Internet-Draft AgentTrust Trace Verification November 2026
Durga Expires 20 May 2027 [Page]
Workgroup:
Network Working Group
Published:
Intended Status:
Informational
Expires:
Author:
R. K. Durga
Microsoft Corporation

Cryptographic Execution-Trace Verification, JCS Canonicalization, and Fail-Closed Delegation Attestation for Autonomous AI Agents

Abstract

This document specifies a deterministic cryptographic verification profile for execution traces, delegation chains, and weight-custody manifests generated by autonomous artificial intelligence (AI) agents operating across Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent-to-Agent (A2A), and enterprise system-of-record boundaries. The profile binds JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS, RFC 8785) pre-image serialization, Ed25519 (RFC 8032) and ECDSA P-256/P-384 signatures, JSON Web Key (JWK, RFC 7517) thumbprint pinning, and fail-closed revocation and freshness checks so that relying parties can independently verify whether an agent action was authorized prior to commit.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 May 2027.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Autonomous AI agents increasingly invoke external tools, modify enterprise state, and delegate subtasks across multi-agent boundaries using protocols such as the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and Agent-to-Agent (A2A) transport envelopes. Without a deterministic, cryptographically verifiable execution receipt, a relying party cannot distinguish between a self-reported agent log and an independently verifiable commitment record.

This specification formalizes the fail-closed verification invariants implemented in the open-source AgentTrust ("agentrust-io/trace-spec", "agentrust-io/agent-manifest", and "agentrust-io/weight-custody-manifest") conformance suites and empirically evaluated in [TR-2026-01], [TR-2026-02], and [TR-2026-03].

2. Conventions and Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

3. Deterministic Pre-Image Canonicalization (RFC 8785 JCS)

To prevent cross-language signature verification drift between Python, TypeScript/JavaScript, and Rust verifiers, every execution trace envelope MUST be serialized according to the JSON Canonicalization Scheme [RFC8785] prior to digest calculation or signature verification:

4. Strict Base64url and JWK Public-Key Hygiene

Verifiers evaluating detached signatures, witness receipts, or JWK bundles [RFC7517] MUST enforce canonical unpadded base64url encoding (Section 5 of [RFC4648]):

5. Parent-Linked Delegation Chain Verification

When an orchestrator agent delegates authority to a sub-agent, each hop record MUST include a "parent_record_hash" field containing the lowercase hexadecimal SHA-256 digest of the canonicalized parent record. A verifier evaluating an N-hop delegation chain MUST verify:

  1. Cryptographic signature validity of every hop i in 0..N-1.
  2. Hash continuity: hop[i].parent_record_hash == SHA256(JCS(hop[i-1])).
  3. Scope attenuation: hop[i].granted_scopes is a strict subset of or equal to hop[i-1].granted_scopes.
  4. Temporal monotonicity: hop[i].issued_at >= hop[i-1].issued_at and hop[i].expires_at <= hop[i-1].expires_at.

6. Canonical Signing Pre-Image, Key Identifier Derivation, and Verification Clock

To ensure deterministic cross-implementation reproducibility from public specification text alone (resolving interoperability feedback from independent verifier implementations), conforming issuers and checkers MUST apply the following signing and digest rules:

  1. SIGNING_PREIMAGE_JCS: The signature pre-image MUST be the UTF-8 byte sequence produced by applying RFC 8785 JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS), restricted to ASCII member names, to the envelope JSON object with the signature member (sig or signature) removed.
  2. SIGNATURE_ENCODING_AND_PAD_BITS: For Ed25519 ([RFC8032]), the 64-byte raw signature MUST be encoded using unpadded RFC 4648 Section 5 Base64url with zero trailing pad bits. For hybrid post-quantum profiles, both the 64-byte Ed25519 signature and the 3309-byte FIPS 204 ML-DSA-65 signature MUST be encoded as unpadded Base64url strings over the identical JCS signing pre-image.
  3. KEY_IDENTIFIER_DERIVATION: The key identifier (kid) MUST equal the lowercase hexadecimal SHA-256 digest of the raw public key bytes (SHA-256(raw_public_key_bytes), prefixed with sha256: where typed digests are required).
  4. ENVELOPE_DIGEST_COVERAGE: When a published receipt or hop record is cited by digest inside a subsequent hop's parent_record_hash or inside an external Verdict Record ([I-D.wright-verdict-record]) evidence array, the SHA-256 digest covers the complete canonical JCS bytes of the signed envelope (or the canonical payload bytes where unsigned hop records are evaluated under a signature-exempt checker policy).
  5. EXPLICIT_VERIFICATION_CLOCK_AND_SKEW: Every signed receipt MUST include integer Unix epoch timestamps iat (issued-at) and exp (expiration) where exp > iat and the validity window exceeds the maximum 60-second clock-skew allowance. Static test vectors specify an explicit reference verification timestamp verification_time_utc so offline checkers evaluate deterministic pass/fail outcomes regardless of wall-clock execution date.

7. Security Considerations

Verifiers that accept boolean literals as integer timestamps (for example, in runtimes where boolean is a subclass of integer) or that silently truncate recursive argument walks without flagging depth exhaustion introduce fail-open bypass vectors. Implementations MUST validate exact integer types for sequence numbers, epochs, and clock-skew bounds, and MUST fail closed when structural nesting bounds are exceeded.

8. IANA Considerations

This document has no IANA actions.

9. References

9.1. Normative References

[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4648]
Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings", RFC 4648, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC7517]
Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.
[RFC7638]
Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK) Thumbprint", RFC 7638, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7638>.
[RFC8032]
Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8785]
Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8785>.

9.2. Informative References

[TR-2026-01]
Durga, R. K., "Deterministic Control-Plane Governance and Lease-Bounded Recovery for Enterprise Agentic AI Systems", DOI 10.5281/zenodo.23735274, , <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23735274>.
[TR-2026-02]
Durga, R. K., "Adversarial Regression Benchmarking for Agentic AI Security Controls Across OWASP ASI01-ASI10", DOI 10.5281/zenodo.23735497, , <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23735497>.
[TR-2026-03]
Durga, R. K., "Cryptographic Weight-Custody Manifests, JCS Canonicalization, and Two-Plane Edge Fleet Verification for Autonomous AI Systems", DOI 10.5281/zenodo.23775009, , <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23775009>.
[I-D.wright-verdict-record]
Wright, D., "Verdict Record: An Evidence-Pack Format for Deterministic Conformance Verification", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-wright-verdict-record-03, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-wright-verdict-record-03>.

Author's Address

Raghuvar Karthik Durga
Microsoft Corporation
Chicago, IL
United States of America