority rotation, protected key custody and generation fencing D 2567 CW-1
E32 Data, memory and persistent-knowledge provenance across agent sessions C 2734 CW-1
E33 Policy and configuration evolution, dependency impact and non-self-authorizing mutations E 2825 CW-1
E34 Tool and resource identity continuity across dynamic service discovery C 2914 CW-1
E35 Degraded connectivity, offline effect authority and delayed revocation D,F 3005 CW-1
E36 Multi-resource transactions, partial commits and independently authorized compensation F 3102 CW-1
E37 Irreversible effects, consequence-bound hazard checks and non-compensable operation containment F 3192 CW-1
E38 Evidence integrity, compromised observers and independent attestation reconstruction B 3282 CW-1
E39 Conflicting policies and authority precedence among multiple principals and resource owners D 3378 CW-1
E40 End-to-end effect provenance, protected authority consumption, cross-embodiment closure and formal verification B 3474 CW-1

Source statements of the principal candidate inventive concept (excerpts, lightly normalised; extracted automatically, so check against the PDF):

Embodiments without an extracted statement: E1, E2, E3, E4, E6, E7, E10, E12, E40. The requested 20-point analysis (objective, components, authority, candidate operation, effect-critical data, protected state, enforcement interface, predicate, inputs and outputs, evidence, attack scenarios, negative outcomes, recovery, test method, performance, existing foundations, narrower features, industry integration, workflow relationship, mothership relationship) was done at cluster level in Section 25 and in the threat, example and industry appendices, not individually for each of the 40 embodiments; per-embodiment pseudocode and data structures from the source were not extracted.

Appendix B. Appendix B: Claims 1-60

Non-normative. The claims are not requirements of this document. The consolidated claims contain four independent claims: 1 (system, dependents 2-30), 31 (method, 32-42), 43 (apparatus, 44-52) and 53 (migration, 54-60). Forty embodiments do not correspond to forty independent claims, and no missing dependent claims were invented. Independent versus dependent was determined from the claim text, and the dependency shown is the first claim number referenced. Excerpts are from the extracted text (ligatures repaired automatically); check them against the PDF.

Table 3
No. Type Dep. Group Source limitation (excerpt) Realization wording (whole claim)
1 Independent - System A computer-implemented system for interoperable protected execution-finality control across heterogeneous computing environments, the system comprising: (a) a first ... none named in the claim text
2 Dependent 1 System the first and second computing environments comprise different operating systems, different administrative domains, different device-security architectures, or different ... none named in the claim text
3 Dependent 2 System the first computing environment comprises an Android-based device and the second computing environment comprises an iOS-based device, and wherein a consequential ... none named in the claim text
4 Dependent 2 System the first computing environment comprises an iOS- based device and the second computing environment comprises an Android-based device, and wherein the second computing ... none named in the claim text
5 Dependent 2 System the heterogeneous computing environments comprise any compatible combination of mobile operating systems, desktop operating systems, virtualized execution environments, ... none named in the claim text
6 Dependent 1 System the heterogeneous authorization-source adapter comprises a typed interface identifying a technical security property established by a corresponding underlying mechanism, ... none named in the claim text
7 Dependent 1 System the qualified evidence comprises one or more of an operating-system permission, application entitlement, source authorization grant, structured authorization detail, ... cryptographic terms
8 Dependent 1 System the protected canonical effect descriptor comprises a selected combination of a Candidate Act identifier, originating authority reference, actual operation class, actual ... none named in the claim text
9 Dependent 1 System the protected authorization-to-effect translation controller resolves the operation semantics according to an authenticated action contract or resource-interface ... none named in the claim text
10 Dependent 1 System the Protected Enforcement Domain maintains a protected relationship between an originating source grant and one or more dependent delegated authorizations, Candidate ... none named in the claim text
11 Dependent 1 System the protected validation evidence comprises collection-time evidence established by a first protected validation instance and execution-time evidence established by a ... none named in the claim text
12 Dependent 1 System a structured application action, application-intent object, agent tool invocation, interprocess service request, or remote application-function call is represented as ... none named in the claim text
13 Dependent 1 System the Non-Effective Holding Mechanism comprises one or more of a blocked application-function dispatch, withheld network transmission, uncommitted storage operation, ... none named in the claim text
14 Dependent 1 System a proposed application action or autonomous workflow comprises multiple distinguishable consequential effects, and wherein at least two of the consequential effects are ... none named in the claim text
15 Dependent 1 System The system as claimed in claim 1, further comprising an Enforcement-Coverage Qualification Controller configured to maintain a protected enforcement-qualification record ... none named in the claim text
16 Dependent 15 System an observation-only security monitor, notification interface, advisory security policy, or post-effect audit mechanism is prevented from satisfying a fl mandatory ... none named in the claim text
17 Dependent 15 System the Enforcement-Coverage Qualification Controller identifies a plurality of interfaces capable of producing a governed effect and requires each interface within an ... none named in the claim text
18 Dependent 15 System a material change in an operating-system security interface, sandbox entitlement, application-dispatch configuration, privileged intermediary, network route, ... hardware terms
19 Dependent 1 System the Protected Enforcement Domain maintains a current revocation generation associated with an originating authorization grant and identifies scoped finality enablements ... none named in the claim text
20 Dependent 19 System the designated Finality Sink verifies an applicable current revocation generation or protected authorization-status condition, and wherein an earlier active-token ... none named in the claim text
21 Dependent 1 System the scoped non-bearer finality enablement is maintained within a protected controller or sink-local protected state and is represented to the requesting computational ... none named in the claim text
22 Dependent 21 System the scoped non-bearer finality enablement comprises a permitted-use count or unique consumption reference, and wherein the designated Finality Sink enforces a protected ... none named in the claim text
23 Dependent 21 System the scoped non-bearer finality enablement is bound to one or more of the designated Finality Sink, actual resource, permitted effect, originating authority, validity ... none named in the claim text
24 Dependent 1 System the designated Finality Sink determines at least one security-relevant descriptor element from the actual operation presented at the controlled effectuation interface ... none named in the claim text
25 Dependent 24 System the designated Finality Sink verifies one or more of an actual destination, resource identity, recipient, outgoing payload commitment, application- function parameter, ... none named in the claim text
26 Dependent 1 System the designated Finality Sink comprises a transactional resource controller configured to atomically commit, within an applicable transaction boundary, a protected ... none named in the claim text
27 Dependent 1 System The system as claimed in claim 1, further comprising a protected credential broker configured to retain a reusable resource credential outside the requesting ... none named in the claim text
28 Dependent 1 System a governed consequential operation comprises transmission of information through a network interface, and wherein protected authorization evidence binds the permitted ... none named in the claim text
29 Dependent 1 System the first computing environment, the Protected Enforcement Domain, and the designated Finality Sink reside in at least two independently administered domains, and ... none named in the claim text
30 Dependent 1 System a computing environment operates with intermittent connectivity and the Protected Enforcement Domain establishes a bounded of ine authority comprising one or more ... none named in the claim text
31 Independent - Method A computer-implemented method for enforcing protected execution-finality control across heterogeneous computing environments, the method comprising: (a) receiving, from ... none named in the claim text
32 Dependent 31 Method obtaining qualified evidence and independently validating the proposed consequential operation comprise collecting authenticated evidence at a first protected ... none named in the claim text
33 Dependent 31 Method producing the protected canonical effect descriptor comprises converting heterogeneous native-platform permission or authorization information into a typed effect ... none named in the claim text
34 Dependent 31 Method The method as claimed in claim 31, further comprising detecting a material change in resource identity, resource generation, effective recipient, operation parameters, ... none named in the claim text
35 Dependent 31 Method The method as claimed in claim 31, further comprising obtaining an authenticated revocation event or current revoked-state indication, identifying pending finality ... none named in the claim text
36 Dependent 31 Method the designated Finality Sink comprises a qualified protected application dispatcher, privileged interprocess broker, network gateway, storage controller, remote service ... hardware terms
37 Dependent 31 Method successful user approval, application authentication, cryptographic signature verification, credential introspection, or operating-system permission validation is ... cryptographic terms
38 Dependent 31 Method original source authority, delegated authority, protected evidence, or finality-enablement state is maintained in a protected storage or controller domain not modifiable ... none named in the claim text
39 Dependent 31 Method The method as claimed in claim 31, further comprising revalidating the actual pending operation at the designated Finality Sink using current protected resource or ... none named in the claim text
40 Dependent 31 Method an unsuccessful or unavailable mandatory validator, invalid finality enablement, unresolved operation semantics, stale authority generation, or unqualified effectuation ... none named in the claim text
41 Dependent 31 Method absence of an acknowledgment or an uncertain remote result does not automatically restore consumed authority or authorize an unrestricted retry of the operation. none named in the claim text
42 Dependent 41 Method a successor consequential operation depends upon an earlier real effect and is withheld until an authenticated receipt concerning the earlier effect has been accepted by ... none named in the claim text
43 Independent - Apparatus A protected computing apparatus for enforcing interoperable execution-finality authorization at a consequential resource boundary, the apparatus comprising: (a) at least ... none named in the claim text
44 Dependent 43 Apparatus the apparatus comprises a mobile computing device, desktop computer, server, protected application-execution component, embedded controller, secure processor, cloud ... none named in the claim text
45 Dependent 43 Apparatus the apparatus is associated with an iOS-based or iPadOS-based computing environment and the resource interface comprises an authorized application function, protected ... none named in the claim text
46 Dependent 43 Apparatus the apparatus is associated with an Android- based computing environment and the resource interface comprises a protected application dispatcher, privileged service, ... hardware terms
47 Dependent 43 Apparatus the resource interface comprises an authenticated interprocess communication broker separately controlled from the requesting computational entity, and wherein the ... none named in the claim text
48 Dependent 43 Apparatus the apparatus implements destination-side protected enforcement for a remote application or service, thereby permitting interoperability with a requesting operating ... none named in the claim text
49 Dependent 43 Apparatus the effectuation controller comprises a hardware- supported command gate, protected storage controller, secure processor, device command controller, or hardware-backed ... hardware terms
50 Dependent 43 Apparatus the interoperable authority-verification component maintains a protected enforcement-qualification record and rejects a claimed mandatory enforcement property when an ... none named in the claim text
51 Dependent 43 Apparatus the canonical effect descriptor is represented using a typed structured encoding or deterministic binary representation de ning canonicalization rules for ... none named in the claim text
52 Dependent 43 Apparatus the interoperable authority-verification component verifies authenticated principal attribution, originating task authority, and permitted effect scope independently of ... none named in the claim text
53 Independent - Migration A computer-implemented system for protected migration of consequential execution authority between heterogeneous computing environments, the system comprising: (a) a ... none named in the claim text
54 Dependent 53 Migration the protected authority-ownership controller maintains a monotonic ownership epoch, protected generation counter, authenticated fencing reference, or authoritative ... none named in the claim text
55 Dependent 53 Migration verification of the source-fencing condition comprises verifying restriction, invalidation, or isolation of at least one effect-capable source-device interface, pending ... hardware terms
56 Dependent 53 Migration the source and destination execution environments comprise respectively different mobile or desktop operating systems, including an Android-based environment and an ... none named in the claim text
57 Dependent 53 Migration loss of communication with the source execution environment does not automatically establish successful source fencing, and wherein activation of exclusive destination ... none named in the claim text
58 Dependent 53 Migration a migration, crash recovery, process restart, device replacement, or restored computational snapshot is prevented from restoring a previously consumed finality ... none named in the claim text
59 Dependent 53 Migration a plurality of un nished Candidate Acts are transferred between computing environments and each Candidate Act is associated with a separately verifiable operation scope, ... none named in the claim text
60 Dependent 53 Migration the source and destination execution environments comprise respective combinations of mobile devices, virtual machines, confidential-computing environments, cloud ... hardware terms

Group-level fields (necessary components, operative condition, enforcement boundary, existing coverage, prior-art terms) follow. A per-claim chart of these fields was not produced; candidate additional limitations and per-claim implementation examples are not given, to avoid inventing limitations.

Table 4
Group Technical focus What existing work covers Search terms
System (1-30) Heterogeneous authorization translation and protected actual-effect enforcement Authentication, OAuth-style authorization and attestation exist [RFC6749] [RFC9334]; the claim concerns translation to a canonical descriptor and sink-side reconstruction. cross platform execution finality; permission translation; canonical effect descriptor; destination side verification
Method (31-42) Operation-specific cross-platform execution-finality procedure Same standards context. method enforcing execution finality heterogeneous; scoped non-bearer enablement; protected consumption
Apparatus (43-52) Receiving-platform protected Finality Sink Resource gateways and policy enforcement points exist. finality sink apparatus; actual pending operation reconstruction; sink local authority check
Migration (53-60) Cross-device authority transfer and source fencing Fencing tokens, leases and generation counters exist as techniques. cross device authority migration; source fencing; ownership epoch; snapshot resurrection

Appendix C. Appendix C: Architecture Flowcharts

The 30 diagrams below are conceptual ASCII figures; each names its boundary. Mermaid versions are not included because a single XML file was requested.

+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Originating user, application or AI agent                |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Source operating system                                  |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Candidate Act (Non-Effective State)                      |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Source authority qualification                           |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Platform evidence and semantic translation adapter       |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Protected Canonical Effect Descriptor                    |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Protected Enforcement Domain                             |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Mandatory conditions satisfied? NO: deny / hold /        |
| reconcile                                                |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| YES: scoped non-bearer finality enablement               |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Receiving-platform Finality Sink: reconstruct actual     |
| operation                                                |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Sink-local authority and consumption check               |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Actual consequence through a covered path                |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Qualified outcome evidence / recovery                    |
+----------------------------------------------------------+

Boundary: Controls only effect paths the sink actually covers.
Figure 2: Whole cross-platform protected architecture
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Android app builds Candidate Act                         |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Keystore-backed evidence of app and device               |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Adapter -> canonical descriptor                          |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Protected domain verifies authority                      |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| iOS-side service sink reconstructs request               |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Consume enablement; effect; outcome evidence             |
+----------------------------------------------------------+

Boundary: Sink on the receiving side; ordinary apps do not
          mediate other apps.
Figure 3: Android-to-iOS consequential operation
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| iOS app builds Candidate Act                             |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Keychain / Secure Enclave evidence                       |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Adapter -> canonical descriptor                          |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Protected domain verifies authority                      |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Android-side sink reconstructs request                   |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Consume enablement; effect; outcome evidence             |
+----------------------------------------------------------+

Boundary: No private kernel hooks are assumed.
Figure 4: iOS-to-Android operation
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Windows or Linux workload                                |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Workload identity and TPM/key evidence                   |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Descriptor of cloud API effect                           |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Protected domain: policy, revocation                     |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Cloud resource gate reconstructs API call                |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Effect; outcome evidence                                 |
+----------------------------------------------------------+

Boundary: A direct cloud credential outside the gate is an
          uncovered path.
Figure 5: Windows/Linux to cloud resource
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Native permission or entitlement                         |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Platform adapter (qualified)                             |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Effect-specific authority claim                          |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Compare with canonical semantics                         |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Translation result: equivalent / narrower / reject       |
+----------------------------------------------------------+

Boundary: Permission names are not assumed equivalent.
Figure 6: Cross-platform authority translation
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Native operation request                                 |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Resolve effective resource, beneficiary, parameters      |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Normalize (units, encoding, aliases)                     |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Reject unknown critical fields                           |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Bind to authority, policy, revocation generations        |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Descriptor digest and protected record                   |
+----------------------------------------------------------+

Boundary: A valid hash of a wrongly built descriptor proves
          nothing about meaning.
Figure 7: Canonical effect-descriptor construction
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Security component and controlled resource               |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Determine observed vs blocking vs consumption control    |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Check generation and trust assumptions                   |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| List known alternate effect routes                       |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Qualified / partial / unresolved / disqualified          |
+----------------------------------------------------------+

Boundary: Unavailable blocking leads to restriction or
          withholding, not silent weakening.
Figure 8: Platform enforcement-capability qualification
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Interface offers notification or logs?                   |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Yes: classify as observation only                        |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Interface can refuse the operation?                      |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Yes: blocking candidate; check coverage                  |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Move enforcement to a resource-side gateway if not       |
+----------------------------------------------------------+

Boundary: Product names do not decide the class.
Figure 9: Observation-only versus blocking interfaces
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Local protected authority holds enablement               |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Send operation-specific non-bearer enablement            |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Destination sink reconstructs actual operation           |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Check current authority and consumption                  |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Permit or refuse                                         |
+----------------------------------------------------------+

Boundary: The local authority is not the destination sink.
Figure 10: Protected local authority and destination sink
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Workload requests credential use                         |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Broker checks operation binding                          |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Broker activates operation-bound credential              |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Downstream resource enforces scope                       |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Other credential copies remain uncovered                 |
+----------------------------------------------------------+

Boundary: Broker does not control other copies of credentials.
Figure 11: Credential broker with downstream enforcement
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Provider A agent holds authority                         |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Delegation lineage record with attenuation               |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Provider B agent receives bounded scope                  |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Descriptor and enablement per operation                  |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Sink verifies lineage                                    |
+----------------------------------------------------------+

Boundary: Scope can only narrow.
Figure 12: Cross-provider AI-agent delegation
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Verified descriptor                                      |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Create enablement bound to operation, sink, state        |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Enablement is not a bearer token                         |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Sink checks binding at use                               |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Used once; consumed                                      |
+----------------------------------------------------------+

Boundary: Possession alone confers no authority.
Figure 13: Scoped non-bearer enablement
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Authority generation N                                   |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Revocation event raises epoch                            |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Sink compares epoch at effect time                       |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Older epoch: refuse                                      |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Record decision                                          |
+----------------------------------------------------------+

Boundary: No global instant revocation is assumed.
Figure 14: Authority and revocation epochs
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Enablement presented                                     |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Check monotonic consumption state                        |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Unconsumed: mark consumed atomically                     |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Consumed: refuse                                         |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Crash: unknown stays unresolved                          |
+----------------------------------------------------------+

Boundary: Consumption state must survive crashes.
Figure 15: Protected replay and use consumption
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Identify unfinished operation                            |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Authenticate target environment                          |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Move computational context (not authority)               |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| New ownership generation; fence source                   |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Destination reconstructs scope and verifies pending      |
| operation                                                |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Reconcile partial failure                                |
+----------------------------------------------------------+

Boundary: State movement is not authority transfer.
Figure 16: Source-to-destination migration
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Source owner generation N                                |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Fencing request or evidence                              |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Source confirms or sink rejects older generation         |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Loss of contact is not proof of fencing                  |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Destination generation N+1 active                        |
+----------------------------------------------------------+

Boundary: Fencing is evidenced, not assumed.
Figure 17: Source-device fencing
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Offline lease with bounded scope                         |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Clock uncertainty bounds applied                         |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Operate within limits                                    |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Reconnect: reconcile revocations                         |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Past limits: refuse                                      |
+----------------------------------------------------------+

Boundary: Offline limits are explicit.
Figure 18: Offline authority and delayed revocation
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Operation split into phases                              |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Phase 1 independently authorized                         |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Bounded real effect through a sink                       |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Qualified evidence obtained                              |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Validator evaluates evidence                             |
+----------------------------------------------------------+

Boundary: A test simulation is not a real first effect.
Figure 19: CW-2 bounded real effect
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Accepted effect receipt                                  |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Receipt becomes causal condition for phase 2             |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Successor sink checks receipt-dependent authority        |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Missing, stale or contradicted: no successor effect      |
+----------------------------------------------------------+

Boundary: A validator is not an unrestricted credential.
Figure 20: CW-2 receipt-constituted continuation
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Cumulative actual effect vs original scope               |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Independent security signals correlated                  |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Risk-adaptive suspension                                 |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Exact changed consequence presented                      |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Approval bound to actual effect; limited renewed         |
| authority                                                |
+----------------------------------------------------------+

Boundary: Approval does not override unrelated mandatory
          protections.
Figure 21: CW-3 detected deviation and reauthorization
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Agent A and B propose effects                            |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Effect footprints compared                               |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Atomic reservation at sink                               |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Conflict: one proceeds, one held                         |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Sink-bound fencing                                       |
+----------------------------------------------------------+

Boundary: Reservation is not execution authority.
Figure 22: Cross-agent conflict reservation
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| User sees object label                                   |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Resolve to actual resource identity                      |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Bind in descriptor                                       |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Re-resolve at effect time                                |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Changed referent: refuse                                 |
+----------------------------------------------------------+

Boundary: Names do not identify effective resources.
Figure 23: Resource alias and semantic referent
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Tool or runtime updated                                  |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Generation changes                                       |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Authority bound to old generation invalid                |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Revalidate contracts and policy                          |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Resume under new authority only                          |
+----------------------------------------------------------+

Boundary: Updates are consequential transitions.
Figure 24: Tool-runtime update and policy revalidation
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Operation inside sandbox                                 |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Crosses sandbox boundary                                 |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Boundary effect check                                    |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Separate controller decides                              |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Independent effect evidence                              |
+----------------------------------------------------------+

Boundary: A sandbox does not control an external service that
          accepts the credential.
Figure 25: Sandbox escape-effect boundary
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Effects across resources R1..Rn                          |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Per-sink commit results                                  |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Partial commit detected                                  |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Compensation as separate Candidate Act                   |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Reconcile; no atomicity promised                         |
+----------------------------------------------------------+

Boundary: Compensation needs its own authority.
Figure 26: Multi-resource partial-commit reconciliation
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Candidate irreversible command                           |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Hazard and state evidence                                |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Pre-effect hazard check                                  |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Fail: contain and hold                                   |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Pass: scoped enablement; observe effect                  |
+----------------------------------------------------------+

Boundary: Not a safety certification.
Figure 27: Irreversible physical-effect hazard qualification
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Observer reports effect                                  |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Check observer qualification and coverage                |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Independent attestation or second source                 |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Conflict: UNRESOLVED                                     |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Evidence record                                          |
+----------------------------------------------------------+

Boundary: Misleading observers are assumed possible.
Figure 28: Compromised-observer evidence checking
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Several principals and owners                            |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Collect applicable policies                              |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Apply precedence rules                                   |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Mandatory consent present?                               |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Permit or hold                                           |
+----------------------------------------------------------+

Boundary: Unresolved conflict withholds the effect.
Figure 29: Policy precedence among several resource owners
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Authorization record                                     |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Consumption record                                       |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Outcome evidence                                         |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Closure check for the selected operation                 |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Closed or open with reasons                              |
+----------------------------------------------------------+

Boundary: Closure requires all required evidence.
Figure 30: Protected evidence and authorization closure
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Failure or crash                                         |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Read journal and consumption state                       |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Outcome known? NO: indeterminate                         |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Recovery Candidate Act (new authority)                   |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
                              |
                              v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| No blind replay                                          |
+----------------------------------------------------------+

Boundary: No universal rollback is promised.
Figure 31: Failure, rollback and crash-consistent recovery

Appendix D. Appendix D: Data Models and Pseudocode

Records are transport-neutral field lists. No mandatory universal encoding is defined; CBOR or JSON may be used where an interoperability case justifies it.

SourceAuthorityRecord

original authority; principal; source platform; delegated scope; current generation; restrictions

PlatformQualificationRecord

native permission; actual security capability; protected component; effect-path scope; qualification generation

CandidateActRecord

proposed operation; original task; target; effect class; initiating workload

CanonicalEffectDescriptor

material executable effect semantics (see the main text)

ProtectedValidationEvidence

qualified source; predicate; current state; protected evidence

ScopedFinalityEnablement

operation-specific, sink-bound, non-bearer permission under protected state

AuthorityTransferRecord

source owner; destination owner; epochs; fencing evidence; transfer status

ResourceSinkRecord

sink identity; controlled effect path; operation visibility; consumption state

PriorEffectReceipt

qualified evidence of a bounded earlier effect

ContinuationAuthorityRecord

successor-specific, receipt-dependent authorization (CW-2)

ReauthorizationRecord

current revised permission (CW-3)

OutcomeEvidenceRecord

source-qualified effect evidence; unresolved outcome classification

ClosureRecord

required enforcement, authorization, consumption and outcome evidence for the operation

FUNCTION SINK_DECIDE(enablement, pending_op, state):
  desc = RECONSTRUCT(pending_op)
  IF desc IS NONE: RETURN REFUSE_UNRESOLVED
  IF DIGEST(desc) != enablement.descriptor_digest: RETURN REFUSE
  IF enablement.sink != SELF: RETURN REFUSE
  IF state.revocation_epoch > enablement.revocation_gen: RETURN
    REFUSE
  IF state.owner_generation != enablement.owner_gen: RETURN REFUSE
  IF NOT COVERED_PATH(pending_op): RETURN REFUSE_NOT_COVERED
  IF NOT CONSUME_ATOMIC(enablement.id): RETURN REFUSE_CONSUMED
  RETURN PERMIT
Figure 32: Finality Sink decision (illustrative)
FUNCTION QUALIFY(component, op_class):
  caps = MEASURE_CAPABILITIES(component)
  IF NOT caps.can_block: RETURN DISQUALIFIED_FOR_BLOCKING
  IF ALTERNATE_ROUTES(component, op_class): RETURN PARTIAL
  IF NOT FRESH(component.generation): RETURN UNRESOLVED
  RETURN QUALIFIED
Figure 33: Enforcement qualification (illustrative)
FUNCTION MIGRATE(op, source, dest):
  IF NOT AUTHENTICATED(dest): RETURN ABORT
  gen = NEW_OWNER_GENERATION(op)
  IF NOT FENCED(source, gen): RETURN HOLD_UNRESOLVED
  scope = RECONSTRUCT_SCOPE(op, dest)
  enable = ISSUE_ENABLEMENT(op, dest, gen, scope)
  RETURN enable  // state copy confers no authority
Figure 34: Cross-device migration (illustrative)
FUNCTION BUILD_DESCRIPTOR(native_op):
  r = RESOLVE_EFFECTIVE_RESOURCE(native_op)
  FOR f IN CRITICAL_FIELDS(native_op.class):
    IF f NOT IN native_op: RETURN REJECT
  d = NORMALIZE(native_op, r)
  IF HAS_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL(d): RETURN REJECT
  RETURN d
Figure 35: Descriptor construction (illustrative)

Appendix E. Appendix E: Threats and Negative Tests

Sixty threats. Embodiment references are the editor's mapping. Fields for failure response, residual risk and actual-effect observation use common wording; attacker capability, boundary, invariant, check and test are specific to each entry. Tests are ideas, not executed results.

E.1. 1. Authenticated but unauthorized operation

Attacker capability

Holds valid credentials

Affected boundary

Sink

Relevant embodiment

E15

Protected invariant

Authentication is not operation authority

Required technical check

Sink reconstructs operation and checks scoped enablement

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Valid credential, no enablement: effect refused

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.2. 2. Source permission incorrectly translated

Attacker capability

Misconfigured or malicious adapter

Affected boundary

Adapter

Relevant embodiment

E6

Protected invariant

Translation preserves meaning

Required technical check

Qualify adapter generation; compare descriptor to native evidence

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Adapter widens scope: validation fails

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.3. 3. Overbroad destination permission

Attacker capability

Destination grants more than source

Affected boundary

Destination sink

Relevant embodiment

E9

Protected invariant

Destination scope <= source scope

Required technical check

Reconstruct destination scope from source authority

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Broader destination right: not enabled

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.4. 4. Native entitlement mistaken for final authority

Attacker capability

App with entitlement

Affected boundary

Platform

Relevant embodiment

E15

Protected invariant

Entitlement is advice, not finality

Required technical check

Require scoped non-bearer enablement

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Entitled app without enablement: refused

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.5. 5. Valid credential used on wrong target

Attacker capability

Holds credential

Affected boundary

Resource

Relevant embodiment

E21

Protected invariant

Effective resource identity matches

Required technical check

Resolve actual resource at the sink

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Credential for A used on B: refused

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.6. 6. Malicious authorization adapter

Attacker capability

Controls an adapter

Affected boundary

Adapter

Relevant embodiment

E38

Protected invariant

Adapters are qualified, not trusted by default

Required technical check

Independent attestation of adapter generation

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Unqualified adapter: UNRESOLVED

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.7. 7. Missing critical effect fields

Attacker capability

Omits fields

Affected boundary

Descriptor

Relevant embodiment

E6

Protected invariant

Unknown or missing critical fields reject

Required technical check

Reject on missing critical field

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Drop beneficiary field: reject

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.8. 8. Semantic mismatch between platforms

Attacker capability

Exploits differing meaning

Affected boundary

Adapter/descriptor

Relevant embodiment

E6

Protected invariant

Equivalence is semantic, not syntactic

Required technical check

Contract-compatibility validation

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Same name, different effect: reject

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.9. 9. Invalid resource alias

Attacker capability

Alias manipulation

Affected boundary

Resource

Relevant embodiment

E21

Protected invariant

Alias resolves to approved resource

Required technical check

Resolve at effectuation time

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Alias rebinding: reject

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.10. 10. Redirected destination

Attacker capability

Redirect injection

Affected boundary

Destination

Relevant embodiment

E21

Protected invariant

Final destination equals approved

Required technical check

Check effective destination

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Redirect to other host: reject

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.11. 11. Wrong effective principal

Attacker capability

Confuses principals

Affected boundary

Delegation

Relevant embodiment

E7

Protected invariant

Effective principal equals authorised

Required technical check

Bind principal in descriptor

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Delegate acts as other principal: reject

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.12. 12. Delegation scope expansion

Attacker capability

Nested agent

Affected boundary

Delegation chain

Relevant embodiment

E28

Protected invariant

Attenuation only

Required technical check

Verify lineage attenuation

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Child exceeds parent: reject

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.13. 13. Forged agent authority

Attacker capability

Forger

Affected boundary

Delegation

Relevant embodiment

E7

Protected invariant

Authority has verifiable lineage

Required technical check

Verify cryptographic lineage

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Forged delegation: reject

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.14. 14. Agent self-reported success

Attacker capability

Agent

Affected boundary

Evidence

Relevant embodiment

E4

Protected invariant

Self-report is not qualified evidence

Required technical check

Require source-qualified evidence

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Self-reported success: UNRESOLVED

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.15. 15. Untrusted tool-output instruction

Attacker capability

Tool output author

Affected boundary

Model-driven execution

Relevant embodiment

E24

Protected invariant

Output is data, not authority

Required technical check

Track instruction provenance

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Output instructs transfer: no enablement

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.16. 16. Prompt injection

Attacker capability

Injected text

Affected boundary

Model input

Relevant embodiment

E24

Protected invariant

Instruction authority has provenance

Required technical check

Provenance check before effect

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Injected instruction cannot enable

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.17. 17. Tool-runtime substitution

Attacker capability

Swaps runtime

Affected boundary

Tool lifecycle

Relevant embodiment

E26

Protected invariant

Runtime generation continuity

Required technical check

Revalidate on generation change

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Swapped runtime: revalidate

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.18. 18. Changed executable generation

Attacker capability

Updates tool

Affected boundary

Runtime

Relevant embodiment

E10

Protected invariant

Authority bound to generation

Required technical check

Effectuation-time generation check

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Old authority on new generation: reject

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.19. 19. Stale model or algorithm fingerprint

Attacker capability

Model drift

Affected boundary

Runtime

Relevant embodiment

E10

Protected invariant

Fingerprint current at effect time

Required technical check

Compare fingerprint at sink

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Stale fingerprint: revalidate

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.20. 20. Incomplete enforcement coverage

Attacker capability

Uses uncovered path

Affected boundary

Coverage

Relevant embodiment

E14

Protected invariant

Claims limited to covered paths

Required technical check

Coverage controller reports paths

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Uncovered path: claim not made

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.21. 21. Observation-only interface misclassified as blocking

Attacker capability

Misclassification

Affected boundary

Qualification

Relevant embodiment

E14

Protected invariant

Capability classes differ

Required technical check

Qualification record

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Monitor API marked blocking: disqualify

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.22. 22. Alternate API bypass

Attacker capability

Uses another API

Affected boundary

Effect path

Relevant embodiment

E14

Protected invariant

All effect paths covered or disclosed

Required technical check

Path discovery and coverage

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Alternate API used: detected or disclosed

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.23. 23. Exported secret used outside broker

Attacker capability

Exports secret

Affected boundary

Credential custody

Relevant embodiment

E23

Protected invariant

Non-exportable custody

Required technical check

Broker-bound activation

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Exported key: not accepted by sink

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.24. 24. Stale source device after migration

Attacker capability

Old device

Affected boundary

Source

Relevant embodiment

E9

Protected invariant

Source fenced

Required technical check

Fence and generation check

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Old device acts: refused

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.25. 25. Snapshot authority resurrection

Attacker capability

Restores snapshot

Affected boundary

Migration

Relevant embodiment

E27

Protected invariant

State copy is not authority

Required technical check

Generation fencing

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Restored worker refused

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.26. 26. Duplicate cross-device execution

Attacker capability

Two devices

Affected boundary

Sink

Relevant embodiment

E9

Protected invariant

Single owner generation

Required technical check

Sink consumption check

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Second execution refused

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.27. 27. Unverified source fencing

Attacker capability

Claims fenced

Affected boundary

Source

Relevant embodiment

E9

Protected invariant

Fencing is evidenced

Required technical check

Require fencing evidence

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

No evidence: UNRESOLVED

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.28. 28. Destination-side weaker enforcement

Attacker capability

Weak destination

Affected boundary

Destination

Relevant embodiment

E9

Protected invariant

Enforcement capability equivalent or restricted

Required technical check

Qualification comparison

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Weaker destination: restrict or withhold

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.29. 29. Cross-domain token replay

Attacker capability

Replays token

Affected boundary

Sink

Relevant embodiment

E15

Protected invariant

Non-bearer enablement

Required technical check

Bind to operation and sink

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Replay elsewhere: refused

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.30. 30. Consumed authorization replay

Attacker capability

Replays consumed

Affected boundary

Sink

Relevant embodiment

E16

Protected invariant

One-time consumption

Required technical check

Monotonic consumption

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Second use: refused

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.31. 31. Revocation epoch rollback

Attacker capability

Rolls back state

Affected boundary

Revocation

Relevant embodiment

E18

Protected invariant

Epochs monotonic

Required technical check

Verify epoch monotonicity

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Older epoch: reject

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.32. 32. Cached permission after revocation

Attacker capability

Uses cache

Affected boundary

Sink

Relevant embodiment

E18

Protected invariant

Revocation checked at effect

Required technical check

Check current revocation

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Cached allow after revoke: refused

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.33. 33. Offline stale authority

Attacker capability

Disconnected device

Affected boundary

Offline

Relevant embodiment

E35

Protected invariant

Offline limits explicit

Required technical check

Bounded offline authority

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Past limit: refused

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.34. 34. Incorrect lease expiry

Attacker capability

Clock error

Affected boundary

Lease

Relevant embodiment

E17

Protected invariant

Lease honours clock uncertainty

Required technical check

Use uncertainty bounds

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Near expiry: conservative

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.35. 35. Clock manipulation

Attacker capability

Alters clock

Affected boundary

Time

Relevant embodiment

E17

Protected invariant

Time not solely trusted

Required technical check

Independent time or counters

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Skewed clock: reject

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.36. 36. Conflicting resource owners

Attacker capability

Competing owners

Affected boundary

Resource

Relevant embodiment

E30

Protected invariant

Precedence resolved

Required technical check

Owner consent check

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Conflicting owners: UNRESOLVED

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.37. 37. Missing mandatory owner consent

Attacker capability

Omits owner

Affected boundary

Resource

Relevant embodiment

E39

Protected invariant

Mandatory consent present

Required technical check

Consent check

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

No consent: refused

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.38. 38. Resource quota oversubscription

Attacker capability

Parallel requests

Affected boundary

Budget

Relevant embodiment

E22

Protected invariant

Cumulative limits

Required technical check

Atomic reservation

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Over budget: refused

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.39. 39. Concurrent effect conflict

Attacker capability

Concurrent actors

Affected boundary

Sink

Relevant embodiment

E11

Protected invariant

Version-bound reservations

Required technical check

Sink commit validation

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Conflict: one refused

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.40. 40. Unauthorized tool-chain continuation

Attacker capability

Skips step

Affected boundary

Workflow

Relevant embodiment

E20

Protected invariant

Dependencies satisfied

Required technical check

Dependency-bound authority

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Skipped step: refused

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.41. 41. Missing prior-effect receipt

Attacker capability

Omits receipt

Affected boundary

CW-2

Relevant embodiment

E2

Protected invariant

Receipt required for continuation

Required technical check

Successor sink checks receipt

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

No receipt: no successor effect

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.42. 42. Replayed Interim Effectuation Validator receipt

Attacker capability

Replays

Affected boundary

CW-2

Relevant embodiment

E2

Protected invariant

Receipt bound to phase and operation

Required technical check

Bind receipt context

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Replayed receipt: refused

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.43. 43. Wrong validator identity

Attacker capability

Impersonates validator

Affected boundary

CW-2

Relevant embodiment

E2

Protected invariant

Validator identity authenticated

Required technical check

Identity check

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Wrong validator: refused

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.44. 44. Untrusted human approval interface

Attacker capability

Spoofed UI

Affected boundary

Approval

Relevant embodiment

E19

Protected invariant

Approval bound to actual operation

Required technical check

Authenticated interface state

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Spoofed UI: not accepted

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.45. 45. Changed actual operation after approval

Attacker capability

Mutates request

Affected boundary

Approval

Relevant embodiment

E19

Protected invariant

Approved equals executed

Required technical check

Sink reconstruction

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Post-approval change: refused

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.46. 46. Credential rotation race

Attacker capability

Race

Affected boundary

Credential

Relevant embodiment

E31

Protected invariant

Generation fencing

Required technical check

Generation check

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Old generation: refused

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.47. 47. Secret-custody compromise

Attacker capability

Compromises custody

Affected boundary

Custody

Relevant embodiment

E23

Protected invariant

Custody qualification

Required technical check

Attest custody

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Unqualified custody: restrict

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.48. 48. Policy update self-authorization

Attacker capability

Agent edits policy

Affected boundary

Policy

Relevant embodiment

E33

Protected invariant

Mutations not self-authorizing

Required technical check

Independent approval of policy change

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Self-approved change: refused

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.49. 49. Sandbox-to-host privilege transition

Attacker capability

Escapes sandbox

Affected boundary

Sandbox

Relevant embodiment

E25

Protected invariant

Effects crossing boundary checked

Required technical check

Boundary effect check

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Escaping op: refused

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.50. 50. Hardware command bypass

Attacker capability

Direct device access

Affected boundary

Hardware

Relevant embodiment

E14

Protected invariant

Command path coverage

Required technical check

Hardware gate or disclose gap

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Direct command: refused or disclosed

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.51. 51. Device reset and queue replay

Attacker capability

Resets device

Affected boundary

Hardware

Relevant embodiment

E16

Protected invariant

No replay after reset

Required technical check

Persistent consumption

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Replayed queue: refused

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.52. 52. Privacy-budget overflow

Attacker capability

Many small disclosures

Affected boundary

Privacy

Relevant embodiment

E8

Protected invariant

Cumulative exposure

Required technical check

Compositional budget

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Aggregate over limit: refused

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.53. 53. Misleading observer evidence

Attacker capability

Observer lies

Affected boundary

Evidence

Relevant embodiment

E38

Protected invariant

Observer qualification

Required technical check

Independent attestation

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Misleading evidence: UNRESOLVED

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.54. 54. Forged remote-effect receipt

Attacker capability

Forger

Affected boundary

Evidence

Relevant embodiment

E4

Protected invariant

Receipt from source-authoritative signer

Required technical check

Verify signer capability

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Receipt outside signer observation: not accepted

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.55. 55. Lost acknowledgment

Attacker capability

Network loss

Affected boundary

Recovery

Relevant embodiment

E16

Protected invariant

Unknown outcome stays unknown

Required technical check

Indeterminate state

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

No ack: UNRESOLVED, no blind retry

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.56. 56. Duplicate recovery execution

Attacker capability

Repeated recovery

Affected boundary

Recovery

Relevant embodiment

E12

Protected invariant

Recovery authority non-replayable

Required technical check

Consume recovery authority

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Second recovery: refused

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.57. 57. Partial multi-resource effect

Attacker capability

Partial failure

Affected boundary

Transaction

Relevant embodiment

E36

Protected invariant

Partial state contained

Required technical check

Cross-sink reconciliation

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Partial commit: contained

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.58. 58. Unauthorized compensation

Attacker capability

Rolls back without authority

Affected boundary

Recovery

Relevant embodiment

E12

Protected invariant

Compensation separately authorised

Required technical check

Compensation Candidate Act

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Unauthorised rollback: refused

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.59. 59. Irreversible unsafe operation

Attacker capability

Triggers irreversible act

Affected boundary

Physical

Relevant embodiment

E37

Protected invariant

Hazard check before effect

Required technical check

Consequence-bound hazard validation

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Unsafe irreversible: refused

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

E.60. 60. Unverified formal evidence closure

Attacker capability

Claims closure

Affected boundary

Closure

Relevant embodiment

E40

Protected invariant

Closure requires evidence

Required technical check

Closure record check

Failure response

Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.

Residual risk

Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.

Concrete test

Missing evidence: not closed

Actual-effect observation requirement

Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.

Appendix F. Appendix F: Examiner Keywords and Search Phrases

Non-normative. Terms were composed by the editor from the claims, embodiment subjects and the source's own term lists, with industry synonyms added. Clusters map to embodiment and claim ranges at cluster level, not term by term.

Keywords (214):

Table 5
Cluster Embodiments / claims Keywords
Core architecture 1-60 Protected Execution Finality, Candidate Act, Actual Pending Operation, Non-Effective State, Protected Enforcement Domain, Finality Gate, Finality Sink, Scoped Finality Authority, Non-Bearer Execution Handle, Consequence-Bound Authorization, Source-Authority Envelope, Actual-Effect Reconstruction, execution finality, policy enforcement point, resource-side enforcement, operation reconstruction, authorization-to-effect translation
Cross-platform interoperability 1, 31, 43 Cross-Platform Execution Authority, Android iOS Interoperability, Heterogeneous Authorization Semantics, Permission Translation, Canonical Effect Descriptor, Native Security Substrate, Cross-Platform Effect Equivalence, Destination-Side Enforcement, Receiving-Platform Verification, heterogeneous operating systems, mobile desktop cloud embedded, vendor-independent security semantics, cross-OS authorization, permission mapping, entitlement mapping, capability translation
Platform assurance 1-52 Enforcement-Capability Qualification, Mandatory Blocking Capability, Observation-Only Security Interface, Effectuation-Path Coverage, Alternative Effect Path, Credential Broker, Protected Application Dispatcher, Source Security Evidence, Protected Service Identity, policy decision point, security API capability, coverage gap, bypass path, mandatory access control, hardware-backed keystore, StrongBox, Secure Enclave, TPM, HSM, KMS
Autonomous agents E7, E20, E24, E28 Cross-Provider Agent Delegation, Agent Tool Execution, MCP Security, Agent-to-Agent Authorization, Multi-Agent Orchestration, Tool Semantic Continuity, Agent Handoff, AI Runtime Security, Agent Context Migration, Nested Tool Authority, agent sandbox, tool gateway, prompt injection, tool-output provenance, agent SDK, A2A, Model Context Protocol, delegation chain, transitive attenuation, agent identity
Cryptographic authorization E15, E23 Sender-Constrained Capability, Scope-Limited Authorization, Protected Consumption, Revocation Epoch, Authority Generation, Replay-Resistant Permission, Trusted Execution Environment, Hardware-Rooted Authority, Attestation, proof of possession, DPoP, token exchange, rich authorization request, CBOR, COSE, JWT, CWT, mutual TLS, workload identity, capability token, one-time authorization
Resource and identity continuity E21, E34, E9 Resource Alias Binding, Dynamic Namespace Rebinding, Object Identity, Redirect Verification, Original Source Principal, Resource Ownership Epoch, Cross-Device Authority Migration, Stale Source Fencing, Snapshot Resurrection, effective resource identity, URL normalization, service discovery identity, alias resolution, namespace rebinding, ownership generation, fencing token, lease, generation counter, device handoff, session continuity
Evidence and outcome E2, E4, E16, E38 Authenticated Effect Evidence, Interim Effectuation Validator, Evidence-Carrying Receipt, Receipt-Gated Continuation, Actual Effect Witness, Remote Outcome Reconciliation, Crash-Consistent Effect Journal, Unknown Outcome, Effect Provenance, indeterminate outcome, idempotency key, transactional outbox, write-ahead journal, receipt validation, observer attestation, compromised observer, outcome evidence, audit log, saga, compensation
Privacy and safety E8, E19, E37 Cumulative Privacy Exposure, Compositional Disclosure Budget, Physical Hazard Validation, Irreversible Effect, Secure Human Approval, Transaction-Bound Consent, Protected Recovery Authority, Non-Compensable Consequence, data egress control, privacy budget, differential disclosure, secure display, what-you-see-is-what-you-sign, human-in-the-loop approval, consent binding, hazard check, safety interlock, physical actuator, recipient change, selective disclosure
Formal assurance E40 Enforcement Composition Graph, Protected Authority-Consumption Invariant, Effect-Path Reachability, Cross-Domain Safety Invariant, Machine-Checkable Finality, Formal State Transition, Negative Effect Verification, model checking, TLA+, invariant, reachability analysis, state machine verification, closure condition, proof obligation, safety property, liveness property, refinement, temporal logic, finality closure, coverage proof
Distributed and concurrency E1, E11, E13, E22, E29 effect conflict arbitration, atomic reservation, version-bound reservation, quorum, Byzantine agreement, consensus, approval quorum, resource quota, cumulative budget, delegated quota, sink-local commit, optimistic concurrency, compare-and-swap, two-phase commit, distributed lock, lease expiry, clock uncertainty, delayed revocation, offline operation, network partition
Runtime and lifecycle E10, E14, E25, E26, E33 model drift, runtime generation, algorithm fingerprint, tool update, installation attestation, supply-chain integrity, sandbox escape, privilege transition, container boundary, policy evolution, configuration drift, change-impact analysis, non-self-authorizing mutation, effectuation-path discovery, bypass detection, runtime revalidation, software bill of materials, secure boot, measured boot, remote attestation

Compound phrases (110):

Table 6
Cluster Phrases
Core protected execution finality; candidate act in non-effective state; actual pending operation reconstruction; scoped non-bearer finality enablement; finality sink verification; protected enforcement domain; consequence-bound authorization; authorization-to-effect translation; source authority envelope; actual effect reconstruction
Cross-platform cross-platform execution authority; Android iOS effect authorization; heterogeneous authorization semantics; permission translation adapter; canonical effect descriptor; native security substrate; destination-side finality verification; receiving-platform sink; cross-platform effect equivalence; vendor-independent authority semantics
Platform enforcement capability qualification; mandatory blocking capability; observation-only security interface; effectuation path coverage; alternate effect path; credential broker downstream enforcement; protected application dispatcher; source security evidence; platform qualification record; unavailable enforcement non-effective
Agents cross-provider agent delegation; agent tool execution authorization; MCP protected operation semantics; agent-to-agent authority; tool contract evolution; tool semantic continuity; agent handoff authority; nested tool authority attenuation; model-driven tool output provenance; agent sandbox privilege transition
Cryptographic sender-constrained capability; scope-limited authorization; protected authority consumption; revocation epoch check; authority generation counter; replay-resistant operation permission; hardware-rooted finality; non-exportable credential custody; one-time execution authorization; operation-bound broker activation
Identity resource alias binding; dynamic namespace rebinding; effective resource identity; redirect destination verification; original source principal; resource ownership epoch; cross-device authority migration; stale source fencing; snapshot authority resurrection; non-resurrectable in-flight effect
Evidence authenticated effect evidence; interim effectuation validator; receipt-gated continuation; evidence-carrying receipt; actual effect witness; remote outcome reconciliation; crash-consistent finality journal; indeterminate outcome handling; effect provenance chain; compromised observer containment
Privacy and safety cumulative privacy exposure; compositional disclosure budget; physical hazard validation; irreversible effect containment; transaction-bound human approval; protected recovery authority; non-compensable consequence; authenticated presentation state; secure approval interface; scope-limited disclosure
Formal enforcement composition graph; authority consumption invariant; effect path reachability; cross-domain safety invariant; machine-checkable finality closure; negative effect verification; formal state transition model; closure record verification; coverage revalidation; bypass detection
Distributed cross-agent effect conflict arbitration; atomic effect reservation; sink-bound fencing; version-bound reservation; independent approval quorum; consensus-to-effect separation; multi-resource budget; delegated quota; partial commit containment; independently authorized compensation
Runtime model algorithm drift revalidation; tool runtime lifecycle authority; installation-time authority attestation; policy mutation non-self-authorizing; configuration change impact; credential rotation generation fencing; offline effect authority; delayed revocation propagation; conflicting policy precedence; resource owner change revocation race

Boolean search phrases (25):

  1. "cross platform" AND "execution finality"
  2. "Android" AND "iOS" AND "effect authorization"
  3. "heterogeneous operating systems" AND "authority continuity"
  4. "permission translation" AND "actual operation"
  5. "canonical effect descriptor" AND "enforcement"
  6. "native permission" AND "consequence bound"
  7. "source authority" AND "receiving platform"
  8. "destination side" AND "finality verification"
  9. "cross device migration" AND "source fencing"
  10. "execution ownership epoch" AND "revocation"
  11. "non bearer capability" AND "effectuation"
  12. "effect path coverage" AND "alternative credential"
  13. "agent tool" AND "execution time authorization"
  14. "MCP" AND "protected operation semantics"
  15. "tool contract evolution" AND "authority"
  16. "credential broker" AND "actual effect"
  17. "agent delegation" AND "non transferable authority"
  18. "receipt gated continuation" AND "actual effect"
  19. "resource alias" AND "authorization correspondence"
  20. "human approval" AND "transaction bound"
  21. "runtime update" AND "finality authority"
  22. "sandbox" AND "escaping operation"
  23. "offline authority" AND "delayed revocation"
  24. "policy mutation" AND "non self authorizing"
  25. "cross domain evidence" AND "authority consumption"

Examiner discussion, to be tested against the filed texts and not decided here: the objective technical problem (keeping protected authority meaningful for an actual effect across platforms); motivation to combine the established mechanisms of the prior-art table; reasonable expectation of success given the platform limits described; functional interdependence of descriptor, qualification, sink reconstruction, consumption and fencing; and avoidance of hindsight. Isolated well-known mechanisms are not claimed as novel.

Appendix G. Appendix G: Industry and Product Mapping

Prospective, non-normative. The rows describe where a check of this kind would sit if integrated, and what it would examine. Product capabilities were not verified against current official documentation in this session, and no adoption, endorsement, implementation, copying or infringement is asserted. The alignment is AI-generated and must be cross-checked against the original PCT filings. Latency and legacy compatibility depend on the loop tier and on whether an existing resource-side gate exists; required changes are the addition of operation reconstruction and consumption at the sink.

G.1. Apple (iOS, iPadOS, macOS)

Proposed integration boundary

App-level dispatcher with Secure Enclave-held keys, and a server-side resource sink

What is checked or rejected

Operation-specific enablement tied to the reconstructed request

Residual bypass risk

Calls using app-held credentials outside the dispatcher

Why it matters

Platform identity of an app does not name the exact effect

Unknown or not verifiable

No system-wide interception by ordinary apps

G.2. Google Android

Proposed integration boundary

App dispatcher with Keystore/StrongBox keys; enterprise-managed gateways; server sink

What is checked or rejected

Same, plus device-state evidence

Residual bypass risk

Unmanaged routes and exported credentials

Why it matters

Different OEM capabilities need qualification records

Unknown or not verifiable

Ordinary apps cannot mediate other apps

G.3. Microsoft Windows and Azure

Proposed integration boundary

Protected service broker with TPM-backed keys; Azure resource-side checks

What is checked or rejected

Operation binding and revocation generation

Residual bypass risk

Principals that can export credentials

Why it matters

Identity differs from operation-specific authority

Unknown or not verifiable

Local administrators outside the broker

G.4. Linux ecosystems

Proposed integration boundary

Resource controller with workload identity and LSM/seccomp confinement

What is checked or rejected

Operation reconstruction at the controller

Residual bypass risk

Direct credentials held by workloads

Why it matters

Process confinement does not know the effect

Unknown or not verifiable

Fully compromised kernel

G.5. Samsung, Qualcomm, MediaTek

Proposed integration boundary

Hardware-backed key stores and TEEs as enforcement substrate

What is checked or rejected

Attestable enforcement generation

Residual bypass risk

Normal-world paths

Why it matters

Capability differs by chipset and OEM

Unknown or not verifiable

Chipset firmware behaviour

G.6. OpenAI Agents SDK

Proposed integration boundary

Tool-call dispatcher gate before executing a tool with consequences

What is checked or rejected

Canonical effect descriptor and enablement per call

Residual bypass risk

Direct API keys held by the tool

Why it matters

Tool names do not identify effects

Unknown or not verifiable

What a hosted tool does internally

G.7. Anthropic Claude Agent SDK and MCP

Proposed integration boundary

Tool-dispatch layer and MCP server resource side

What is checked or rejected

Operation provenance and tool contract version

Residual bypass risk

Credentials available outside the dispatcher

Why it matters

Tool-output text is data, not authority

Unknown or not verifiable

Server-side behaviour not exposed

G.8. Google ADK and A2A

Proposed integration boundary

Delegation hand-off between agents

What is checked or rejected

Delegation lineage with attenuation

Residual bypass risk

Direct calls between agents outside the lineage

Why it matters

Cross-provider handoff must not widen scope

Unknown or not verifiable

Remote agent internal state

G.9. Microsoft agent services

Proposed integration boundary

Agent runtime dispatcher with managed identity

What is checked or rejected

Runtime-generation revalidation

Residual bypass risk

Managed identity used elsewhere

Why it matters

Identity is not operation authority

Unknown or not verifiable

Service internals

G.10. AWS agent systems and AWS cloud

Proposed integration boundary

Resource-side gate beside IAM; KMS-held keys

What is checked or rejected

Sink reconstruction of the API call

Residual bypass risk

Paths using unrestricted keys

Why it matters

IAM authorizes principals, not specific effect

Unknown or not verifiable

Services not routed through the gate

G.11. Salesforce, IBM watsonx, Alibaba AgentScope

Proposed integration boundary

Agent action dispatcher

What is checked or rejected

Action-contract compatibility

Residual bypass risk

Direct connectors

Why it matters

Different tool contracts under similar names

Unknown or not verifiable

Connector internals

G.12. Oracle, IBM Cloud and other clouds

Proposed integration boundary

Resource gateway and HSM/KMS custody

What is checked or rejected

Consumed authorization and revocation epochs

Residual bypass risk

Other credential routes

Why it matters

Differing IAM semantics

Unknown or not verifiable

Provider internals

G.13. Arm, Intel, AMD, NVIDIA

Proposed integration boundary

TEE or confidential-computing attestation as enforcement evidence

What is checked or rejected

Attested enforcement generation

Residual bypass risk

Effects after leaving the enclave

Why it matters

Attestation shows environment, not each effect

Unknown or not verifiable

Microarchitectural limits

G.14. SAP, ServiceNow, Databricks, Snowflake

Proposed integration boundary

Enterprise workflow or data-platform gate

What is checked or rejected

Dependency-bound workflow authority; disclosure budgets

Residual bypass risk

Direct database credentials

Why it matters

Data egress paths vary

Unknown or not verifiable

Platform-internal jobs

G.15. Visa, Mastercard, Swift, payment processors

Proposed integration boundary

Payment execution gate beside the processor

What is checked or rejected

Reconstruction of amount, payee and currency; consumed once

Residual bypass risk

Alternate payment rails

Why it matters

Authorization of a payment is separate

Unknown or not verifiable

Settlement finality outside the gate

G.16. Huawei, Ericsson, Nokia, operators and Open RAN

Proposed integration boundary

Network-management and exposure gates

What is checked or rejected

Operation reconstruction and revocation propagation

Residual bypass risk

Vendor-private interfaces

Why it matters

Multi-vendor semantics differ

Unknown or not verifiable

Vendor-internal behaviour

G.17. Siemens, Schneider Electric, industrial IoT and robotics

Proposed integration boundary

Actuator or command-controller gate

What is checked or rejected

Hazard check and irreversible-effect containment

Residual bypass risk

Direct actuator wiring

Why it matters

Not a safety certification

Unknown or not verifiable

Physical effects without sensors

Appendix H. Appendix H: Mothership Comparison

This table is the editor's preliminary sorting based on the work's own description of the earlier programme. The foundational JSON (Technical_Disclosure_1.json) was not available and the Datatracker drafts were not read, so no comparison of actual filed texts was done and no patentability or priority conclusion is made.

Table 7
Concept Relationship to earlier work Status
Candidate Acts, Non-Effective State, Protected Enforcement Domains, Finality Sinks, scoped effect authority, revocation, anti-replay, actual-effect evidence Foundational (Mothership programme) Not new in October
Native-permission semantic differences Applies earlier principles to platforms To examine against filed texts
Platform-specific authority adapters Specific implementation of authorization-to-effect translation To examine
Canonical effect descriptors Related to operation reconstruction Cross-platform canonicalization issues may be additional
Native enforcement capability qualification Potentially additional To examine
Cross-platform source-authority continuity Potentially additional To examine
Protected cross-device authority ownership and stale-source fencing Potentially additional To examine
Unavailable enforcement capabilities; credential-broker limitations Honest limitation handling To examine
Platform upgrade and security API changes Related to runtime lifecycle To examine
Cross-provider AI-agent handoffs Application of delegation continuity To examine
Hardware and software enforcement equivalence; partial coverage and alternative paths Potentially additional To examine

Appendix I. Appendix I: IPR and Research Lineage

Appendix J. Appendix J: Source Verification and Limitations

J.1. Source Verification

  • Source: 3,577-page PDF; text extracted with pdftotext; embodiment boundaries located from END OF EMBODIMENT markers; claims 1-60 parsed in sequence.
  • Duplicate E31: two full sections labelled Embodiment 31 (about pages 2567-2650 and 2650-2734). A sentence-level comparison found the same number of sentences in each, and the differences seen were whitespace and bullet-glyph artefacts of the extraction. They are treated as one embodiment.
  • CW-1 begins near page 15, CW-2 near page 63, CW-3 near page 119 and CW-IMP-1 near page 178 of the PDF; these were located but not read in full.
  • The source was read selectively. Per-embodiment fields, formal predicates, diagrams, machine-verifiable records, reference software and cross-embodiment combinations in the source were not individually extracted.
  • The application number and date are applicant-identified; the PDF signature date is 25 October 2026 and is not a certified acknowledgment.
  • Technical_Disclosure_1.json was not available; Datatracker drafts and vendor documentation were not read; RFC titles are from the editor's knowledge.
  • No code was executed and no tests or benchmarks are reported.

J.2. Readiness Report and Limitations

  • Section prose, threats, examples, industry rows and platform notes are written by the editor from the work's own task description and general technical knowledge, not extracted from the 3,577 pages.
  • Overlap with the four earlier drafts must be checked before submission.
  • Formal IETF IPR disclosure is pending.

J.3. Self-Audit

  1. Correct October 25 PDF used (3,577 pages): yes.
  2. All 40 distinct embodiments covered: yes, at the level stated in Appendix A.
  3. Duplicate E31 not counted twice: yes.
  4. Claims 1-60 included: yes (excerpts).
  5. Independent claims 1, 31, 43 and 53 distinguished: yes.
  6. CW-1, CW-2 and CW-3 kept separate: yes.
  7. CW-IMP-1 summarised: yes, from the task description; the source section was located but not read in full.
  8. Interoperability not confused with data exchange: yes.
  9. Source authentication not equated with effect authority: yes.
  10. Permission names not assumed equivalent: yes.
  11. Descriptors carry material properties: yes.
  12. Platform capabilities evaluated realistically: yes.
  13. Observation-only interfaces not called blocking: yes.
  14. Unavailable enforcement leads to non-effective condition: yes.
  15. Task-state movement distinguished from authority transfer: yes.
  16. Source fencing supported by evidence: yes.
  17. Epochs and revocation checked: yes.
  18. Offline limits explicit: yes.
  19. Receipt validation not audit logging: yes.
  20. Earlier success distinguished from unverified acknowledgment: yes.
  21. Human approval does not override other restrictions: yes.
  22. Protected consumption enforced: yes.
  23. Destination reconstruction explicit: yes.
  24. Alternative paths in threat model: yes.
  25. No private Android or iOS APIs invented: yes.
  26. Hardware and software claims match trust assumptions: yes.
  27. Standards credited: yes.
  28. No benchmark invented: yes.
  29. Companies not implied to adopt: yes.
  30. Filing metadata flagged as applicant-identified: yes.
  31. Mothership attribution stated: yes.
  32. Earlier principles not called new in October: yes.
  33. Examiner terms include industry equivalents: yes.
  34. Security and privacy sections present: yes.
  35. IANA section correct: yes.
  36. References resolvable and current: not verified.
  37. IPR without invented licensing: yes.
  38. Useful without patent annexes: yes.
  39. Per-embodiment 20-point analysis: partial (cluster level).
  40. Per-claim 14-field chart: partial (group level).

Author's Address

Sangam Kumar Das
Independent Inventor
Balasore 756001
Odisha
India