Internet-Draft AUDIT Decision Receipts November 2026
Gruszka Expires 21 May 2027 [Page]
Workgroup:
Network Working Group
Internet-Draft:
draft-gruszka-audit-decision-receipts-10
Published:
Intended Status:
Informational
Expires:
Author:
K. Gruszka
b7n0de

Decision Receipts for Approvals, Declined Actions and Executed Actions in Agent Audit Records

Abstract

The architecture for auditing agent delegation and interactions proposed for the AUDIT effort names Interaction Records, Action Records and Authorization Transition Records and leaves their encoding open. This document maps a pair of signed records, the decision receipt and the outcome receipt, onto those record types for three cases, a human approval, a declined action and an executed action with its result. It states what each record requires independently of its encoding, exact bytes, a signature over them, digest bindings, required members and a content root, with verification steps that a third party can run offline, and it gives the binding of these requirements to DSSE and in-toto that existing receipts use and a second binding to COSE_Sign1, in which a receipt is itself a Signed Statement for a Transparency Service. Each receipt is created when the decision or the outcome occurs and is checked by an Auditor post hoc, and a declined or refused action is a record of its own. For each case the document states what the receipt adds and what it does not show, and it gives a verification procedure that runs offline. It requires that an approval be honoured at most once, even after the record of consumed approvals is rotated. Test vectors for all three cases, each with a counterexample, are included. The document also describes, informatively, how a receipt can be registered with a Transparency Service under RFC 9943 and what a SCITT Receipt then shows and does not show. It defines no new predicate or registry; the COSE_Sign1 binding names its two receipt types by new identifiers. How the issuer of a receipt enforces its decision is out of scope.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on 21 May 2027.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

The architecture of [AUDIT-ARCH] asks that auditing link user intent, delegation, authorization and execution, and treats authorization as a state that changes over time. Three of its four record types (its Section 5) matter here. Interaction Records capture user-facing events such as approvals and refusals, Action Records capture events at the boundary where an action took effect, and Authorization Transition Records capture changes in permission state. Its field names are placeholders (its Section 7), and a canonical data model is a work item (WI-1).

An Auditor in that architecture does not trust the Agent (its Section 8), so a record helps only when a third party can check it. That needs exact bytes, a signature over them and bindings to inputs and evidence by digest. This document states these needs as requirements on a decision receipt and its companion outcome receipt that do not depend on their encoding (Section 3.9): a payload in the serialization of [RFC8785], signed with Ed25519 [RFC8032], with bindings by digest, required members and a content root. A binding says how a receipt carries them. Section 3.10 gives the binding that existing receipts use, an in-toto Statement [INTOTO-STATEMENT] in a DSSE envelope [DSSE], and Appendix B gives a second binding beside it, a COSE_Sign1 message [RFC9052]. Section 5 names implementations. The document covers three cases:

  1. a human approval of one action (an Interaction Record of an approval and an Authorization Transition Record with the trigger user_approval);
  2. a declined action, with its reason and without an effect;
  3. an executed action with its result (an Action Record).

The document maps and verifies. It does not propose the decision receipt as the data model of the architecture and does not change the receipts it describes. The mapping of Section 2 follows revision -01 of [AUDIT-ARCH]; a later revision of the architecture can change it.

A decision receipt is an audit record (Section 3.1 of [AUDIT-ARCH]) that is created when the decision is taken, before the action it decides takes effect, and an outcome receipt is created after the action. An Auditor (Section 4.3 of [AUDIT-ARCH]) checks both post hoc, as records, with the procedure of Section 3, which is the post‑hoc use of records that Section 1 of [AUDIT-ARCH] describes. A declined or refused action is a record of its own, a decision receipt with the verdict DENY or REFUSE (Case 2 of Section 3.3). How the issuer of a receipt enforces its decision is not a subject of this document. Section 4 applies to a relying party when it honours an approval, not to an Auditor.

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

In this document, these key words apply to a verifier in Section 2.6 and in the procedure of Section 3, to an Auditor that performs the checks of Section 3.5, to a relying party that lets an action run because of an approval in Section 4, to whoever issues approval records there, and to the use of the test keys of Appendix A. They also apply to a verifier in Section 3.11 and to whoever issues approval records with approverSignature.

1.2. Terms

Decision receipt, outcome receipt:
A signed record of one decision, or of the outcome of one decided action, that meets the requirements of Section 3.9 in a binding. In the binding of Section 3.10, a DSSE envelope whose payload is an in-toto Statement v1 with the decision receipt type or the outcome receipt type of that section.
Binding:
An encoding of receipts that gives steps 1, 2, 3 and 6 of Section 3.2 for it (Section 3.9). Section 3.10 gives the DSSE binding and Appendix B the COSE_Sign1 binding.
Receipt bytes:
The bytes of a receipt as received; in the DSSE binding, the envelope bytes.
Payload bytes:
The bytes that the signature of a receipt covers and over which its content root is computed. In the DSSE binding, the bytes obtained by base64 decoding the payload member of the envelope; a DSSE signature covers the pre-authentication encoding of payloadType and these bytes.
Predicate, predicate digest:
The JSON object of a receipt whose members Section 3.8 gives, and SHA-256 over its [RFC8785] serialization. In the DSSE binding, the member predicate of the Statement and the digest.sha256 of its subject entry (Section 3.10).
Content root:
SHA-256 [RFC6234] over the payload bytes. Other digests commit to the byte strings identified by their respective fields. Two receipts with the same content root have the same payload bytes, assuming the collision resistance of SHA-256; their receipt bytes, signatures and keys can differ.
Approval record:
The record of one human act that approves one action (Section 2.1).
Relying party:
The component that lets an action run because of a decision.
Consumption state:
The durable record in which a relying party notes each approval it has honoured.
Consumption scope:
The set of decisions of a relying party within which it honours each approval at most once (Section 4), and within which the first check of Section 3.5 counts released ALLOW decisions.
Decision maker, outcome signer:
The holder of the key that signs a decision receipt, named by decisionMaker.id, and the holder of the key that signs an outcome receipt. The outcome signer is the executor or an observer (Section 3.1).
Trust policy:
The configuration of a verifier that says which key it accepts for which decisionMaker.id and for which period and which key may attest which executor.id, and that may name the consumption scope of an Auditor (Section 3.5). This document does not define its format.
Verifier, Auditor:
A verifier runs the procedure of Section 3.2 to Section 3.4 on a receipt. An Auditor is a verifier in the role of Section 4.3 of [AUDIT-ARCH] that can also run the checks of Section 3.5 over the receipts it holds.

2. Mapping the Three Cases onto AUDIT Records

All decision receipts here use the decisionType preActionAuthorization and carry validity with audience, nonce and expiresAt. A decision receipt is the gate's signed view of an event; the human act itself is the approval record, bound by digest. In the tables, IR stands for Interaction Record, ATR for Authorization Transition Record and AR for Action Record, followed by a placeholder field of the architecture. The fields common to all cases map as follows.

event_id
decisionId (outcomeId in an outcome receipt)
trace_id, parent_id
traceContext.traceId, traceContext.parentId
timestamp
decidedAt (performedAt in an outcome receipt)
actor, on_behalf_of
agent.id, principal.id
action
proposedAction (actionType, target, method)
exact action bytes
proposedAction.parametersDigest, where present
authorization.expires_at
validity.expiresAt
delegation_chain
none (delegationRefs is not used here)
record signer
decisionMaker.id, bound to the key by a trust policy

Every decision receipt thus names, in principal.id, the user or other party on whose behalf the agent acted, which step 7 of Section 3.2 requires to be a non-empty string; a delegation through further agents is not recorded here (delegationRefs is not used).

2.1. Case 1, a Human Approval

A gate asks a person before an action and records the answer. An earlier receipt for the same request, such as one with the verdict ESCALATE, is a separate record; this receipt does not reference it. After the answer the gate decides ALLOW for exactly the approved action. The approval record carries approvalId, approver, session, actionDigest (SHA-256 of the approved action bytes), approvedAt and validUntil. The decision receipt names it in inputSnapshot under the name "approval record".

Table 1: Case 1
Record, field Decision receipt
IR, approval approval record, by its digest in inputSnapshot
IR, actor approver in the approval record, equal to principal.id
ATR, previous_state not recorded in this receipt; preceding state must be established separately
ATR, new_state verdict ALLOW for parametersDigest
ATR, trigger reasonCodes contains user_approval
ATR, actor approver in the approval record

The scope of the new state is one action, identified by its bytes. A second action, even one with the same name and target, needs a new approval.

2.2. Case 2, a Declined Action

A gate declines an action because a rule or a person says no. The receipt records the verdict DENY or REFUSE with its reasons. It may say in actionOutcome that the call was blocked, which is the decision maker's own statement. This document treats DENY and REFUSE alike and does not define a difference between them.

Table 2: Case 2
Record, field Decision receipt
IR, refusal verdict DENY or REFUSE
reason reasonCodes
action proposedAction with parametersDigest, where present
no effect actionOutcome.status blocked (self-asserted); no outcome with status executed names this decision in the supplied set
ATR none; the state is unchanged

A receipt cannot prove that something did not happen. An observer at the boundary can separately report that it observed no effect. The check in Section 3.5 detects a conflicting executed outcome in the supplied set; it does not establish absence of an effect.

2.3. Case 3, an Executed Action and Its Result

A gate allows an action, the action runs, and an executor or an observer at the boundary records what happened in an outcome receipt signed with its own key. The outcome receipt names the decision by its content root in decisionRef.

Table 3: Case 3
Record, field Outcome and decision receipt
AR, event_id outcomeId
AR, parent_id traceContext.parentId of the referenced decision
decision binding decisionRef, the content root of the decision
AR, timestamp performedAt
AR, actor executor.id
AR, action requestedActionDigest, equal to parametersDigest
result status executed, effectDigest
authorization the decision (ALLOW, validity.expiresAt)
evidence evidenceRefs of the decision

The architecture asks that Action Records be produced at the boundary where the action took effect. Its WI-1-3 distinguishes the Recorder's signing identity from the recorded Agent's identity where they are operationally separate. Section 3.4 checks that the outcome and decision use different keys and that executor.id differs from decisionMaker.id. Those checks alone do not establish operational separation or that the outcome signer observed the boundary.

2.4. What the Receipt Adds

  • Exact bytes. The payload is its own serialization under [RFC8785]. A verifier uses the received payload bytes for the signature input and content root. Canonical serialization is used to check equality and to derive the predicate digest, never to repair or replace the received payload.
  • A signature. Ed25519 over a signature input that contains the payload bytes unchanged; in the DSSE binding, the pre-authentication encoding of the payload type and the payload bytes.
  • Binding by digest. The action bytes (parametersDigest, where present), the approval record and other inputs (inputSnapshot), the policy (policyBoundary.policyDigest), evidence (evidenceRefs), the decision itself (decisionRef in the outcome) and the observed effect (effectDigest) are named by SHA-256.
  • Stated limits. The member notChecked lists what the decision maker did not check, and decisionChangeConditions lists what would change the decision.

A record made after the interaction, such as an outcome receipt, a later countersignature or a settlement, can name the decision by its content root. The content root is the same for every copy of the payload and does not change for as long as the payload bytes are kept; a receipt that supersedes it has its own content root and names it in relationships (Section 3.8). decisionId and validity.nonce serve the exchange in which the decision is made, and this document does not require them to be unique beyond it.

2.5. What the Receipt Does Not Do

  • It does not show that a decision was correct, safe or lawful.
  • The decision receipt alone does not authenticate the approval. Where Section 3.11.3 passes, it additionally shows that the holder of a key that the trust policy binds to approver signed the approval record as described in Section 3.11.4. This does not show that the person named in approver made the signature or approved the action. A deployment can additionally cite a separately signed approval in inputSnapshot. Validating that signature and establishing its correspondence to the approval record require rules beyond this document. The signed approvals of [IZMAYLOV] are one possible source of such evidence. The proof token of [YOSSIF] is another, a JWS signed by a hardware-protected key that a user-verification event gates for each signature, bound to one named action (Sections 3, 3.7 and 3.13 of [YOSSIF]), which shows that a verified human was present, not which person (Section 6.8.3 of [YOSSIF]). Such a token carries its own signature for a verifier of that format; an entry of inputSnapshot that names it by digest does not carry its signer (Section 3.1). A record of an approval that an authorization server signs has the same limit: its signature does not show that the approver actually approved (Section 9.4 of [LIU]). In cases N17, N18 and N22 of [DPS-RAR], with a test key for the authorization server, such a record passes the checks of Section 7 of [LIU] for an approval the person never gave, for a text other than the one the person was shown, and for a decision recorded before the person signed; only the binding to the person's own signature catches them.
  • It does not show that an effect happened. An outcome receipt shows that its signer stated an effect with a given digest. A digest that cannot be resolved to bytes shows only that a value was written.
  • It does not register anything. Transparency in the sense of [RFC9943] needs a separate registration and a SCITT Receipt; Section 3.7 describes how a receipt of this document can be registered.
  • It does not detect a receipt that was never written. An added observer or a sequence counter can reveal some such receipts, not all (Section 7).
  • It does not show that no action ran while an ALLOW was usable. An ALLOW that expires unused leaves no outcome receipt, and the receipts of this document do not establish an absence over its validity or over any other time window (compare Section 2.2).
  • It does not enforce single use of an approval or of an ALLOW. What the receipts make visible about reuse, and what they do not, is stated once at the end of Section 4.
  • Its times are the signer's clock.
  • It is not an access token or an authorization grant (Section 6). A verified ALLOW is a record of a decision, and the executing system makes its own authorization check. A pass shows neither that the decision maker or the agent was authorized at the time of the action nor the state of a delegation at that time.

2.6. Evaluation Receipts Are Evidence, Never Authorization

A decision may rest on an evaluation result, such as a test suite that passed. A Signed Evaluation Receipt [SER] records such a result. It appears in a decision receipt only as an entry of evidenceRefs whose digest is the receipt digest, SHA-256 over its payload bytes, as in [SER-MAPPINGS]. A verifier MUST NOT treat a valid Signed Evaluation Receipt, or its presence in evidenceRefs, as permission for an action. In the records of this document only a decision receipt with the verdict ALLOW, from a key the relying party trusts for decisions, records a permission.

2.7. Observations for the Architecture

This section is informative. At the places below, the mapping of this section needed a reading of revision -01 of [AUDIT-ARCH]. They are offered as observations and questions, not as requirements.

  • Evidence for a human approval. Section 3 of [AUDIT-ARCH] associates Interaction Records with the User; Section 3.1 says that user-facing systems produce records of prompts and approvals, and Section 4.2 has the Auditing Service sign records under its own identity. In Case 1, the gate's decision receipt binds an approval record by digest. Case 1 alone does not check an approver signature. Section 3.11 optionally checks a signature by the holder of a key that the trust policy binds to the approver, with the limits stated in Section 3.11.4. What evidence is needed to bind such a record to that person's act of approval, and when is the person's own signature required? [YOSSIF] offers one form of such evidence, signed by a device key that user verification gates rather than by the person (Sections 1.2 and 3.7 of [YOSSIF]).
  • Previous state. The Authorization Transition Record of Section 7.4 of [AUDIT-ARCH], and its work item WI-1-4 (Section 6 of [AUDIT-ARCH]), carries a previous state, a new state, a trigger and an actor in one record. A decision receipt records only the new state for one action and leaves the previous state to other records (Section 2.1). Section 5 of [AUDIT-ARCH] reconstructs authorization from the ordered sequence of such records; is a record without the previous state enough for that?
  • Binding an Action Record to its authorization. In Section 7.2 of [AUDIT-ARCH] the parent_id of an Action Record references the Interaction Record that motivated the action, and the authorization appears as scope and expiry. The outcome receipt of Case 3 names the decision receipt by its content root in decisionRef and takes parent_id from that decision (Section 2.3). The examples of [AUDIT-ARCH] have no member that binds an Action Record to the authorizing decision by digest.
  • Refusals before execution. Section 5 of [AUDIT-ARCH] includes model responses and agent-to-agent dialogue among Interaction Records. Its work item WI-1-2 (Section 6 of [AUDIT-ARCH]) also includes system events and does not preclude profiles for non-conversational interactions. In Case 2, a gate can decline a proposed action under a rule before execution (Section 2.2). When such a denial is internal to a workflow and is not part of a conversation, is it an Interaction Record, an Action Record of an attempted request, or a different event type?
  • Who records an action. Section 3 of [AUDIT-ARCH] has Action Records generated by the Agent, while Section 5 of [AUDIT-ARCH] places them at the boundary where the action took effect. Its work item WI-1-3 (Section 6 of [AUDIT-ARCH]) already distinguishes the Recorder's signing identity from the recorded Agent's identity where they are operationally separated. In Case 3 the outcome signer can be an observer that attests the executor's identifier (Section 3.1 and Section 3.4). How should an Action Record and the Auditor's trust policy identify the Recorder separately from the actor whose action is recorded?

3. Offline Verification

The procedure below needs no network access. Each step either passes or ends the procedure with a failure named by the step. A later step never repairs an earlier failure. Where several checks of one step fail, the failure is that of the step; which or how many of the failing members a verifier reports is not part of the result. A requirement that more than one step checks fails at the first of those steps. Wherever this section compares two times, it compares their full value, as if each fraction of a second were padded with zeros to six digits.

Steps 1, 2, 3 and 6 of Section 3.2, and with them steps 1 and 2 of Section 3.4, are those of the binding of the receipt. Section 3.9 states what each of them establishes in every binding, and Section 3.10 gives them for the DSSE binding and Appendix B for the COSE_Sign1 binding. All other steps and checks of this section and of Section 4 use only the payload bytes, the content root, the predicate and the predicate digest, and are the same in every binding. The verifier supplies the binding of each receipt, including each held receipt, as an input and does not infer it from the receipt bytes. Receipt bytes that the selected binding does not accept fail step 1.

3.1. Inputs

The verifier needs the receipt bytes of each receipt and the Ed25519 public keys selected by its trust policy for the decision signer and, for Case 3, the outcome signer. It also needs the expected decisionMaker.id and, for Case 3, the expected executor.id whose assertion that policy permits under the outcome-signing key. An outcome signer may be an observer rather than the executor.

The verifier supplies an evaluation time T in UTC, in the form of the timestamps of Section 3.8; it does not take T from a receipt. It also chooses which case of Section 3.3 it checks; it does not take the case from the receipt. Expected audience and nonce and the effect bytes are optional inputs. Action bytes are optional except where Section 3.11 is requested; in that case they are required. Case 1 requires the approval record bytes. A further optional input is the request to check the approver signature and, for it, the approver key of Section 3.11.2. Inputs or evidence whose bytes are not checked remain digest references, not verified contents. The members inputSnapshot and evidenceRefs name digests and relations, not the issuer or operator of the evidence they name, so a verifier cannot tell from them who issued each item; separate keys do not show independent operators either (step 5 of Section 3.4).

For JSON values parsed from receipt bytes, payload bytes or approval record bytes, the outermost value has depth zero. Each object member value or array element increases depth by one. A value with depth greater than 64 fails the step that parses it. For identity extraction in the first check of Section 3.5, such a citation gives no identity and is reported as not counted. Where a verifier, relying party or Auditor parses another input of this document as JSON, such as a consumption state, the same limit applies.

An Auditor that checks a receipt post hoc sets T to the time that its audit asks about and takes that time from its audit context, for example from a record made at the boundary where the action took effect. With a later T, such as the current time of the Auditor, step 9 of Section 3.2 fails for every receipt whose validity has ended. That failure says that the receipt is not usable at T. It does not say that the receipt was invalid when it was issued. A relying party that lets an action run uses its own current time as T (Section 4).

3.2. Decision Receipt

  1. Container. Apply step 1 of the binding of the receipt to the receipt bytes; a receipt that fails it fails this step.
  2. Payload bytes. Obtain the payload bytes P by step 2 of the binding; a receipt from which the binding does not obtain P fails this step.
  3. Signature. Apply step 3 of the binding, which verifies an Ed25519 signature under the expected key over a signature input that contains P. A key identifier that the receipt carries is not used to select a key. A signature verifies where its S, read as a little-endian integer, is less than the order L of Section 5.1 of [RFC8032] and the group equation of Section 5.1.7 of [RFC8032] holds in its form without the cofactor 8; a signature whose S is not less than L MUST NOT verify. The expected key MUST decode successfully as specified in Section 5.1.7 of [RFC8032], it MUST NOT be the identity point, and multiplying it by L MUST give the identity point; a receipt whose expected key does not meet this fails this step whatever signature it carries. This applies to decision receipts and outcome receipts in every binding. Without it, the key 01 followed by 31 zero bytes, which encodes the identity point, accepts the signature with R equal to that point and S = 0 for every message.
  4. Canonical form. P MUST be valid UTF-8 and parse as one JSON value with no duplicate member names. The serialization of the parsed value under [RFC8785] MUST be byte for byte equal to P. A verifier MUST NOT continue with a re-serialized form. Numbers are IEEE 754 double precision values under Section 3.1 of [RFC8785], so a P with the number 9007199254740993, which becomes 9007199254740992, fails this step, as does a P with an unpaired surrogate (Section 3.2.2.2 of [RFC8785]). P MUST NOT contain, anywhere in its parsed value and at any depth, a number whose absolute value is greater than 9007199254740991 and that is written without the frac and exp parts of the grammar in Section 6 of [RFC8259], even where P equals its serialization, because under Section 2.2 of [RFC7493] a receiver cannot be expected to treat such an integer as an exact value. A number written with frac or exp, such as 1e+21, is not covered by that sentence; for such a number this step asks only that P equal its serialization, which a P with 1e+21 does.
  5. Content root. Compute R = SHA-256(P).
  6. Statement. Apply step 6 of the binding for the decision receipt type. It checks that P names that type and yields the predicate, a JSON object, and the predicate digest; a receipt that fails it fails this step.
  7. Members. predicate MUST be a JSON object satisfying the field rules of Section 3.8.
  8. Signer. decisionMaker.id MUST be an identifier that the trust policy binds to the key of step 3, and it MUST equal the expected decisionMaker.id of Section 3.1.
  9. Validity. decidedAt MUST NOT be later than T, and T MUST be strictly earlier than expiresAt. Where an expected audience is given, audience MUST contain it; where an expected nonce is given, nonce MUST equal it.
  10. Action bytes. Where the action bytes are given, their SHA-256 MUST equal proposedAction.parametersDigest.sha256.

3.3. Checks per Case

The checks of a case follow step 10 of Section 3.2.

Case 1, approval.

decision.verdict MUST be ALLOW and decision.reasonCodes MUST contain user_approval. inputSnapshot MUST contain exactly one entry whose name is "approval record"; it may contain other entries. The approval record bytes A MUST be supplied, MUST hash to that entry's digest, and MUST be their own [RFC8785] serialization.

A MUST be a JSON object containing approvalId, approver, session, actionDigest, approvedAt and validUntil. Other members of A are not checked. The bound of step 4 of Section 3.2 on integer literals applies to P and not to A. approvalId, approver and session MUST be non-empty strings. actionDigest MUST have the digest form of Section 3.8 and MUST equal proposedAction.parametersDigest. approver MUST equal principal.id. approvedAt and validUntil MUST be [RFC3339] UTC timestamps with a trailing "Z" in the form given in Section 3.8. The bounds approvedAt <= decidedAt <= T < validity.expiresAt <= validUntil MUST hold.

Case 2, declined.
decision.verdict MUST be DENY or REFUSE. Where actionOutcome is present, its status MUST be notAttempted, blocked or refused, and performedAt and outcomeRef MUST be absent or null. An actionOutcome without status fails this case.
Case 3, executed.
The checks run in this order. First, decision.verdict MUST be ALLOW. Second, the outcome receipt MUST pass Section 3.4 against this decision, and an outcome receipt that fails one of its steps fails there. Third, the status of the outcome receipt MUST be executed.

3.4. Outcome Receipt

  1. Apply steps 1 to 5 of Section 3.2 separately to the outcome receipt, in its binding, with the expected outcome-signing key, obtaining payload bytes Q. A failure there is a failure of this step. Retain the decision receipt's content root R for the binding check below.
  2. Statement. Apply step 6 of the binding of the outcome receipt for the outcome receipt type, as step 6 of Section 3.2 does for the decision receipt type; a receipt that fails it fails this step.
  3. Members. predicate MUST be a JSON object satisfying the field rules of Section 3.8.
  4. Binding. decisionRef.sha256 MUST equal the content root R of the decision receipt that passed Section 3.2, and requestedActionDigest MUST equal its parametersDigest.
  5. Identity and separation. executor.id MUST equal the expected executor identifier supplied under Section 3.1. The verifier's trust policy MUST permit the outcome-signing key to attest that identifier. That key MUST differ from the decision maker's key, and executor.id MUST differ from decisionMaker.id. These checks do not establish that the two keys are controlled by operationally independent parties. The outcome-signing key is the key under which step 1 verified the outcome receipt. Where the trust policy lists the key of the decision maker for outcome receipts too and step 1 verified the outcome receipt under that key, this step fails.
  6. Result. status executed MUST come with a non-null effectDigest. Where effect bytes are supplied, effectDigest MUST be present, whatever the status, and their SHA-256 MUST equal effectDigest.sha256.
  7. Time. performedAt MUST NOT be earlier than the decision's decidedAt and MUST be strictly earlier than its validity.expiresAt. No step of this section compares performedAt or another member with T.

3.5. Checks over a Set of Receipts

An Auditor that holds the receipts and approval records of a run can check three properties that no single receipt shows. These checks are only as complete as the set of receipts the Auditor holds.

The Auditor supplies the expected signing key for each held receipt under its trust policy and checks every supplied held receipt, in its binding, before the three checks below. A held decision receipt must pass steps 1 to 6 of Section 3.2 under its expected signing key. A held outcome receipt must pass steps 1 to 5 of Section 3.2 under its expected signing key and step 2 of Section 3.4. In addition, the predicate of every supplied held receipt must be a JSON object. Where relationships is present in that predicate, the member and its entries must satisfy the field rules of Section 3.8 for relationships, including the definitions of the types and the notes that those rules reference. These additional requirements are part of the preliminary checks, and failure of either makes the input invalid.

The first and second checks count the receipts that pass these preliminary checks under their expected signing keys; a receipt that has expired at the evaluation time T is not left out of either check for that reason.

The Auditor MUST obtain the relying party's consumption scope from its audit context, or where that names none, from its trust policy; that scope is not inferred from an approvalId alone. First, within that scope, no two distinct released ALLOW decision payloads, identified by different content roots, may cite approval records with the same identity (approvalId, actionDigest and session). Such a pair violates item 1 of Section 4, for an approval identified as in item 2; additional copies or signatures of one payload do not. An ALLOW is released as Section 4 defines it; one that the Auditor can show never left the control of the relying party does not count. The audit context or trust policy that names the scope also says which decisions belong to it, and the audit context says which held ALLOW decisions the Auditor can show were never released; this document does not define their form. Where the Auditor can obtain no consumption scope, or cannot read its audit context or the scope it obtains, the first check gives no result; it does not then take a scope from the trust policy instead. The first check counts the held receipts; the receipt being verified counts only where it is also held. The identity of a cited approval is read from the approval record bytes whose SHA-256 is the digest of an inputSnapshot entry named "approval record", and two identities are the same where their approvalId values are equal strings, their session values are equal strings and their actionDigest values are equal. A held ALLOW that cites more than one approval record is counted for each of them. For identity extraction in this first check, the approval record bytes must be valid UTF-8 and parse as one JSON object with no duplicate member names. Bytes that hold a value with depth greater than 64, counted as in Section 3.1, do not parse in this sense. approvalId and session must be non-empty strings, and actionDigest must have the digest form of Section 3.8. No other Case 1 checks are applied when extracting this identity. This does not waive Case 1 for a receipt being verified in its own right. If the cited bytes are unavailable or do not meet these requirements, that citation gives no identity for this check; it is not counted and is reported as not counted. What the first check can and cannot detect is stated at the end of Section 4.

Second, no outcome receipt with status executed may name, in decisionRef, the content root of a receipt whose verdict is not ALLOW. Case 3 of Section 3.3 requires ALLOW for an executed action, so an execution that names a decision with DENY, REFUSE, ESCALATE, DEFER or OBSERVE is the same conflict.

Third, an entry of relationships of a decision or outcome receipt whose relation is supersedes names the predecessor of its receipt, the receipt that the Auditor holds whose content root is the digest of targetReceiptDigest of that entry. A payload is its own [RFC8785] serialization (step 4 of Section 3.2), so that content root is the jcs-sha256-v1 digest of the parsed payload of the predecessor, in the DSSE binding its Statement. The Auditor takes the predecessor as the state before the receipt that its issuer declared, not as a statement that this state is correct (Section 3.8), and derives earlier states from the predecessor of each predecessor in turn. An entry fails this check where the Auditor holds no receipt with that content root, or where the entry has targetSubjectDigest and its digest is not the predicate digest of the predecessor, in the DSSE binding the digest.sha256 of its subject entry; no earlier state is derived from such an entry. Entries with another relation are not part of this check, and no earlier state is derived from them. Where a receipt has more than one entry with relation supersedes, each entry is checked on its own and names one predecessor, and the Auditor derives earlier states from each of them.

For this third check, the lookup of predecessors follows only the entries with relation supersedes of the receipt being verified and, in turn, of each predecessor found; a held receipt that this chain does not reach is subject only to the preliminary checks, and its own entries are not looked up. Either kind of held receipt may be a predecessor of either kind of receipt.

Apart from these preliminary checks, a held receipt used as a predecessor need not pass the remaining checks of Sections 3.2 to 3.4. Failure of one of those remaining checks is not, by itself, a failure of this third check. In particular, a historical predecessor is not rejected by this check merely because it has expired at the evaluation time T or does not pass a case of Section 3.3. This does not waive any check required for a receipt that is also being verified in its own right. An entry of a predecessor, at any depth of the chain, is checked like an entry of the receipt, and where it fails, this third check fails for the receipt.

If any supplied held receipt fails the preliminary checks above, the input is invalid and the Auditor reports no result for this third check. This applies also to supplied held receipts that no supersedes entry references. An invalid input is distinct from a supersedes entry that fails because its predecessor is absent from a valid set of held receipts. Passing the preliminary checks does not establish that a predecessor's declared state is correct. The third check does not require that a predecessor concerns the same action as its receipt; it matches digests only.

3.6. What a Pass Shows

A pass shows that the holder of the decision maker's key signed exactly these payload bytes. Where action bytes are supplied under Section 3.1, their SHA-256 matches proposedAction.parametersDigest.sha256. In Case 1, the SHA-256 of the required approval record bytes matches the digest.sha256 value of the unique inputSnapshot entry whose name is "approval record". For Case 3, a pass also shows that the holder of a different key, which the trust policy permits to attest the expected executor.id, signed an outcome with status executed bound to that decision. It does not show that the signer's statements are true, that the approval came from the named person, that the outcome signer observed the boundary, that no other receipt exists, or that the keys were not misused. Nor does it show that the decision maker held its authority, or a delegation that delegationRefs names, at the time of the action; a pass binds only what the steps of Section 3 check. A decision maker that did not check its own authority or a delegation at the time of the action can say so in notChecked (Section 3.2, step 7); such an entry is its own statement and not a result of the steps of Section 3. Those questions belong to the trust policy, to signed approvals, to observers and to transparency registration (Section 3.7). Where Section 3.11 passed, see Section 3.11.4.

3.7. Registering a Receipt with a Transparency Service

This section is informative. It describes how the receipts of this document can be registered with a Transparency Service under [RFC9943]. It defines no format, predicate type, media type or registry and adds no requirement to those of [RFC9943].

Registration. In SCITT a Signed Statement is a COSE_Sign1 message whose protected header carries CWT Claims with an Issuer Claim and a Subject Claim (Section 6 of [RFC9943]). A decision receipt or an outcome receipt can be registered in two ways. Its receipt bytes can be the payload of a Signed Statement. Or, as Section 6.2 of [RFC9943] allows for Statements too large or too sensitive to send to a Transparency Service, the Signed Statement can be made over a hash, here the content root of the receipt. This document does not define how a Signed Statement indicates the hash, its algorithm or its content type; that belongs to a deployment's profile and to the Registration Policy of the Transparency Service (Section 5.1.1 of [RFC9943]).

The test package of Appendix A.5 gives one example Signed Statement for each of the two ways, with a SCITT Receipt for each.

A receipt in the COSE_Sign1 binding of Appendix B is itself a Signed Statement and can be registered without either of these two ways (Appendix B.4).

Issuer. The Issuer of the Signed Statement is the entity identified by its iss Claim, whose key signs the COSE_Sign1 (Sections 3 and 6 of [RFC9943]). It can be the decision maker or the outcome signer, or another party such as the Auditing Service of Section 4.2 of [AUDIT-ARCH]. The Client that registers a Signed Statement need not be its Issuer (Section 7 of [RFC9943]). For the two wrapping forms described above, the Issuer's COSE signature is separate from the signature of the receipt. For direct registration under Appendix B.4, they are the same signature. The COSE signature authenticates the Signed Statement's protected header and payload. The signature of the receipt covers the signature input of its binding, in the DSSE binding the pre-authentication encoding of the receipt's payloadType and decoded payload bytes, not the DSSE envelope as a whole. Section 3.2 or Section 3.4 checks the signature of the receipt and its signer.

What a SCITT Receipt shows. During Registration the Transparency Service verifies the Issuer's signature and applies its Registration Policy (Sections 5.1.1.1 and 6.3 of [RFC9943]). It registers the Signed Statement before it releases a Receipt (Section 6.3 of [RFC9943]), and the Receipt demonstrates inclusion of the Signed Statement in the Verifiable Data Structure of the Transparency Service and can be verified without online access to it (Section 4 of [RFC9943]). The Transparency Service records the Registration time when it adds the Signed Statement (Section 7 of [RFC9943]).

What it does not show. Registering a Statement proves only that it was produced by an Issuer, not that it is accurate (Section 9.2 of [RFC9943]). Issuers can register some Statements and not others (Section 9.3 of [RFC9943]), so a Receipt for one receipt says nothing about a receipt that was never registered. The Subject Claim lets Relying Parties identify the Transparent Statements registered for a Subject (Section 3 of [RFC9943]), not receipts that were never registered. Unless the Registration Policy says otherwise, the order of the Verifiable Data Structure need not be the order of issuance (Section 9.1 of [RFC9943]). A Receipt does not change what the checks of Section 3 show, and it does not make an ALLOW an authorization.

Verification. A verifier checks the SCITT Receipt for the particular Signed Statement, including its inclusion proof, using the verification key of a Receipt Issuer it trusts and the verification rules for the applicable Verifiable Data Structure (Sections 7 and 7.1 of [RFC9943]). It establishes the binding from the registered Signed Statement to the receipt bytes or content root used in the following checks. If the Signed Statement's COSE payload is detached and this binding depends on the Issuer's signature, it verifies that signature. It then applies Section 3 of this document to the receipt. Where the receipt bytes are the Signed Statement's payload, it checks those bytes; where the Signed Statement is made over the content root, it checks a receipt whose computed content root equals the registered value. This latter comparison binds the payload bytes, not the receipt bytes or the signature of the receipt, and does not establish that the signature of the receipt existed when the content root was registered. Section 7.1 of [RFC9943] permits verification of a Receipt without rechecking the Issuer's signature on the Signed Statement; this does not dispense with the binding just described. The signatures of the decision maker and of the outcome signer are checked by Section 3 in either case.

3.8. Field Rules

Step 7 of Section 3.2 and step 3 of Section 3.4 apply the rules of this section. Figure 1 lists every member of the predicate of a decision receipt that this document admits, and Figure 2 every member of the predicate of an outcome receipt, each with its full path in predicate, where [] stands for each entry of an array. This section states these rules itself, and they are the same in every binding. The rules and figures in this section define the admitted predicate members for every binding.

In the column Type, a digest is an object with exactly one member, sha256, whose value is 64 lowercase hexadecimal digits; a timestamp is an [RFC3339] UTC timestamp with a trailing "Z", with an upper-case "T" and "Z", a year from 0001 to 9999, a date that exists in the calendar, a second from 00 to 59 and, where present, a fraction of a second with one to six digits after the point; a typedDigest is an object whose only members are type, digestAlgorithm, digest and, optionally, purpose, where type is a non-empty string, purpose, where present, a non-empty string, digestAlgorithm jcs-sha256-v1 and digest 64 lowercase hexadecimal digits; a relationDigest is an object whose only members are digestAlgorithm, which is jcs-sha256-v1, and digest, which is 64 lowercase hexadecimal digits; an array of 1 to 64 objects holds at least one and at most 64 entries, each an object; a string is any JSON string, and a non-empty string has at least one character; a boolean is one of the JSON values true or false; any value is any JSON value. The type integer, 0 or more, is a JSON number written without the frac and exp parts of the grammar in Section 6 of [RFC8259], from 0 to 9007199254740991; a number written with frac or exp is not such an integer, even where its value is whole. In an array of objects or strings, each entry is an object or a string, and one array may hold both. The type object admits only the members listed for it, and the type open object admits any members. The type names preActionAuthorization and outcome allow only the JSON strings "preActionAuthorization" and "outcome", respectively. The type "0.1." and one or more digits means a string consisting of "0.1." followed by one or more ASCII decimal digits. The notes (1) to (6) follow the figures.

Required yes means that the member MUST be present whenever the object or array entry that contains it is present. Only decisionMaker.version, actionOutcome.performedAt and actionOutcome.outcomeRef may be null. Everywhere else a null is not allowed, including inside an open object, in an array of any values and inside a non-null member of type any value. A member that the figures do not list for an object that is not open is not allowed, including at the top level of predicate.

An entry of relationships that verifies shows a relation that the issuer of the receipt declared to the receipt or subject that its relationDigests name; it is not a statement that the target is correct.

Member  Type  Required
schemaVersion  "0.1." and one or more digits  yes
decisionId  non-empty string  yes
decisionType  preActionAuthorization  yes
decidedAt  timestamp  yes
recordedAt  timestamp  no
decisionMaker  object  yes
decisionMaker.id  non-empty string  yes
decisionMaker.version  any value  no
agent  object  yes
agent.id  non-empty string  yes
agent.version  string  no
agent.configurationDigest  digest  no
principal  object  yes
principal.id  non-empty string  yes
principal.authnContextRef  object  no
principal.authnContextRef.uri  string  no
principal.authnContextRef.digest  digest  no
delegationRefs  array of any values  no
proposedAction  object  yes
proposedAction.actionType  string  yes
proposedAction.target  object  no
proposedAction.target.name  string  no
proposedAction.target.uri  string  no
proposedAction.target.digest  digest  no
proposedAction.method  string  no
proposedAction.parametersDigest  digest  (1)
proposedAction.parametersRef  open object  (1)
proposedAction.parametersSchemaRef  object  no
proposedAction.parametersSchemaRef.uri  string  no
proposedAction.parametersSchemaRef.digest  digest  no
inputSnapshot  array of objects  yes
inputSnapshot[].name  string  no
inputSnapshot[].uri  string  no
inputSnapshot[].digest  digest  yes
inputSnapshot[].mediaType  string  no
policyBoundary  object  yes
policyBoundary.policyEngine  non-empty string  yes
policyBoundary.policyId  non-empty string  yes
policyBoundary.decisionPath  non-empty string  yes
policyBoundary.policyDigest  digest  yes
policyBoundary.bundleRevision  string  no
policyBoundary.validFrom  timestamp  no
policyBoundary.validUntil  timestamp  no
evidenceRefs  array of objects  yes
evidenceRefs[].relation  string  yes
evidenceRefs[].digest  digest  yes
evidenceRefs[].artifactDigest  digest  no
evidenceRefs[].uri  string  no
evidenceRefs[].predicateType  string  no
evidenceRefs[].typedDigest  typedDigest  no
decision  object  yes
decision.verdict  (2)  yes
decision.reasonCodes  non-empty array of non-empty strings  yes
decision.humanReadableSummary  string  no
decision.obligations  array of any values  no
decision.allowedScope  array of any values  no
notChecked  array of objects or strings  yes
notChecked[].field  string  no
notChecked[].reason  string  no
notChecked[].impact  string  no
decisionChangeConditions  array of objects  yes
decisionChangeConditions[].conditionType  string  no
decisionChangeConditions[].description  string  no
decisionChangeConditions[].requiredEvidenceType  string  no
actionOutcome  object  no
actionOutcome.status  (3)  no
actionOutcome.performedAt  timestamp  no
actionOutcome.outcomeRef  object  no
actionOutcome.outcomeRef.uri  string  no
actionOutcome.outcomeRef.digest  digest  no
traceContext  open object  no
privacy  object  yes
privacy.rawInputsIncluded  boolean  yes
privacy.redactionProfile  string  no
privacy.erased  array of any values  no
privacy.masked  array of any values  no
validity  object  yes
validity.audience  non-empty array of non-empty strings  yes
validity.nonce  non-empty string  yes
validity.expiresAt  timestamp  yes
relationships  array of 1 to 64 objects  no
relationships[].relation  (5)  yes
relationships[].targetReceiptDigest  relationDigest  yes
relationships[].targetSubjectDigest  relationDigest  no
relationships[].reason  string  no
relationships[].reasonCode  (6)  no
relationships[].declaredAt  timestamp  no
Figure 1: Members of the predicate of a decision receipt
Member  Type  Required
schemaVersion  "0.1." and one or more digits  yes
outcomeId  non-empty string  yes
decisionRef  digest  yes
executor  object  yes
executor.id  non-empty string  yes
executor.keyId  string  no
requestedActionDigest  digest  yes
status  (4)  yes
performedAt  timestamp  yes
effectDigest  digest  no
actualActionDigest  digest  no
responseDigest  digest  no
policyPurpose  outcome  no
receiverRefs  array of objects  no
receiverRefs[].relation  non-empty string  yes
receiverRefs[].digest  digest  yes
receiverRefs[].receiverId  string  no
receiverRefs[].receiverKeyId  string  no
receiverRefs[].artifactDigest  digest  no
sequence  object  no
sequence.runId  non-empty string  yes
sequence.seq  integer, 0 or more  yes
recordedAt  timestamp  no
limitations  array of strings  no
traceContext  object  no
traceContext.traceparent  string  no
validity  object  no
validity.audience  array of any values  no
validity.nonce  string  no
relationships  array of 1 to 64 objects  no
relationships[].relation  (5)  yes
relationships[].targetReceiptDigest  relationDigest  yes
relationships[].targetSubjectDigest  relationDigest  no
relationships[].reason  string  no
relationships[].reasonCode  (6)  no
relationships[].declaredAt  timestamp  no
Figure 2: Members of the predicate of an outcome receipt

The notes of the figures are as follows. (1) proposedAction MUST carry parametersDigest, parametersRef or both. This document takes no digest from parametersRef, so with parametersRef alone step 10 of Section 3.2 fails where action bytes are given, and Case 1 of Section 3.3 and step 4 of Section 3.4 fail. (2) decision.verdict is ALLOW, DENY, REFUSE, ESCALATE, DEFER or OBSERVE. (3) actionOutcome.status is notAttempted, blocked, refused, attempted, executed, failed or unknown. (4) status is executed, refused, failed or partial. (5) relationships[].relation is supersedes, revises, corrects, retracts, renews, derivedFrom or amends. (6) relationships[].reasonCode is correction, rerun, data-update, methodology-update, policy-change, withdrawal or other. Section 3.3 adds rules per case, and steps 8 to 10 of Section 3.2 and steps 4 to 7 of Section 3.4 add rules across members.

3.9. Requirements Independent of the Encoding

A decision receipt and an outcome receipt meet the requirements below in every binding. Each item names the steps that check it. The key words of those steps apply; this section adds no requirement of its own.

  1. Exact bytes. The receipt carries one byte string, its payload bytes P, which is valid UTF-8 and the [RFC8785] serialization of the JSON value it parses as (step 4 of Section 3.2). The verifier uses P as received for the signature input, the content root and every digest it computes over P. Canonical serialization is used to check equality and to derive the predicate digest, never to repair or replace P.
  2. A signature over these bytes. The binding forms a signature input that contains P unchanged and every value that the binding takes from outside P to interpret P, such as payloadType in the DSSE binding. The receipt carries an Ed25519 signature over that input that verifies under the key that the trust policy selects for its signer, with the rules for S and for the expected key of step 3 of Section 3.2. Other signatures that the receipt carries are not verified, and a key identifier that it carries does not select the key (step 3 of Section 3.2, step 1 of Section 3.4).
  3. Binding by digest. P names the receipt type, decision receipt or outcome receipt, and contains the predicate, so that the signature and the content root cover both (step 6 of Section 3.2, step 2 of Section 3.4). The predicate names its action bytes, inputs, policy, evidence and effect, and an outcome receipt names its decision, by the SHA-256 digests of Section 3.8 (steps 7 and 10 of Section 3.2, Section 3.3, steps 3, 4 and 6 of Section 3.4).
  4. Required members. The predicate is a JSON object with the members, types and forms that Section 3.8 gives for its receipt type (step 7 of Section 3.2, step 3 of Section 3.4).
  5. Content root. The content root R is SHA-256 over P (step 5 of Section 3.2) in every binding. decisionRef of an outcome receipt and targetReceiptDigest of an entry of relationships name a receipt by it (Section 3.4, Section 3.5). The payload bytes may depend on the binding. The content root identifies P, not its container or binding; two receipts with identical P have the same content root. The predicate digest depends only on the predicate. It is SHA-256 over the [RFC8785] serialization of the predicate, and targetSubjectDigest names a receipt by it (Section 3.5).
  6. Verification steps. A binding gives steps 1, 2, 3 and 6 of Section 3.2. The binding defines the accepted container syntax and its step 1 checks, including rejection of duplicate names or keys in every object or map that step parses. Its step 2 defines how to obtain P unambiguously. A unique serialization of the container is required only where the binding explicitly specifies one. Its step 3 verifies the signature of item 2; its step 6 checks the receipt type and yields the predicate, a JSON object, and the predicate digest. A failure in a step of a binding is a failure of the step of Section 3.2 with the same number, and for an outcome receipt a failure of step 1 or step 2 of Section 3.4. Steps 4, 5 and 7 to 10 of Section 3.2, Section 3.3, steps 3 to 7 of Section 3.4, Section 3.5 and Section 4 are the same in every binding. A decision receipt and the outcome receipt that names it can be in different bindings.

3.10. DSSE and in-toto Binding

In this binding a receipt is a DSSE envelope [DSSE] whose payload is an in-toto Statement v1 [INTOTO-STATEMENT], and the receipt bytes are the envelope bytes. Existing receipts use this binding. The decision receipt type is https://b7n0de.com/proofbundle/predicates/decision-receipt/v0.1 ([PB-DECISION]) and the outcome receipt type is https://b7n0de.com/proofbundle/predicates/action-outcome/v0.1 ([PB-OUTCOME]). For a receipt in this binding, steps 1, 2, 3 and 6 of Section 3.2 are as follows. For an outcome receipt, step 6 uses the outcome receipt type and is step 2 of Section 3.4.

Step 1, envelope.
The envelope MUST be valid UTF-8 and parse as one JSON text of [RFC8259] that is an object, with no duplicate member names in any object. The envelope bytes MUST NOT begin with the byte order mark U+FEFF, which Section 8.1 of [RFC8259] forbids adding. It MUST contain payload, payloadType and signatures. payloadType MUST be application/vnd.in-toto+json. An envelope fails this step where signatures is not an array or where an entry of signatures is not an object whose member sig is a string.
Step 2, payload bytes.
Decode payload as base64 [RFC4648] into the payload bytes P. Here and for sig in step 3, base64 has only the characters of the alphabet of Section 4 of [RFC4648] and its padding, so no line breaks, and pad bits of zero (Section 3.5 of [RFC4648]); a payload in another form fails this step. Padding is required, so the base64 text of payload and of sig has a length that is a multiple of four. A sig in another form is not decoded; step 3 counts it as a signature that does not verify, and it does not fail this step.
Step 3, signature.
Form PAE = "DSSEv1" SP LEN(type) SP type SP LEN(P) SP P, where SP is one space, LEN is the length in bytes as ASCII decimal without leading zeros, and type is the payloadType. At least one entry of signatures MUST carry a base64 sig that verifies as an Ed25519 signature over PAE under the expected key, as step 3 of Section 3.2 says. The keyid member is not used to select a key. The sig of other entries of signatures is not verified.
Step 6, Statement.
_type MUST be https://in-toto.io/Statement/v1 and predicateType the decision receipt type, or for an outcome receipt the outcome receipt type, of this section. subject MUST contain exactly one entry, whose digest.sha256 is SHA-256 over the [RFC8785] serialization of predicate; it MUST NOT contain other entries. Other members of the Statement, of the subject entry and of its digest are not checked. A Statement without predicate fails this step. A Statement whose predicate is not a JSON object fails this step. The predicate is the member predicate of the Statement, and the predicate digest is the digest.sha256 of its subject entry.

3.11. Approval Signed by the Approver

This section is optional. It defines a member of the approval record of Case 1 of Section 3.3 through which the holder of a key that the trust policy binds to the approver signs the approval record, and a check of that signature. An approval record without that member is an approval record of Case 1 and is checked as before; nothing in this section makes it invalid.

3.11.1. The Member approverSignature

An approval record A MAY contain the member approverSignature. Its value is a JSON object whose only member is sig. The value of sig is a string that holds an Ed25519 signature [RFC8032] in base64 in the form of step 2 of Section 3.10.

The signed bytes are formed from A in three steps.

  1. U is the parsed value of A without the member approverSignature. Every other member of A stays in U, including members that Case 1 of Section 3.3 does not check.
  2. B is the [RFC8785] serialization of U.
  3. M = "DSSEv1" SP LEN(c) SP c SP LEN(B) SP B, where SP and LEN are as in step 3 of Section 3.10 and c is the ASCII string approval-record-signature-v1.

The approver signs M. B holds approvalId, approver, session, actionDigest, approvedAt and validUntil, so the signature covers each of them. It covers the action bytes through actionDigest, their SHA-256. The canonical serialization in step 2 derives the signed bytes; as for P in item 1 of Section 3.9, it never repairs or replaces the bytes of A, which Case 1 requires to be their own [RFC8785] serialization.

Whoever issues an approval record with approverSignature MUST NOT change a member of U after the approver has signed M. A changed record needs a new signature of the approver, and a later validity needs a new approval act, as Section 4 says.

The approver key SHOULD be held so that neither the decision maker nor the agent can sign with it.

3.11.2. Inputs

A verifier checks the approver signature only where it is asked to; it does not take that choice from the approval record, just as it does not take the case from the receipt (Section 3.1). For that check it needs, in addition to the inputs of Case 1, the action bytes and the Ed25519 public key that its trust policy selects for the approver named in A. This key is called the approver key. The check belongs to Case 1 and is not asked for under another case.

3.11.3. Verification

The check of the approver signature runs after the checks of Case 1 of Section 3.3 have passed and before any check of Section 4. Each of the checks below either passes or ends the procedure with the failure named "approver signature". They run in this order.

  1. Action bytes. The action bytes MUST be supplied. Step 10 of Section 3.2 has then compared their SHA-256 with proposedAction.parametersDigest, and Case 1 has compared actionDigest with that member.
  2. Presence and form. A MUST contain approverSignature. Its value MUST be a JSON object whose only member is sig, and sig MUST be a string in the base64 form of step 2 of Section 3.10, which includes pad bits of zero. Unlike a sig in step 3 of Section 3.10, a sig in another form fails this check.
  3. Key binding. The trust policy MUST bind the approver key to the value of approver in A.
  4. Separation. The approver key MUST differ from the key under which step 3 of Section 3.2 verified the decision receipt.
  5. Signature. Form U, B and M as in Section 3.11.1. The decoded sig MUST pass this check if and only if all of the following hold: it is 64 bytes long; R and the approver public key decode successfully as specified in Section 5.1.7 of [RFC8032]; the decoded approver public key is not the identity point and multiplying it by L gives the identity point; S, read as a little-endian integer, is less than L; and the group equation of that section holds without the cofactor 8, with M as the message. No subgroup test is applied to R.

No check of this section compares a time with T. The time bounds of Case 1 apply unchanged. After a pass, the values of approvedAt and validUntil that they compare are values that the holder of the approver key signed.

Where a verifier is not asked to check the approver signature, approverSignature is one of the members of A that Case 1 does not check. A verifier that has not run the checks of this section on an approval record, or for which they failed, MUST NOT report that the approver signed that approval. It can report that A carries approverSignature if it says that the signature was not checked or did not pass.

3.11.4. What a Pass Shows and What It Does Not Show

A pass of Section 3.11.3 shows, in addition to Section 3.6, that the holder of a key that the trust policy binds to the approver signed approvalId, approver, session, actionDigest, approvedAt, validUntil and every other member of A except approverSignature, and that the supplied action bytes have that actionDigest as their SHA-256. Changing session or a validity value changes M. A record that retains the original approver signature then fails check 5 if it reaches that check. Supplied action bytes whose SHA-256 differs from actionDigest fail step 10 of Section 3.2 or Case 1 of Section 3.3, before Section 3.11.3.

A pass does not show the following.

  • that the person understood the action or its consequences, or that the person was shown the action bytes rather than a rendering of them;
  • who holds the approver key, that the person named in approver made the signature rather than someone else with use of that key or of the device that holds it, or that the key was not compromised;
  • when the approver signed. approvedAt and validUntil are the statements of the holder of the approver key, from a clock that the verifier does not see;
  • that the approver had the authority to approve the action;
  • that the action was executed, which is Case 3;
  • that the approval is honoured at most once, which is the duty of the relying party under Section 4;
  • that the decision was correct, safe or lawful (Section 2.5).

3.11.5. Records With and Without the Signature

An approval record without approverSignature passes Case 1 where it meets Case 1. An unsigned approval record that reaches check 2 of Section 3.11.3 fails that check. Whether signed approvals are required is a choice of the relying party and of its trust policy; this document does not require them.

An approval record with approverSignature passes Case 1 if it meets all of Case 1's requirements. A verifier that is not asked to check the approver signature does not check that member and does not report it as signed (Section 3.11.3).

The identity of an approval under item 2 of Section 4 stays (approvalId, actionDigest and session). A signed record and a copy of it without approverSignature are the same approval, and the rules of Section 4 apply to them as to any copies. A copy with another session has another identity, so consumption state alone does not detect that substitution. If it retains the original approver signature and reaches check 5, it fails that check.

4. Approvals Are Honoured At Most Once

An approval in Case 1 covers one action and can be used once. Another copy or another signature of the payload of a signed ALLOW that a relying party has released is part of the same honouring and not a second one, as the first check of Section 3.5 counts it. For live use, the relying party MUST apply the time bounds of Section 3.3 with its own current time as T. A historical audit time MUST NOT make an expired approval usable. A relying party that lets an action run because of an approval:

  1. MUST honour each approval at most once;
  2. MUST key its consumption state by the identity of the approval (approvalId, actionDigest and session), not by the bytes of one copy of the approval record. Copies or reissues with other metadata count as the same approval. Among copies received for that identity, the relying party MUST NOT honour the approval unless T is strictly earlier than the earliest of the validUntil values, and it does not replace that bound with a later value. This observed bound is not necessarily the original validUntil: an earlier-issued copy with a shorter validity might not have been received. A relying party can claim to enforce the original bound only if it has a trustworthy basis for that bound, independent of the arrival order of copies; otherwise it claims only to enforce the observed bound. Extending validity requires a new approval act and a new approvalId;
  3. MUST mark the approval as consumed durably before it either allows the action to run or releases a signed ALLOW that cites the approval;
  4. MUST treat an approval recorded as consumed in any current, rotated, archived or compacted representation as consumed for as long as item 6 requires that state to be retained;
  5. MUST NOT honour an approval unless it can consult a complete, durable view of the consumption state required by this section. Rotation, archiving or compaction MAY replace earlier generations if all entries still required by item 6 are preserved. Missing or unreadable state whose required entries have not been preserved elsewhere MUST cause refusal. Before checking whether an approval is consumed, validate every entry of every supplied generation. Each entry must be an object containing non-empty string approvalId and session members and an actionDigest in the digest form of Section 3.8. A malformed entry causes refusal under item 5;
  6. MAY drop an entry only if a trustworthy upper bound has been established on the latest time any copy of that approval identity can be honoured, that bound remains enforceable after the entry is dropped, and the bound plus the clock skew the relying party allows has passed. The earliest validUntil among received copies does not by itself establish the bound. Without a trustworthy bound, the consumed identity remains in the durable state required by items 4 and 5.

A relying party that releases a signed ALLOW citing an approval honours that approval in the sense of item 1, as one that lets the action run does. Releasing a signed ALLOW for an approval and then letting exactly the action it names run are one honouring. A relying party releases a signed ALLOW when the signed decision receipt leaves its control, to the executor, to the agent or to any store that another party can read. A signed ALLOW that never leaves its control, for example one discarded after the durable marking of item 3 failed, is not released and honours no approval. A relying party that is shown again the approval record bytes it has honoured refuses them under item 1. One that is shown a copy with other bytes refuses it under item 1 as well, because item 2 makes the copy the same approval. Releasing the same signed ALLOW again is part of the same honouring and not a second one.

Whoever issues approval records MUST NOT give a copy or reissue of an approval a validUntil later than that of the approval act it records; a later validity needs a new approval act and a new approvalId. A relying party cannot check this duty on the records it receives, which is why item 2 has it use the earliest of the validUntil values it has received.

Rotation is the step where this requirement is most easily lost. A record that is full is moved aside so that new approvals can be written; if the relying party then reads only the new generation, approvals of the old one may become usable again. Items 4 and 5 preserve the consumed state without requiring a particular storage format.

What the receipts show about single use. A decision receipt for Case 1 binds its approval record by digest. An Auditor that holds the receipts and the approval records can therefore detect, with the first check of Section 3.5, a pair of distinct released ALLOW payloads, with different content roots, that cite approval records with the same identity within one consumption scope; such a pair shows that item 1 was not met. Copies of one payload and further signatures over it form no such pair. The first check of Section 3.5 does not detect two executions that reuse one released ALLOW without producing another decision receipt. Outcome receipts may record both executions, but no check in this document compares them for reuse. The first check cannot find a pair if the Auditor lacks either decision receipt or the approval record bytes needed to identify either cited approval. Receipts citing different approval identities form no such pair, including receipts signed with a compromised decision maker key. A pair whose two decisions lie in different consumption scopes is not counted. The receipts enforce nothing. Preventing reuse of an approval or of an already issued ALLOW remains the duty of the relying party under this section, and a pass of Section 3 or of Section 3.5 does not show that the relying party met it.

5. Implementation Status

This section is given per [RFC7942] and is to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication.

Each entry gives the known items of Section 2 of [RFC7942] with their evidence and date; an entry without evidence is not given. This information does not constitute endorsement.

5.1. proofbundle

Maintained by the author of this document, MIT License, contact through [PB-REPO]. Version 6.6.0 on PyPI [PB-PYPI], built from tag v6.6.0, commit 850be24a8d068170180f8a6e0521f18f1b022b03, is a Python library and command line interface that produces and verifies receipts in the DSSE binding of Section 3.10; version 6.4.0 produced the seven DSSE vectors of Appendix A.3. Its classifier is "Development Status :: 4 - Beta", and [PB-REPO] describes the decision receipt predicate as shipped since version 2.1.0 and the outcome predicate as experimental. Its decision verify and outcome verify commands check receipts of the two receipt types of Section 3.10; the exit codes they returned for the vectors of this revision are given below. The commands recorded in Appendix A.3 and in the test package of Appendix A.5 give decision verify the case of Section 3.3, the action bytes and the approval record that the vector supplies and, where it supplies them, the consumption state and the received copies of Section 4. They give outcome verify the bound decision receipt with its key, the effect bytes, the expected executor.id, the evaluation time T and Case 3. They give neither command a trust policy. For vectors of the second and third checks of Section 3.5, the recorded commands supply related receipts with ‑‑with‑related and, where recorded, their keys with ‑‑related‑pub.

The figures of Section 3.8 follow the strict v0.1 form of [PB-DECISION] and [PB-OUTCOME] and their machine schemas, restricted to the members this document admits, as those documents stand at commit e1fec86351b216af369a2e6ac106dcc41aaf4b4c of [PB-REPO], where the machine schemas are the same as in version 6.4.0.

In the seven command line runs reported in Appendix A.3, the four passing vectors returned exit code 0, the invalid signature of V1-bad returned 1, and the non-canonical payload of V2-bad and the decision binding mismatch of V3-bad each returned 2. For the 171 vectors retained unchanged from the package of -08, 149 are classified as failing, refused or input-invalid and 22 as passing. The following proofbundle counts concern that subset and the vectors that have a recorded command for the first time in this revision. For the 149, the recorded commands returned a non-zero exit code for 129 and 0 for 20; for the 22, they returned 0 for 20 and 2 for V2-micro and K7. Sixteen of the 149 vectors have invalid input to the third check of Section 3.5 and therefore no result for that check. PK1 to PK5, H314 to H316, I1, N1, J1, J2 and CS1 to CS4 have a recorded command for the first time. For the 13 of them that fail or are refused, their commands returned a non-zero exit code for 8 and 0 for PK3, PK4 and H314 to H316. For I1, whose expected result is no result for an incomplete invocation, the recorded command returned 2; for N1 and J1, which pass, their commands returned 2. These results do not specify the command line interface's complete exit-code contract.

On the following vectors, version 6.6.0 and this document disagree. Version 6.6.0 accepts, where this document rejects, recordedAt with the second 60 (H314), with the year 0000 (H315) and with seven digits of a fraction of a second (H316), and decidedAt with seven such digits (F72), against the timestamp form of Section 3.8; null where no rule of Section 3.8 permits it, in a member of decisionMaker.version (H022), traceContext (H184) and proposedAction.parametersRef (H070) and in an entry of delegationRefs (H048), decision.obligations (H145), decision.allowedScope (H148), privacy.erased (H194), privacy.masked (H197) and, in an outcome receipt, validity.audience (H287); an entry of decision.reasonCodes (H139) and of validity.audience (H203, H204) that is not a non-empty string; decisionType postHocReview (F29); a subject with more than one entry (F22) or with a digest that is not over the [RFC8785] form of the predicate (F23), against step 6 of Section 3.2; a second entry of signatures that is not an object with a string sig (F117 to F119), against step 1; an evaluation time T earlier than decidedAt (F37, F73), against step 9; and an expected key that is the key of gate-1 or observer-1 plus a point of order 8, against the rule on the expected key of step 3 (PK3) and its use in step 1 of Section 3.4 (PK4). Version 6.6.0 rejects, where this document accepts, an evaluation time with a fraction of a second, which its option for T does not take (V2-micro); an approval record that holds the integer literal 9007199254740992 (N1) or a value at depth 64 (J1), which it does not read as one JSON value; and K7, whose predecessor, given to it as a related receipt, fails its structure check at policyBoundary.policyDigest. The maintainer intends a later release to reject the timestamps of H314 to H316 and F72. The recorded commands for F3, F122 and F65 receive no trust policy for the specified trust checks. Related receipts are supplied for the following differences under Section 3.5: K3, K5, K13 and K28 lack a required predecessor among those receipts; K23 to K25 include an unreferenced supplied receipt whose relationships member, entry or targetReceiptDigest, respectively, is malformed; and S1, G10a and G10b include an executed outcome referring to a decision with verdict ESCALATE, DENY and REFUSE, respectively. Their recorded commands return 0, whereas this document specifies failure or invalid input for the corresponding check.

The release information above concerns tag v6.6.0, dated 16 November 2026. The proofbundle commands of the test package and their exit codes were recorded with version 6.6.0 on 17 November 2026; the maintainer intends to record them again with each later release, and this revision describes version 6.6.0. On 17 November 2026, pip installing proofbundle from PyPI without a version selected version 6.6.0.

5.2. Agent Guard

Maintained by the author of this document, MIT License, contact through [PB-REPO]. Agent Guard is the name used here for the preview in plugins/proofbundle of [PB-REPO], which its public README names the proofbundle plugin for Claude Code and Codex. This entry is based on its source and runbook at commit 8bb289c8b41d32c54734155fc00756231093bc2a of 1 November 2026, not on the release tag v6.4.0 and not on a live execution. A separate signing service signs preActionAuthorization decisions with verdict ALLOW, DENY or ESCALATE for the writes the receipt pilot supports, and an observer, which the runbook assigns to an operator account separate from the agent session, signs outcome receipts for the effects it matches to decisions. The approval path requires an explicit operator configuration, is not enabled under Codex and binds an approval to the command bytes and its session. The pilot does not produce Case 1 receipts as this document describes them; it writes released_by_owner where the vectors of Appendix A.3 write user_approval, and it leaves evidenceRefs empty.

The signing service treats an approval named in its current or a retained record as honoured; the hook treats a copy of a used approval as used and keeps a digest of each removed identity. Neither layer keeps an original validity per identity, so a later copy of an identity not yet used opens a later window, which item 2 of Section 4 does not permit where an earlier copy was received. No conformance of Agent Guard to Section 4 and no enforcement of single use in a running host is claimed from these source-level observations.

5.3. Go Verifier of the Test Package

Written by the author of this document, contact through [PB-REPO]. The prototype in the directory verifier of the test package of Appendix A.5 is written in Go from the text of this document with the Go standard library only and shares no code with proofbundle. It implements checks of Section 3.2 to Section 3.4, Section 3.8, the checks of a relying party in Section 4 that the vectors exercise the three checks of Section 3.5 and the check of Section 3.11; the test package shows its results for the vectors it holds, not that every condition of those sections is implemented. It agrees with the proofbundle 6.6.0 command line interface on acceptance or rejection of all seven vectors of Appendix A.3, as recorded on 17 November 2026, and the 171 vectors of the package of -08 gave the result recorded for them, on 8 November 2026 and, for the eight vectors added on 13 November 2026, on that date. The revision of the test package of this document, of 15 November 2026, takes steps 1, 2, 3 and 6 of Section 3.2 from the binding of the receipt, adds the COSE_Sign1 binding of Appendix B with a reader of the core deterministic encoding of CBOR written for it, chosen by the verifier with an argument, the first check of Section 3.5, the check of Section 3.11, the rule on the expected key of step 3, the year rule of Section 3.8, the depth limit for JSON of Section 3.1, the check of every entry of a consumption state under item 5 of Section 4 and the bound on iss of Appendix B.3. Its decision command accepts cases approval and declined, and Case 3 is checked with its outcome command, which takes both receipts. With it, all 615 vectors of the test package gave the result and the output recorded for them on that date, the 501 vectors recorded before with their earlier output. It does not take receipts held for Section 3.5 in the COSE_Sign1 binding. This does not establish complete equivalence of the verifiers, conformance of Agent Guard to Sections 3 and 4, or enforcement of single use in a running host. No later implementation revision is assessed here.

5.4. Registration at a Local scitt-ccf-ledger

A measurement of the author, not an implementation of this document and not a production service, from tools/scitt_ccf_external/README.md at tag v6.4.0 of [PB-REPO], lines 341 to 398. On 25 September 2026 a Signed Statement over the [RFC8785] root of an example bundle of proofbundle, not a decision receipt, was submitted for registration in eight forms at an instance of [SCITT-CCF-LEDGER] at commit 00101f769d872711356e080fbb089ac48589c60a, run locally with one node in virtual mode and CCF 7.0.17. The service accepted some of the forms and refused others, and [SCITT-VERIFIER] 0.4.0, built at commit bd6fb8ba79dbb521257b7f09682c03c6681dc3d0, ran offline on twelve statements; 58 values compared with proofbundle agreed, none differed and 9 were not comparable. It covers no step of Section 3 and no registration as Section 3.7 describes it.

5.5. Implementation Written from the Text

Toshikatsu Oga (The HORIZONs Co., Ltd.) checked the test vectors of several revisions of this document with an implementation written from the text and reported places that read two ways. By his report, it is one Python 3 file per revision with the Python standard library and the Python package cryptography for Ed25519, implementing checks from Section 3.2 to Section 3.5, Section 3.8 and Section 4 as present in the respective revision; this entry does not establish complete coverage of those sections or independently verified conformance to them. The results below concern revisions -03 to -06; no result for revision -07 is reported here.

By his report, its result and failing step agreed with this document for all 7 vectors of Appendix A of revision -03, which prints their expected results, so that check was not blind; for all 17 vectors of Appendices A.3 and A.5 of revision -04; and for the 21 vectors of Appendices A.3 and A.5 of revision -05 other than F15, which was not run against that revision. For an earlier test package of revision -06 with SHA-256 850195e6288dc1716a77aa92c4732b54caa20aacf7661ef24059e314341f001c, made before that revision was submitted and not published, they agreed for all 96 of its vectors; the verdicts were recorded at 08:48:54 UTC on 4 November 2026, before the expected results of that package were read, and F15 was run against the receipt of vector P1 of [SER].

The evidence for his reported results is the Acknowledgments section of draft‑gruszka‑audit‑decision‑receipts‑06, dated 15 November 2026, and his message to the author of 7 November 2026. His message of 8 November 2026 reports publication of the implementation for revision -06 as dr_check 0.1.0 under the MIT License. The published reader was inspected on 11 November 2026 at https://github.com/ogasurfproject-jpg/horizon-shield/tree/53ea626494f79eec7f935f56406decd7c225ca7d/tools/decision-receipts-reader. On 9 November 2026 the author ran dr_check 0.1.0 at that commit, without network access, on the test package of revision -06 named above; all 96 verdicts agreed with the expected results of that package in both result and failing step, repeating his reported result for that package.

7. Security Considerations

Key binding. A receipt is only as trustworthy as the verifier's choice of keys and its policy for the identities those keys may attest. Section 3.2 checks decisionMaker.id; Section 3.4 checks the expected executor.id under the outcome-signing key. An observer's signature over an executor identifier is not the executor's own signature. A key held in the recorded Agent's process gives an Auditor that does not trust that Agent little assurance. One inspected design uses separate service accounts (Section 5.2).

Key compromise. Whoever holds the signing key of a decision maker or of an outcome signer can produce receipts with any decidedAt or performedAt, since these times come from the signer's clock, as the paragraph on clocks below says. A check under Section 3 does not tell such a receipt from one signed before the key was compromised or replaced. Which keys are accepted for which identity and for which period is set by the verifier's trust policy, not by this document; [RFC9943] likewise leaves revocation strategies for compromised keys out of its scope (Section 9.4.2 of [RFC9943]). A time anchor outside the signer helps, if it was set before the compromise. Where the receipt bytes are the payload of a registered Signed Statement (Section 3.7), a Receipt for it shows that the signature of the receipt existed when that Signed Statement was registered, and the Transparency Service records the Registration time (Section 7 of [RFC9943]). Where the Signed Statement is made over the content root, the comparison binds the payload bytes, not the receipt bytes or the signature of the receipt, and does not establish that this signature existed when the content root was registered (Section 3.7). The holder of a compromised decision maker key can also sign ALLOW receipts that cite approvals with new identities. Section 4 does not prevent such signing; what the first check of Section 3.5 can detect is stated at the end of Section 4.

Approver key. An approver key that the decision maker or the agent can use gives no assurance beyond their own statements; check 4 of Section 3.11.3 detects only the case where it is the decision maker's key. Compromise of an approver key lets its holder sign approvals with any times, as for the keys of the paragraph Key compromise.

Exact bytes. A verifier that re-serializes a payload before checking it can be led to accept bytes that were never signed, or to compute another content root. Step 4 refuses such payloads, and vector V2-bad tests one of them.

Algorithms. Section 3 fixes Ed25519 for signatures and SHA-256 for digests. A digest object names its algorithm by its only member, sha256, and a typedDigest or a relationDigest by its digestAlgorithm, which is jcs-sha256-v1. In the COSE_Sign1 binding the protected header names EdDSA, and a receipt that names another algorithm fails step 1 (Appendix B). The DSSE envelope names no signature algorithm; the verifier uses the Ed25519 public key that its trust policy selects (Section 3.1). A verifier that follows Section 3 accepts no other algorithm, so a change of algorithm needs a revision of this procedure.

Replay. An ALLOW for one action must not be usable for another, and an outcome that names another decision must not count as the result of this one. parametersDigest, where present, binds the action bytes, validity binds audience, nonce and expiry, decisionRef binds the outcome, and Section 4 requires the relying party to prevent reuse of an approval; what the receipts show about such reuse is stated at the end of that section. V1-bad tests rejection of changed payload bytes under an unchanged signature. V3-bad tests rejection of an outcome bound to a different decision. The seven vectors do not test consumption-state retention or rotation; F13 in the test package of Appendix A.5 tests refusal of an approval that is recorded as consumed only in an already rotated generation, not the rotation itself. E1 to E21 test how the first check of Section 3.5 counts released ALLOW payloads over the receipts and approval records held; they do not test that a relying party prevents reuse, and no vector tests two executions under one ALLOW, which the first check does not detect (end of Section 4).

Self-assertion. actionOutcome in a decision receipt and an outcome receipt whose effect cannot be resolved are statements of their signers. A digest that is present but cannot be resolved to bytes was chosen by the signer.

Suppression. A decision maker can fail to write a receipt for a decision it does not want seen. Independent observers at the boundary, as the architecture requires for Action Records, reduce this risk. Registration with a Transparency Service helps address selective registration when Relying Parties accept a Signed Statement only if they can discover and verify a Receipt for that Signed Statement from a Transparency Service they trust (Sections 7.1 and 9.3 of [RFC9943]). This document does not ensure that a receipt is produced for every decision. A SCITT Receipt shows inclusion of the registered Signed Statement, not that every receipt was registered (Section 3.7). Completeness presupposes an expectation of which receipts ought to exist, and this document does not define that expectation.

Gaps. Outcome receipts may carry the optional sequence member, with a run identifier and a counter, as specified in Section 3.8. A verifier that holds numbered outcome receipts of a run can report a gap in the numbers it has. Such a gap can reflect withholding or delivery delay; the numbers alone do not establish its cause. Those sequence numbers alone do not show whether receipts above the highest observed number have been withheld, and a run without the member leaves no such trace (compare Section 6.3 of [GILDA]). The profile of Section 3.2 defines no sequence counter and requires no chain of decision receipts; a predecessor named in relationships (Section 3.5) is optional and does not show a receipt that was withheld. Records that a Service or Tool emits at the boundary where an action took effect (Section 4.1 of [AUDIT-ARCH]) can expose an effect for which the Auditor has no matching decision receipt.

Clocks. decidedAt and performedAt come from the signers' clocks. Ordering against outside events needs a timestamp or a transparency registration. A verified time-stamp token under [RFC3161] for a hash of the receipt bytes is, like a registration (Section 3.7), an anchor outside the signer for a verifier that trusts the time-stamping authority. It supports the assertion that those bytes existed no later than genTime plus the applicable accuracy (Section 2.4.2 of [RFC3161]). If the accuracy field is absent, the accuracy may be available through other means, such as the TSA policy; its absence does not establish zero uncertainty. validity.expiresAt, recordedAt and the times of an approval record are statements of their signer as well; the times of an approval record are statements of the gate. Where Section 3.11.3 passes, they are also signed statements of the holder of the approver key. Neither signature establishes when the person approved (Section 3.11.4). The checks of step 9 of Section 3.2 and of Case 1 in Section 3.3 compare decidedAt, validity.expiresAt and the times of an approval record with each other and with the verifier's time T; none of them compares recordedAt. They do not show when a decision was made or when a person approved.

8. Privacy Considerations

The example receipts in Appendix A carry digests of action bytes, approval records and effects rather than those bytes, and the example decision receipts set privacy.rawInputsIncluded to false. The field rules of Section 3.8 allow that member to be true and permit raw content in other admitted members, such as a decision receipt's open traceContext object. A successful check under Section 3 does not establish that raw inputs are absent. A digest of a short or predictable input, such as a command line, can be found by trying candidate inputs; a deployment that must hide such inputs keeps the receipts as private as the inputs, or adds a secret salt to the digested bytes. Identifiers such as principal.id, agent.id and traceContext link a person's actions across services, as Section 9 of [AUDIT-ARCH] describes; pairwise or opaque identifiers reduce that linkage. The approver of an approval record and principal.id can be pseudonymous identifiers or references to a role, and the mapping from them to a person is then kept by the deploying organization. An approval record that names a person identifies that person to everyone who holds it; how long it is held is set by the deployment. Registration shows that the registered Signed Statement existed by the time of registration, not when the decision was taken. Where that Statement is made over the content root, it does not establish that the signature of the receipt existed at that time (Section 3.7). Where the receipt bytes are the payload of a registered Signed Statement (Section 3.7), readers of that payload can read the receipt with its identifiers and digests. Registering a Statement over the content root avoids including the receipt bytes in that Statement, but the Signed Statement still carries its Issuer and Subject Claims and the Transparency Service records the Registration time (Sections 6 and 7 of [RFC9943]). Access to the registered data and any detached payload depends on the Transparency Service and any Adjacent Services; Issuers and Clients assess their privacy and security posture before registration (Section 8 of [RFC9943]).

Key reuse can link records and pseudonyms for verifiers that know the keys and their bindings. The profile of Section 3.11 includes neither the approver key nor its identity mapping in approverSignature. Deployments can reduce such linkage by using a separate key per pseudonym.

9. IANA Considerations

This document has no IANA actions.

10. References

10.1. Normative References

[DSSE]
Secure Systems Lab, "DSSE: Dead Simple Signing Envelope, protocol specification, version 1.0.2", , <https://github.com/secure-systems-lab/dsse/blob/v1.0.2/protocol.md>.
[INTOTO-STATEMENT]
in-toto project, "in-toto Attestation Framework: Statement layer, v1 (release v1.2.0)", , <https://github.com/in-toto/attestation/blob/v1.2.0/spec/v1/statement.md>.
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3339]
Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet: Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339>.
[RFC4648]
Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC6234]
Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234, DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6234>.
[RFC7493]
Bray, T., Ed., "The I-JSON Message Format", RFC 7493, DOI 10.17487/RFC7493, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7493>.
[RFC8032]
Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032, DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8259]
Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259, DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.
[RFC8785]
Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785, DOI 10.17487/RFC8785, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8785>.
[RFC8949]
Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949, DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.
[RFC9052]
Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052, DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9052>.
[RFC9053]
Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Initial Algorithms", RFC 9053, DOI 10.17487/RFC9053, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9053>.
[RFC9597]
Looker, T. and M.B. Jones, "CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims in COSE Headers", RFC 9597, DOI 10.17487/RFC9597, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9597>.

10.2. Informative References

[AUDIT-ARCH]
Kuehlewind, M. and H. Birkholz, "An Architecture for Auditing Agent Delegation and Interactions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-kuehlewind-audit-architecture-01, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kuehlewind-audit-architecture-01>.
[BIRKHOLZ]
Birkholz, H., Petrie, D. G., McCarthy-Howe, T., Rosenberg, J., and O. Steele, "An AI Agent Extension for Virtualized Conversations (vCon)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-birkholz-vcon-ai-agent-extension-00, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-birkholz-vcon-ai-agent-extension-00>.
[DPS-RAR]
"dps-scitt-decision-layer, interop/rar, commit c0a7bd2b6e80b294be326f6401d89a25a50da17e", , <https://github.com/Laurent-Lemonnier/dps-scitt-decision-layer/tree/c0a7bd2b6e80b294be326f6401d89a25a50da17e/interop/rar>.
[GILDA]
Gilda, S., "An Audit Record Format for AI Agent Authorization Decisions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-gilda-audit-agent-audit-record-03, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-gilda-audit-agent-audit-record-03>.
[IZMAYLOV]
Izmaylov, P., "Signed Permissions and Action Receipts for Automated Agents", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-izmaylov-agent-permission-receipts-02, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-izmaylov-agent-permission-receipts-02>.
[JCS-JS]
Erdtman, S., "canonicalize 2.1.0, a JavaScript implementation of RFC 8785", , <https://www.npmjs.com/package/canonicalize/v/2.1.0>.
[KRAUSZ]
Krausz, J., "The verification.* Constraint Family: Pre-Action Fail-Closed Gates for AI Agent Decisions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-krausz-verification-state-03, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-krausz-verification-state-03>.
[LEMONNIER]
Lemonnier, L., "Decision Provenance for SCITT: binding software releases and agent actions to the decisions behind them", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-lemonnier-scitt-decision-provenance-01, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-lemonnier-scitt-decision-provenance-01>.
[LIU]
Liu, D., Zhu, H., Krishnan, S., and A. Parecki, "Authorization Evidence and Audit Trail for OAuth 2.0 Access Tokens", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-liu-oauth-authorization-evidence-02, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-liu-oauth-authorization-evidence-02>.
[PB-DECISION]
proofbundle project, "Decision Receipt predicate decision-receipt/v0.1", proofbundle, tag v6.4.0, docs/predicates/decision-receipt.md, , <https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/v6.4.0/docs/predicates/decision-receipt.md>.
[PB-OUTCOME]
proofbundle project, "Action Outcome predicate action-outcome/v0.1", proofbundle, tag v6.4.0, docs/predicates/action-outcome.md, , <https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/blob/v6.4.0/docs/predicates/action-outcome.md>.
[PB-PYPI]
Python Package Index, "proofbundle 6.6.0", , <https://pypi.org/project/proofbundle/6.6.0/>.
[PB-REPO]
proofbundle project, "proofbundle source repository", , <https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle>.
[RFC3161]
Adams, C., Cain, P., Pinkas, D., and R. Zuccherato, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP)", RFC 3161, DOI 10.17487/RFC3161, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3161>.
[RFC7942]
Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205, RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942>.
[RFC9162]
Laurie, B., Messeri, E., and R. Stradling, "Certificate Transparency Version 2.0", RFC 9162, DOI 10.17487/RFC9162, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9162>.
[RFC9396]
Lodderstedt, T., Richer, J., and B. Campbell, "OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests", RFC 9396, DOI 10.17487/RFC9396, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9396>.
[RFC9679]
Isobe, K., Tschofenig, H., and O. Steele, "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) Key Thumbprint", RFC 9679, DOI 10.17487/RFC9679, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9679>.
[RFC9942]
Steele, O., Birkholz, H., Delignat-Lavaud, A., and C. Fournet, "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) Receipts", RFC 9942, DOI 10.17487/RFC9942, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9942>.
[RFC9943]
Birkholz, H., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Deshpande, Y., and S. Lasker, "An Architecture for Trustworthy and Transparent Digital Supply Chains", RFC 9943, DOI 10.17487/RFC9943, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9943>.
[RFC9995]
Steele, O., Lasker, S., and H. Birkholz, "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) Hash Envelope", RFC 9995, DOI 10.17487/RFC9995, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9995>.
[SCITT-CCF-LEDGER]
Microsoft, "scitt-ccf-ledger, commit 00101f769d872711356e080fbb089ac48589c60a", , <https://github.com/microsoft/scitt-ccf-ledger/tree/00101f769d872711356e080fbb089ac48589c60a>.
[SCITT-COSE]
Action State Group, "scitt-cose 0.5.0", , <https://pypi.org/project/scitt-cose/0.5.0/>.
[SCITT-VERIFIER]
Microsoft, "scitt-verifier, commit bd6fb8ba79dbb521257b7f09682c03c6681dc3d0", , <https://github.com/microsoft/scitt-verifier/tree/bd6fb8ba79dbb521257b7f09682c03c6681dc3d0>.
[SER]
Gruszka, K., "Signed Evaluation Receipts", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-gruszka-signed-evaluation-receipts-04, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-gruszka-signed-evaluation-receipts-04>.
[SER-MAPPINGS]
Gruszka, K., "Citing Signed Evaluation Receipts from Existing Envelopes", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-gruszka-evaluation-receipt-mappings-04, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-gruszka-evaluation-receipt-mappings-04>.
[WRIGHT]
Wright, D., "Verdict Records: Results on Claims that Cite Receipts as Evidence", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-wright-verdict-record-02, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-wright-verdict-record-02>.
[YOSSIF]
Yossif, M. K., "PSEA Token Profile: An EAT Profile for Action-Bound, User-Verification-Gated Transaction-Confirmation Evidence", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-yossif-psea-03, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-yossif-psea-03>.

Appendix A. Test Vectors

The seven DSSE vectors described in Appendix A.3 were generated with proofbundle 6.4.0 from PyPI. All vectors and keys in this appendix are for testing only. The seed of each test key that signs a vector of this appendix or of its test package is SHA-256 over a public ASCII label, so that every byte can be rebuilt: the keys of Appendix A.1, among them gate-sa, approver-1 and approver-2 of the vectors of Section 3.11, and the keys issuer-1 and receipt-issuer-1 of Appendix A.4. A few failure vectors use a public key that has no seed: the identity point, a key that is not the encoding of a point, and the key of gate-1 or observer-1 plus a point of order 8, whose signatures are made with the secret scalar of that key. These keys MUST NOT be used for any real receipt. Ed25519 is deterministic, so the signatures below follow from the seeds and the payloads.

A.1. Test Keys and Inputs

Each key is given by its label, Ed25519 seed (hex), public key (base64) and keyid. The key labelled gate-1 signs the decision receipts; the key labelled observer-1 signs the outcome receipts. For these tests, the trust policy accepts decisionMaker.id gate-1 under the gate-1 key and permits the observer-1 key to attest executor.id forge:agent-42-bot. The key label observer-1 does not assert that the observer is the executing account.

gate-1
draft-gruszka-audit-decision-receipts test key gate-1
100fa92fa6464c141f791a96327f555c1c0cfbf3095af986537e50c3c4335f8c
TWfs75IN1In3CNI8TnyIOUHgtwilOPGcRFQLJ670CJc=
SHA256:NjZMAelLq9XON3pxV5tR5hZjX99NkQyw4gGJSRc2gP8

observer-1
draft-gruszka-audit-decision-receipts test key observer-1
f03ad5b668ad225ea15fd9fd272fc8df84be59f467da86b0f2ad0a5ad26f4ddd
4hDsi5TCL+A+9SB7k2l4EkY7XePUheE+zE9mBazt2Fs=
SHA256:q/d0VZCREBObUFi8PWKWXEF4lVNeYPuGn0GuOqd1ij0

gate-sa
draft-gruszka-audit-decision-receipts test key gate-sa
2f4dc12b893338e2cd324f681baf8acf2a46830105a683cdba7b0ab00d7d7cd5
ULcjJ1DulKja0EjIH+F/fCjsHCX64AHa5vM3Zo01tH8=
SHA256:hbX2BDnXPmITRVdno78Mdk/qWHNavEMCKAzgVC+eTuU

approver-1
draft-gruszka-audit-decision-receipts test key approver-1
a49c35e42e266cce01738b3e8581ede5c99735853586619c2781f948d9c637ad
NaFodtbI4q99jUOKDY3PdgFuOX3ODCQ3cpuZ4DK3Z1o=
SHA256:fDsZsZLXxGReK2KGzLgq4I3KEDuii3XBNnISFhQqGKg

approver-2
draft-gruszka-audit-decision-receipts test key approver-2
0b988ae84c124001421578eab44b0cfc83f928063ae9d74bacd52e35a7df7818
i262dRw6N2af5ECLfw3xwFdco7MAzbhloiUF6lB6xbY=
SHA256:ZduWovwwZWMFM4GK5mRSALiopia6UyQbMwswrisUyGs

The keys gate-sa, approver-1 and approver-2 sign only the vectors of Section 3.11 in the test package: gate-sa their decision receipts, under a trust policy that accepts decisionMaker.id gate-sa under it, and approver-1 and approver-2 the approval records, under a trust policy that binds approver-1 to the approver user-123 and approver-2 to user-456. Their envelopes carry the keyid gate-sa, which does not select a key.

Each input is given by a name, its bytes, its size and its SHA-256. "\n" stands for one line feed byte. The bytes of ap, a3 and e3 are the serialization under [RFC8785] of the JSON value shown, on one line and without white space. In ap, SHA-256(a1) stands for the JSON string of the 64 lowercase hexadecimal digits of the SHA-256 of a1. pol is the policy named by every policyDigest. B is the payload of vector P1 of [SER], Appendix A.2.1, cited by V3-decision, F17 and F89 and carried by F15, vectors of the test package of Appendix A.5; its bytes are given in base64 [RFC4648].

a1 "git push origin refs/heads/topic:refs/heads/topic\n"
50 bytes, SHA-256
dec54f771352454097310ae4bd6608c0070ebebb3955c6be013c1b3a8e310bd0
a1x "git push --force origin refs/heads/topic:refs/heads/main\n"
57 bytes, SHA-256
b683418806875ff79c6fa190c50edab0b96577ad8062de5ba7b41dc1d9c363fb
a2 "gh pr merge 7 --repo acme/widgets --merge\n"
42 bytes, SHA-256
5a7549948a1441addb710f5ada59e06dbce25cc5a59accf14f140379f47adb5b
pol "example gate rules, revision 1\n"
31 bytes, SHA-256
43789b41915ae0febcd13263d293101af5ab041eb7c234e1cbe625d6312815f6
ap, 231 bytes, SHA-256
88e5b6d69b3e4bc250a42aeffea0414d406e5f04ba4f991ee432a78231da1170
{
 "actionDigest": {
  "sha256": SHA-256(a1)
 },
 "approvalId": "appr-001",
 "approvedAt": "2026-10-15T09:00:00Z",
 "approver": "user-123",
 "session": "sess-1",
 "validUntil": "2026-10-15T09:15:00Z"
}
a3, 81 bytes, SHA-256
9165c850b7e03cd59578efa1769be74c5386cff5ce96df6b59e25d38ad6f88b4
{
 "body": "All required checks passed for 4f1c2a9.",
 "pull": 7,
 "repo": "acme/widgets"
}
e3, 93 bytes, SHA-256
d3d824cf55168298c0f651244853ec9d9620ea09087abe899243ceb8f9df3a6d
{
 "author": "agent-42-bot",
 "body": "All required checks passed for 4f1c2a9.",
 "id": 9001,
 "pull": 7
}
B, 458 bytes, SHA-256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A.2. Statements

The payload bytes of each vector are the serialization under [RFC8785] of a Statement {"_type": "https://in-toto.io/Statement/v1", "predicateType": P, "predicate": D, "subject": [{"name": N, "digest": {"sha256": H}}]}, where H is SHA-256 over the serialization of D. For a decision receipt P is the decision receipt type and N is "decision:" followed by decisionId; for an outcome receipt P is the outcome receipt type and N is "outcome:" followed by outcomeId.

The predicate of V1-good is given below as a list of assignments that starts from the predicate named in its first line, {} being the empty object; the Statements of the other vectors are in the test package of Appendix A.5. An assignment sets the member at the path to the JSON value shown. A path is a sequence of member names joined by dots, where a decimal index i in square brackets after a name selects element i of an array; missing objects on the path are created, and an assignment to element i of an array with i elements appends it. Members not named keep their value. SHA-256(x) stands for the JSON string of the 64 lowercase hexadecimal digits of the SHA-256 of input x, and R(V) for that of the payload bytes of vector V.

V1-good, from {}
agent.id = "agent-42"
decidedAt = "2026-10-15T09:00:05Z"
decision.reasonCodes = ["user_approval"]
decision.verdict = "ALLOW"
decisionChangeConditions = []
decisionChangeConditions[0].conditionType = "ruleChange"
decisionChangeConditions[0].description =
 "a changed gate, mode or rule of the gate"
decisionId = "dec-0001"
decisionMaker.id = "gate-1"
decisionType = "preActionAuthorization"
evidenceRefs = []
inputSnapshot = []
inputSnapshot[0].digest.sha256 = SHA-256(a1)
inputSnapshot[0].mediaType = "text/plain"
inputSnapshot[0].name = "approved bytes"
inputSnapshot[1].digest.sha256 = SHA-256(ap)
inputSnapshot[1].mediaType = "application/json"
inputSnapshot[1].name = "approval record"
notChecked = []
notChecked[0].field = "content"
notChecked[0].impact = "an approved text can be wrong"
notChecked[0].reason =
 "the gate does not judge whether the text is true"
policyBoundary.bundleRevision = "1"
policyBoundary.decisionPath = "outbound-gate/allow-write"
policyBoundary.policyDigest.sha256 = SHA-256(pol)
policyBoundary.policyEngine = "proofbundle-pilot/github-write"
policyBoundary.policyId = "outbound-gate-rules"
principal.id = "user-123"
privacy.rawInputsIncluded = false
proposedAction.actionType = "git.push"
proposedAction.method = "write"
proposedAction.parametersDigest.sha256 = SHA-256(a1)
proposedAction.target.name =
 "https://git.example/acme/widgets refs/heads/topic"
proposedAction.target.uri = "https://git.example/acme/widgets"
schemaVersion = "0.1.0"
traceContext.parentId = "int-002"
traceContext.traceId = "trace-abc"
validity.audience = ["observer-1"]
validity.expiresAt = "2026-10-15T09:05:05Z"
validity.nonce = "dec-0001"

V1-bad has the payload bytes of V1-good with every occurrence of the hexadecimal SHA-256 of a1 replaced by that of a1x, and keeps the signature of V1-good. V2-bad has as payload bytes the output of Python's json.dumps(s, sort_keys=True) for the Statement s of V2-good, with a space after each comma and colon, and is validly signed over them by gate-1.

A.3. Results

Every envelope is {"payload": base64 of the payload bytes, "payloadType": "application/vnd.in-toto+json", "signatures": [{"keyid": keyid of the signer, "sig": signature}]}. Each of the two blocks below gives the vector, the evaluation time T, the expected result with the exit code of the proofbundle 6.6.0 command line interface, the payload size and signer, the SHA-256 of the payload bytes (the content root where the payload is canonical) and the signature in base64 on two lines. The expected audience is observer-1 and the expected nonce is the decisionId. decision verify ran with ‑‑strict, ‑‑aud, ‑‑nonce and ‑‑verification‑time T, and for V1-good, V1-bad, V2-good and V2-bad with ‑‑case and ‑‑action and for V1-good and V1-bad with ‑‑approval; outcome verify with ‑‑strict, ‑‑expected‑decision‑ref R(V3-decision), ‑‑decision‑maker‑id gate-1, ‑‑executor‑id, ‑‑effect, ‑‑decision with ‑‑decision‑pub, ‑‑verification‑time T and ‑‑case executed.

V1-good, T 2026-10-15T09:01:00Z, pass, exit 0
1829 bytes, signed by gate-1
b9dfd26537542632013d0df166141a788551b4987dfa33b060d5b5ebba78dfb1
GkvzPjklV5ZbtomNRXbS4+O4MIOSw8xGmA0diAEYKEm0
s4Q9qLkL1j7+e5RZnT9l56tfB2utDoNycACsSvSoDw==
V1-bad, T 2026-10-15T09:01:00Z, fail at step 3, exit 1
1829 bytes, signed by gate-1
69eb87fb33a29153182b0e0c89a444023cc00c82fe7c8db1c7e0893363b2c926
GkvzPjklV5ZbtomNRXbS4+O4MIOSw8xGmA0diAEYKEm0
s4Q9qLkL1j7+e5RZnT9l56tfB2utDoNycACsSvSoDw==

The blocks above give V1-good and V1-bad in full. The other five vectors of this appendix are in the test package of Appendix A.5, with their payload bytes, envelopes and Statements; Figure 3 gives for each its name, the procedure it is judged by, its expected result with the evaluation time T and the exit code of the proofbundle 6.6.0 command line interface, and the SHA-256 of its receipt file in the test package.

V2-good: Case 2 of Section 3.3, using a2
  T 2026-10-15T09:06:00Z, pass, exit 0
  3e3b7d575b712ada2c813ee98fd3b0c80d788e2558444a34338510c9978fa47a

V2-bad: V2-good not canonical, see Appendix A.2
  T 2026-10-15T09:06:00Z, fail at step 4, exit 2
  afa39fd7086e4c5af7ef5c7b8cf0ceeaedcb0af26a07ac8082efeb4874b0f424

V3-decision: Case 3, the pair with V3-good
  T 2026-10-15T09:11:00Z, pass, exit 0
  b28dc232b4bb98044a962714c99f1343df3e136246e434bf0f7fdd72dbb925ed

V3-good: Case 3 with V3-decision and e3
  pass, exit 0
  436fb6f6f19cecbd67df9f468556807eab5003ddb8eb60c8b9c2f708e3e9bb66

V3-bad: V3-good with decisionRef R(V1-good)
  fail at step 4 of Section 3.4, exit 2
  2a0fe3ab106095df99e1ee41b938e04678973b7a4fed14c0482f63eca6472d05
Figure 3: Further vectors of Appendix A.3

The payload bytes of V1-good, V2-good, V3-decision, V3-good and V3-bad and the inputs ap, a3, e3 and B are each equal to three serializations of their parsed value: Python's json.dumps with sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":") and either setting of ensure_ascii; the rfc8785 package 0.1.4 for Python; and the independent JavaScript implementation [JCS-JS]. The values contain no floating-point numbers and no characters outside ASCII, which keeps these serializations equal. The payload of V2-bad differs from all of them, as intended.

Each result is that of one procedure. V1-good is judged by Section 3.2 with Case 1 of Section 3.3, using a1 and ap; V1-bad fails at step 3 of Section 3.2, before any check of Case 1. V2-good is judged by Section 3.2 with Case 2, using a2; V2-bad fails at step 4 of Section 3.2. V3-good is judged as Case 3, by Section 3.2 for V3-decision and Section 3.4 for V3-good, with e3 as effect bytes, no action bytes for step 10 of Section 3.2, and forge:agent-42-bot as expected executor.id; V3-bad fails at step 4 of Section 3.4. V3-decision is judged by the same Case 3 procedure as V3-good and passes; it has no result of its own, and its pass is that of the pair with V3-good. The exit code of proofbundle decision verify for V3-decision reflects Section 3.2 alone. In the test package of Appendix A.5, V3-decision and F31 to F34, which are derived from it, are each checked as the pair with V3-good.

A.4. Signed Statements for Registration

The test package of Appendix A.5 holds, for V2-good, one Signed Statement for each of the two wrapping forms described in Section 3.7, a SCITT Receipt for each and the counterexamples, with the test keys issuer-1 and receipt-issuer-1, built like the keys of Appendix A.1, and the text that gives their bytes and describes how they are built and checked. The Signed Statements are COSE_Sign1 messages of [RFC9052] with an EdDSA signature of [RFC9053], CWT Claims of [RFC9597] and a kid that is a COSE Key Thumbprint of [RFC9679], in the deterministic encoding of [RFC8949]; the second uses the COSE Hash Envelope of [RFC9995]. The Receipts are those of [RFC9942] over a Merkle Tree of [RFC9162], generated for illustration with scitt-cose 0.5.0 [SCITT-COSE], and no Transparency Service issued them.

A.5. Test Package and Further Vectors

Appendix A.3 gives a passing and a failing vector for each case of Section 3.3, V1-good and V1-bad for Case 1, V2-good and V2-bad for Case 2, and V3-decision and V3-good with V3-bad for Case 3 and Section 3.4. For every vector, the expected audience and nonce are the verifier inputs recorded for it in the package. For the 171 vectors retained from -08, the expected audience is observer‑1 except for F38, and the expected nonce is that of the base vector except for F10, F39 and F90. For F10 and F90, the expected nonce is dec-0004. V1-accept is V1-good checked by a relying party whose consumption state is the empty JSON array; it passes, and no item of Section 4 refuses it.

The other failure vectors, F1 to F9, F11 to F93 and F95 to F125 with F17-outcome, the passing vectors V2-micro, V2-num, V2-rel, V3-rel, V3-seq, F94, V1-accept, V2-ref and V3-late, K1 to K29 of the third check of Section 3.5, S1 and S2 of its second check and E1 to E21 of its first check, G01 to G16c, H001 to H316, PK1 to PK5, I1, N1, J1, J2, CS1 to CS4, SA1 to SA21 of Section 3.11 and the vectors of the COSE_Sign1 binding of Appendix B.5 are in the test package archive draft‑gruszka‑audit‑decision‑receipts‑10‑test‑vectors.tar.gz, with SHA-256 9f3aa3711b3b332e009dc7edf6e276c866f3cd638b2a10670668fb7793790e43. The URL https://github.com/b7n0de/proofbundle/raw/984dc3e1a1b4bdac9542c6f02fb7648e6bba0560/drafts/draft-gruszka-audit-decision-receipts/draft-gruszka-audit-decision-receipts-10-test-vectors.tar.gz identifies that exact archive file at a fixed commit of the public proofbundle repository, not merely its unpacked directory. The package holds every vector of Appendix A with the inputs it uses and the result and step expected for it, a description of how each vector is derived and checked, for each vector outside the COSE_Sign1 binding, the first check of Section 3.5 and the check of Section 3.11 with the commands and exit codes of the proofbundle 6.6.0 command line interface, the Signed Statements and SCITT Receipts that Appendix A.4 names with the text that describes them, a verifier of Section 3, Section 4 and Appendix B written in Go from this document, and a script that runs every vector against that verifier offline. Its file MANIFEST.sha256 gives the SHA-256 of each other file.

F19 to F71 in the test package were added for requirements of this document that F1 to F18 leave without a vector and that can be checked on a receipt and its inputs; the test package records the step at which each fails. The six requirements named below have no vector because a receipt and its inputs do not show whether they are met. They are not the only requirements without a vector; others lack one too, among them the conditions of item 6 of Section 4, and a requirement with a vector need not have one that separates each condition it states. For each rule of the field rules of Section 3.8, the test package has a vector that fails because of that rule alone, except the rule that an integer is not greater than 9007199254740991, which step 4 of Section 3.2 checks first; no vector shows a consumption state that has lost an entry that item 6 of Section 4 still requires, because the inputs of a receipt do not show which entries are still required. The vectors therefore do not show that every requirement that can be checked on a receipt and its inputs is tested. The consumption scope of Section 3.5, the rule of Appendix A that the test keys are not used for real receipts and the rule of Section 4 for whoever issues approval records cannot be checked on a receipt. The two sentences of the opening paragraph of Section 4 that have the relying party apply its own current time as T and keep a historical audit time from making an expired approval usable, and item 3 of Section 4, which orders durable marking before release, state duties of the relying party outside the procedures of Section 3. The second check of Section 3.5 has the vectors S1 and S2 and its first check the vectors E1 to E21, which the verifier of the test package checks (Section 5.3).

The test package gives each further vector an entry in its expected files with its expected result and the files its recorded command checks, and a corresponding entry in its inputs files without the expected result; its README describes the vectors in prose, and its file MANIFEST.sha256 gives the path and the SHA-256 of each file. A changed payload is signed again by the key that signed its base, with the subject digest taken over the new predicate. For K1 to K29, S1 and S2 and E1 to E21, the receipt passes, and the expected result recorded in the test package is that of the third, second or first check of Section 3.5 over the receipts held, each held under the key that signed it unless its entry in the test package says otherwise; an invalid input gives no result for that check. For E1 to E21 the Auditor also holds approval records and takes the consumption scope from its audit context or its trust policy, in the form that the test package describes; where it can obtain or read none, the first check gives no result. F10 is V1-good with decidedAt 2026-10-15T09:20:00Z, decisionId and validity.nonce dec-0004, validity.expiresAt 2026-10-15T09:25:00Z and the approval record ap2, ap with validUntil 2026-10-15T09:30:00Z, in inputSnapshot[1]; c1 is the consumption state of a relying party that has honoured ap. F90 is refused under item 2 of Section 4. For SA1 to SA21, the package specifies whether the approver-signature check is requested and which inputs are supplied. SA8 and SA10 do not request it. SA12 requests it without action bytes and fails check 1. The other vectors request it with action bytes and the specified approver key. SA1 to SA16, SA19 and SA20 are signed with the test keys gate-sa, approver-1 and approver-2 of Appendix A.1. SA19 is SA1 with its signature written with pad bits that are not zero, the decoded bytes unchanged. SA20 is signed under approver-1 with R the identity point and S = k a mod L, a the secret scalar of approver-1, and passes, because no subgroup test is applied to R. SA21 is SA1 checked with an approver key that is not the encoding of a point. SA17 and SA18 are signed by gate-1 and have as approver key the identity point O, 01 followed by 31 zero bytes, and the key of observer-1 plus a point of order 8. PK1 to PK4 are V1-good and V3-good under the key O with the signature R = O, S = 0 and under the key of gate-1 or observer-1 plus a point of order 8, with a nonce for which the group equation without the cofactor holds; each passes that equation and fails under the rule on the expected key of step 3 of Section 3.2. PK5 is V1-good checked under an expected key that is not the encoding of a point. H315 and H316 are V1-good with recordedAt in the year 0000 and with seven digits of a fraction of a second. N1 is V1-good with an approval record that has a further member with the integer literal 9007199254740992; it passes, because the bound of step 4 of Section 3.2 applies to P and not to A. I1 gives the decision receipt of V3-good to the decision command of the verifier of the test package with case executed and without an outcome receipt. The decision command accepts cases approval and declined. Case 3 is checked with the outcome command and requires both receipts. A decision command requesting case executed is an incomplete invocation and gives no verification result. For I1, success requires exit code 2, the expected incomplete-invocation diagnostic, and the absence of any receipt-verification PASS or FAIL result. Without a case, the decision command checks Section 3.2 only and checks no case. E20 is E15 without e-ap4 held: the held decision cites e-ap4, which is not held and is reported as not counted, and then ap, which still counts, so the first check fails. E21 is E1 with V1-good held and ap held replaced by a payload of V1-good signed anew and by ap with a further member whose deepest value has depth 66; that citation gives no identity and is reported as not counted, so only F10 cites the identity and the first check passes. J1 and J2 are V1-good with an approval record whose deepest value has depth 64 and 65; J1 passes, and J2 fails at Case 1. CS1 to CS4 are V1-accept with a consumption state that holds a malformed entry: the entry null, an entry without session, an entry whose actionDigest is not in the digest form, and in a second generation an entry whose approvalId is the empty string; each is refused under item 5 of Section 4. The vectors of field rules of Section 3.8, H001 to H316, have such entries too; MANIFEST.sha256 of the test package gives the SHA-256 of each file. The other vectors of the test package, F1 to F9, F11 to F88 and F17-outcome, are described only in the package.

G01 separates the equation with the cofactor from the one without. F89 illustrates rejection despite the presence of evaluation evidence, but does not establish that a verifier enforces the second half of the rule of Section 2.6. F17 fails at the verdict check of Case 3 whatever its evidenceRefs hold and only illustrates that rule. V1-good and V2-rel decide different actions, and a DENY changes no state (Section 2.2), so K1 to K5 show only how the third check matches digests, not a sequence of states of one action (Section 2.1).

F10 passes receipt verification and is refused by the relying party under Section 4, with c1 under item 1, because item 2 makes ap2, a copy of ap with other metadata, the same approval. The proofbundle 6.6.0 command receives ap2 and c1 and refuses F10 under Section 4 with exit code 3. The trust policy of Appendix A.1 names no consumption scope, so Section 3.5 gives no result for F10 without an audit context that names one (E6); E1 holds V1-good and F10 within one scope, and its first check reports them as a pair.

Appendix B. COSE_Sign1 Binding

This appendix gives a second binding of the requirements of Section 3.9, to a COSE_Sign1 message of [RFC9052] signed with Ed25519. For a receipt in this binding, steps 1, 2, 3 and 6 of Section 3.2 are those of Appendix B.3, and every other step of Section 3 and Section 4 applies unchanged. The key words of this appendix apply to a verifier, as in the procedure of Section 3.

B.1. Payload and Content Root

The payload bytes P are the [RFC8785] serialization of a JSON object with exactly two members, predicate, which is the predicate, and type, which is the receipt type. The decision receipt type of this binding is https://signed-evidence.org/receipts/decision/v0.1 and its outcome receipt type https://signed-evidence.org/receipts/outcome/v0.1. The message carries P as its payload; P is not detached.

The content root is SHA-256 over P, as in every binding (step 5 of Section 3.2). The predicate digest is SHA-256 over the [RFC8785] serialization of predicate; the verifier computes it, and this binding carries no subject. One predicate in this binding and in the DSSE binding gives two receipts with different content roots and the same predicate digest. decisionRef of an outcome receipt names the content root of its decision receipt in the binding of that decision receipt, so either receipt of Case 3 can be in either binding.

B.2. Protected and Unprotected Header

The receipt bytes are a COSE_Sign1 message with tag 18 in the core deterministic encoding of Section 4.2.1 of [RFC8949]. Its protected header holds exactly these four parameters:

  • alg (label 1), the value -8, EdDSA of [RFC9053], with an Ed25519 key;
  • content type (label 3), the text string "application/json";
  • kid (label 4), a non-empty byte string. An issuer sets it to the COSE Key Thumbprint of its public key ([RFC9679]). For receipt verification, the verifier checks only that kid is a non-empty byte string; it neither compares kid with a thumbprint nor uses it to select a key;
  • CWT Claims (label 15) of [RFC9597], a map with exactly iss (1), a non-empty text string that names the signer, and sub (2), the text string "decision:" followed by decisionId or "outcome:" followed by outcomeId. This binding limits iss to between 1 and 8192 Unicode code points, inclusive, including when kid is used. The length of iss is counted as Unicode code points; the number 8192 is taken from the length that Section 6 of [RFC9943] gives for the iss Claim.

The protected header holds nothing else, in particular no crit, no typ and no parameter of a COSE Hash Envelope of [RFC9995], since P is the receipt and not a hash of it. iss is not compared with decisionMaker.id or with another member; the trust policy binds the key to decisionMaker.id (step 8 of Section 3.2) and to executor.id (step 5 of Section 3.4).

The unprotected header is a map that repeats no label of the protected header. The unprotected header is not covered by the issuer's signature. Step 1 checks its encoding, permitted value types and labels. Adding a SCITT Receipt preserves P, the content root, the signature and the remaining verification results only if the resulting message still passes step 1. This procedure does not verify the SCITT Receipt; Section 3.7 describes that separate verification.

B.3. Steps of This Binding

Step 1, message.
The receipt bytes MUST be one CBOR data item in the core deterministic encoding of Section 4.2.1 of [RFC8949], with no byte after it, with no floating-point value, no simple value other than false, true and null, no integer outside the range of a signed 64-bit integer, no indefinite length and no tag other than the outer tag 18. For each CBOR data item decoded by this step, the outermost item has depth zero. Each array element, map key, map value and tagged item increases the depth by one. An item with a depth greater than 32 fails this step. The protected header is decoded separately, with its map at depth zero. They MUST be a COSE_Sign1 message with tag 18, an array of the protected header as a byte string, the unprotected header as a map, the payload as a byte string or nil and the signature as a byte string. The protected header byte string MUST hold one map in the same encoding with exactly the four parameters specified in Appendix B.2. At this step, alg is checked for -8, content type for "application/json", kid for a non-empty byte string, and CWT Claims for exactly iss and sub as non-empty text strings. iss is also checked for a length between 1 and 8192, inclusive, counted as Unicode code points, including when kid is used (Appendix B.2). The comparison of sub with the predicate is performed only at step 6. Every label of the unprotected header MUST be an integer or a text string, as specified in Section 3 of [RFC9052]. The unprotected header MUST NOT contain crit, label 2. The unprotected header MUST NOT hold a label of the protected header.
Step 2, payload bytes.
P is the payload byte string. A message whose payload is nil fails this step.
Step 3, signature.
Form the Sig_structure of Section 4.4 of [RFC9052] for COSE_Sign1 from the context "Signature1", the protected header byte string as received, an empty external_aad and P, in the core deterministic encoding. The signature MUST be 64 bytes that verify as an Ed25519 signature over the Sig_structure under the expected key, as step 3 of Section 3.2 says. kid is not used to select a key.
Step 6, payload object.
P MUST be a JSON object with exactly the members predicate and type. type MUST be the decision receipt type of Appendix B.1, or for an outcome receipt its outcome receipt type. predicate MUST be a JSON object. sub MUST be "decision:" followed by the value of decisionId, or for an outcome receipt "outcome:" followed by the value of outcomeId; a predicate without that member as a non-empty string fails this step. For an outcome receipt this step is step 2 of Section 3.4.

A failure in one of these steps is a failure of the step of Section 3.2 with the same number, and for an outcome receipt of step 1 or step 2 of Section 3.4 (Section 3.9). The verifier chooses the binding of each receipt it checks and does not take it from the receipt, as it chooses the case; a receipt in the DSSE binding checked in this binding fails step 1, and the reverse.

B.4. Registration as a Signed Statement

This section is informative. A receipt in this binding has the form of a Signed Statement of [RFC9943]: a COSE_Sign1 message whose protected header carries CWT Claims with an Issuer Claim and a Subject Claim (Section 6 of [RFC9943]). It can be registered as it is, with no second Signed Statement around it, and its Issuer is the signer of the receipt, named by iss. The signature that the Transparency Service verifies at Registration is then the signature that step 3 checks, so a Receipt for it shows that this signature existed by the Registration time, which the registration over the content root of Section 3.7 does not show. A Transparent Statement carries the SCITT Receipt in the header parameter receipts, label 394, of its unprotected header, an array of Receipts (Section 2 of [RFC9942], Section 7 of [RFC9943]). Adding or removing the SCITT Receipt preserves the result of Section 3 provided that both messages satisfy step 1 of Appendix B.3. Whether a Transparency Service accepts such a statement is set by its Registration Policy (Section 5.1.1 of [RFC9943]). What Section 3.7 says a Receipt shows and does not show applies unchanged.

B.5. Test Vectors

The folder cose of the test package holds 56 vectors for this binding, signed with the keys gate-1 and observer-1 of Appendix A.1 or, for CPK2 and CPK4, with their secret scalars, with their expected results in cose/expected-cose.json; the script of the test package runs them with all other vectors. Every vector uses the inputs, T, expected audience and nonce of the vector of Appendix A.3 whose predicate it carries.

C1-good, C2-good and C3-good carry the predicates of V1-good, V2-good, and V3-decision with V3-good in this binding and pass Cases 1, 2 and 3; in C3-good, decisionRef names the content root of the decision receipt in this binding. C3-mixed carries the predicate of V3-good unchanged in this binding and passes Case 3 with the DSSE receipt V3-decision. For each case, one vector fails at each of steps 1, 2, 3 and 6 of Section 3.2, for Case 3 in the decision receipt, and five vectors fail at steps 1 and 2 of Section 3.4 in the outcome receipt. Eighteen vectors derived from C2-good fail at step 1 (a byte after the message, labels out of order, alg -7, a further label, no kid, no iss, a label repeated in the unprotected header, another content type, and in the unprotected header an indefinite length, a floating-point value, a tag and the simple value undefined), at step 3 (another key, S plus L), at step 4 (a payload that is not its own serialization) and at step 6 (a third member, another sub, a predicate that is not an object). Two vectors check a receipt in the other binding and fail at step 1. C2-depth32 has in its unprotected header the label 99 with 29 nested arrays around null, which puts null at depth 32, and passes; C2-s1-depth33 has 30 such arrays and fails at step 1. C2-s1-unprot-label and C2-s1-unprot-crit have in the unprotected header the label false and the label 2, crit, and fail at step 1. C2-int64-max holds there the integers 9223372036854775807 and -9223372036854775808 and passes; C2-s1-int64-pos and C2-s1-int64-neg hold 9223372036854775808 and -9223372036854775809 and fail at step 1, as does C2-s1-dup-label, whose map has one label twice. C2-iss-8192 and C2-s1-iss-8193 are C2-good with an iss of 8192 and 8193 ASCII characters, signed anew by gate-1; the first passes and the second fails at step 1. Their protected header holds kid and neither x5t nor x5chain. C2-iss-4097e is C2-good with an iss of 4097 times the character U+00E9, which is 4097 Unicode code points and 8194 bytes in UTF-8, signed anew by gate-1, and passes, because iss is counted as Unicode code points. CPK1 to CPK4 are C1-good and the outcome receipt of C3-good under the expected key O with R = O, S = 0 and under the key of gate-1 or observer-1 plus a point of order 8; they fail at step 3, the outcome receipts at step 1 of Section 3.4. Figure 4 gives each vector with its expected result, its file and the SHA-256 of the file.

C1-good: pass
  cose/vectors/c1-good.cose
  9bfa2af0590fb73735d93cf03c485b477ff464b8d58cf641f27880d07b76bac3
C2-good: pass
  cose/vectors/c2-good.cose
  f1e188098c32d697847fb754c25ed29dc8cfaa89ca1c69b8b48b557d7827c1c1
C3-good: pass
  cose/vectors/c3-outcome-good.cose
  03e4f62c851eb99b62ea74e5275eadd6ee0edb1a2281fa469583e5f9320b2c89
C3-mixed: pass
  cose/vectors/c3-outcome-mixed.cose
  879ed0c38c35ef8849a8e228f1839daa9256352e92e2ba8dd3e1b92a5adb950e
C1-s1: fail at step 1 of 3.2
  cose/vectors/c1-s1.cose
  767bc867cfa43e309df3e7ac53793d3b1fa3587ef3ecc0f1030cbaa3a57a36df
C1-s2: fail at step 2 of 3.2
  cose/vectors/c1-s2.cose
  585154316383aef4d26f92c254e3641dc1ae7b3a0114212a48956a73a8bcff82
C1-s3: fail at step 3 of 3.2
  cose/vectors/c1-s3.cose
  81c66c143984d93459b780cb876728523348e2de9d25783b841baf62d5b7ade2
C1-s6: fail at step 6 of 3.2
  cose/vectors/c1-s6.cose
  1022a9246241629dedfa103e2961a118eb6170d43037200e27a6f41f38b6ad0b
C2-s1: fail at step 1 of 3.2
  cose/vectors/c2-s1.cose
  fc3083272de695351862d38491b1fe282b0949872049833b320848d0312453e9
C2-s2: fail at step 2 of 3.2
  cose/vectors/c2-s2.cose
  ff6d6b45be8f2a63969403db3c0fa204d2dbbcfc1432e3a90c01553d5c120be7
C2-s3: fail at step 3 of 3.2
  cose/vectors/c2-s3.cose
  415ce804a1050fcf2dbcb2e6dbec49bb8bb9fc9924908267597dfdc122bfcd1c
C2-s6: fail at step 6 of 3.2
  cose/vectors/c2-s6.cose
  a1b3e11767b3bfa7eeada3bfc8a2119f956828c2bc829b096a7c7238828326e0
C3D-s1: fail at step 1 of 3.2
  cose/vectors/c3-outcome-good.cose
  03e4f62c851eb99b62ea74e5275eadd6ee0edb1a2281fa469583e5f9320b2c89
  C3D-s1 decision input:
  cose/vectors/c3d-s1.cose
  e3a7a74d42c3284ad21cdc2380aedaa7bd790c8e01de51de0489152eb1e3ba0a
C3D-s2: fail at step 2 of 3.2
  cose/vectors/c3-outcome-good.cose
  03e4f62c851eb99b62ea74e5275eadd6ee0edb1a2281fa469583e5f9320b2c89
  C3D-s2 decision input:
  cose/vectors/c3d-s2.cose
  91e8384cfc4013b6d7492665a8c528cf1f63112bbb2229da04a84419831536e2
C3D-s3: fail at step 3 of 3.2
  cose/vectors/c3-outcome-good.cose
  03e4f62c851eb99b62ea74e5275eadd6ee0edb1a2281fa469583e5f9320b2c89
  C3D-s3 decision input:
  cose/vectors/c3d-s3.cose
  5feb6786ee72c396ff3b99e4080453cc4cf97bb633cff2c34b48375c18f07b4c
C3D-s6: fail at step 6 of 3.2
  cose/vectors/c3-outcome-good.cose
  03e4f62c851eb99b62ea74e5275eadd6ee0edb1a2281fa469583e5f9320b2c89
  C3D-s6 decision input:
  cose/vectors/c3d-s6.cose
  ddfd8f163cea823aa77f28a2b8e976a67b25f720ef019b3f43b16d2dc03cb3fe
C3O-o1-tag: fail at step 1 of 3.4
  cose/vectors/c3o-o1-tag.cose
  8ab8085c1500fa253bf3229dd581d7c9308767cd41abb03a25595edeef0d6257
C3O-o1-detached: fail at step 1 of 3.4
  cose/vectors/c3o-o1-detached.cose
  4aadd2bb13b89c42e39e5a18e2a99d044be5d74cd2c0cbb806bf9644e6384e48
C3O-o1-sig: fail at step 1 of 3.4
  cose/vectors/c3o-o1-sig.cose
  f52915c05443d31e2c85a7a21665589f84d9c319a28d593b7d2e8b95ebaec368
C3O-o2-type: fail at step 2 of 3.4
  cose/vectors/c3o-o2-type.cose
  612082ee7873be62302c4cd90529934c4646fcdde809ba05852f4175ced3ce3b
C3O-o2-sub: fail at step 2 of 3.4
  cose/vectors/c3o-o2-sub.cose
  e942091a95ca37f90ee9ff0e26ff1664eef86fd9b31819b1c9fa793ed6fd5056
C2-s1-trailing: fail at step 1 of 3.2
  cose/vectors/c2-s1-trailing.cose
  b655c96f816fb1d1598f33adde366942dd4fddc6f1a7eda56d92180df055c591
C2-s1-order: fail at step 1 of 3.2
  cose/vectors/c2-s1-order.cose
  5eb8c66c9d4feee30096daaa673effe362d57ac37b34d66c0f474e5ac6004a3d
C2-s1-alg: fail at step 1 of 3.2
  cose/vectors/c2-s1-alg.cose
  311636e9dcef21df95672de6e33cb72341f33ab82c7b6dc7aca5f5ed25728c49
C2-s1-label: fail at step 1 of 3.2
  cose/vectors/c2-s1-label.cose
  258e704c4349bd08b6a218024a9ffac106b3af1c37e03f2d1864ab3b0ded4989
C2-s1-nokid: fail at step 1 of 3.2
  cose/vectors/c2-s1-nokid.cose
  b263768b1d5ce8cef795004b43cb6e8118879c7c4ea30467f3c2d0bee470bb1e
C2-s1-noiss: fail at step 1 of 3.2
  cose/vectors/c2-s1-noiss.cose
  32568d53b28145777e7e71b3643455f89ad566e1c0f3eb4398b16193e33205d6
C2-s1-unprot: fail at step 1 of 3.2
  cose/vectors/c2-s1-unprot.cose
  b2234f93b135b8b457676152c31859c73f96e487ded9e0097b2722defd03ed05
C2-s1-ct: fail at step 1 of 3.2
  cose/vectors/c2-s1-ct.cose
  acc04c57af623d71b04611076d86c479a1a6a8c277d41dc00fa926d28ab3195b
C2-s1-indef: fail at step 1 of 3.2
  cose/vectors/c2-s1-indef.cose
  820f7ffb630a1da611f01dd4872e0010068b406c7372752fb4773e4907b44ed1
C2-s1-float: fail at step 1 of 3.2
  cose/vectors/c2-s1-float.cose
  20ed0b53b88f21de911e2418e7a4a9e51a5eed885722cae260a4e7309e1ff6e3
C2-s1-innertag: fail at step 1 of 3.2
  cose/vectors/c2-s1-innertag.cose
  4de3296d064c11fbb1de4c88b64265df7412f224ebd1801a148e89c1a2b15a10
C2-s1-simple: fail at step 1 of 3.2
  cose/vectors/c2-s1-simple.cose
  58748bb744e9c35720e776badbbfe4a5ed26ecfbf968197663fb20f49f772e6c
C2-s3-key: fail at step 3 of 3.2
  cose/vectors/c2-s3-key.cose
  10adf9fd81f0609a1379e81cc09db77290c90520dbb7f99e7ebbb679794ac289
C2-s3-sl: fail at step 3 of 3.2
  cose/vectors/c2-s3-sl.cose
  4de75ee1fda9978dbb2360df9562600e16bcb9912047db545d09cd7c3572259f
C2-s4-space: fail at step 4 of 3.2
  cose/vectors/c2-s4-space.cose
  2ca6d0368a3ff8741ba2867c5643e41dad6fd9b9fc0abfd2f0d52626c1fe996e
C2-s6-member: fail at step 6 of 3.2
  cose/vectors/c2-s6-member.cose
  1318e1ab8b3e05f4f59048f34b7811fe94de721349e67a15e1acd9a6f210cc78
C2-s6-sub: fail at step 6 of 3.2
  cose/vectors/c2-s6-sub.cose
  df2e0e7d2b98d4bc3c9c4df1b173d896423bc92ce583ce1cb9dc369924db668a
C2-s6-pred: fail at step 6 of 3.2
  cose/vectors/c2-s6-pred.cose
  bc6ece2463320b09d0a9e6cffd28f4a6a2390874aae350644947dec8cd8f3ac9
X-dsse-as-cose: fail at step 1 of 3.2
  vectors/v2-declined-good.dsse.json
  file of the package of -08
X-cose-as-dsse: fail at step 1 of 3.2
  cose/vectors/c2-good.cose
  f1e188098c32d697847fb754c25ed29dc8cfaa89ca1c69b8b48b557d7827c1c1
C2-depth32: pass
  cose/vectors/c2-depth32.cose
  2ed2fca9b85d4c38ae4f56f5ebadb47b2d460629b9a75603392f317b8f7f1c05
C2-s1-depth33: fail at step 1 of B.3
  cose/vectors/c2-s1-depth33.cose
  136ad311afc8383d931995388153fa1d94305fd7a35e51917b70d3443ee128ab
CPK1: fail at step 3 of B.3
  cose/vectors/cpk1.cose
  22fa3110c4254c15498f9844443ee711cd9248bdd38cf3d6629a46e122f7b24d
CPK2: fail at step 3 of B.3
  cose/vectors/cpk2.cose
  64080c173e7eb8eee77eda39675fb76934023cc87aeb700bf3891b8a48a509dd
CPK3: fail at step 1 of 3.4
  cose/vectors/cpk3.cose
  a7fa15ba0e1bb531939b791c88a9c24c2c79104c3524e7bf9e2d42c0de160f66
CPK4: fail at step 1 of 3.4
  cose/vectors/cpk4.cose
  c8c06919e48a8fa9dd940c9d288d601e4aa21f7f435ca4fae6e37ddcbab793e0
C2-s1-unprot-label: fail at step 1 of B.3
  cose/vectors/c2-s1-unprot-label.cose
  ef7b7aaa28fb17a40d5602f78a5945dd5d693fa838c17d4aa97d2eee1dee885f
C2-s1-unprot-crit: fail at step 1 of B.3
  cose/vectors/c2-s1-unprot-crit.cose
  c40820d324cf96fd95d33c967b13bd7cc48950ef0f77bf5381a1f749d2c5ace0
C2-int64-max: pass
  cose/vectors/c2-int64-max.cose
  ec2fcad62c59889a1f835e91c16f9702dbb76f6bb696c0dadfe70e7d4a8b6fe7
C2-s1-int64-pos: fail at step 1 of B.3
  cose/vectors/c2-s1-int64-pos.cose
  6910f8930c059c8364b7f569db94d29ec72ce89a84e2b6ec3e8f4aebd49edd6f
C2-s1-int64-neg: fail at step 1 of B.3
  cose/vectors/c2-s1-int64-neg.cose
  88b46ae96c504f56ad906dba394219eb8bb58c4ad1bce572c600699199c141a9
C2-s1-dup-label: fail at step 1 of B.3
  cose/vectors/c2-s1-dup-label.cose
  77f462a7d20f277b818a17875a145a4576c2b8ac58d0a5ac76853d5b276b59f6
C2-iss-8192: pass
  cose/vectors/c2-iss-8192.cose
  7352e31ab2d6736757df9c94ca940d3abd14c90c447f5dff7367bfd59eef8085
C2-s1-iss-8193: fail at step 1 of B.3
  cose/vectors/c2-s1-iss-8193.cose
  ef82a26ed7bdc4fecdcb6254c06d04f7783e71b23bab333d0386a3035f4531ad
C2-iss-4097e: pass
  cose/vectors/c2-iss-4097e.cose
  bad5c135f2fe0863a442a677bfb0bbec658376d204dee0ffa370087e5f9247d8
Figure 4: Vectors of the COSE_Sign1 binding

Appendix C. Changes

This section is to be removed before publication.

C.1. Changes from -09

Each paragraph of this section describes one change from -09.

Section 3.9 is new. It states what a decision receipt and an outcome receipt require in every binding, exact bytes, a signature over them, bindings by digest, required members, the content root and the steps that check them, and adds no requirement of its own.

Section 3.10 is new. It holds the DSSE and in-toto forms of steps 1, 2, 3 and 6 of Section 3.2 and of step 2 of Section 3.4, and the two receipt types, which Section 1.2 named in -09. Those steps now apply the step of the binding, and the rule for S of an Ed25519 signature stays in step 3 for every binding.

Section 1.2 defines binding, receipt bytes, predicate and predicate digest, and defines decision receipt, outcome receipt and payload bytes for every binding.

The abstract, Section 1 and Section 7 describe the receipts by their requirements and their binding, not as the records of one project; Section 5 names the implementations.

Section 3.8 no longer names the documents its figures follow; Section 5.1 does.

Section 2.4, Section 3.1, Section 3.4, Section 3.5, Section 3.7, Section 6, Section 7 and Section 8 say receipt bytes, signature of the receipt and predicate digest where -09 said envelope bytes, DSSE signature and digest of the subject entry, and keep the DSSE terms where they speak of that binding.

Section 5.3 reports a revision of the verifier that takes the steps of the DSSE binding apart from the others.

Appendix B is new. It gives a second binding, to COSE_Sign1 with Ed25519, with two new receipt type identifiers under signed-evidence.org, its steps 1, 2, 3 and 6, how a receipt in it is registered as a Signed Statement, and test vectors in the folder cose of the test package. The abstract, Section 1, Section 1.2, Section 3, Section 3.7, Section 5.3 and Section 7 name it, and RFC 8949, RFC 9052, RFC 9053 and RFC 9597 are normative references.

Section 3.5 says how the first check finds the consumption scope, the identity of a cited approval and the decisions it counts, and Section 4 states once, at its end, what the receipts show about single use and what they do not; Section 2.5 and Section 7 refer to it.

Section 3.11 is new. It defines the optional member approverSignature of an approval record, signed by the holder of a key that the trust policy binds to the approver, and its check after Case 1. Section 1.1, Section 2.5, Section 2.7, Section 3.1, Section 3.6, Section 7 and Section 8 refer to it.

Step 3 of Section 3.2 requires that the expected key decodes, is not the identity point and multiplied by L gives the identity point, for decision and outcome receipts in every binding, and check 5 of Section 3.11.3 requires the same of the approver key.

Section 3 says that the verifier supplies the binding of each receipt, held receipts included. Section 3.9 says what a binding defines for its steps 1 and 2 and that two receipts with identical payload bytes have the same content root. Step 1 of Appendix B.3 bounds the depth of CBOR data items at 32 and says what it checks in the protected header; Appendix B.2 says what the verifier does with kid and that a SCITT Receipt in the unprotected header preserves the result only where step 1 still passes; Appendix B.4 names the header parameter receipts of RFC 9942. Section 3.7 says that in direct registration the signature of the Signed Statement is the signature of the receipt.

The test package is the archive draft-gruszka-audit-decision-receipts-10-test-vectors.tar.gz of Appendix A.5. It keeps every vector of the package of -08 with its files and entries, the proofbundle commands of the entries recorded anew with version 6.6.0, and adds 444 vectors: G01 to G16c, H001 to H316, PK1 to PK5, I1, N1, J1, J2 and CS1 to CS4, E1 to E21 of the first check of Section 3.5, SA1 to SA21 of Section 3.11 and 56 vectors of the COSE_Sign1 binding. G01 separates the equation with the cofactor from the one without. G02a, G02c and G02f add entries of signatures beside the valid one, G03a and G03b place a number of 2^53 deep in the payload, G05a and G05b check note (1) of Section 3.8 under Case 1 and Section 3.4, G06 checks an actionOutcome without status, G07 an executed outcome without effectDigest, G10a and G10b the second check of Section 3.5 with DENY and REFUSE, and G14a to G16c items 2 and 5 of Section 4. H001 to H316 give each rule of Section 3.8 that the earlier vectors did not separate a vector that fails because of that rule alone, except the bound on integers; the test package gives each with its expected result and the SHA-256 of its file. PK1 to PK4 and CPK1 to CPK4 separate the rule on the expected key, and PK5 and SA21 hold a key that is not the encoding of a point. I1 checks that the decision command gives no result for case executed, N1 that the bound on integer literals applies to P only, E20 an ALLOW whose first citation gives no identity, SA19 the pad bits of the approver signature and SA20 an R that is the identity point. J1, J2 and E21 check the depth limit for JSON, and CS1 to CS4 the entries of a consumption state. Six vectors of the COSE_Sign1 binding check the labels of the unprotected header, the range of integers and a repeated label, two more the bound on iss, and C2-iss-4097e that iss is counted as Unicode code points. SA1 to SA16 were re-signed with keys derived from public labels. The approval-record signatures and, where necessary, the inputSnapshot digests and subject digests of their decision receipts were regenerated. Their other predicate members and expected results are unchanged. Its verifier runs all 615 vectors with one script (Section 5.3).

A timestamp of Section 3.8 has a year from 0001 to 9999; H315 has the year 0000 and H316 seven digits of a fraction of a second.

Step 1 of Appendix B.3 requires that every label of the unprotected header is an integer or a text string and that crit is not in the unprotected header.

Case 1 of Section 3.3 says that the bound of step 4 of Section 3.2 on integer literals applies to P and not to the approval record.

The opening of Appendix A says which test keys have a seed from a public label, and Appendix A.1 lists gate-sa, approver-1 and approver-2. Appendix A.5 says for each vector of Section 3.11 whether the check is requested and with which inputs, and that the decision command of the verifier of the test package gives no result for case executed. Section 5.1 names the subset of 171 vectors that its exit codes concern.

Section 3.1 says how the depth of a JSON value is counted and that a value with depth greater than 64 fails the step that parses it, and Section 3.5 says that a citation of such approval record bytes gives no identity in the first check.

Item 5 of Section 4 says that every entry of every supplied generation of the consumption state is validated before an approval is checked as consumed, and that a malformed entry causes refusal.

Appendix B.2 says that this binding limits iss to between 1 and 8192 Unicode code points, inclusive, including when kid is used, and takes the number from Section 6 of [RFC9943] without attributing the rule to it; step 1 of Appendix B.3 checks that length, counted as Unicode code points.

Appendix A.5 says what success means for I1, that the expected audience and nonce of every vector are the inputs recorded for it in the package, that F10 and F90 are checked with the expected nonce dec-0004, and what the new vectors J1, J2, CS1 to CS4 and E21 are; Appendix B.5 describes C2-iss-8192, C2-s1-iss-8193 and C2-iss-4097e.

Section 5.1 describes proofbundle 6.6.0, the inputs its recorded commands receive and the vectors on which it and this document disagree.

No test vector of the package of -08 is changed.

The list of further vectors with the SHA-256 of their files, a figure in -09, is left out of the text; the test package holds an entry and the SHA-256 of the file for each vector of that list. Its README's reference to vector tables in Appendix A.5 describes the earlier presentation. This appendix gives only the changes from -09; the changes before it stand in the earlier revisions.

Acknowledgments

Toshikatsu Oga (The HORIZONs Co., Ltd.) checked the test vectors of several revisions with an implementation written from the text and reported places that read two ways.

The author used AI tools to help draft this document and to generate and cross-check its examples. The author reviewed the entire text and is responsible for it.

Citing adjacent work in the References does not imply that its authors endorse this document.

Author's Address

Konrad Gruszka
b7n0de
Germany