| Internet-Draft | Interoperable Execution Finality | November 2026 |
| Das | Expires 20 May 2027 | [Page] |
Computation is not authority to act. An operating system may authenticate an application, a device may recognize a permission, a cloud service may accept a token, an AI agent may hold a tool credential and a remote application may receive a command, yet none of these facts shows that the consequential operation actually executed is still within the originating authority, scope, current policy and resource state. This document describes an informational architecture for preserving an equivalent protected authorization relationship across heterogeneous platforms such as Android, iOS, macOS, Windows, Linux, cloud services, trusted hardware, edge devices and autonomous agents, whose native permission models and enforcement mechanisms differ. Qualified native evidence is translated into a protected canonical effect descriptor, scoped non-bearer enablement is created, and a receiving Finality Sink reconstructs the actual pending operation and enforces authority at a covered boundary. The document covers enforcement-capability qualification, cross-device ownership with source fencing, receipt-gated continuation, protected reauthorization, recovery and an honest account of what each mechanism can and cannot control.¶
Foundational reference: PCT/IB2026/055615 ("Mothership"), filed 4 June 2026 and published 16 July 2026 as WO 2026/150382 A2. Where to read the full PCT filing: search "Sangam Das" on WIPO PATENTSCOPE; search PCT/IB2026/055615 (pctib202655615); or read the PCT file directly in Technical Disclosure Commons at https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/12542/.¶
Technical source of this document: an Indian provisional specification titled "Systems and Methods for Cross-Platform Interoperable Execution-Finality Control, Protected Authority Continuity, and Consequence Enforcement Across Heterogeneous Operating Systems, Devices, and Autonomous Computing Environments", supplied as a 3,577-page document with 40 distinct numbered embodiments and 60 claims, electronically signed 25 October 2026. The applicant identifies the application as 202631127058, filed 25 October 2026. The PDF text is not a certified Patent Office acknowledgment, so the number and date are applicant-identified and are not independently verified. See [[ipr]] and [[app-j]].¶
The IPR disclosure for this document will be made at the appropriate time in accordance with IETF guidelines.¶
Human-Originated Invention: the underlying invention is attributed to the human inventor Sangam Kumar Das. AI-Assisted Technical Preparation: this text was prepared with AI assistance and may contain errors; identifiers, dates, standards references and product statements must be verified against primary sources. Non-Endorsement: this is an individual proposal, not an IETF standard; company and product references are prospective research environments only, and no adoption, endorsement, partnership, copying, infringement or implementation is asserted. Security Limitation: protection applies only to effect paths actually covered; no universal operating-system privilege, instantaneous cross-domain revocation, global exactly-once execution, complete physical safety or zero-latency validation is presumed.¶
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.¶
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.¶
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."¶
This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 May 2027.¶
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.¶
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document.¶
Interoperability between computing platforms is usually described as the ability to exchange data or requests. A different and harder question is whether two or more environments can preserve an equivalent protected authorization relationship for a consequential operation when their permission models, application isolation, hardware security, execution interfaces and trust assumptions differ.¶
The architecture answers that question without assuming uniform kernels or identical security APIs. Heterogeneous platforms translate qualified authority into operation-specific effect semantics, and a participating resource boundary independently enforces those semantics.¶
This document is understandable without reading the patent. Appendices map the mechanisms to the source specification and to examiner terminology; they are non-normative.¶
A native permission on one platform and a native permission on another with a similar name may not mean the same thing. A credential accepted by a cloud service says who is calling, not which operation is about to take effect. When an unfinished operation moves from a phone to a cloud service, copying its state does not tell anyone whether the old device is still able to act. When a tool is updated, its effect semantics may change while its name stays the same. These problems are about authority for actual effects, not about transport or authentication.¶
The central question is how to keep protected authority meaningful across platforms, and how to say plainly where it stops.¶
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] terms are used only where a requirement is intentionally stated.¶
A proposed consequential operation held in a Non-Effective State.¶
A versioned, typed representation of the material actual operation.¶
The component at an actual resource boundary that reconstructs the pending operation and permits or withholds the effect.¶
Operation-specific, sink-bound permission whose possession alone confers no authority.¶
A record of what a platform security mechanism can actually observe, block or consume.¶
A monotonic generation used for ownership, revocation or policy.¶
Evidence or mechanism that prevents a previous owner from effecting the operation.¶
The foundational sequence is: originating authority, Candidate Act, Non-Effective State, heterogeneous evidence translation, protected canonical effect descriptor, independent protected validation, scoped non-bearer finality enablement, receiving Finality Sink reconstruction, current authority and coverage check, protected consumption, actual consequence, and qualified outcome evidence. See Figure 2.¶
Controls the request origin; can prove what it observes, not what a remote sink will do.¶
Translates native evidence; must itself be qualified; can mistranslate.¶
Holds authority, policy, revocation and consumption state; trusted only within its stated environment.¶
Controls the effect at its boundary; cannot control paths it does not cover.¶
Provides evidence within its observation capability.¶
An unauthorized action can still bypass the architecture through any effect path that does not pass a covered sink, through a compromised privileged host, or through a credential copy outside the broker. The draft therefore ties every assurance to the component that can provide it.¶
Platform permission names are not treated as semantically equivalent. An adapter produces an effect-specific claim and records whether the claim is equivalent to, narrower than, or incompatible with the canonical semantics (Figure 6). A native entitlement is advice; it is not final authority for an operation.¶
Syntactic interoperability (the fields parse) differs from semantic equivalence (the operation means the same). The former never implies the latter.¶
A Candidate Act identifies the proposed operation and binds its action class, resource, destination, parameters, source authority and effect constraints. The Non-Effective State keeps the consequence from taking effect while conditions remain unsatisfied. Forms include protected queues, withheld credentials, uncommitted transactions and isolated command buffers. A simulated hold is insufficient if another effective route remains available. Where mandatory enforcement is unavailable, the defined condition is non-effective, not silently weakened.¶
The original authority, principal, delegated scope and restrictions are recorded. Delegation across providers keeps a cryptographic lineage in which scope can only narrow (Figure 12). A forged or expanded delegation fails lineage verification. Source authentication is not the same as actual effect authority.¶
Embodiments E7, E28 and E29 address delegation continuity, transitive attenuation and approval quorums.¶
Adapters translate qualified native-platform security information into the protected common representation. For each platform below, the table-like list states what established controls provide, what additional binding is needed, and what is not assumed.¶
Application UID isolation, app permissions, Keystore and hardware-backed keys, StrongBox where available, managed/enterprise device services, app-controlled tool dispatchers, server-side resource enforcement, authorised accessibility interfaces, device state and security updates.¶
Native permissions describe what an app may ask the platform to do; they do not describe the specific consequential operation. A binding of permission, operation-specific canonical descriptor and a resource-side check is needed.¶
An ordinary Android application has no unrestricted system-wide mediation; enforcement is limited to effects routed through the app dispatcher or a participating resource-side gateway.¶
App sandbox, entitlements, Keychain, Secure Enclave, app-controlled effectuation, system-approved extensions, managed apps or enterprise interfaces, server-side enforcement, app-to-app and device-to-device communication, current platform security state.¶
The same operation-specific binding is needed; platform identity of the app is not authority for a particular effect.¶
No private kernel hooks, no universal app interception and no access to other apps credentials are assumed.¶
Process and service identities, AppContainer and isolation mechanisms, security principals, credential protection, TPM-backed keys, protected service brokers, endpoint management, privileged execution interfaces.¶
A broker or service can hold authority, but binding it to the exact pending effect and to a revocation generation is an addition.¶
Security principals do not by themselves limit what an authorised principal does with a credential it can export.¶
Process credentials, namespaces, LSMs, seccomp, capabilities, cgroups, containers, hardware-backed keys, service-mesh and workload identity, privileged resource controllers.¶
Kernel controls restrict processes; they do not know an operation-level canonical effect. A resource controller or sink must reconstruct the operation.¶
Application-level code cannot independently resist a fully compromised kernel.¶
Cloud IAM, resource-native API authorization, managed identity, confidential computing, HSM/KMS, secure and measured boot, device command controllers, firmware security, trusted peripherals, remote attestation, resource-gateway enforcement.¶
Cloud IAM authorizes API principals; the additional binding is operation-specific, sink-reconstructed and consumed once under protected state.¶
Where a direct credential path to the resource remains, a gateway does not control the effect.¶
The Canonical Effect Descriptor is versioned and typed. Candidate fields: descriptor version; original operation and Candidate Act identifiers; originating principal; requesting workload; source and receiving platform; parent task; delegation chain; effect class; effective resource identity; destination or beneficiary; material parameters; allowed transformations; source authority; scope; policy, revocation and resource generations; designated Finality Sink; required evidence; enforcement-coverage reference; validity conditions; protected usage conditions. Mandatory fields depend on the effect; not every application carries all fields.¶
Canonicalization must address Unicode normalization, binary addresses, object ordering, numeric precision, timestamps, resource aliases, URL normalization, redirects, nested operations, unknown critical fields, schema evolution, units, localized strings and application-specific semantics. Unknown critical fields cause rejection. A valid hash of an incorrectly built descriptor does not prove the actual operation has the intended meaning (Figure 7).¶
Illustrative JSON (not a mandatory encoding):¶
{
"v": 1,
"op": "op-7f3a",
"candidate_act": "ca-19",
"effect_class": "payment.transfer",
"resource": "acct:EXAMPLE-1",
"beneficiary": "acct:EXAMPLE-2",
"params": {"amount": "100.00", "ccy": "EUR"},
"source_platform": "android",
"recv_platform": "linux",
"authority_gen": 12,
"revocation_gen": 4,
"sink": "sink-pay-01",
"critical": ["resource","beneficiary","params"]
}
A security mechanism may provide authentication, authorization advice, logging, observation, notification, isolation, revocation notification, restricted credential use, operation-specific blocking, actual resource-side refusal, protected authority consumption or trusted state verification. These capabilities are not interchangeable. A monitoring API is not a blocking interface because its name contains security; a sandbox does not control an external service that accepts the agent's credentials; a credential broker does not control other copies of credentials (Figure 8, Figure 9).¶
An Enforcement Qualification Record contains: platform; security component; controlled resource; operation class; available observation; ability to block; current component generation; required trust assumption; known alternate effect routes; qualification status; and the event that requires revalidation. Status values are qualified, partially qualified, unresolved and disqualified. Where mandatory blocking is unavailable, the options are to move enforcement to a participating resource-side gateway, to restrict supported effects, or to withhold the protected operation. The claimed protection property is not silently weakened.¶
The Protected Enforcement Domain maintains applicable authority, evidence, policy versions, revocation, consumption counters and technical conditions. An Extended Verification Module Interface supports optional checks on semantic identity, privacy, conflicts, device state, resource limits, evidence, delegation or prior-effect dependencies. A Protected Authority Controller creates, derives or activates scoped finality enablement; a Finality Gate combines mandatory predicates. Domain separation is by control, not by location alone.¶
Enablement is operation-specific, sink-bound and non-bearer: possessing it does not authorize arbitrary use (Figure 13). It is bound to the descriptor, the designated sink, current generations and a protected usage condition. A sink that cannot verify the binding refuses.¶
Local authority and the destination sink are distinct (Figure 10). A credential broker can hold the credential, but downstream enforcement must still check the operation (Figure 11).¶
The sink independently obtains or reconstructs the actual pending operation, checks its correspondence to the descriptor and to current sink-local state, and permits or withholds the effect through a controlled enforcement boundary. A sink that only logs is not a sink. A sink controls only effects that pass through it; effect-path discovery and a coverage controller report which routes are covered.¶
Authorization is consumed under protected monotonic state (Figure 15). A crash between consumption and effect leaves the outcome indeterminate; it is recorded as unknown and is not blindly retried. Authority and revocation epochs are checked at effect time (Figure 14).¶
The stages are: identify the unfinished operation; establish the current source owner; authenticate the target; verify eligibility; determine effect-capable source routes; prepare transferable computational context; distinguish computational state from finality authority; establish a protected ownership-transition generation; verify source fencing; reconstruct the destination effect scope; establish destination-specific protected authority; verify the actual pending operation at the destination; prevent stale source effectuation; preserve consumed or unresolved effect state; reconcile partial migration failure (Figure 16, Figure 17).¶
Negative scenarios include a suspended or disconnected source, both sides active, snapshot restoration reviving an old worker, a source that retains an API credential, a hardware queue that remains executable, weaker destination trust, an effect before transfer completes, revocation during transfer, a delayed callback to the source, destination retry of an unresolved operation, and accidental merging of two pending operations.¶
Invariant: no duplicated, unauthorized execution authority may arise merely from copying or restoring computational state. Instant global revocation across disconnected devices is not assumed.¶
Revocation propagates across domains and invalidates dependent authority; offline authority is bounded by explicit leases and clock uncertainty (Figure 18). Cached permission after revocation, epoch rollback and incorrect lease expiry are threats listed in Appendix E. Delayed revocation is a stated limitation, not a solved problem.¶
CW-1 is the modular protected architecture with actual-operation reconstruction, independent protected authority, non-bypassable consequence enforcement and optional advanced mechanisms. Components: Requesting Computational Entity (constructs requests, holds no finality authority automatically); Candidate Act Constructor; Non-Effective Holding Mechanism; Protected Enforcement Domain; Extended Verification Module Interface; Protected Authority Controller; Finality Gate; Finality Sink; Protected State and Evidence Store; Optional Effect Observer; Optional Interim Effectuation Validator; Effectuation-Path Coverage Controller. No implementation need contain every optional module.¶
CW-2 divides an operation into bounded phases. The first phase is independently authorized; a bounded real effect occurs through a participating sink; qualified evidence is obtained; an authorized Interim Effectuation Validator evaluates it; the accepted receipt becomes a required causal condition for the next phase; the successor sink independently checks the receipt-dependent authority. Missing, stale, replayed, unqualified or contradicted evidence does not enable the successor effect (Figure 19, Figure 20).¶
CW-3 covers original task scope, cumulative actual effect, material scope deviation, independent security signals, false positives, conflicting evidence, risk-adaptive suspension, reauthorization eligibility, the exact changed consequence, human or authorized automated approval, protected authority generation, current policy and revocation, limited renewed authority, sink-side verification, repeated deviations, recovery and audit (Figure 21).¶
A human approval or automated reauthorization cannot override unrelated mandatory protections: approval to continue a robotic operation does not establish physical safety, actuator identity or valid prior-effect evidence. An approval screen, a confirmation prompt or an alert acknowledgment is insufficient unless the resulting permission is bound to the actual effect.¶
The source's supplementary implementation material (CW-IMP-1) explains how existing technologies can support selected functions: protected application dispatchers, credential brokers, secure enclaves, TEEs, HSMs, secure elements, transactional databases, authenticated receipts, hardware command gates, server-side resource controllers, attestation services, runtime policy engines, monotonic state, recovery journals, isolated services and protected device communication. These provide building blocks; the additional enforcement relationships (operation reconstruction at the sink, operation-bound enablement, source fencing) are what the architecture adds. For every assurance, the component able to provide it is named in Appendix D and in the mechanism list in Section 23. Application code cannot resist a fully compromised kernel; an iOS app has no arbitrary system-wide interception; an Android app cannot mediate all device or app operations; cross-platform non-bypassability is not claimed unless all relevant paths are controlled.¶
Tool installation, update and runtime changes are consequential transitions: authority bound to a prior generation does not carry over without revalidation (Figure 24). Tool outputs are data, not instruction authority. Cross-provider handoff keeps delegation lineage; moving agent context does not move effect authority. Nested tool invocation attenuates authority. Embodiments E10, E20, E24, E25, E26, E27, E28 and E34 apply.¶
Tool names that look equivalent may carry different permissions or effects; compatibility is validated per contract version before authority is accepted.¶
For each enforcement alternative the entries state: effects it can control; what an attacker can bypass; whether protected state survives crashes; whether it can prevent replay; whether it can verify current revocation; whether authority is transferable; whether it can attest its enforcement generation; and what happens when it is unavailable. Not every implementation is hardware-rooted, and software-only separation from a fully compromised privileged host is not claimed.¶
Only effects routed through the application dispatcher.¶
A compromised or modified application, or any direct credential path.¶
Only if the application journals durably.¶
Only with a durable counter.¶
Only by querying a service.¶
Only by explicit transfer protocol.¶
No, unless backed by an attestable component.¶
Effects through the dispatcher stop; other paths are unaffected.¶
Effects mediated by the service on that host.¶
A compromised kernel or direct driver access.¶
Depends on service storage.¶
Yes, if state is monotonic.¶
If it can reach the revocation source.¶
Not inherently.¶
Possible with platform attestation.¶
Mediated effects stop; the rest is outside control.¶
Effects of managed devices routed through it.¶
Unmanaged devices and alternate networks.¶
Yes if stored in the gateway.¶
Yes.¶
Yes when online.¶
Gateway-held authority can be moved.¶
Partly.¶
Managed effects stop; others unaffected.¶
Effects at the resource it fronts.¶
Paths to the resource that bypass the controller.¶
Yes if transactional.¶
Yes.¶
Yes when it can reach revocation state.¶
Resource-bound, not transferable.¶
Possible.¶
The resource refuses by default; availability falls.¶
Cryptographic operations it holds keys for.¶
Effects outside the key use.¶
Yes, in the module.¶
Via monotonic counters.¶
Not by itself.¶
Keys may be non-transferable.¶
Yes.¶
Key use stops.¶
Operations the element signs or authorizes.¶
Everything not routed through it.¶
Yes.¶
Via counters.¶
Not by itself.¶
Typically bound to a device.¶
Yes.¶
Key use stops.¶
Operations needing keys sealed to platform state.¶
Effects not gated by those keys.¶
Yes for sealed state.¶
Via counters.¶
No.¶
Bound to platform.¶
Yes (measured state).¶
Sealed secrets become unusable.¶
Computation inside the protected environment.¶
Effects emitted after leaving it.¶
Depends on storage design.¶
Possible.¶
Not by itself.¶
Depends.¶
Yes, for the environment.¶
Environment attestation fails closed.¶
Operations run in the trusted world.¶
The normal world and unrelated paths.¶
Depends.¶
Possible.¶
Not by itself.¶
Depends.¶
Yes.¶
Trusted operations stop.¶
Effects the VM boundary mediates.¶
Host-level compromise and paths outside the VM.¶
Depends.¶
Possible.¶
Not by itself.¶
Migration needs fencing.¶
Depends.¶
VM-mediated effects stop.¶
Queued device commands.¶
Direct register or alternate queue access.¶
Depends on device.¶
Depends.¶
No.¶
Not transferable.¶
Device-dependent.¶
Queued commands are withheld.¶
Commands through the controlled queue.¶
Alternate queues or drivers.¶
Depends.¶
Depends.¶
No.¶
No.¶
Device-dependent.¶
Controlled commands stop.¶
Traffic crossing the egress point.¶
Alternate egress paths.¶
Depends.¶
Yes for counters.¶
Yes if connected.¶
Not transferable.¶
Possible.¶
Egress blocks; connectivity falls.¶
What the user sees and confirms.¶
Differences between displayed and executed operation.¶
N/A.¶
Single-use confirmation tokens.¶
N/A.¶
No.¶
Platform dependent.¶
No confirmation, no operation.¶
Commands to the actuator.¶
Direct wiring or an uncontrolled controller.¶
Yes if non-volatile.¶
Yes.¶
No.¶
No.¶
Possible.¶
Actuation withheld; safety state must be defined separately.¶
Unknown completion stays unknown. Replay of consumed authority is refused. Recovery is a new Candidate Act with its own authority; compensation is separately authorized. Partial multi-resource effects are contained and reconciled without promising atomicity (Figure 26, Figure 31). Irreversible effects are checked for hazard before effect and, if unsafe, contained (Figure 27). Evidence from a possibly compromised observer is checked by independent attestation (Figure 28).¶
Six clusters group the embodiments. Embodiment numbering E1 to E40 follows the source; the second full section labelled Embodiment 31 is a repeated version, not a forty-first embodiment (Appendix J).¶
Embodiments: E1, E5, E11, E13, E22, E29.¶
A quorum approval is not automatically authority to execute. A resource fairness decision is not automatically a valid execution capability. Individually permissible operations may become impermissible when jointly applied; examples are cloud resource allocation, network reconfiguration and payment budgets.¶
Embodiments: E2, E4, E15, E16, E38, E40.¶
A signature is not truth, and a dispatch acknowledgment is not actual completion. Independent validator identity, observation coverage, consumed authorization and indeterminate outcomes must each be represented.¶
Embodiments: E3, E6, E8, E19, E21, E24, E32, E34.¶
The visible object, the named tool and the identifier may not identify the actual effective resource after rebinding, redirect or contract change. Human approval is meaningful only when bound to the actual operation.¶
Embodiments: E7, E9, E17, E18, E27, E30, E31, E35, E39.¶
Moving computational state does not establish transfer of effect authority. Loss of source-device communication does not prove the source has been fenced. Offline validity and delayed revocation must be explicit.¶
Embodiments: E10, E14, E20, E23, E25, E26, E28, E33.¶
Blocking one API route does not prevent an independent direct-credential route. Runtime or policy changes require mandatory revalidation, and a tool output is not an instruction authority.¶
Embodiments: E12, E16, E18, E27, E35, E36, E37.¶
Unknown completion, replay and partial multi-resource effects must stay visible. Compensation is a separately authorized Candidate Act. No universal rollback or distributed atomicity is promised.¶
The 17 worked examples follow the chain: original authority, Candidate Act, platform-native inputs, canonical effect, protected verification, destination Finality Sink, outcome evidence, failure and recovery. They are illustrations, not test results.¶
Android app permission; user intent¶
Candidate Act held non-effective¶
Android UID and Keystore evidence¶
Canonical descriptor: service, resource, parameters¶
Descriptor validated; scoped enablement¶
iOS-side sink reconstructs request and consumes enablement¶
Sink-side evidence of the effect¶
If the sink cannot reconstruct: refuse; unknown outcome stays UNRESOLVED¶
iOS user authority¶
Candidate Act at the delegate¶
Delegation lineage¶
Descriptor with attenuated scope¶
Lineage verified¶
Android sink checks bounded scope¶
Receipt¶
Scope expansion: refuse¶
Windows service identity¶
Config change Candidate Act¶
Principal and device evidence¶
Descriptor: host, file, diff¶
Policy and revocation checked¶
Linux resource controller reconstructs the change¶
Controller evidence¶
Controller unreachable: stay non-effective¶
Phone-held authority¶
Pending Candidate Act¶
Source state and fencing evidence¶
Descriptor of the payment¶
New ownership generation¶
Cloud sink verifies destination authority¶
Outcome evidence for the first attempt¶
Unknown outcome: do not retry blindly¶
Source authority¶
Pending act¶
Credential custody evidence¶
Descriptor bound to generation¶
Generation fenced¶
Sink rejects old generation¶
Rejection event¶
Credential exported: sink refuses it¶
Provider A tool contract¶
Candidate Act¶
Contract versions¶
Descriptor with contract identifier¶
Compatibility validation fails¶
Sink refuses¶
Refusal¶
Incompatible: withhold¶
Task authority¶
Export Candidate Act¶
Instruction provenance¶
Descriptor with effective destination¶
Provenance and destination check¶
Egress sink checks actual destination¶
Refusal¶
Redirect: refuse¶
Human approval¶
Candidate Act¶
Aliased referent at approval¶
Descriptor with resolved identity¶
Revalidate at effect time¶
Sink resolves alias¶
Evidence of resolution¶
Changed referent: refuse¶
Approval¶
Candidate Act¶
Approved parameters¶
Approved descriptor¶
Digest binds parameters¶
Sink reconstructs parameters¶
Mismatch evidence¶
Different parameters: refuse¶
First-phase authority¶
Phase 1 act¶
Receipt¶
Descriptor of phase 1¶
Validator checks signer capability¶
Successor sink refuses continuation¶
Unverified receipt recorded¶
Receipt outside observation capability: not accepted¶
Phase 1 authority¶
Phase 2 act held¶
No receipt¶
Phase 2 descriptor¶
Receipt required¶
Successor sink holds¶
Pending record¶
Remain non-effective until receipt or reauthorization¶
Reauthorization¶
Revised Candidate Act¶
Approval and hazard evidence¶
Descriptor with hazard fields¶
Hazard check fails¶
Actuator gate refuses¶
Refusal¶
Approval does not override safety¶
Broker authority¶
Candidate Act¶
Broker and key inventory¶
Descriptor¶
Coverage controller flags alternate key¶
Sink only controls brokered path¶
Coverage report¶
Claim limited; alternate path disclosed¶
Cached authority¶
Offline act¶
Offline limits and clock bounds¶
Descriptor with lease¶
Limits exceeded¶
Sink refuses¶
Refusal¶
Offline past limit: refuse¶
Agent grants¶
Two acts¶
Budget state¶
Descriptors with budget refs¶
Atomic reservation: second fails¶
Sink applies reservation¶
Reservation record¶
Second request refused¶
Workflow authority¶
Next step act¶
Tool generation¶
Descriptor with generation¶
Mismatch triggers revalidation¶
Sink compares generation¶
Revalidation record¶
Stop at the step boundary¶
Operator authority¶
Candidate Act¶
Hazard and state evidence¶
Descriptor with irreversibility flag¶
Pre-effect hazard check passes or fails¶
Actuator controller gate¶
Effect observation¶
If unsafe: contain; no compensation promised¶
Where an implementation claims interoperability under this profile, it should carry the fields marked mandatory for the effect class, reject unknown critical fields, use qualified adapters, record qualification status, and treat unavailable enforcement as non-effective. It must not claim protection for effect paths that are not covered. No universal encoding is mandated; CBOR [RFC8949] and JSON are illustrative choices.¶
Records are listed in Appendix D.¶
Guidance follows [RFC3552]. The architecture does not protect against effects through uncovered paths, a compromised privileged host when enforcement runs on that host, or false evidence from an unqualified source. A cryptographic signature or zero-trust label does not by itself prevent any listed threat; each threat in Appendix E names the check that is required. Enforcement qualification records themselves are an attack surface and need freshness and integrity. Resource exhaustion by forcing unresolved states is possible and needs bounded handling.¶
Considerations in [RFC6973] apply. Separate valid disclosures may collectively create an unauthorized aggregate disclosure under a policy, so cumulative exposure budgets are tracked (E8). Agent memory, context compression and persistent knowledge carry provenance (E32). A privacy-preserving log does not by itself stop a release; disclosure control must identify the real egress or destination boundary. Execution evidence can itself leak information, so audit minimization and selective disclosure are needed.¶
No performance results are claimed. Three paths are distinguished: a fast path (local protected finality checks and current protected-state admission), a warm path (independent policy or semantic validation, resource identity resolution, authority verification, evidence qualification) and a recovery path (reconciliation, revocation propagation, migration, unresolved outcomes, reauthorization). There is no per-token validation, no model-inference interruption, and no remote validator call for harmless operations; enforcement sits at real consequential boundaries. Protected precomputation and local gates can reduce latency. Cross-domain consensus has inherent cost, and behaviour during disconnection must be explicit.¶
A validation plan should measure p50, p95, p99 and p99.9 latency, throughput, memory, energy and battery impact, validator availability, protected-state persistence and recovery correctness on the target hardware.¶
For each mechanism: it already provides authentication, binding or attestation; the remaining problem is keeping authority meaningful for an actual effect across heterogeneous platforms; the additional mechanisms described are operation-specific descriptors, qualification records, sink reconstruction, consumption and fencing; whether the literature already provides substantially the same relationship was not checked here; evidence for any improvement would need testing.¶
| Established mechanism | What it provides and what remains |
|---|---|
| OAuth [RFC6749], token exchange [RFC8693], rich authorization requests [RFC9396], DPoP [RFC9449] | Authorize and bind callers and requests; they do not reconstruct the operation at the sink or consume authority per effect. |
| RATS [RFC9334], EAT [RFC9711], TPM, HSM, Secure Enclave, Android Keystore, Arm CCA, Intel TDX, AMD SEV-SNP, secure and measured boot | Attest environments and hold keys; attestation shows the environment, not each effect. |
| Android, Apple, Windows and Linux security models | Isolate and authorize processes; no cross-platform effect semantics. |
| MCP, A2A, agent SDKs, tool gateways, service meshes, policy enforcement points | Orchestrate and gate calls; coverage and operation semantics vary. |
| Fencing tokens, leases, generation counters, idempotency keys, journals, outbox, consensus, sagas | Known distributed-systems techniques reused here; none is claimed as new in isolation. |
The examiner discussion (objective technical problem, motivation to combine, reasonable expectation of success, functional interdependence, hindsight) is in Appendix F and is non-normative.¶
This document has no IANA actions.¶
Human inventor: Sangam Kumar Das. Current patent source: Indian provisional application identified by the applicant as 202631127058, reported filed 25 October 2026, technical title as stated in the note at the start. The source is a 3,577-page PDF with 40 distinct numbered embodiments and 60 formal claims. These details are applicant-identified and must be checked against the official acknowledgment.¶
Foundational application: PCT/IB2026/055615, filed 4 June 2026, published 16 July 2026 as WO 2026/150382 A2 ([PCT-055615]; WIPO PATENTSCOPE https://patentscope.wipo.int/). The 25 October filing is part of the earlier human-invented DAS Protocols research programme; its cross-platform mechanisms are to be differentiated from the foundational architecture and assessed on their specific features. Related public Internet-Drafts are [REL-FOUND], [REL-IEV] and [REL-CBEA]; newer revisions were not checked. Publication on the Datatracker is not adoption, patent examination or validation.¶
The IPR disclosure for this document will be made at the appropriate time in accordance with IETF guidelines and BCP 78 and BCP 79 ([RFC8179]). A patent statement inside a draft does not replace an official IETF IPR disclosure. No royalty-free, FRAND or other licensing commitment is made here.¶
The 40 distinct embodiments follow the source's numbering. Start pages are pages of the supplied 3,577-page PDF, approximate where the source repeats headings (E1 and E2 headings recur near pages 364 and 378). The second full section labelled Embodiment 31 (about pages 2650-2734) is a repeated version and is not counted as an embodiment. Clusters A-F are those of Section 25; an embodiment may belong to more than one cluster.¶
| No. | Technical subject | Cluster | Start page | Workflow |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| E1 | Protected cross-agent effect-conflict arbitration with atomic reservations and sink-bound fencing | A | 248 | CW-1 |
| E2 | Identity-bound Interim Effectuation Validation and receipt-constituted causal continuation | B | 295 | CW-1, CW-2 |
| E3 | User-referenced semantic object correspondence and authenticated presentation-state binding | C | 363 | CW-1 |
| E4 | Cross-domain actual-consequence witnessing and qualified remote-effect evidence | B | 492 | CW-1 |
| E5 | Cryptographically verifiable, assistant-neutral resource allocation and protected eligible-demand completeness | A | 555 | CW-1 |
| E6 | Semantic action-contract evolution and effect-compatibility validation | C | 666 | CW-1 |
| E7 | Cross-provider delegated agent authority continuity and cryptographic delegation lineage | D | 723 | CW-1 |
| E8 | Correlation-aware cumulative privacy exposure and compositional disclosure constraints | C | 787 | CW-1 |
| E9 | Cross-device execution-authority ownership, hardware epochs and source fencing | D | 859 | CW-1 |
| E10 | Model, algorithm and runtime-generation drift with effectuation-time revalidation | E | 926 | CW-1 |
| E11 | Concurrent-effect reconciliation, version-bound reservations and sink-local commit validation | A | 994 | CW-1 |
| E12 | Autonomous recovery, compensating effects and non-replayable recovery authority | F | 1063 | CW-1 |
| E13 | Multi-agent consensus, quorum integrity and non-delegable finality authorization | A | 1140 | CW-1 |
| E14 | Effectuation-path discovery, bypass detection and enforcement-coverage revalidation | E | 1221 | CW-1 |
| E15 | Cross-domain evidence commitments, non-bearer authority and sink-local monotonic consumption | B | 1309 | CW-1 |
| E16 | Crash-consistent finality journaling, one-time authorization and indeterminate outcome handling | B,F | 1384 | CW-1 |
| E17 | Temporal authority, lease expiration, clock uncertainty and delayed-effect control | D | 1465 | CW-1 |
| E18 | Cross-domain revocation propagation and dependent authority invalidation | D,F | 1541 | CW-1 |
| E19 | Computer-use and transaction-bound human-approval finality | C | 1625 | CW-1 |
| E20 | Multi-step tool-chain and workflow dependency-bound execution authority | E | 1683 | CW-1 |
| E21 | Actual resource identity, aliases, redirects and dynamic namespace rebinding | C | 1758 | CW-1 |
| E22 | Multi-resource budgets, delegated quotas and cumulative consequential limits | A | 1830 | CW-1 |
| E23 | Credential and secret-use finality with non-exportable broker-controlled authority | E | 1897 | CW-1 |
| E24 | Tool-output and instruction provenance through model-driven execution | C | 2019 | CW-1 |
| E25 | Agent sandbox privilege transitions and consequential operations escaping sandbox boundaries | E | 2092 | CW-1 |
| E26 | Tool installation, updates and runtime lifecycle authority continuity | E | 2169 | CW-1 |
| E27 | Distributed agent handoff, workload migration and non-resurrectable in-flight effects | D,F | 2246 | CW-1 |
| E28 | Nested multi-agent tool invocation chains and transitive authority attenuation | E | 2318 | CW-1 |
| E29 | Independent approval quorums and protected consensus-to-effect separation | A | 2398 | CW-1 |
| E30 | Resource-owner changes, competing administrative authority and revocation races | D | 2480 | CW-1 |
| E31 | Credential and administrative authority rotation, protected key custody and generation fencing | D | 2567 | CW-1 |
| E32 | Data, memory and persistent-knowledge provenance across agent sessions | C | 2734 | CW-1 |
| E33 | Policy and configuration evolution, dependency impact and non-self-authorizing mutations | E | 2825 | CW-1 |
| E34 | Tool and resource identity continuity across dynamic service discovery | C | 2914 | CW-1 |
| E35 | Degraded connectivity, offline effect authority and delayed revocation | D,F | 3005 | CW-1 |
| E36 | Multi-resource transactions, partial commits and independently authorized compensation | F | 3102 | CW-1 |
| E37 | Irreversible effects, consequence-bound hazard checks and non-compensable operation containment | F | 3192 | CW-1 |
| E38 | Evidence integrity, compromised observers and independent attestation reconstruction | B | 3282 | CW-1 |
| E39 | Conflicting policies and authority precedence among multiple principals and resource owners | D | 3378 | CW-1 |
| E40 | End-to-end effect provenance, protected authority consumption, cross-embodiment closure and formal verification | B | 3474 | CW-1 |
Source statements of the principal candidate inventive concept (excerpts, lightly normalised; extracted automatically, so check against the PDF):¶
Embodiments without an extracted statement: E1, E2, E3, E4, E6, E7, E10, E12, E40. The requested 20-point analysis (objective, components, authority, candidate operation, effect-critical data, protected state, enforcement interface, predicate, inputs and outputs, evidence, attack scenarios, negative outcomes, recovery, test method, performance, existing foundations, narrower features, industry integration, workflow relationship, mothership relationship) was done at cluster level in Section 25 and in the threat, example and industry appendices, not individually for each of the 40 embodiments; per-embodiment pseudocode and data structures from the source were not extracted.¶
Non-normative. The claims are not requirements of this document. The consolidated claims contain four independent claims: 1 (system, dependents 2-30), 31 (method, 32-42), 43 (apparatus, 44-52) and 53 (migration, 54-60). Forty embodiments do not correspond to forty independent claims, and no missing dependent claims were invented. Independent versus dependent was determined from the claim text, and the dependency shown is the first claim number referenced. Excerpts are from the extracted text (ligatures repaired automatically); check them against the PDF.¶
| No. | Type | Dep. | Group | Source limitation (excerpt) | Realization wording (whole claim) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Independent | - | System | A computer-implemented system for interoperable protected execution-finality control across heterogeneous computing environments, the system comprising: (a) a first ... | none named in the claim text |
| 2 | Dependent | 1 | System | the first and second computing environments comprise different operating systems, different administrative domains, different device-security architectures, or different ... | none named in the claim text |
| 3 | Dependent | 2 | System | the first computing environment comprises an Android-based device and the second computing environment comprises an iOS-based device, and wherein a consequential ... | none named in the claim text |
| 4 | Dependent | 2 | System | the first computing environment comprises an iOS- based device and the second computing environment comprises an Android-based device, and wherein the second computing ... | none named in the claim text |
| 5 | Dependent | 2 | System | the heterogeneous computing environments comprise any compatible combination of mobile operating systems, desktop operating systems, virtualized execution environments, ... | none named in the claim text |
| 6 | Dependent | 1 | System | the heterogeneous authorization-source adapter comprises a typed interface identifying a technical security property established by a corresponding underlying mechanism, ... | none named in the claim text |
| 7 | Dependent | 1 | System | the qualified evidence comprises one or more of an operating-system permission, application entitlement, source authorization grant, structured authorization detail, ... | cryptographic terms |
| 8 | Dependent | 1 | System | the protected canonical effect descriptor comprises a selected combination of a Candidate Act identifier, originating authority reference, actual operation class, actual ... | none named in the claim text |
| 9 | Dependent | 1 | System | the protected authorization-to-effect translation controller resolves the operation semantics according to an authenticated action contract or resource-interface ... | none named in the claim text |
| 10 | Dependent | 1 | System | the Protected Enforcement Domain maintains a protected relationship between an originating source grant and one or more dependent delegated authorizations, Candidate ... | none named in the claim text |
| 11 | Dependent | 1 | System | the protected validation evidence comprises collection-time evidence established by a first protected validation instance and execution-time evidence established by a ... | none named in the claim text |
| 12 | Dependent | 1 | System | a structured application action, application-intent object, agent tool invocation, interprocess service request, or remote application-function call is represented as ... | none named in the claim text |
| 13 | Dependent | 1 | System | the Non-Effective Holding Mechanism comprises one or more of a blocked application-function dispatch, withheld network transmission, uncommitted storage operation, ... | none named in the claim text |
| 14 | Dependent | 1 | System | a proposed application action or autonomous workflow comprises multiple distinguishable consequential effects, and wherein at least two of the consequential effects are ... | none named in the claim text |
| 15 | Dependent | 1 | System | The system as claimed in claim 1, further comprising an Enforcement-Coverage Qualification Controller configured to maintain a protected enforcement-qualification record ... | none named in the claim text |
| 16 | Dependent | 15 | System | an observation-only security monitor, notification interface, advisory security policy, or post-effect audit mechanism is prevented from satisfying a fl mandatory ... | none named in the claim text |
| 17 | Dependent | 15 | System | the Enforcement-Coverage Qualification Controller identifies a plurality of interfaces capable of producing a governed effect and requires each interface within an ... | none named in the claim text |
| 18 | Dependent | 15 | System | a material change in an operating-system security interface, sandbox entitlement, application-dispatch configuration, privileged intermediary, network route, ... | hardware terms |
| 19 | Dependent | 1 | System | the Protected Enforcement Domain maintains a current revocation generation associated with an originating authorization grant and identifies scoped finality enablements ... | none named in the claim text |
| 20 | Dependent | 19 | System | the designated Finality Sink verifies an applicable current revocation generation or protected authorization-status condition, and wherein an earlier active-token ... | none named in the claim text |
| 21 | Dependent | 1 | System | the scoped non-bearer finality enablement is maintained within a protected controller or sink-local protected state and is represented to the requesting computational ... | none named in the claim text |
| 22 | Dependent | 21 | System | the scoped non-bearer finality enablement comprises a permitted-use count or unique consumption reference, and wherein the designated Finality Sink enforces a protected ... | none named in the claim text |
| 23 | Dependent | 21 | System | the scoped non-bearer finality enablement is bound to one or more of the designated Finality Sink, actual resource, permitted effect, originating authority, validity ... | none named in the claim text |
| 24 | Dependent | 1 | System | the designated Finality Sink determines at least one security-relevant descriptor element from the actual operation presented at the controlled effectuation interface ... | none named in the claim text |
| 25 | Dependent | 24 | System | the designated Finality Sink verifies one or more of an actual destination, resource identity, recipient, outgoing payload commitment, application- function parameter, ... | none named in the claim text |
| 26 | Dependent | 1 | System | the designated Finality Sink comprises a transactional resource controller configured to atomically commit, within an applicable transaction boundary, a protected ... | none named in the claim text |
| 27 | Dependent | 1 | System | The system as claimed in claim 1, further comprising a protected credential broker configured to retain a reusable resource credential outside the requesting ... | none named in the claim text |
| 28 | Dependent | 1 | System | a governed consequential operation comprises transmission of information through a network interface, and wherein protected authorization evidence binds the permitted ... | none named in the claim text |
| 29 | Dependent | 1 | System | the first computing environment, the Protected Enforcement Domain, and the designated Finality Sink reside in at least two independently administered domains, and ... | none named in the claim text |
| 30 | Dependent | 1 | System | a computing environment operates with intermittent connectivity and the Protected Enforcement Domain establishes a bounded of ine authority comprising one or more ... | none named in the claim text |
| 31 | Independent | - | Method | A computer-implemented method for enforcing protected execution-finality control across heterogeneous computing environments, the method comprising: (a) receiving, from ... | none named in the claim text |
| 32 | Dependent | 31 | Method | obtaining qualified evidence and independently validating the proposed consequential operation comprise collecting authenticated evidence at a first protected ... | none named in the claim text |
| 33 | Dependent | 31 | Method | producing the protected canonical effect descriptor comprises converting heterogeneous native-platform permission or authorization information into a typed effect ... | none named in the claim text |
| 34 | Dependent | 31 | Method | The method as claimed in claim 31, further comprising detecting a material change in resource identity, resource generation, effective recipient, operation parameters, ... | none named in the claim text |
| 35 | Dependent | 31 | Method | The method as claimed in claim 31, further comprising obtaining an authenticated revocation event or current revoked-state indication, identifying pending finality ... | none named in the claim text |
| 36 | Dependent | 31 | Method | the designated Finality Sink comprises a qualified protected application dispatcher, privileged interprocess broker, network gateway, storage controller, remote service ... | hardware terms |
| 37 | Dependent | 31 | Method | successful user approval, application authentication, cryptographic signature verification, credential introspection, or operating-system permission validation is ... | cryptographic terms |
| 38 | Dependent | 31 | Method | original source authority, delegated authority, protected evidence, or finality-enablement state is maintained in a protected storage or controller domain not modifiable ... | none named in the claim text |
| 39 | Dependent | 31 | Method | The method as claimed in claim 31, further comprising revalidating the actual pending operation at the designated Finality Sink using current protected resource or ... | none named in the claim text |
| 40 | Dependent | 31 | Method | an unsuccessful or unavailable mandatory validator, invalid finality enablement, unresolved operation semantics, stale authority generation, or unqualified effectuation ... | none named in the claim text |
| 41 | Dependent | 31 | Method | absence of an acknowledgment or an uncertain remote result does not automatically restore consumed authority or authorize an unrestricted retry of the operation. | none named in the claim text |
| 42 | Dependent | 41 | Method | a successor consequential operation depends upon an earlier real effect and is withheld until an authenticated receipt concerning the earlier effect has been accepted by ... | none named in the claim text |
| 43 | Independent | - | Apparatus | A protected computing apparatus for enforcing interoperable execution-finality authorization at a consequential resource boundary, the apparatus comprising: (a) at least ... | none named in the claim text |
| 44 | Dependent | 43 | Apparatus | the apparatus comprises a mobile computing device, desktop computer, server, protected application-execution component, embedded controller, secure processor, cloud ... | none named in the claim text |
| 45 | Dependent | 43 | Apparatus | the apparatus is associated with an iOS-based or iPadOS-based computing environment and the resource interface comprises an authorized application function, protected ... | none named in the claim text |
| 46 | Dependent | 43 | Apparatus | the apparatus is associated with an Android- based computing environment and the resource interface comprises a protected application dispatcher, privileged service, ... | hardware terms |
| 47 | Dependent | 43 | Apparatus | the resource interface comprises an authenticated interprocess communication broker separately controlled from the requesting computational entity, and wherein the ... | none named in the claim text |
| 48 | Dependent | 43 | Apparatus | the apparatus implements destination-side protected enforcement for a remote application or service, thereby permitting interoperability with a requesting operating ... | none named in the claim text |
| 49 | Dependent | 43 | Apparatus | the effectuation controller comprises a hardware- supported command gate, protected storage controller, secure processor, device command controller, or hardware-backed ... | hardware terms |
| 50 | Dependent | 43 | Apparatus | the interoperable authority-verification component maintains a protected enforcement-qualification record and rejects a claimed mandatory enforcement property when an ... | none named in the claim text |
| 51 | Dependent | 43 | Apparatus | the canonical effect descriptor is represented using a typed structured encoding or deterministic binary representation de ning canonicalization rules for ... | none named in the claim text |
| 52 | Dependent | 43 | Apparatus | the interoperable authority-verification component verifies authenticated principal attribution, originating task authority, and permitted effect scope independently of ... | none named in the claim text |
| 53 | Independent | - | Migration | A computer-implemented system for protected migration of consequential execution authority between heterogeneous computing environments, the system comprising: (a) a ... | none named in the claim text |
| 54 | Dependent | 53 | Migration | the protected authority-ownership controller maintains a monotonic ownership epoch, protected generation counter, authenticated fencing reference, or authoritative ... | none named in the claim text |
| 55 | Dependent | 53 | Migration | verification of the source-fencing condition comprises verifying restriction, invalidation, or isolation of at least one effect-capable source-device interface, pending ... | hardware terms |
| 56 | Dependent | 53 | Migration | the source and destination execution environments comprise respectively different mobile or desktop operating systems, including an Android-based environment and an ... | none named in the claim text |
| 57 | Dependent | 53 | Migration | loss of communication with the source execution environment does not automatically establish successful source fencing, and wherein activation of exclusive destination ... | none named in the claim text |
| 58 | Dependent | 53 | Migration | a migration, crash recovery, process restart, device replacement, or restored computational snapshot is prevented from restoring a previously consumed finality ... | none named in the claim text |
| 59 | Dependent | 53 | Migration | a plurality of un nished Candidate Acts are transferred between computing environments and each Candidate Act is associated with a separately verifiable operation scope, ... | none named in the claim text |
| 60 | Dependent | 53 | Migration | the source and destination execution environments comprise respective combinations of mobile devices, virtual machines, confidential-computing environments, cloud ... | hardware terms |
Group-level fields (necessary components, operative condition, enforcement boundary, existing coverage, prior-art terms) follow. A per-claim chart of these fields was not produced; candidate additional limitations and per-claim implementation examples are not given, to avoid inventing limitations.¶
| Group | Technical focus | What existing work covers | Search terms |
|---|---|---|---|
| System (1-30) | Heterogeneous authorization translation and protected actual-effect enforcement | Authentication, OAuth-style authorization and attestation exist [RFC6749] [RFC9334]; the claim concerns translation to a canonical descriptor and sink-side reconstruction. | cross platform execution finality; permission translation; canonical effect descriptor; destination side verification |
| Method (31-42) | Operation-specific cross-platform execution-finality procedure | Same standards context. | method enforcing execution finality heterogeneous; scoped non-bearer enablement; protected consumption |
| Apparatus (43-52) | Receiving-platform protected Finality Sink | Resource gateways and policy enforcement points exist. | finality sink apparatus; actual pending operation reconstruction; sink local authority check |
| Migration (53-60) | Cross-device authority transfer and source fencing | Fencing tokens, leases and generation counters exist as techniques. | cross device authority migration; source fencing; ownership epoch; snapshot resurrection |
The 30 diagrams below are conceptual ASCII figures; each names its boundary. Mermaid versions are not included because a single XML file was requested.¶
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Originating user, application or AI agent |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Source operating system |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Candidate Act (Non-Effective State) |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Source authority qualification |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Platform evidence and semantic translation adapter |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Protected Canonical Effect Descriptor |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Protected Enforcement Domain |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Mandatory conditions satisfied? NO: deny / hold / |
| reconcile |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| YES: scoped non-bearer finality enablement |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Receiving-platform Finality Sink: reconstruct actual |
| operation |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Sink-local authority and consumption check |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Actual consequence through a covered path |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Qualified outcome evidence / recovery |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Boundary: Controls only effect paths the sink actually covers.
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Android app builds Candidate Act |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Keystore-backed evidence of app and device |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Adapter -> canonical descriptor |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Protected domain verifies authority |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| iOS-side service sink reconstructs request |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Consume enablement; effect; outcome evidence |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Boundary: Sink on the receiving side; ordinary apps do not
mediate other apps.
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| iOS app builds Candidate Act |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Keychain / Secure Enclave evidence |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Adapter -> canonical descriptor |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Protected domain verifies authority |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Android-side sink reconstructs request |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Consume enablement; effect; outcome evidence |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Boundary: No private kernel hooks are assumed.
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Windows or Linux workload |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Workload identity and TPM/key evidence |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Descriptor of cloud API effect |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Protected domain: policy, revocation |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Cloud resource gate reconstructs API call |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Effect; outcome evidence |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Boundary: A direct cloud credential outside the gate is an
uncovered path.
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Native permission or entitlement |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Platform adapter (qualified) |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Effect-specific authority claim |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Compare with canonical semantics |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Translation result: equivalent / narrower / reject |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Boundary: Permission names are not assumed equivalent.
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Native operation request |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Resolve effective resource, beneficiary, parameters |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Normalize (units, encoding, aliases) |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Reject unknown critical fields |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Bind to authority, policy, revocation generations |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Descriptor digest and protected record |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Boundary: A valid hash of a wrongly built descriptor proves
nothing about meaning.
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Security component and controlled resource |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Determine observed vs blocking vs consumption control |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Check generation and trust assumptions |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| List known alternate effect routes |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Qualified / partial / unresolved / disqualified |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Boundary: Unavailable blocking leads to restriction or
withholding, not silent weakening.
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Interface offers notification or logs? |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Yes: classify as observation only |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Interface can refuse the operation? |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Yes: blocking candidate; check coverage |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Move enforcement to a resource-side gateway if not |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Boundary: Product names do not decide the class.
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Local protected authority holds enablement |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Send operation-specific non-bearer enablement |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Destination sink reconstructs actual operation |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Check current authority and consumption |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Permit or refuse |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Boundary: The local authority is not the destination sink.
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Workload requests credential use |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Broker checks operation binding |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Broker activates operation-bound credential |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Downstream resource enforces scope |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Other credential copies remain uncovered |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Boundary: Broker does not control other copies of credentials.
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Provider A agent holds authority |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Delegation lineage record with attenuation |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Provider B agent receives bounded scope |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Descriptor and enablement per operation |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Sink verifies lineage |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Boundary: Scope can only narrow.
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Verified descriptor |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Create enablement bound to operation, sink, state |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Enablement is not a bearer token |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Sink checks binding at use |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Used once; consumed |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Boundary: Possession alone confers no authority.
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Authority generation N |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Revocation event raises epoch |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Sink compares epoch at effect time |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Older epoch: refuse |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Record decision |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Boundary: No global instant revocation is assumed.
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Enablement presented |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Check monotonic consumption state |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Unconsumed: mark consumed atomically |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Consumed: refuse |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Crash: unknown stays unresolved |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Boundary: Consumption state must survive crashes.
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Identify unfinished operation |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Authenticate target environment |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Move computational context (not authority) |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| New ownership generation; fence source |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Destination reconstructs scope and verifies pending |
| operation |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Reconcile partial failure |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Boundary: State movement is not authority transfer.
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Source owner generation N |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Fencing request or evidence |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Source confirms or sink rejects older generation |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Loss of contact is not proof of fencing |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Destination generation N+1 active |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Boundary: Fencing is evidenced, not assumed.
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Offline lease with bounded scope |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Clock uncertainty bounds applied |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Operate within limits |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Reconnect: reconcile revocations |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Past limits: refuse |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Boundary: Offline limits are explicit.
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Operation split into phases |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Phase 1 independently authorized |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Bounded real effect through a sink |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Qualified evidence obtained |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Validator evaluates evidence |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Boundary: A test simulation is not a real first effect.
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Accepted effect receipt |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Receipt becomes causal condition for phase 2 |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Successor sink checks receipt-dependent authority |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Missing, stale or contradicted: no successor effect |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Boundary: A validator is not an unrestricted credential.
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Cumulative actual effect vs original scope |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Independent security signals correlated |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Risk-adaptive suspension |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Exact changed consequence presented |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Approval bound to actual effect; limited renewed |
| authority |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Boundary: Approval does not override unrelated mandatory
protections.
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Agent A and B propose effects |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Effect footprints compared |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Atomic reservation at sink |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Conflict: one proceeds, one held |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Sink-bound fencing |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Boundary: Reservation is not execution authority.
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| User sees object label |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Resolve to actual resource identity |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Bind in descriptor |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Re-resolve at effect time |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Changed referent: refuse |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Boundary: Names do not identify effective resources.
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Tool or runtime updated |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Generation changes |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Authority bound to old generation invalid |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Revalidate contracts and policy |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Resume under new authority only |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Boundary: Updates are consequential transitions.
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Operation inside sandbox |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Crosses sandbox boundary |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Boundary effect check |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Separate controller decides |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Independent effect evidence |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Boundary: A sandbox does not control an external service that
accepts the credential.
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Effects across resources R1..Rn |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Per-sink commit results |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Partial commit detected |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Compensation as separate Candidate Act |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Reconcile; no atomicity promised |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Boundary: Compensation needs its own authority.
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Candidate irreversible command |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Hazard and state evidence |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Pre-effect hazard check |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Fail: contain and hold |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Pass: scoped enablement; observe effect |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Boundary: Not a safety certification.
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Observer reports effect |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Check observer qualification and coverage |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Independent attestation or second source |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Conflict: UNRESOLVED |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Evidence record |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Boundary: Misleading observers are assumed possible.
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Several principals and owners |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Collect applicable policies |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Apply precedence rules |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Mandatory consent present? |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Permit or hold |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Boundary: Unresolved conflict withholds the effect.
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Authorization record |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Consumption record |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Outcome evidence |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Closure check for the selected operation |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Closed or open with reasons |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Boundary: Closure requires all required evidence.
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Failure or crash |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Read journal and consumption state |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Outcome known? NO: indeterminate |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Recovery Candidate Act (new authority) |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
|
v
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| No blind replay |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Boundary: No universal rollback is promised.
Records are transport-neutral field lists. No mandatory universal encoding is defined; CBOR or JSON may be used where an interoperability case justifies it.¶
original authority; principal; source platform; delegated scope; current generation; restrictions¶
native permission; actual security capability; protected component; effect-path scope; qualification generation¶
proposed operation; original task; target; effect class; initiating workload¶
material executable effect semantics (see the main text)¶
qualified source; predicate; current state; protected evidence¶
operation-specific, sink-bound, non-bearer permission under protected state¶
source owner; destination owner; epochs; fencing evidence; transfer status¶
sink identity; controlled effect path; operation visibility; consumption state¶
qualified evidence of a bounded earlier effect¶
successor-specific, receipt-dependent authorization (CW-2)¶
current revised permission (CW-3)¶
source-qualified effect evidence; unresolved outcome classification¶
required enforcement, authorization, consumption and outcome evidence for the operation¶
FUNCTION SINK_DECIDE(enablement, pending_op, state):
desc = RECONSTRUCT(pending_op)
IF desc IS NONE: RETURN REFUSE_UNRESOLVED
IF DIGEST(desc) != enablement.descriptor_digest: RETURN REFUSE
IF enablement.sink != SELF: RETURN REFUSE
IF state.revocation_epoch > enablement.revocation_gen: RETURN
REFUSE
IF state.owner_generation != enablement.owner_gen: RETURN REFUSE
IF NOT COVERED_PATH(pending_op): RETURN REFUSE_NOT_COVERED
IF NOT CONSUME_ATOMIC(enablement.id): RETURN REFUSE_CONSUMED
RETURN PERMIT
FUNCTION QUALIFY(component, op_class): caps = MEASURE_CAPABILITIES(component) IF NOT caps.can_block: RETURN DISQUALIFIED_FOR_BLOCKING IF ALTERNATE_ROUTES(component, op_class): RETURN PARTIAL IF NOT FRESH(component.generation): RETURN UNRESOLVED RETURN QUALIFIED
FUNCTION MIGRATE(op, source, dest): IF NOT AUTHENTICATED(dest): RETURN ABORT gen = NEW_OWNER_GENERATION(op) IF NOT FENCED(source, gen): RETURN HOLD_UNRESOLVED scope = RECONSTRUCT_SCOPE(op, dest) enable = ISSUE_ENABLEMENT(op, dest, gen, scope) RETURN enable // state copy confers no authority
FUNCTION BUILD_DESCRIPTOR(native_op):
r = RESOLVE_EFFECTIVE_RESOURCE(native_op)
FOR f IN CRITICAL_FIELDS(native_op.class):
IF f NOT IN native_op: RETURN REJECT
d = NORMALIZE(native_op, r)
IF HAS_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL(d): RETURN REJECT
RETURN d
Sixty threats. Embodiment references are the editor's mapping. Fields for failure response, residual risk and actual-effect observation use common wording; attacker capability, boundary, invariant, check and test are specific to each entry. Tests are ideas, not executed results.¶
Holds valid credentials¶
Sink¶
E15¶
Authentication is not operation authority¶
Sink reconstructs operation and checks scoped enablement¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Valid credential, no enablement: effect refused¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Misconfigured or malicious adapter¶
Adapter¶
E6¶
Translation preserves meaning¶
Qualify adapter generation; compare descriptor to native evidence¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Adapter widens scope: validation fails¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Destination grants more than source¶
Destination sink¶
E9¶
Destination scope <= source scope¶
Reconstruct destination scope from source authority¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Broader destination right: not enabled¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
App with entitlement¶
Platform¶
E15¶
Entitlement is advice, not finality¶
Require scoped non-bearer enablement¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Entitled app without enablement: refused¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Holds credential¶
Resource¶
E21¶
Effective resource identity matches¶
Resolve actual resource at the sink¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Credential for A used on B: refused¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Controls an adapter¶
Adapter¶
E38¶
Adapters are qualified, not trusted by default¶
Independent attestation of adapter generation¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Unqualified adapter: UNRESOLVED¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Omits fields¶
Descriptor¶
E6¶
Unknown or missing critical fields reject¶
Reject on missing critical field¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Drop beneficiary field: reject¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Exploits differing meaning¶
Adapter/descriptor¶
E6¶
Equivalence is semantic, not syntactic¶
Contract-compatibility validation¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Same name, different effect: reject¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Alias manipulation¶
Resource¶
E21¶
Alias resolves to approved resource¶
Resolve at effectuation time¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Alias rebinding: reject¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Redirect injection¶
Destination¶
E21¶
Final destination equals approved¶
Check effective destination¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Redirect to other host: reject¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Confuses principals¶
Delegation¶
E7¶
Effective principal equals authorised¶
Bind principal in descriptor¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Delegate acts as other principal: reject¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Nested agent¶
Delegation chain¶
E28¶
Attenuation only¶
Verify lineage attenuation¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Child exceeds parent: reject¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Forger¶
Delegation¶
E7¶
Authority has verifiable lineage¶
Verify cryptographic lineage¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Forged delegation: reject¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Agent¶
Evidence¶
E4¶
Self-report is not qualified evidence¶
Require source-qualified evidence¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Self-reported success: UNRESOLVED¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Tool output author¶
Model-driven execution¶
E24¶
Output is data, not authority¶
Track instruction provenance¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Output instructs transfer: no enablement¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Injected text¶
Model input¶
E24¶
Instruction authority has provenance¶
Provenance check before effect¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Injected instruction cannot enable¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Swaps runtime¶
Tool lifecycle¶
E26¶
Runtime generation continuity¶
Revalidate on generation change¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Swapped runtime: revalidate¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Updates tool¶
Runtime¶
E10¶
Authority bound to generation¶
Effectuation-time generation check¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Old authority on new generation: reject¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Model drift¶
Runtime¶
E10¶
Fingerprint current at effect time¶
Compare fingerprint at sink¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Stale fingerprint: revalidate¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Uses uncovered path¶
Coverage¶
E14¶
Claims limited to covered paths¶
Coverage controller reports paths¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Uncovered path: claim not made¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Misclassification¶
Qualification¶
E14¶
Capability classes differ¶
Qualification record¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Monitor API marked blocking: disqualify¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Uses another API¶
Effect path¶
E14¶
All effect paths covered or disclosed¶
Path discovery and coverage¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Alternate API used: detected or disclosed¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Exports secret¶
Credential custody¶
E23¶
Non-exportable custody¶
Broker-bound activation¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Exported key: not accepted by sink¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Old device¶
Source¶
E9¶
Source fenced¶
Fence and generation check¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Old device acts: refused¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Restores snapshot¶
Migration¶
E27¶
State copy is not authority¶
Generation fencing¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Restored worker refused¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Two devices¶
Sink¶
E9¶
Single owner generation¶
Sink consumption check¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Second execution refused¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Claims fenced¶
Source¶
E9¶
Fencing is evidenced¶
Require fencing evidence¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
No evidence: UNRESOLVED¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Weak destination¶
Destination¶
E9¶
Enforcement capability equivalent or restricted¶
Qualification comparison¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Weaker destination: restrict or withhold¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Replays token¶
Sink¶
E15¶
Non-bearer enablement¶
Bind to operation and sink¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Replay elsewhere: refused¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Replays consumed¶
Sink¶
E16¶
One-time consumption¶
Monotonic consumption¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Second use: refused¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Rolls back state¶
Revocation¶
E18¶
Epochs monotonic¶
Verify epoch monotonicity¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Older epoch: reject¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Uses cache¶
Sink¶
E18¶
Revocation checked at effect¶
Check current revocation¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Cached allow after revoke: refused¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Disconnected device¶
Offline¶
E35¶
Offline limits explicit¶
Bounded offline authority¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Past limit: refused¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Clock error¶
Lease¶
E17¶
Lease honours clock uncertainty¶
Use uncertainty bounds¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Near expiry: conservative¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Alters clock¶
Time¶
E17¶
Time not solely trusted¶
Independent time or counters¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Skewed clock: reject¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Competing owners¶
Resource¶
E30¶
Precedence resolved¶
Owner consent check¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Conflicting owners: UNRESOLVED¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Omits owner¶
Resource¶
E39¶
Mandatory consent present¶
Consent check¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
No consent: refused¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Parallel requests¶
Budget¶
E22¶
Cumulative limits¶
Atomic reservation¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Over budget: refused¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Concurrent actors¶
Sink¶
E11¶
Version-bound reservations¶
Sink commit validation¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Conflict: one refused¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Skips step¶
Workflow¶
E20¶
Dependencies satisfied¶
Dependency-bound authority¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Skipped step: refused¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Omits receipt¶
CW-2¶
E2¶
Receipt required for continuation¶
Successor sink checks receipt¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
No receipt: no successor effect¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Replays¶
CW-2¶
E2¶
Receipt bound to phase and operation¶
Bind receipt context¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Replayed receipt: refused¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Impersonates validator¶
CW-2¶
E2¶
Validator identity authenticated¶
Identity check¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Wrong validator: refused¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Spoofed UI¶
Approval¶
E19¶
Approval bound to actual operation¶
Authenticated interface state¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Spoofed UI: not accepted¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Mutates request¶
Approval¶
E19¶
Approved equals executed¶
Sink reconstruction¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Post-approval change: refused¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Race¶
Credential¶
E31¶
Generation fencing¶
Generation check¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Old generation: refused¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Compromises custody¶
Custody¶
E23¶
Custody qualification¶
Attest custody¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Unqualified custody: restrict¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Agent edits policy¶
Policy¶
E33¶
Mutations not self-authorizing¶
Independent approval of policy change¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Self-approved change: refused¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Escapes sandbox¶
Sandbox¶
E25¶
Effects crossing boundary checked¶
Boundary effect check¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Escaping op: refused¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Direct device access¶
Hardware¶
E14¶
Command path coverage¶
Hardware gate or disclose gap¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Direct command: refused or disclosed¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Resets device¶
Hardware¶
E16¶
No replay after reset¶
Persistent consumption¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Replayed queue: refused¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Many small disclosures¶
Privacy¶
E8¶
Cumulative exposure¶
Compositional budget¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Aggregate over limit: refused¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Observer lies¶
Evidence¶
E38¶
Observer qualification¶
Independent attestation¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Misleading evidence: UNRESOLVED¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Forger¶
Evidence¶
E4¶
Receipt from source-authoritative signer¶
Verify signer capability¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Receipt outside signer observation: not accepted¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Network loss¶
Recovery¶
E16¶
Unknown outcome stays unknown¶
Indeterminate state¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
No ack: UNRESOLVED, no blind retry¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Repeated recovery¶
Recovery¶
E12¶
Recovery authority non-replayable¶
Consume recovery authority¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Second recovery: refused¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Partial failure¶
Transaction¶
E36¶
Partial state contained¶
Cross-sink reconciliation¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Partial commit: contained¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Rolls back without authority¶
Recovery¶
E12¶
Compensation separately authorised¶
Compensation Candidate Act¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Unauthorised rollback: refused¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Triggers irreversible act¶
Physical¶
E37¶
Hazard check before effect¶
Consequence-bound hazard validation¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Unsafe irreversible: refused¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Claims closure¶
Closure¶
E40¶
Closure requires evidence¶
Closure record check¶
Hold the operation in the Non-Effective State, reject or mark UNRESOLVED, and preserve the evidence; do not fall back to weaker protection.¶
Cannot cover effect paths that are not under control, or evidence sources that never expose the fact.¶
Missing evidence: not closed¶
Observe the actual effect or its absence at the covered boundary; a missing observation is recorded as unknown, not as success.¶
Non-normative. Terms were composed by the editor from the claims, embodiment subjects and the source's own term lists, with industry synonyms added. Clusters map to embodiment and claim ranges at cluster level, not term by term.¶
Keywords (214):¶
| Cluster | Embodiments / claims | Keywords |
|---|---|---|
| Core architecture | 1-60 | Protected Execution Finality, Candidate Act, Actual Pending Operation, Non-Effective State, Protected Enforcement Domain, Finality Gate, Finality Sink, Scoped Finality Authority, Non-Bearer Execution Handle, Consequence-Bound Authorization, Source-Authority Envelope, Actual-Effect Reconstruction, execution finality, policy enforcement point, resource-side enforcement, operation reconstruction, authorization-to-effect translation |
| Cross-platform interoperability | 1, 31, 43 | Cross-Platform Execution Authority, Android iOS Interoperability, Heterogeneous Authorization Semantics, Permission Translation, Canonical Effect Descriptor, Native Security Substrate, Cross-Platform Effect Equivalence, Destination-Side Enforcement, Receiving-Platform Verification, heterogeneous operating systems, mobile desktop cloud embedded, vendor-independent security semantics, cross-OS authorization, permission mapping, entitlement mapping, capability translation |
| Platform assurance | 1-52 | Enforcement-Capability Qualification, Mandatory Blocking Capability, Observation-Only Security Interface, Effectuation-Path Coverage, Alternative Effect Path, Credential Broker, Protected Application Dispatcher, Source Security Evidence, Protected Service Identity, policy decision point, security API capability, coverage gap, bypass path, mandatory access control, hardware-backed keystore, StrongBox, Secure Enclave, TPM, HSM, KMS |
| Autonomous agents | E7, E20, E24, E28 | Cross-Provider Agent Delegation, Agent Tool Execution, MCP Security, Agent-to-Agent Authorization, Multi-Agent Orchestration, Tool Semantic Continuity, Agent Handoff, AI Runtime Security, Agent Context Migration, Nested Tool Authority, agent sandbox, tool gateway, prompt injection, tool-output provenance, agent SDK, A2A, Model Context Protocol, delegation chain, transitive attenuation, agent identity |
| Cryptographic authorization | E15, E23 | Sender-Constrained Capability, Scope-Limited Authorization, Protected Consumption, Revocation Epoch, Authority Generation, Replay-Resistant Permission, Trusted Execution Environment, Hardware-Rooted Authority, Attestation, proof of possession, DPoP, token exchange, rich authorization request, CBOR, COSE, JWT, CWT, mutual TLS, workload identity, capability token, one-time authorization |
| Resource and identity continuity | E21, E34, E9 | Resource Alias Binding, Dynamic Namespace Rebinding, Object Identity, Redirect Verification, Original Source Principal, Resource Ownership Epoch, Cross-Device Authority Migration, Stale Source Fencing, Snapshot Resurrection, effective resource identity, URL normalization, service discovery identity, alias resolution, namespace rebinding, ownership generation, fencing token, lease, generation counter, device handoff, session continuity |
| Evidence and outcome | E2, E4, E16, E38 | Authenticated Effect Evidence, Interim Effectuation Validator, Evidence-Carrying Receipt, Receipt-Gated Continuation, Actual Effect Witness, Remote Outcome Reconciliation, Crash-Consistent Effect Journal, Unknown Outcome, Effect Provenance, indeterminate outcome, idempotency key, transactional outbox, write-ahead journal, receipt validation, observer attestation, compromised observer, outcome evidence, audit log, saga, compensation |
| Privacy and safety | E8, E19, E37 | Cumulative Privacy Exposure, Compositional Disclosure Budget, Physical Hazard Validation, Irreversible Effect, Secure Human Approval, Transaction-Bound Consent, Protected Recovery Authority, Non-Compensable Consequence, data egress control, privacy budget, differential disclosure, secure display, what-you-see-is-what-you-sign, human-in-the-loop approval, consent binding, hazard check, safety interlock, physical actuator, recipient change, selective disclosure |
| Formal assurance | E40 | Enforcement Composition Graph, Protected Authority-Consumption Invariant, Effect-Path Reachability, Cross-Domain Safety Invariant, Machine-Checkable Finality, Formal State Transition, Negative Effect Verification, model checking, TLA+, invariant, reachability analysis, state machine verification, closure condition, proof obligation, safety property, liveness property, refinement, temporal logic, finality closure, coverage proof |
| Distributed and concurrency | E1, E11, E13, E22, E29 | effect conflict arbitration, atomic reservation, version-bound reservation, quorum, Byzantine agreement, consensus, approval quorum, resource quota, cumulative budget, delegated quota, sink-local commit, optimistic concurrency, compare-and-swap, two-phase commit, distributed lock, lease expiry, clock uncertainty, delayed revocation, offline operation, network partition |
| Runtime and lifecycle | E10, E14, E25, E26, E33 | model drift, runtime generation, algorithm fingerprint, tool update, installation attestation, supply-chain integrity, sandbox escape, privilege transition, container boundary, policy evolution, configuration drift, change-impact analysis, non-self-authorizing mutation, effectuation-path discovery, bypass detection, runtime revalidation, software bill of materials, secure boot, measured boot, remote attestation |
Compound phrases (110):¶
| Cluster | Phrases |
|---|---|
| Core | protected execution finality; candidate act in non-effective state; actual pending operation reconstruction; scoped non-bearer finality enablement; finality sink verification; protected enforcement domain; consequence-bound authorization; authorization-to-effect translation; source authority envelope; actual effect reconstruction |
| Cross-platform | cross-platform execution authority; Android iOS effect authorization; heterogeneous authorization semantics; permission translation adapter; canonical effect descriptor; native security substrate; destination-side finality verification; receiving-platform sink; cross-platform effect equivalence; vendor-independent authority semantics |
| Platform | enforcement capability qualification; mandatory blocking capability; observation-only security interface; effectuation path coverage; alternate effect path; credential broker downstream enforcement; protected application dispatcher; source security evidence; platform qualification record; unavailable enforcement non-effective |
| Agents | cross-provider agent delegation; agent tool execution authorization; MCP protected operation semantics; agent-to-agent authority; tool contract evolution; tool semantic continuity; agent handoff authority; nested tool authority attenuation; model-driven tool output provenance; agent sandbox privilege transition |
| Cryptographic | sender-constrained capability; scope-limited authorization; protected authority consumption; revocation epoch check; authority generation counter; replay-resistant operation permission; hardware-rooted finality; non-exportable credential custody; one-time execution authorization; operation-bound broker activation |
| Identity | resource alias binding; dynamic namespace rebinding; effective resource identity; redirect destination verification; original source principal; resource ownership epoch; cross-device authority migration; stale source fencing; snapshot authority resurrection; non-resurrectable in-flight effect |
| Evidence | authenticated effect evidence; interim effectuation validator; receipt-gated continuation; evidence-carrying receipt; actual effect witness; remote outcome reconciliation; crash-consistent finality journal; indeterminate outcome handling; effect provenance chain; compromised observer containment |
| Privacy and safety | cumulative privacy exposure; compositional disclosure budget; physical hazard validation; irreversible effect containment; transaction-bound human approval; protected recovery authority; non-compensable consequence; authenticated presentation state; secure approval interface; scope-limited disclosure |
| Formal | enforcement composition graph; authority consumption invariant; effect path reachability; cross-domain safety invariant; machine-checkable finality closure; negative effect verification; formal state transition model; closure record verification; coverage revalidation; bypass detection |
| Distributed | cross-agent effect conflict arbitration; atomic effect reservation; sink-bound fencing; version-bound reservation; independent approval quorum; consensus-to-effect separation; multi-resource budget; delegated quota; partial commit containment; independently authorized compensation |
| Runtime | model algorithm drift revalidation; tool runtime lifecycle authority; installation-time authority attestation; policy mutation non-self-authorizing; configuration change impact; credential rotation generation fencing; offline effect authority; delayed revocation propagation; conflicting policy precedence; resource owner change revocation race |
Boolean search phrases (25):¶
Examiner discussion, to be tested against the filed texts and not decided here: the objective technical problem (keeping protected authority meaningful for an actual effect across platforms); motivation to combine the established mechanisms of the prior-art table; reasonable expectation of success given the platform limits described; functional interdependence of descriptor, qualification, sink reconstruction, consumption and fencing; and avoidance of hindsight. Isolated well-known mechanisms are not claimed as novel.¶
Prospective, non-normative. The rows describe where a check of this kind would sit if integrated, and what it would examine. Product capabilities were not verified against current official documentation in this session, and no adoption, endorsement, implementation, copying or infringement is asserted. The alignment is AI-generated and must be cross-checked against the original PCT filings. Latency and legacy compatibility depend on the loop tier and on whether an existing resource-side gate exists; required changes are the addition of operation reconstruction and consumption at the sink.¶
App-level dispatcher with Secure Enclave-held keys, and a server-side resource sink¶
Operation-specific enablement tied to the reconstructed request¶
Calls using app-held credentials outside the dispatcher¶
Platform identity of an app does not name the exact effect¶
No system-wide interception by ordinary apps¶
App dispatcher with Keystore/StrongBox keys; enterprise-managed gateways; server sink¶
Same, plus device-state evidence¶
Unmanaged routes and exported credentials¶
Different OEM capabilities need qualification records¶
Ordinary apps cannot mediate other apps¶
Protected service broker with TPM-backed keys; Azure resource-side checks¶
Operation binding and revocation generation¶
Principals that can export credentials¶
Identity differs from operation-specific authority¶
Local administrators outside the broker¶
Resource controller with workload identity and LSM/seccomp confinement¶
Operation reconstruction at the controller¶
Direct credentials held by workloads¶
Process confinement does not know the effect¶
Fully compromised kernel¶
Hardware-backed key stores and TEEs as enforcement substrate¶
Attestable enforcement generation¶
Normal-world paths¶
Capability differs by chipset and OEM¶
Chipset firmware behaviour¶
Tool-call dispatcher gate before executing a tool with consequences¶
Canonical effect descriptor and enablement per call¶
Direct API keys held by the tool¶
Tool names do not identify effects¶
What a hosted tool does internally¶
Tool-dispatch layer and MCP server resource side¶
Operation provenance and tool contract version¶
Credentials available outside the dispatcher¶
Tool-output text is data, not authority¶
Server-side behaviour not exposed¶
Delegation hand-off between agents¶
Delegation lineage with attenuation¶
Direct calls between agents outside the lineage¶
Cross-provider handoff must not widen scope¶
Remote agent internal state¶
Resource-side gate beside IAM; KMS-held keys¶
Sink reconstruction of the API call¶
Paths using unrestricted keys¶
IAM authorizes principals, not specific effect¶
Services not routed through the gate¶
TEE or confidential-computing attestation as enforcement evidence¶
Attested enforcement generation¶
Effects after leaving the enclave¶
Attestation shows environment, not each effect¶
Microarchitectural limits¶
Payment execution gate beside the processor¶
Reconstruction of amount, payee and currency; consumed once¶
Alternate payment rails¶
Authorization of a payment is separate¶
Settlement finality outside the gate¶
This table is the editor's preliminary sorting based on the work's own description of the earlier programme. The foundational JSON (Technical_Disclosure_1.json) was not available and the Datatracker drafts were not read, so no comparison of actual filed texts was done and no patentability or priority conclusion is made.¶
| Concept | Relationship to earlier work | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Candidate Acts, Non-Effective State, Protected Enforcement Domains, Finality Sinks, scoped effect authority, revocation, anti-replay, actual-effect evidence | Foundational (Mothership programme) | Not new in October |
| Native-permission semantic differences | Applies earlier principles to platforms | To examine against filed texts |
| Platform-specific authority adapters | Specific implementation of authorization-to-effect translation | To examine |
| Canonical effect descriptors | Related to operation reconstruction | Cross-platform canonicalization issues may be additional |
| Native enforcement capability qualification | Potentially additional | To examine |
| Cross-platform source-authority continuity | Potentially additional | To examine |
| Protected cross-device authority ownership and stale-source fencing | Potentially additional | To examine |
| Unavailable enforcement capabilities; credential-broker limitations | Honest limitation handling | To examine |
| Platform upgrade and security API changes | Related to runtime lifecycle | To examine |
| Cross-provider AI-agent handoffs | Application of delegation continuity | To examine |
| Hardware and software enforcement equivalence; partial coverage and alternative paths | Potentially additional | To examine |