Network Working Group R. K. Durga
Internet-Draft Microsoft Corporation
Intended status: Informational 16 November 2026
Expires: 20 May 2027
Post-Quantum Hybrid Cryptographic Delegation Chains and Merkle-
Aggregated Execution Receipts for Autonomous AI Agents
draft-durga-pquip-pqc-agentic-delegation-01
Abstract
Autonomous AI agent ecosystems rely on multi-hop cryptographic
delegation chains and signed execution traces (currently built on
Ed25519, ECDSA P-256, and RSA-PSS) to enforce least-privilege tool
invocations across Model Context Protocol (MCP) and Agent-to-Agent
(A2A) boundaries, and to preserve long-term non-repudiation for
regulatory audit logs. This architecture faces two existential
vulnerabilities in the Post-Quantum era: (1) "Harvest-Now, Forge-and-
Repudiate-Later" (HNFRL) attacks, wherein Cryptographically Relevant
Quantum Computers (CRQCs) running Shor's algorithm retroactively
forge or repudiate multi-year compliance traces (e.g., 7-to-10-year
HIPAA, SOX, FDA 21 CFR Part 11, and defense operational logs) and
synthesize retroactive human-in-the-loop approvals; and (2) "Lattice
Signature-Bloat Amplification," wherein naively substituting 64-byte
Ed25519 signatures with 3,309-byte ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) signatures
across a 10-hop sub-agent chain inflates per-call authorization
headers from 640 bytes to over 46 KB (including public keys),
exceeding HTTP/2 header limits and degrading sub-10ms real-time tool
routing.
This document specifies a wire-compatible Post-Quantum Agentic
Delegation and Trace Receipt profile ("PQ-Agentic"). It introduces a
two-tier cryptographic architecture: (a) a Hot-Path Hybrid Delegation
Envelope combining classical Ed25519 with ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) via
Pre-Verified Session-Grant Digest Chaining (PVSGDC), replacing
redundant per-call inline re-transmission of O(N) prior delegators'
5,261-byte ML-DSA-65 public keys and signatures with 32-byte SHAKE256
digests of out-of-band PEP-verified delegation grants; and (b) a
Cold-Path Long-Horizon Archival Receipt anchored with stateless hash-
based SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128f ([FIPS205]) over RFC 9943 SCITT transparency
Merkle roots, guaranteeing 30-year quantum-resistant non-repudiation
even under catastrophic lattice cryptanalysis.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Two-Tier Post-Quantum Agentic Architecture . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Tier 1: Hot-Path Hybrid Delegation with Merkle Hop
Folding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Tier 2: Cold-Path Stateless Hash-Based Archival (SLH-DSA /
FIPS 205) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Normative PQ-Agentic Envelope Schema (JCS / JSON-RPC) . . . . 6
5. Canonical Signing Pre-Image, Key Identifier Derivation, and
Verification Clock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.1. Cryptographic Suite Downgrade Prevention . . . . . . . . 8
6.2. Protection Against Retroactive Policy-Drift Forgery . . . 9
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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1. Introduction
As autonomous AI agents transition into regulated enterprise,
healthcare, financial, and critical-infrastructure operations,
security standards—including IETF WIMSE workload credentials, IETF
SCITT transparency receipts, and emerging agentic execution-trace
verification specifications
([I-D.durga-agenttrust-trace-verification] and
[I-D.durga-wimse-ctx-isolation])—rely on asymmetric digital
signatures to bind human intent, scope attenuation, and tool-
invocation receipts.
Today, virtually 100% of production agentic identity tokens (OAuth
2.0 JWT/JWS, SPIFFE SVIDs, and COSE receipts) use classical elliptic-
curve cryptography (Ed25519 or ECDSA P-256). While the broader
Internet community has prioritized Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC)
for TLS key establishment (to defeat "Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later"
confidentiality attacks via ML-KEM / FIPS 203), the agentic AI
ecosystem has overlooked a dual threat that strikes digital
signatures directly:
* *1. Harvest-Now, Forge-and-Repudiate-Later (HNFRL) on Long-Lived
Agentic Audit Logs:* Regulated industries require immutable
retention of autonomous decision and tool-execution logs for 7 to
30 years (e.g., HIPAA 6-year minimum, SOX 7-year audit trails,
aviation/industrial safety logs). Once a CRQC recovers the
classical private key corresponding to a historical agent identity
or human approver public key recorded in an audit log, an
adversary (or a negligent operator seeking to repudiate liability)
can mathematically forge alternative historical execution traces
with identical timestamps and valid Ed25519 signatures, destroying
the evidentiary integrity of the entire archive.
* *2. Multi-Hop Lattice Signature-Bloat Amplification (DoS):*
Unlike TLS handshakes—which amortize PQC key and signature sizes
across long-lived TCP/QUIC connections—autonomous agent workflows
execute stateless, high-frequency JSON-RPC tool invocations across
deeply nested delegation chains (User -> Orchestrator -> Planner
-> Domain Sub-Agent -> MCP Gateway -> Tool Server). In classical
Ed25519, a 10-hop delegation chain carries 10 x (64-byte signature
+ 32-byte public key) = 960 bytes. Under NIST FIPS 204 (ML-DSA-
65), a single signature is 3,309 bytes and a public key is 1,952
bytes (5,261 bytes per hop). A naive 10-hop nested token balloons
to 52,610 bytes (over 70 KB when Base64url-encoded), breaking 8
KB–16 KB HTTP header buffers, overflowing JSON-RPC frame limits,
and introducing unacceptable serialization latency.
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This specification defines the normative cryptographic structures,
CBOR/JCS canonicalization rules, and Merkle-folded delegation
envelopes required to make autonomous AI agent protocols quantum-
resilient today without violating wire-size or latency budgets.
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
HNFRL (Harvest-Now, Forge-and-Repudiate-Later): An adversarial or
evidentiary-repudiation model in which classical public keys and
signed agentic audit logs are archived today and subsequently
compromised via Shor's algorithm on a CRQC to synthesize
counterfeit historical approvals or repudiate authentic execution
receipts.
Composite Hybrid Algorithm (Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65): A dual-signature
construction requiring both a valid RFC 8032 Ed25519 signature and
a valid NIST FIPS 204 ML-DSA-65 lattice signature over a domain-
separated canonical pre-image.
Merkle-Folded Delegation Hop (MFDH): A compact intermediate
delegation link that binds scope attenuation into a SHAKE256
Merkle accumulator anchored by the terminal invoker's hybrid PQ
signature and verified by the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) via
pre-registered key-directory digests.
3. Two-Tier Post-Quantum Agentic Architecture
To simultaneously satisfy sub-10ms runtime tool-invocation latency
and 30-year regulatory non-repudiation, compliant agentic runtimes
MUST separate cryptographic enforcement into two coupled planes:
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+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TIER 1: HOT-PATH DELEGATION & TOOL INVOCATION (Sub-10ms Budget) |
| |
| [Human / Root Intent] |
| | Hybrid Root Anchor: Ed25519 + ML-DSA-65 (Detached JWKThumb)|
| v |
| [Hop 1..k-1: Intermediate Sub-Agents] |
| | Merkle-Folded Scope Attenuation (SHAKE256 + Key-Bound MAC) |
| | (32-byte inclusion witness per hop instead of 5.2KB ML-DSA)|
| v |
| [Hop k: Terminal Invoker -> MCP / A2A Policy Enforcement Point] |
| | Single Terminal Hybrid Proof: Ed25519 (64B) + ML-DSA-65 |
| | (3,309B) over JCS(Intent_Root || Merkle_Chain_Root || Tool)|
+---------+-------------------------------------------------------------+
|
| Asynchronous Batch Commit (Every T <= 60s or N <= 1024 steps)
v
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TIER 2: COLD-PATH ARCHIVAL TRANSPARENCY LEDGER (30-Year Horizon) |
| |
| [SCITT / Append-Only Trace Notary] |
| | Computes Binary Merkle Tree over Tier-1 Hybrid Receipts |
| | Signs Epoch Root with Stateless Hash-Based Signature: |
| +--> SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128f () + RFC 3161 PQ Timestamp |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
3.1. Tier 1: Hot-Path Hybrid Delegation with Merkle Hop Folding
In a multi-hop delegation chain of depth k, requiring every
intermediate agent A_1, ..., A_k to append an inline ML-DSA-65 public
key (1,952 bytes) and signature (3,309 bytes) scales linearly at
5,261 bytes per hop. Instead, this specification defines *Merkle-
Folded Delegation Hop (MFDH)* compaction:
1. *Key-Directory Thumbprint Addressing:* Agent identities MUST NOT
embed raw 1,952-byte ML-DSA-65 public keys inline within per-
request JSON-RPC or HTTP headers. Instead, each agent references
its composite key via a 32-byte SHAKE256 JWK/COSE_Key thumbprint
(pq_kid) resolved and cached out-of-band via the WIMSE/SPIFFE
workload trust bundle.
2. *Epoch-Pinned Hybrid Delegation Grant:* When Agent A_{i-1}
delegates attenuated scope S_i (where S_i is a strict subset of
S_{i-1}) to A_i, A_{i-1} signs the delegation grant once per
session epoch using Hybrid-Ed25519-ML-DSA-65 and registers the
32-byte grant receipt hash H_i = SHAKE256(JCS(Grant_i) ||
Sig_{ML-DSA-65}) with the local or federated Guardrail Witness
cache.
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3. *Constant-Size Per-Call Wire Envelope:* On each individual MCP
tool invocation, the terminal agent A_k transmits: (a) the
ordered list of 32-byte hop digests [H_1, ..., H_{k-1}], (b) the
canonicalized tool-call parameters and context-isolation witness
([I-D.durga-wimse-ctx-isolation]), and (c) a single terminal
Hybrid-Ed25519-ML-DSA-65 signature (3,373 bytes total) over the
Merkle root of [H_1, ..., H_{k-1}, Call_k].
Consequently, a 10-hop Post-Quantum delegation proof on the wire
requires only 3,373 + (9 * 32) = 3,661 bytes—a *93.0% wire-size
reduction* compared to naive 52,610-byte inline ML-DSA-65
chaining—while preserving full non-interactive lattice verification
against cached session grants.
3.2. Tier 2: Cold-Path Stateless Hash-Based Archival (SLH-DSA / FIPS
205)
Because structured lattice assumptions (Module-LWE / Module-SIS
underlying ML-DSA) are mathematically newer than hash collision-
resistance assumptions, high-assurance regulatory archives MUST NOT
rely solely on lattice signatures for multi-decade non-repudiation.
At configurable epoch boundaries (Delta_t <= 60 seconds or N <= 1,024
trace steps), the Trace Verification Notary aggregates all verified
Tier-1 step digests into a SHAKE256 Merkle tree and signs the epoch
root using *SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128f (NIST FIPS 205)* alongside a composite
ML-DSA-87 signature. Even if an adversary archives all traffic today
and later wields both a CRQC (breaking Ed25519) and a theoretical
algebraic lattice reduction (weakening ML-DSA), the SLH-DSA-SHAKE-
128f epoch seal remains secure under the sole assumption that
SHAKE256 is pre-image and second-pre-image resistant.
4. Normative PQ-Agentic Envelope Schema (JCS / JSON-RPC)
When serialized in JSON (such as inside an MCP _meta.pq_delegation
block or an A2A task header), the envelope MUST be canonicalized
using RFC 8785 JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS) prior to domain-
separated hashing and signing:
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{
"pq_profile": "durga-pquip-agentic-v1",
"suite_id": "HYBRID-ED25519-MLDSA65-SHAKE256",
"policy_epoch": 42,
"policy_manifest_sha256": "e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855",
"invoker_pq_kid": "shake256:9f86d081884c7d659a2feaa0c55ad015a3bf4f1b2b0b822cd15d6c15b0f00a08",
"hop_chain_digests": [
"shake256:4a44dc15364204a80fe80e9039455cc1608281820fe2b24f1e5233ade6af1dd5",
"shake256:6b86b273ff34fce19d6b804eff5a3f5747ada4eaa22f1d49c01e52ddb7875b4b"
],
"effective_scope": ["mcp:tool:erp.ledger.read", "mcp:max_rows:100"],
"clean_context_root": "sha256:7f83b1657ff1fc53b92dc18148a1d65dfc2d4b1fa3d677284addd200126d9069",
"timestamp_ms": 1793460000000,
"nonce": "b4f2e8a1-9c3d-4e7b-8a2f-1d5c6e7f8a9b",
"signatures": {
"ed25519": "base64url(64-byte-rfc8032-signature)",
"ml_dsa_65": "base64url(3309-byte-fips204-signature)"
}
}
The domain-separated signing pre-image MUST be constructed as:
PreImage = "PQ-AGENTIC-DELEGATION-V1" || 0x00 ||
SHAKE256_512(JCS(Envelope_Without_Signatures))
A Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) MUST verify *both*
signatures.ed25519 and signatures.ml_dsa_65 against the public keys
bound to invoker_pq_kid. If either signature fails verification, or
if policy_manifest_sha256 does not match the active policy AST
digest, the PEP MUST fail closed and reject the tool invocation with
error code -32098 (PQ_SIGNATURE_OR_EPOCH_INVALID).
5. Canonical Signing Pre-Image, Key Identifier Derivation, and
Verification Clock
To ensure deterministic cross-implementation reproducibility from
public specification text alone (resolving interoperability feedback
from independent verifier implementations), conforming issuers and
checkers MUST apply the following signing and digest rules:
1. SIGNING_PREIMAGE_JCS: The signature pre-image MUST be the UTF-8
byte sequence produced by applying [RFC8785] JSON
Canonicalization Scheme (JCS), restricted to ASCII member names,
to the envelope JSON object with the signature member (sig or
signature) removed.
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2. SIGNATURE_ENCODING_AND_PAD_BITS: For Ed25519 (RFC 8032), the
64-byte raw signature MUST be encoded using unpadded RFC 4648
Section 5 Base64url with zero trailing pad bits. For hybrid
post-quantum profiles, both the 64-byte Ed25519 signature and the
3309-byte [FIPS204] ML-DSA-65 signature MUST be encoded as
unpadded Base64url strings over the identical JCS signing pre-
image.
3. KEY_IDENTIFIER_DERIVATION: The key identifier (kid) MUST equal
the lowercase hexadecimal SHA-256 digest of the raw public key
bytes (SHA-256(raw_public_key_bytes), prefixed with sha256: where
typed digests are required).
4. ENVELOPE_DIGEST_COVERAGE: When a published receipt or hop record
is cited by digest inside a subsequent hop's parent_record_hash
or inside an external Verdict Record
([I-D.wright-verdict-record]) evidence array, the SHA-256 digest
covers the complete canonical JCS bytes of the signed envelope
(or the canonical payload bytes where unsigned hop records are
evaluated under a signature-exempt checker policy).
5. EXPLICIT_VERIFICATION_CLOCK_AND_SKEW: Every signed receipt MUST
include integer Unix epoch timestamps iat (issued-at) and exp
(expiration) where exp > iat and the validity window exceeds the
maximum 60-second clock-skew allowance. Static test vectors
specify an explicit reference verification timestamp
verification_time_utc so offline checkers evaluate deterministic
pass/fail outcomes regardless of wall-clock execution date.
6. Security Considerations
6.1. Cryptographic Suite Downgrade Prevention
An adversary capable of intercepting MCP or A2A traffic MAY attempt
to strip the ml_dsa_65 signature field and force fallback to
classical ed25519. To prevent stripping attacks, the suite_id is
bound inside the JCS-canonicalized signed payload, and the workload's
SPIFFE/WIMSE trust bundle entry explicitly marks pq_required: true.
Any envelope presenting only a classical signature for a pq_required
workload MUST be rejected immediately.
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6.2. Protection Against Retroactive Policy-Drift Forgery
Binding policy_manifest_sha256 and policy_epoch directly into the
hybrid-signed pre-image ensures that even across software releases
that retain the same invoker_pq_kid, any modification to scope-
interpretation semantics produces a deterministic digest mismatch,
requiring explicit re-appraisal prior to carrying forward historical
authorization conclusions.
7. IANA Considerations
This document has no immediate IANA actions. Future revisions will
request registration of the HYBRID-ED25519-MLDSA65-SHAKE256 algorithm
identifier within the IANA JOSE and COSE Algorithms registries.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997,
.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, May 2017,
.
[RFC8785] Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON
Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785, June 2020,
.
[FIPS204] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Module-
Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard (ML-DSA)", NIST
FIPS 204, August 2024,
.
[FIPS205] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Stateless
Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard (SLH-DSA)", NIST
FIPS 205, August 2024,
.
8.2. Informative References
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[I-D.durga-agenttrust-trace-verification]
Durga, R. K., "Cryptographic Execution-Trace Verification
and Scope-Bounded Delegation for Autonomous AI Agents",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-durga-agenttrust-
trace-verification-00, October 2026,
.
[I-D.durga-wimse-ctx-isolation]
Durga, R. K., "Cryptographic Separation of Untrusted Data-
Plane Context from Control-Plane Tool Invocations in
Autonomous AI Agents", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-durga-wimse-ctx-isolation-00, October 2026,
.
[I-D.wright-verdict-record]
Wright, D., "Verdict Record: An Evidence-Pack Format for
Deterministic Conformance Verification", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-wright-verdict-record-03, November
2026, .
Author's Address
Raghuvar Karthik Durga
Microsoft Corporation
Chicago, IL
United States of America
Email: rdurga@microsoft.com
URI: https://orcid.org/0009-0003-7014-355X
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