<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
<!DOCTYPE rfc [
  <!ENTITY nbsp    "&#160;">
  <!ENTITY zwsp   "&#8203;">
  <!ENTITY nbhy   "&#8209;">
  <!ENTITY wj     "&#8288;">
]>
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="rfc2629.xslt" ?>
<!-- generated by https://github.com/cabo/kramdown-rfc version 1.7.43 (Ruby 3.2.3) -->
<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-bpm-savnet-sav-benchmarking-01" category="info" submissionType="IETF" xml:lang="en" version="3">
  <!-- xml2rfc v2v3 conversion 3.35.0 -->
  <front>
    <title abbrev="SAV Benchmarking Methodology">Benchmarking Methodology for Intra-domain and Inter-domain Source Address Validation</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-bpm-savnet-sav-benchmarking-01"/>
    <author initials="L." surname="Chen" fullname="Li Chen">
      <organization>Zhongguancun Laboratory</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <city>Beijing</city>
          <country>China</country>
        </postal>
        <email>lichen@zgclab.edu.cn</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="D." surname="Li" fullname="Dan Li">
      <organization>Tsinghua University</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <city>Beijing</city>
          <country>China</country>
        </postal>
        <email>tolidan@tsinghua.edu.cn</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="L." surname="Liu" fullname="Libin Liu">
      <organization>Zhongguancun Laboratory</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <city>Beijing</city>
          <country>China</country>
        </postal>
        <email>liulb@zgclab.edu.cn</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="L." surname="Qin" fullname="Lancheng Qin">
      <organization>Zhongguancun Laboratory</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <city>Beijing</city>
          <country>China</country>
        </postal>
        <email>qinlc@zgclab.edu.cn</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="17"/>
    <area>Operations and Management</area>
    <workgroup>BPM</workgroup>
    <abstract>
      <?line 54?>

<t>This document defines methodologies for benchmarking the performance of intra-domain and inter-domain source address validation (SAV) mechanisms. SAV mechanisms are utilized to generate SAV rules that prevent source address spoofing. The methodology treats a SAV device as a black box and is therefore agnostic to the specific SAV mechanism and implementation used by the device. This document defines test setups, performance indicators, and test cases for SAV accuracy, control-plane and data-plane performance, and resource utilization.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 58?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>Source address validation (SAV) is a fundamental mechanism for mitigating IP source address spoofing <xref target="RFC2827"/> <xref target="RFC3704"/> <xref target="RFC8704"/>. Operators may deploy SAV at different locations, including access networks, intra-domain interfaces, and inter-domain interfaces <xref target="RFC5210"/>. Existing intra-domain and inter-domain SAV mechanisms can suffer from improper blocks, improper permits, and operational overhead in several deployment scenarios <xref target="RFC10078"/> <xref target="I-D.ietf-savnet-inter-domain-problem-statement"/>.</t>
      <t>The SAVNET Working Group has analyzed the problem space for both intra-domain and inter-domain SAV. 
Intra-domain SAV is applied at external interfaces on routers facing entities that are not deployed as neighboring ASes, such as a single host, a set of hosts, or a customer network with no AS. SAV on traffic received on external interfaces facing a neighboring AS is considered inter-domain SAV, regardless of whether the neighboring AS uses a public or private ASN. 
SAV on internal interfaces between routers in the same AS is outside the scope of the intra-domain SAV benchmarking scenarios in this document. This document uses the same conceptual split when defining benchmarking test cases.</t>
      <t>This document provides generic methodologies for benchmarking SAV mechanism performance. A SAV device may support one or more SAV mechanisms, and operators may enable different mechanisms depending on their network environments. This document treats the Device Under Test (DUT) as a black box and does not assume a particular implementation. The tests defined in this document can be used to benchmark SAV accuracy, protocol convergence performance, control-plane processing performance, data-plane SAV table refresh performance, data-plane forwarding performance, and resource utilization. These tests can be performed on a hardware router, software router, virtual machine (VM), or container instance that runs as a SAV device.</t>
      <section anchor="goal-and-scope">
        <name>Goal and Scope</name>
        <t>The benchmarking methodology outlined in this document has two goals:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Benchmark SAV mechanisms and implementations over a set of well-defined intra-domain and inter-domain scenarios.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Measure the contribution of control-plane, data-plane, and resource-related sub-systems to the overall performance of a SAV device.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>This document focuses on laboratory benchmarking of individual DUTs. It does not define a new SAV mechanism, protocol extension, or operational recommendation. The test cases are intended to measure SAV behavior and performance under representative scenarios, rather than to prescribe pass/fail conformance criteria. Human configuration effort is outside the scope of these repeatable device-level benchmarks; measurable resource and update-processing overhead is covered by the performance indicators in this document.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="requirements-language">
        <name>Requirements Language</name>
        <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
        <?line -18?>

</section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="terminology">
      <name>Terminology</name>
      <t>This document uses the terminology in <xref target="RFC10078"/> and <xref target="I-D.ietf-savnet-inter-domain-problem-statement"/>. The following terms are used in this document.</t>
      <t>SAV Device: A device that applies SAV to incoming packets. In this document, the SAV device is the DUT.</t>
      <t>SAV Control Plane: The processes used to gather, communicate, compute, and update information used for SAV rule or SAV table generation.</t>
      <t>SAV Data Plane: The packet-processing component that validates each incoming packet against the applicable SAV rules and either permits or blocks the packet.</t>
      <t>SAV Rule: A rule that indicates the validity of a specific source IP address or source IP prefix per router interface. It is used by a router to make SAV decisions.</t>
      <t>SAV Table: The table of prefixes that indicates the validity of a specific source IP address or source IP prefix per interface. A SAV table contains the information used by the DUT to make SAV decisions. In this document, "SAV rule" denotes an individual validation rule and "SAV table" denotes the collection of rules maintained by the DUT.</t>
      <t>Proper Block: The validation result in which packets with spoofed source addresses are blocked by the DUT.</t>
      <t>Proper Permit: The validation result in which packets with legitimate source addresses are permitted by the DUT.</t>
      <t>Improper Block: The validation result in which packets with legitimate source addresses are blocked improperly due to inaccurate SAV rules or an inaccurate SAV table. The terms "improper block" and "false positive" are used synonymously in this document.</t>
      <t>Improper Permit: The validation result in which packets with spoofed source addresses are permitted improperly due to inaccurate SAV rules or an inaccurate SAV table. The terms "improper permit" and "false negative" are used synonymously in this document.</t>
      <t>Intra-domain SAV: SAV performed by an AS to validate the source addresses of data traffic that the AS originates directly or indirectly. Intra-domain SAV is applied at external interfaces on routers facing entities that are not deployed as neighboring ASes, such as a single host, a set of hosts, or a customer network with no AS.</t>
      <t>Inter-domain SAV: SAV performed by an AS on traffic received from a neighboring AS at an external data-plane interface. Neighboring ASes typically use eBGP, including direct customer, provider, and lateral-peer sessions. More details can refer to <xref target="I-D.ietf-savnet-inter-domain-problem-statement"/>.</t>
      <t>Customer Network with No AS: A customer network that manages one or more IP prefixes but is not deployed as a neighboring AS of the SAV-performing AS.</t>
      <t>Neighboring AS: An AS directly connected to the SAV-performing AS using eBGP. The relationship can be Customer-to-Provider (C2P), Provider-to-Customer (P2C), lateral peering (P2P), or Route Server (RS) to RS-client.</t>
      <t>Customer Cone (CC): For a given AS, the set that includes the AS itself, its direct customer ASes, and all indirect customer ASes reachable recursively through provider-to-customer links.</t>
      <t>Prefixes in the Customer Cone: IP prefixes permitted by their owners to be originated by, or used as source addresses for data traffic originated from, one or more ASes within the customer cone.</t>
      <t>Limited Propagation of a Prefix (LPP): An inter-domain scenario in which a prefix is not propagated to all relevant ASes or interfaces due to mechanisms such as NO_EXPORT, NO_ADVERTISE, or selective export policies, while legitimate traffic using that prefix may still arrive at an interface where the prefix is not visible in BGP.</t>
      <t>Hidden Prefix (HP): A scenario in which an entity legitimately originates traffic using source addresses that are not visible to the routing or forwarding information used by the SAV mechanism.</t>
      <t>Direct Server Return (DSR): A traffic delivery model commonly used by CDNs that use anycast service addresses while delivering data from edge locations that do not announce those addresses. A request is received by an anycast server or location, but the response is sent directly by another server using the anycast service address as the source address. This can create a legitimate hidden-prefix scenario.</t>
      <t>SAV-related Information: Routing information, such as RIBs and FIBs populated by routing protocols or local configuration information, and objects published in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) that were originally proposed for non-SAV purposes but may also be used for SAV. The RPKI objects include existing RPKI object types, such as ROAs and ASPAs, as well as any new types that may be proposed.</t>
      <t>SAV-specific Information: Information dedicated to SAV table generation. It may be defined and exchanged between ASes using a SAV-specific communication protocol or an extension of an existing protocol. The information may also take the form of SAV-specific RPKI object types or local configuration information provided by an operator.</t>
      <t>Configuration Information: Information configured locally by the network operator that describes the authorized use or propagation of source prefixes. Such information may be used by SAV mechanisms to generate or update the SAV table.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="test-methodology">
      <name>Test Methodology</name>
      <section anchor="test-setup">
        <name>Test Setup</name>
        <t>The test setup in general is compliant with <xref target="RFC2544"/>. The DUT is connected to a Tester and other network devices to construct the network topology introduced in <xref target="testcase-sec"/>. The Tester is a traffic generator that generates network traffic with specified source and destination addresses in order to emulate spoofed or legitimate traffic. The Tester may also emulate routing peers, hosts, customer networks with no AS, or neighboring ASes, depending on the test case.</t>
        <figure anchor="testsetup">
          <name>Generic Test Setup.</name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
    +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
    | Test Network Environment |
    |     +--------------+     |
    |     |              |     |
+-->|     |      DUT     |     |---+
|   |     |              |     |   |
|   |     +--------------+     |   |
|   +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+   |
|                                  |
|         +--------------+         |
+---------|    Tester    |<--------+
          +--------------+
]]></artwork>
        </figure>
        <t><xref target="testsetup"/> illustrates the generic test configuration. Within the test network environment, the DUT can be interconnected with other devices to create the specific intra-domain or inter-domain test scenarios described in <xref target="testcase-sec"/>. The Tester may connect directly to the DUT or indirectly through other emulated routers or ASes. The Tester generates both spoofed and legitimate traffic for SAV accuracy tests and may generate traffic at controlled offered loads for data-plane performance tests. Accuracy tests <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be conducted at an offered traffic rate below the loss-free forwarding capacity of the DUT. The measurement method <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> also distinguish packets blocked by SAV from packets lost for unrelated reasons, including congestion, interface errors, or routing transitions. The DUT is expected to provide logs, counters, telemetry, or other observable outputs sufficient to compute the performance indicators defined in this document. When DUT counters are unavailable, an equivalent instrumented test setup <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> establish the SAV decision for each counted test packet.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="network-topology-and-device-configuration">
        <name>Network Topology and Device Configuration</name>
        <t>The position of the DUT within the test topology has an impact on SAV performance. Therefore, each benchmark report must identify the DUT location and the interface on which SAV is evaluated.</t>
        <t>For intra-domain SAV, the report must specify whether the DUT interface faces a single host, a set of hosts, or a customer network with no AS. 
For inter-domain SAV, the report must identify the customer, provider, or lateral-peer relationship associated with the tested data-plane ingress interface. For route-server-assisted peering, the report must separately identify the RS/RS-client control-plane relationships and the IXP data-plane interface used for SAV benchmarking.</t>
        <t>The routing, policy, and SAV configurations used in the test must be documented. Examples include IGP configuration, BGP configuration, business relationships, NO_EXPORT or NO_ADVERTISE communities, route-policy configuration, and any SAV-specific configuration. If the DUT uses SAV-related information, SAV-specific information, configuration information, or a combination of these, their sources, availability, and update procedures should be documented. The test topology <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> also identify which ASes or tested interfaces deploy SAV and which do not.</t>
        <t>When evaluating data-plane forwarding performance, the traffic generated by the Tester must be characterized by traffic rate, packet size distribution, ratio of spoofed to legitimate traffic, source prefix distribution, destination prefix distribution, and the ingress interface on which the traffic is received.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sav-performance-indicators">
      <name>SAV Performance Indicators</name>
      <t>This section lists key performance indicators (KPIs) for SAV benchmarking tests. All KPIs should be measured in the applicable benchmarking scenarios described in <xref target="testcase-sec"/>. The standard deviation of repeated test results should be reported for each fixed test setup. The data-plane SAV table refresh rate and data-plane forwarding rate should be measured using varying SAV table sizes to show the sensitivity of the DUT to the SAV table size. Accuracy measurements require independently established ground truth for the legitimacy of each test source address on the tested ingress interface.</t>
      <section anchor="false-positive-rate">
        <name>False Positive Rate</name>
        <t>The ratio of legitimate packets improperly blocked by SAV to the total number of legitimate test packets presented to the SAV function at the tested ingress interface. This metric corresponds to the improper block rate and is computed on a per-packet basis: FPR = N_improper_block / N_legitimate. Packet loss not caused by an SAV decision <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be counted as an improper block. If no legitimate test packets are presented, FPR is not applicable for that test run.</t>
        <t>Note that other computation methods, such as byte-count-based computation, may be used for supplementary analysis, but are outside the scope of the normative metric definition in this document.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="false-negative-rate">
        <name>False Negative Rate</name>
        <t>The ratio of spoofed packets improperly permitted by SAV to the total number of spoofed test packets presented to the SAV function at the tested ingress interface. This metric corresponds to the improper permit rate and is computed on a per-packet basis: FNR = N_improper_permit / N_spoofed. A spoofed packet counted as an improper permit <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be shown to have passed SAV validation, rather than inferred solely from unrelated forwarding behavior. If no spoofed test packets are presented, FNR is not applicable for that test run.</t>
        <t>Note that other computation methods, such as byte-count-based computation, may be used for supplementary analysis, but are outside the scope of the normative metric definition in this document.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sav-convergence-time">
        <name>SAV Convergence Time</name>
        <t>SAV convergence time measures the elapsed time from a relevant input-state change becoming observable to the DUT until the corresponding SAV table reaches a stable updated state at the tested interface. Changes can include route announcements or withdrawals, policy or prefix-authorization changes, configuration changes, and SAV-specific information updates. The report <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> distinguish underlying information convergence, SAV computation, and SAV table installation when these stages are observable. The trigger timestamp and the method used to determine table stability <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be documented; any optional measurement from the original network event to the DUT-visible change should be reported separately.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="protocol-message-processing-throughput">
        <name>Protocol Message Processing Throughput</name>
        <t>The protocol message processing throughput measures the sustained rate at which the DUT processes control-plane messages used to communicate SAV-related or SAV-specific information. It <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be reported in messages per second and, where applicable, updates, changed prefixes, or SAV objects per second; byte rate may be reported as a supplementary metric.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="data-plane-sav-table-refreshing-rate">
        <name>Data Plane SAV Table Refreshing Rate</name>
        <t>The data-plane SAV table refreshing rate measures the number of SAV table entries installed, modified, or removed per second. The total installation latency and the initial table size <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> also be reported. An update held intentionally by the mechanism, for example due to configured withdrawal hysteresis, <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be distinguished from the subsequent data-plane installation time.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="data-plane-forwarding-rate">
        <name>Data Plane Forwarding Rate</name>
        <t>The data-plane forwarding rate measures the throughput of legitimate traffic forwarded while SAV is enabled and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be reported in packets per second and/or bits per second. The same traffic profile should be tested with SAV disabled to quantify its relative forwarding impact. Spoofed packets intentionally blocked by SAV are not forwarding loss.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="resource-utilization">
        <name>Resource Utilization</name>
        <t>Resource utilization refers to the CPU, memory, and other relevant resources consumed by SAV control-plane and data-plane processes on the DUT. CPU and memory utilization should be recorded continuously during each test and should be reported separately for control-plane and data-plane components when possible.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="testcase-sec">
      <name>Benchmarking Tests</name>
      <section anchor="intra_domain_sav">
        <name>Intra-domain SAV</name>
        <section anchor="false-positive-and-false-negative-rates">
          <name>False Positive and False Negative Rates</name>
          <t><strong>Objective</strong>: Evaluate the false positive rate and false negative rate of the DUT when performing intra-domain SAV on external interfaces facing a single host, a set of hosts, or a customer network with no AS.</t>
          <t>The intra-domain SAV accuracy tests consist of a baseline symmetric-routing scenario and two gap scenarios identified in <xref target="RFC10078"/>: asymmetric routing and hidden prefix. The baseline scenario exercises both improper-block and improper-permit behavior. The asymmetric-routing and hidden-prefix scenarios primarily expose improper blocks, while spoofed traffic can also be used to detect overly permissive validation behavior. The DUT should be evaluated on the external interface where SAV is applied. The generated spoofed traffic should include different types of forged source addresses, such as source addresses not assigned to the connected entity, private-use or special-purpose addresses when applicable, internal-use-only prefixes of the AS, and external prefixes that are routable but not authorized for the tested ingress interface.</t>
          <figure anchor="intra-baseline">
            <name>Intra-domain SAV facing host or customer network with no AS under symmetric routing scenario.</name>
            <artwork><![CDATA[
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
|                   Test Network Environment                 |
|                         +~~~~~~~~~~+                       |
|                         | Router 1 |                       |
| FIB on DUT              +~~~~~~~~~~+                       |
| Dest           Next_hop   /\    |                          |
| 2001:db8::/55  Network 1   |    |                          |
|                            |    \/                         |
|                         +----------+                       |
|                         |   DUT    |                       |
|                         +----------+                       |
|                           /\    |                          |
|               Traffic with |    | Traffic with             |
|        source IP addresses |    | destination IP addresses |
|           of 2001:db8::/55 |    | of 2001:db8::/55         |
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
                             |    \/
                      +------------------------+
                      |Tester (Host or customer|
                      |   network with no AS)  |
                      |     (2001:db8::/55)    |
                      +------------------------+
]]></artwork>
          </figure>
          <t><strong>Intra-domain Symmetric Routing Scenario</strong>: <xref target="intra-baseline"/> shows an intra-domain symmetric routing scenario. The Tester emulates a host, a set of hosts, or a customer network with no AS connected to the DUT. The Tester is authorized to originate traffic using 2001:db8::/55. The DUT applies intra-domain SAV on the interface facing the Tester.</t>
          <t>The <strong>procedure</strong> for this test is as follows:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>Configure the DUT and other routers in <xref target="intra-baseline"/> so that traffic from the Tester to destinations in the domain or outside the domain is forwarded through the DUT.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Configure or advertise the authorized source prefix 2001:db8::/55 according to the SAV mechanism under test.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Send legitimate traffic from the Tester using source addresses in 2001:db8::/55.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Send spoofed traffic from the Tester using source addresses not authorized for the Tester, for example 2001:db8:0:200::/55.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Vary the ratio of legitimate to spoofed traffic, for example from 1:9 to 9:1, and record the DUT counters or logs.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Measure the false positive rate and false negative rate.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
          <t>The test records whether the DUT properly permits the legitimate traffic and properly blocks the spoofed traffic. Any improper blocks and improper permits are reflected in the measured false positive and false negative rates.</t>
          <figure anchor="intra-asymmetric">
            <name>Intra-domain SAV facing host or customer network with no AS under asymmetric routing scenario.</name>
            <artwork><![CDATA[
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
|                         Test Network Environment                       |
|                             +~~~~~~~~~~+                               |
|                             | Router 2 |                               |
| FIB on DUT                  +~~~~~~~~~~+   FIB on Router 1             |
| Dest                Next_hop  /\      \    Dest               Next_hop |
| 2001:db8::/56       Network 1 /        \ 2001:db8:0:100::/56  Network 1|
| 2001:db8:0:100::/56 Router 2 /         \/ 2001:db8::/56       Router 2 |
|                    +----------+     +~~~~~~~~~~+                       |
|                    |   DUT    |     | Router 1 |                       |
|                    +----------+     +~~~~~~~~~~+                       |
|                       /\               /                               |
|           Traffic with \              / Traffic with                   |
|     source IP addresses \            / destination IP addresses        |
|   of 2001:db8:0:100::/56 \          / of 2001:db8:0:100::/56           |
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
                             \      \/
                     +------------------------+
                     |Tester (Host or customer|
                     |   network with no AS)  |
                     |     (2001:db8::/55)    |
                     +------------------------+
]]></artwork>
          </figure>
          <t><strong>Intra-domain Asymmetric Routing Scenario</strong>: <xref target="intra-asymmetric"/> shows an intra-domain asymmetric routing scenario. The host or customer network with no AS owns 2001:db8::/55 and is connected to both the DUT and Router 2. Inbound traffic for 2001:db8:0::/56 uses the DUT, while inbound traffic for 2001:db8:0:100::/56 uses Router 2. The customer network may nevertheless send outbound traffic with source addresses in 2001:db8:0:100::/56 through the DUT. This creates a legitimate asymmetric path.</t>
          <t>The <strong>procedure</strong> for this test is as follows:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>Configure the topology shown in <xref target="intra-asymmetric"/>. The Tester emulates the host or the customer network with no AS and connects to both the DUT and Router 2.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Configure the routing system so that the DUT's route to 2001:db8:0:100::/56 points away from the Tester, while the Tester can send traffic with source addresses in 2001:db8:0:100::/56 to the DUT.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Send legitimate traffic from the Tester to the DUT using source addresses in 2001:db8:0:100::/56.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Send spoofed traffic from the Tester to the DUT using source addresses not authorized for the Tester, for example 2001:db8:0:200::/55.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Vary the ratio of legitimate to spoofed traffic, for example from 1:9 to 9:1, and record the DUT counters or logs.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Measure the false positive rate and false negative rate.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
          <t>The test records whether the DUT permits the legitimate traffic that follows the asymmetric path and blocks the spoofed traffic. Any improper blocks and improper permits are reflected in the measured false positive and false negative rates.</t>
          <figure anchor="intra-hidden-prefix">
            <name>Intra-domain SAV under a hidden prefix scenario.</name>
            <artwork><![CDATA[
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
|                   Test Network Environment                 |
|                         +~~~~~~~~~~+                       |
|                         | Router 1 |                       |
| FIB on DUT              +~~~~~~~~~~+                       |
| Dest            Next_hop  /\    |                          |
| 2001:db8::/56   Network 1  |    |                          |
|                            |    \/                         |
|                         +----------+                       |
|                         |   DUT    |                       |
|                         +----------+                       |
|                           /\    |                          |
|         Hidden-source     |    |  Traffic to the           |
|         traffic from      |    |  visible prefix           |
|    2001:db8:0:100::/56    |    |  2001:db8::/56            |
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
                             |    \/
                      +------------------------+
                      |Tester (Host or customer|
                      |   network with no AS)  |
                      +------------------------+
Visible/assigned prefix:  2001:db8::/56
Hidden source prefix:     2001:db8:0:100::/56
]]></artwork>
          </figure>
          <t><strong>Intra-domain Hidden Prefix Scenario</strong>: <xref target="intra-hidden-prefix"/> shows an intra-domain hidden prefix scenario. The Tester emulates a host or customer network with no AS that legitimately originates traffic from a source prefix not visible to the routing or forwarding information used by the SAV mechanism. Examples include DSR deployments or other cases where the authorized source prefix is not propagated within the operator's intra-domain routing system.</t>
          <t>The <strong>procedure</strong> for this test is as follows:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>Configure the Tester as a host, a set of hosts, or a customer network with no AS connected to the DUT.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Configure the test so that 2001:db8::/56 is visible to the DUT as an assigned or routed prefix, while 2001:db8:0:100::/56 is a legitimate source prefix for the Tester but is not visible in the routing or forwarding information normally used by the DUT.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Send legitimate traffic from the Tester using source addresses in 2001:db8:0:100::/56.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Send spoofed traffic from the Tester using source addresses not authorized for the Tester.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Measure the false positive rate and false negative rate.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
          <t>The test records whether the DUT permits legitimate traffic from the hidden prefix and blocks spoofed control traffic. This scenario primarily exercises improper-block behavior. If the DUT does not support the information needed to authorize the hidden prefix, the report should record the resulting improper block behavior.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="intra-control-plane-sec">
          <name>Control Plane Performance</name>
          <t><strong>Objective</strong>: Measure the SAV protocol convergence performance of the DUT and, when applicable, the processing performance of control-plane messages used to communicate SAV-related or SAV-specific information.</t>
          <t><strong>SAV Convergence Performance</strong>: SAV protocol convergence is measured from a relevant input-state change until the corresponding SAV table has been updated on the DUT. The input-state change can be a route announcement or withdrawal, policy or configuration change, prefix-authorization change, or SAV-specific information update. The test should distinguish SAV convergence from the convergence of an underlying routing protocol when the distinction is observable.</t>
          <figure anchor="intra-convg-perf">
            <name>Test setup for control-plane performance measurement.</name>
            <artwork><![CDATA[
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+      +-------------+          +-----------+
| Emulated Topology |------|   Tester    |<-------->|    DUT    |
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+      +-------------+          +-----------+
]]></artwork>
          </figure>
          <t>The <strong>procedure</strong> for measuring SAV convergence is as follows:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>Set up the test environment as depicted in <xref target="intra-convg-perf"/>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Establish a stable initial routing and SAV state and record the initial SAV table.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Trigger a specified number or percentage of changes in the information used by the DUT for SAV, for example by announcing or withdrawing prefixes, changing configuration or authorization information, or updating SAV-specific information.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Record the time at which the relevant change becomes observable to the DUT and the time at which the corresponding SAV table reaches the stable updated state on the tested interface. Document how the completion time is established.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Repeat the test for different initial SAV table sizes and different numbers or percentages of changed entries. Test additions, modifications, and removals separately where applicable; document any configured withdrawal hysteresis.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Report SAV convergence time and, where observable, separately report the contribution of underlying routing or information convergence, SAV computation, and SAV table installation. When controlled legitimate and spoofed test traffic is available, report FPR and FNR during the transition and after convergence, with the observation intervals identified.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
          <t>For an IGP-driven test in which the trigger is an adjacency failure, the receipt time of the last hello message, or a more explicit shutdown indication when available, may be used as the routing-event timestamp as described in <xref target="RFC4061"/>. This timestamp represents the underlying routing trigger; if it precedes the DUT-visible SAV input change, the earlier start point <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be identified and the resulting end-to-end interval distinguished from SAV convergence time as defined in this document.</t>
          <t><strong>Protocol Message Processing Performance</strong>: This test is <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> and applies when the SAV mechanism receives explicit control-plane messages carrying information used for SAV. The offered load <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be expressed primarily as messages per second, updates per second, or changed prefixes/objects per second rather than as a percentage of link capacity. Byte rate <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be reported as a supplementary metric.</t>
          <t>The <strong>procedure</strong> for testing protocol message processing performance is as follows:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>Set up the test environment as shown in <xref target="intra-convg-perf"/>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Send control-plane updates at increasing offered rates, expressed in messages per second and, where applicable, changed prefixes or SAV objects per second.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>For each offered rate, record the number of messages or updates successfully processed, the processing interval, queueing or backlog when observable, and any message loss or processing failure.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Report the sustained processing throughput and the offered rate at which processing backlog or loss begins to occur.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
        </section>
        <section anchor="intra-data-plane-sec">
          <name>Data Plane Performance</name>
          <t><strong>Objective</strong>: Evaluate SAV table refresh performance and packet-processing performance while SAV is enabled.</t>
          <t><strong>Data Plane SAV Table Refreshing Performance</strong>: This metric measures how quickly the DUT installs, modifies, or removes entries in the data-plane SAV table after the corresponding SAV state has been computed.</t>
          <t>The <strong>procedure</strong> for testing data-plane SAV table refresh performance is as follows:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>Establish an initial SAV table of a specified size.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Trigger a batch of changes that causes a specified number or percentage of SAV table entries to be added, modified, or removed.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Record the number of changed entries and the time from the start of data-plane installation until the update is complete. Distinguish deliberate update hold-down or hysteresis from installation latency where applicable.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Repeat the test for multiple initial SAV table sizes and multiple update sizes, for example 1%, 10%, 50%, and 100% of the table.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Report the refresh rate in entries per second and the total installation latency. Additions, modifications, and removals <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be reported separately when their performance differs materially.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
          <t><strong>Data Plane Forwarding Performance</strong>: The forwarding benchmark <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> distinguish intentional SAV filtering from unintended forwarding loss. The primary forwarding-performance comparison uses legitimate traffic and compares SAV enabled with SAV disabled. The Tester increases the offered load and determines the forwarding throughput at which legitimate traffic is forwarded without unintended loss according to the selected benchmarking procedure.</t>
          <t>A supplementary mixed-traffic test <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> combine legitimate and spoofed traffic to characterize SAV packet-processing behavior under different traffic compositions. For a mixed-traffic test, the report <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> separately identify the offered packet rate, legitimate forwarding rate, spoofed blocking rate, and any unintended loss. Intentionally blocked spoofed packets <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be counted as forwarding-performance loss.</t>
          <t>The <strong>procedure</strong> for testing data-plane forwarding performance is as follows:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>Establish a stable, fully populated SAV table and record its size.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Send legitimate traffic at increasing offered loads and measure forwarding performance with SAV enabled.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Repeat the same traffic profile with SAV disabled and report the relative performance impact of SAV.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Optionally, repeat the test with mixtures of legitimate and spoofed traffic, varying the ratio, for example from 1:9 to 9:1.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>For mixed traffic, report legitimate forwarding and spoofed blocking separately, together with any unintended packet loss.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="inter_domain_sav">
        <name>Inter-domain SAV</name>
        <section anchor="false-positive-and-false-negative-rates-1">
          <name>False Positive and False Negative Rates</name>
          <t><strong>Objective</strong>: Evaluate the false positive rate and false negative rate of the DUT when performing inter-domain SAV on an external interface connected to a neighboring AS.</t>
          <t>The inter-domain SAV accuracy tests include the Limited Propagation of a Prefix (LPP), Hidden Prefix (HP), and Source Address Spoofing within a Customer Cone (SCC) scenarios at customer interfaces. At provider interfaces, the primary improper-permit scenario is source address spoofing from providers. A symmetric-routing customer-interface test is retained as a baseline. The generated spoofed traffic should include source addresses belonging to prefixes outside the legitimate set for the tested ingress interface, prefixes originated elsewhere in the customer cone, prefixes originated by the SAV-performing AS, special-purpose or unallocated prefixes when applicable, and prefixes associated with other ASes.</t>
          <figure anchor="inter-customer-syn">
            <name>SAV for customer-facing ASes in inter-domain symmetric routing scenario.</name>
            <artwork><![CDATA[
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
|                  Test Network Environment                |
|                        +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+                |
|                        |    AS 3(P3)    |                |
|                        +~+/\~~~~~~+/\+~~+                |
|                           /         \                    |
|                          /           \                   |
|                         /             \                  |
|                        / (C2P)         \                 |
|              +------------------+       \                |
|              |   DUT:AS 4(P4)   |        \               |
|              +-+/\+-+/\+----+/\++         \              |
|                 /     |       \            \             |
|      P2[AS 2]  /      |        \            \            |
|P6[AS 2, AS 1] /       |         \            \           |
|P1[AS 2, AS 1]/ (C2P)  |          \ P5[AS 5]   \ P5[AS 5] |
|+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+     |           \            \         |
||    AS 2(P2)    |     | P1[AS 1]   \            \        |
|+~~~~~~~~~~+/\+~~+     | P6[AS 1]    \            \       |
|             \         |              \            \      |
|     P6[AS 1] \        |               \            \     |
|      P1[AS 1] \       |                \            \    |
|          (C2P) \      | (C2P)     (C2P) \      (C2P) \   |
|             +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+        +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+ |
|             |  AS 1(P1, P6)  |        |    AS 5(P5)    | |
|             +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+        +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+ |
|                  /\     |                                |
|                  |      |                                |
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
                   |     \/
              +----------------+
              |     Tester     |
              +----------------+
]]></artwork>
          </figure>
          <t><strong>SAV at a Customer Interface under Symmetric Routing</strong>: <xref target="inter-customer-syn"/> presents a test case for SAV in customer-facing ASes under an inter-domain symmetric routing scenario. In this setup, AS 1, AS 2, AS 3, the DUT, and AS 5 form the test network environment, with the DUT representing the SAV-performing border router of AS 4. AS 1 is a customer of both AS 2 and AS 4; AS 2 is a customer of the DUT, which in turn is a customer of AS 3; and AS 5 is a customer of both AS 3 and the DUT. AS 1 advertises prefixes P1 and P6 to AS 2 and the DUT, respectively. AS 2 then propagates routes for P1 and P6 to the DUT, enabling the DUT to learn these prefixes from both AS 1 and AS 2. In this test, the legitimate path for traffic with source addresses in P1 and destination addresses in P4 is AS 1-&gt;AS 2-&gt;DUT. The Tester is connected to AS 1 to evaluate the DUT's SAV performance for customer-facing ASes.</t>
          <t>The <strong>procedure</strong> for testing SAV in this scenario is as follows:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>To evaluate whether the DUT can generate accurate SAV rules for customer-facing ASes under symmetric inter-domain routing scenario, construct the test environment as shown in <xref target="inter-customer-syn"/>. The Tester is connected to AS 1 and generates test traffic toward the DUT.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Configure AS 1, AS 2, AS 3, the DUT, and AS 5 to establish symmetric routing environment.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>The Tester sends both legitimate traffic (with source addresses in P1 and destination addresses in P4) and spoofed traffic (with source addresses in P5 and destination addresses in P4) to the DUT via AS 2. The ratio of spoofed to legitimate traffic may vary, for example, from 1:9 to 9:1.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
          <t>The test records whether the DUT blocks the spoofed traffic and permits the legitimate traffic received from the direction of AS 2. Any improper block or improper permit is reflected in the measured false positive or false negative rate.</t>
          <t>The DUT may also be placed in AS 1 or AS 2 for supplementary tests. In that case, the tested interface, traffic paths, and source-address authorization ground truth <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be re-established before applying the accuracy methodology.</t>
          <figure anchor="inter-customer-lpp">
            <name>SAV for customer-facing ASes in inter-domain asymmetric routing scenario caused by NO_EXPORT.</name>
            <artwork><![CDATA[
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
|                  Test Network Environment                |
|                        +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+                |
|                        |    AS 3(P3)    |                |
|                        +~+/\~~~~~~+/\+~~+                |
|                           /         \                    |
|                          /           \                   |
|                         /             \                  |
|                        / (C2P)         \                 |
|              +------------------+       \                |
|              |   DUT:AS 4(P4)   |        \               |
|              ++/\+--+/\+----+/\++         \              |
|                /      |       \            \             |
|      P2[AS 2] /       |        \            \            |
|P6[AS 2, AS 1]/        |         \            \           |
|             / (C2P)   |          \ P5[AS 5]   \ P5[AS 5] |
|+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+     |           \            \         |
||    AS 2(P2)    |     | P1[AS 1]   \            \        |
|+~~~~~~~~~~+/\+~~+     | P6[AS 1]    \            \       |
|    P6[AS 1] \         | NO_EXPORT    \            \      |
|     P1[AS 1] \        |               \            \     |
|     NO_EXPORT \       |                \            \    |
|          (C2P) \      | (C2P)     (C2P) \      (C2P) \   |
|             +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+        +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+ |
|             |  AS 1(P1, P6)  |        |    AS 5(P5)    | |
|             +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+        +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+ |
|                  /\     |                                |
|                  |      |                                |
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
                   |     \/
              +----------------+
              |     Tester     |
              +----------------+
]]></artwork>
          </figure>
          <t><strong>SAV at a Customer Interface under the Limited Propagation of a Prefix (LPP) Scenario</strong>: <xref target="inter-customer-lpp"/> presents a test case for SAV at a customer interface under a Limited Propagation of a Prefix (LPP) scenario. In this example, limited propagation is induced by NO_EXPORT community configuration. In this setup, AS 1, AS 2, AS 3, the DUT, and AS 5 form the test network, with the DUT representing the SAV-performing border router of AS 4. AS 1 is a customer of both AS 2 and AS 4; AS 2 is a customer of the DUT, which is itself a customer of AS 3; and AS 5 is a customer of both AS 3 and the DUT. AS 1 advertises prefix P1 to AS 2 with the NO_EXPORT community attribute, preventing AS 2 from propagating the route for P1 to the DUT. Similarly, AS 1 advertises prefix P6 to the DUT with the NO_EXPORT attribute, preventing the DUT from propagating this route to AS 3. As a result, the DUT learns the route for prefix P1 only from AS 1. The legitimate path for traffic with source addresses in P1 and destination addresses in P4 is AS 1-&gt;AS 2-&gt;DUT. The Tester is connected to AS 1 to evaluate the DUT's SAV performance for customer-facing ASes.</t>
          <t>The <strong>procedure</strong> for testing SAV in this asymmetric routing scenario is as follows:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>To evaluate the DUT under an LPP scenario created using NO_EXPORT, construct the test environment as shown in <xref target="inter-customer-lpp"/>. The Tester is connected to AS 1 and generates test traffic toward the DUT.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Configure AS 1, AS 2, AS 3, the DUT, and AS 5 to establish the asymmetric routing scenario.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>The Tester sends both legitimate traffic (with source addresses in P1 and destination addresses in P4) and spoofed traffic (with source addresses in P5 and destination addresses in P4) to the DUT via AS 2. The ratio of spoofed to legitimate traffic may vary, for example, from 1:9 to 9:1.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
          <t>The test records whether the DUT blocks the spoofed traffic and permits the legitimate traffic received from the direction of AS 2. Any improper block or improper permit is reflected in the measured false positive or false negative rate.</t>
          <t>The DUT may also be placed in AS 1 or AS 2 for supplementary tests, provided that the routing policy, tested interface, and authorization ground truth are adjusted to preserve an LPP scenario at that location.</t>
          <figure anchor="inter-customer-dsr">
            <name>SAV for customer-facing ASes in the scenario of hidden prefix caused by direct server return (DSR).</name>
            <artwork><![CDATA[
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
|                  Test Network Environment                       |
|                                +----------------+               |
|                Anycast Server+-+  AS 3(P3, P7)  |               |
|                                +-+/\----+/\+----+               |
|                                   /       \                     |
|                       / P3[AS 3] /         \ P3[AS 3] \         |
|                      / P7[AS 3] /           \ P7[AS 3] \        |
|                     \/         / (C2P)       \         \/       |
|                       +----------------+      \                 |
|                       |  DUT: AS 4(P4) |       \                |
|                       ++/\+--+/\+--+/\++        \               |
|                         /     |      \           \              |
|       / P3[AS 4, AS 3] /      |       \           \             |
|      / P7[AS 4, AS 3] /       |        \           \            |
|    \/                / (C2P)  |         \ P5[AS 5]  \ P5[AS 5]  |
|      +----------------+       |          \           \          |
|User+-+    AS 2(P2)    |       | P1[AS 1]  \           \         |
|      +----------+/\+--+       | P6[AS 1]   \           \        |
|                   \           |             \           \       |
|           P6[AS 1] \          |              \           \      |
|            P1[AS 1] \         |               \           \     |
|                      \(C2P)   |(C2P)      (C2P)\      (C2P)\    |
|                    +---------------+         +----------------+ |
|       Edge Server+-+  AS 1(P1, P6)  |        |    AS 5(P5)    | |
|                    +----------------+        +----------------+ |
|                         /\     |                                |
|                          |     |                                |
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
                           |    \/
                     +----------------+
                     |     Tester     |
                     | (Edge Server)  |
                     +----------------+
P7 is the anycast prefix and is originated only by AS 3 via BGP.
Note that the prefix route propagations relevant to the DSR
scenario are depicted; not all prefix propagations are depicted.
]]></artwork>
          </figure>
          <t><strong>SAV at a Customer Interface under the Hidden Prefix (HP) Scenario</strong>: <xref target="inter-customer-dsr"/> presents a test case for SAV at a customer interface under a Hidden Prefix (HP) scenario. DSR is used as one representative realization of the HP scenario. In this setup, AS 1, AS 2, AS 3, the DUT, and AS 5 form the test network, with the DUT representing the SAV-performing border router of AS 4. AS 1 is a customer of both AS 2 and AS 4; AS 2 is a customer of the DUT, which is itself a customer of AS 3; and AS 5 is a customer of both AS 3 and the DUT. When users in AS 2 send requests to an anycast destination IP in P7, the forwarding path is AS 2-&gt;DUT-&gt;AS 3. Anycast servers in AS 3 receive the requests and tunnel them to edge servers in AS 1. The edge servers then return content to the users with source addresses in prefix P7. If the reverse forwarding path is AS 1-&gt;DUT-&gt;AS 2, the Tester sends traffic with source addresses in P7 and destination addresses in P2 along the path AS 1-&gt;DUT-&gt;AS 2. Alternatively, if the reverse forwarding path is AS 1-&gt;AS 2, the Tester sends traffic with source addresses in P7 and destination addresses in P2 along the path AS 1-&gt;AS 2. In this case, AS 2 may serve as the DUT.</t>
          <t>The <strong>procedure</strong> for testing SAV in this DSR scenario is as follows:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>To evaluate whether the DUT can generate accurate SAV rules under DSR conditions, construct the test environment as shown in <xref target="inter-customer-dsr"/>. The Tester is connected to AS 1 and generates test traffic toward the DUT.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Configure AS 1, AS 2, AS 3, the DUT, and AS 5 to establish the DSR scenario.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>The Tester sends legitimate traffic (with source addresses in P7 and destination addresses in P2) to AS 2 via the DUT.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
          <t>The test records whether the DUT permits legitimate traffic with source addresses in P7 received from the direction of AS 1. This HP scenario primarily exercises improper-block behavior. Other HP cases, including prefixes legitimately used only as source addresses without being advertised through BGP, may be tested using the same methodology.</t>
          <t>If a DUT is instead placed in AS 2, the Tester, traffic path, and tested ingress interface <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be reconfigured to exercise the HP scenario at that DUT. This example sends legitimate P7 traffic and therefore measures improper-block behavior; FNR is not applicable unless spoofed test traffic is also sent.</t>
          <figure anchor="inter-customer-reflect">
            <name>SAV for customer-facing ASes in the scenario of reflection attacks.</name>
            <artwork><![CDATA[
             +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
             |                   Test Network Environment                 |
             |                          +----------------+                |
             |                          |    AS 3(P3)    |                |
             |                          +--+/\+--+/\+----+                |
             |                              /      \                      |
             |                             /        \                     |
             |                            /          \                    |
             |                           / (C2P)      \                   |
             |                  +----------------+     \                  |
             |                  |     DUT(P4)    |      \                 |
             |                  ++/\+--+/\+--+/\++       \                |
             |     P6[AS 1, AS 2] /     |      \          \               |
             |          P2[AS 2] /      |       \          \              |
             |                  /       |        \          \             |
             |                 / (C2P)  |         \ P5[AS 5] \ P5[AS 5]   |
+----------+ |  +----------------+      |          \          \           |
|  Tester  |-|->|                |      |           \          \          |
|(Attacker)| |  |    AS 2(P2)    |      |            \          \         |
|  (P1')   |<|--|                |      | P1[AS 1]    \          \        |
+----------+ |  +---------+/\+---+      | P6[AS 1]     \          \       |
             |     P6[AS 1] \           | NO_EXPORT     \          \      |
             |      P1[AS 1] \          |                \          \     |
             |      NO_EXPORT \         |                 \          \    |
             |                 \ (C2P)  | (C2P)      (C2P) \    (C2P) \   |
             |             +----------------+          +----------------+ |
             |     Victim+-+  AS 1(P1, P6)  |  Server+-+    AS 5(P5)    | |
             |             +----------------+          +----------------+ |
             +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
P1' is the spoofed source prefix P1 by the attacker which is inside of 
AS 2 or connected to AS 2 through other ASes.
]]></artwork>
          </figure>
          <t><strong>SAV at a Customer Interface under the Source Address Spoofing within a Customer Cone (SCC) Scenario -- Reflection Variant</strong>: <xref target="inter-customer-reflect"/> illustrates a test case for SAV in customer-facing ASes under a reflection attack scenario. In this SCC scenario, source address spoofing occurs within the DUT's customer cone and is used to trigger a reflection attack. The attacker spoofs the victim's IP address (P1) and sends requests to server IP addresses (P5) that are configured to respond to such requests. The Tester emulates the attacker by performing source address spoofing. The arrows in <xref target="inter-customer-reflect"/> indicate the business relationships between ASes: AS 3 serves as the provider for both the DUT and AS 5, while the DUT acts as the provider for AS 1, AS 2, and AS 5. Additionally, AS 2 is the provider for AS 1.</t>
          <t>The <strong>procedure</strong> for testing SAV under reflection attack conditions is as follows:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>To evaluate whether the DUT can generate accurate SAV rules in a reflection attack scenario, construct the test environment as shown in <xref target="inter-customer-reflect"/>. The Tester is connected to AS 2 and generates test traffic toward the DUT.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Configure AS 1, AS 2, AS 3, the DUT, and AS 5 to simulate the reflection attack scenario.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>The Tester sends spoofed traffic (with source addresses in P1 and destination addresses in P5) toward AS 5 via the DUT.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
          <t>The test records whether spoofed traffic with source addresses in P1 is permitted on the AS 2-facing interface. Because legitimate traffic from AS 1 can also traverse AS 2 and enter the DUT through that same interface with source addresses in P1, the DUT may be unable to distinguish these packets using source prefix and ingress interface alone. This variant measures the residual improper-permit behavior under the specified deployment conditions; such permits <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> automatically be interpreted as a DUT implementation defect.</t>
          <t>The DUT may also be placed in AS 1 or AS 2 for supplementary tests, provided that the tested ingress interface, legitimate-source authorization, and traffic paths are re-established.</t>
          <figure anchor="inter-customer-direct">
            <name>SAV for customer-facing ASes in the scenario of direct attacks.</name>
            <artwork><![CDATA[
             +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
             |                   Test Network Environment                 |
             |                          +----------------+                |
             |                          |    AS 3(P3)    |                |
             |                          +--+/\+--+/\+----+                |
             |                              /      \                      |
             |                             /        \                     |
             |                            /          \                    |
             |                           / (C2P)      \                   |
             |                  +----------------+     \                  |
             |                  |     DUT(P4)    |      \                 |
             |                  ++/\+--+/\+--+/\++       \                |
             |     P6[AS 1, AS 2] /     |      \          \               |
             |          P2[AS 2] /      |       \          \              |
             |                  /       |        \          \             |
             |                 / (C2P)  |         \ P5[AS 5] \ P5[AS 5]   |
+----------+ |  +----------------+      |          \          \           |
|  Tester  |-|->|                |      |           \          \          |
|(Attacker)| |  |    AS 2(P2)    |      |            \          \         |
|  (P5')   |<|--|                |      | P1[AS 1]    \          \        |
+----------+ |  +---------+/\+---+      | P6[AS 1]     \          \       |
             |     P6[AS 1] \           | NO_EXPORT     \          \      |
             |      P1[AS 1] \          |                \          \     |
             |      NO_EXPORT \         |                 \          \    |
             |                 \ (C2P)  | (C2P)      (C2P) \    (C2P) \   |
             |             +----------------+          +----------------+ |
             |     Victim+-+  AS 1(P1, P6)  |          |    AS 5(P5)    | |
             |             +----------------+          +----------------+ |
             +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
P5' is the spoofed source prefix P5 by the attacker which is inside of 
AS 2 or connected to AS 2 through other ASes.
]]></artwork>
          </figure>
          <t><strong>SAV at a Customer Interface under the Source Address Spoofing within a Customer Cone (SCC) Scenario -- Direct Variant</strong>: <xref target="inter-customer-direct"/> presents a test case for SAV in customer-facing ASes under a direct attack scenario. In this SCC scenario, source address spoofing occurs within the DUT's customer cone and the spoofed traffic is sent directly toward the victim. The attacker spoofs a source address (P5) and directly targets the victim's IP address (P1), aiming to overwhelm its network resources. The Tester emulates the attacker by performing source address spoofing. The arrows in <xref target="inter-customer-direct"/> indicate the business relationships between ASes: AS 3 serves as the provider for both the DUT and AS 5, while the DUT acts as the provider for AS 1, AS 2, and AS 5. Additionally, AS 2 is the provider for AS 1.</t>
          <t>The <strong>procedure</strong> for testing SAV under direct attack conditions is as follows:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>To evaluate whether the DUT can generate accurate SAV rules in a direct attack scenario, construct the test environment as shown in <xref target="inter-customer-direct"/>. The Tester is connected to AS 2 and generates test traffic toward the DUT.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Configure AS 1, AS 2, AS 3, the DUT, and AS 5 to simulate the direct attack scenario.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>The Tester sends spoofed traffic (with source addresses in P5 and destination addresses in P1) toward AS 1 via the DUT.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
          <t>The test records whether the DUT blocks spoofed traffic with source addresses in P5 received from the direction of AS 2. Unlike the preceding same-ingress case, this variant evaluates directionality across customer interfaces and primarily exercises improper-permit behavior. The report <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> identify the ASes and interfaces that have deployed SAV and the information available to the DUT.</t>
          <t>The two SCC variants illustrate distinct visibility limits. When spoofed and legitimate traffic using the same source prefix arrive through the same customer interface and the DUT has no additional distinguishing information, a single DUT may be unable to prevent the improper permit. Such limitations depend on the location of the spoofing source, the ingress interface, and the SAV deployment scope within the customer cone, as discussed in <xref target="I-D.ietf-savnet-inter-domain-problem-statement"/>. The report <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> identify these conditions when interpreting results.</t>
          <t>The DUT may also be placed in AS 1 or AS 2 for supplementary tests, but the tested interface, traffic paths, legitimate-source ground truth, and applicable test procedure <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be re-established for each DUT placement.</t>
          <figure anchor="reflection-attack-p">
            <name>SAV for provider-facing ASes in the scenario of reflection attacks.</name>
            <artwork><![CDATA[
                                   +----------------+
                                   |     Tester     |
                                   |   (Attacker)   |
                                   |      (P1')     |
                                   +----------------+
                                        |     /\
                                        |      |
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
| Test Network Environment              \/     |                    |
|                                  +----------------+               |
|                                  |                |               |
|                                  |    AS 3(P3)    |               |
|                                  |                |               |
|                                  +-+/\----+/\+----+               |
|                                     /       \                     |
|                                    /         \                    |
|                                   /           \                   |
|                                  / (C2P/P2P)   \                  |
|                         +----------------+      \                 |
|                         |     DUT(P4)    |       \                |
|                         ++/\+--+/\+--+/\++        \               |
|            P6[AS 1, AS 2] /     |      \           \              |
|                 P2[AS 2] /      |       \           \             |
|                         /       |        \           \            |
|                        / (C2P)  |         \ P5[AS 5]  \ P5[AS 5]  |
|        +----------------+       |          \           \          |
|Server+-+    AS 2(P2)    |       | P1[AS 1]  \           \         |
|        +----------+/\+--+       | P6[AS 1]   \           \        |
|            P6[AS 1] \           | NO_EXPORT   \           \       |
|             P1[AS 1] \          |              \           \      |
|             NO_EXPORT \         |               \           \     |
|                        \ (C2P)  | (C2P)    (C2P) \     (C2P) \    |
|                      +----------------+        +----------------+ |
|              Victim+-+  AS 1(P1, P6)  |        |    AS 5(P5)    | |
|                      +----------------+        +----------------+ |
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
P1' is the spoofed source prefix P1 by the attacker which is inside of 
AS 3 or connected to AS 3 through other ASes.
]]></artwork>
          </figure>
          <t><strong>SAV at a Provider Interface under the Spoofing-from-Providers Scenario -- Reflection Variant</strong>: <xref target="reflection-attack-p"/> illustrates a test case for SAV in provider/peer-facing ASes under a reflection attack scenario. In this scenario, the attacker spoofs the victim's IP address (P1) and sends requests to server IP addresses (P2) that are configured to respond. The Tester emulates the attacker by performing source address spoofing. The servers then send overwhelming responses to the victim, exhausting its network resources. The arrows in <xref target="reflection-attack-p"/> represent the business relationships between ASes: AS 3 acts as either a provider or a lateral peer of the DUT and is the provider for AS 5, while the DUT serves as the provider for AS 1, AS 2, and AS 5. Additionally, AS 2 is the provider for AS 1.</t>
          <t>The <strong>procedure</strong> for testing SAV under reflection attack conditions is as follows:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>To evaluate the DUT under a spoofing-from-providers scenario using reflection traffic, construct the test environment as shown in <xref target="reflection-attack-p"/>. The Tester is connected to AS 3 and generates test traffic toward the DUT.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Configure AS 1, AS 2, AS 3, the DUT, and AS 5 to simulate the reflection attack scenario.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>The Tester sends spoofed traffic (with source addresses in P1 and destination addresses in P2) toward AS 2 via AS 3 and the DUT.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
          <t>The test records whether the DUT blocks spoofed traffic with source addresses in P1 received from the direction of AS 3. This spoofing-from-providers variant primarily exercises improper-permit behavior.</t>
          <t>Any supplementary DUT placement in AS 1 or AS 2 requires reconfiguring the tested ingress interface and traffic paths and re-establishing source-address authorization ground truth.</t>
          <figure anchor="direct-attack-p">
            <name>SAV for provider-facing ASes in the scenario of direct attacks.</name>
            <artwork><![CDATA[
                           +----------------+
                           |     Tester     |
                           |   (Attacker)   |
                           |      (P2')     |
                           +----------------+
                                |     /\
                                |      |
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
| Test Network Environment      \/     |                    |
|                          +----------------+               |
|                          |    AS 3(P3)    |               |
|                          +-+/\----+/\+----+               |
|                             /       \                     |
|                            /         \                    |
|                           /           \                   |
|                          / (C2P/P2P)   \                  |
|                 +----------------+      \                 |
|                 |     DUT(P4)    |       \                |
|                 ++/\+--+/\+--+/\++        \               |
|    P6[AS 1, AS 2] /     |      \           \              |
|         P2[AS 2] /      |       \           \             |
|                 /       |        \           \            |
|                / (C2P)  |         \ P5[AS 5]  \ P5[AS 5]  |
|+----------------+       |          \           \          |
||    AS 2(P2)    |       | P1[AS 1]  \           \         |
|+----------+/\+--+       | P6[AS 1]   \           \        |
|    P6[AS 1] \           | NO_EXPORT   \           \       |
|     P1[AS 1] \          |              \           \      |
|     NO_EXPORT \         |               \           \     |
|                \ (C2P)  | (C2P)    (C2P) \     (C2P) \    |
|              +----------------+        +----------------+ |
|      Victim+-+  AS 1(P1, P6)  |        |    AS 5(P5)    | |
|              +----------------+        +----------------+ |
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
P2' is the spoofed source prefix P2 by the attacker which is inside of 
AS 3 or connected to AS 3 through other ASes.
]]></artwork>
          </figure>
          <t><strong>SAV at a Provider Interface under the Spoofing-from-Providers Scenario -- Direct Variant</strong>: <xref target="direct-attack-p"/> presents a test case for SAV in provider-facing ASes under a direct attack scenario. In this scenario, the attacker spoofs a source address (P2) and directly targets the victim's IP address (P1), overwhelming its network resources. The arrows in <xref target="direct-attack-p"/> represent the business relationships between ASes: AS 3 acts as either a provider or a lateral peer of the DUT and is the provider for AS 5, while the DUT serves as the provider for AS 1, AS 2, and AS 5. Additionally, AS 2 is the provider for AS 1.</t>
          <t>The procedure for testing SAV under direct attack conditions is as follows:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>To evaluate the DUT under a spoofing-from-providers scenario using direct traffic, construct the test environment as shown in <xref target="direct-attack-p"/>. The Tester is connected to AS 3 and generates test traffic toward the DUT.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Configure AS 1, AS 2, AS 3, the DUT, and AS 5 to simulate the direct attack scenario.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>The Tester sends spoofed traffic (with source addresses in P2 and destination addresses in P1) toward AS 1 via AS 3 and the DUT.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
          <t>The test records whether the DUT blocks spoofed traffic with source addresses in P2 received from the direction of AS 3. This spoofing-from-providers variant primarily exercises improper-permit behavior.</t>
          <t>Any supplementary DUT placement in AS 1 or AS 2 requires reconfiguring the tested ingress interface and traffic paths and re-establishing source-address authorization ground truth.</t>
          <t><strong>Applicability to Peer and Route-Server-Assisted Peering</strong>: For a lateral peer interface, the applicable accuracy test depends on the validation model used by the DUT. If the interface is validated using customer-interface-like directionality, the customer-interface test cases apply. If it is validated using provider-interface-like relaxed filtering, the provider-interface test cases apply. A route server exchanges BGP routes but does not forward data traffic between its RS clients, as described in <xref target="RFC7947"/>. Therefore, a route-server BGP session itself <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be treated as the data-plane ingress interface for SAV accuracy benchmarking. For route-server-assisted peering at an IXP, the DUT <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be placed on an RS client's data-plane ingress interface receiving traffic from IXP member ASes. Depending on the SAV policy, that interface may be modeled as provider-like or as the union of the applicable lateral peers. The report <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> identify the actual data-plane interface and the peer-set assumptions used for determining legitimate source addresses.</t>
          <t><strong>Additional Operational Dynamics</strong>: The following FRR and routing-policy-change tests are supplementary operational scenarios. They evaluate whether SAV behavior remains stable while routing or forwarding state changes.</t>
          <figure anchor="inter-domain-frr-topo">
            <name>Inter-domain SAV under FRR scenario.</name>
            <artwork><![CDATA[
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
|                   Test Network Environment           |
|          +-----------+            +-----------+      |
|          |   AS3     |------------|   AS2     |      |
|          +-----------+            +-----------+      |
|               /\                       /\            |
|               |                        |             |
| primary link  |            backup link |             |
|               | (C2P)                  | (C2P)       |
|        +-----------------------------------------+   |
|        |                   DUT                   |   |
|        +-----------------------------------------+   |
|                           /\                         |
|                           |                          |
|                           | Legitimate and           |
|                           | Spoofed Traffic          |
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
                            | (C2P)
                     +-------------+
                     |    Tester   |
                     +-------------+
]]></artwork>
          </figure>
          <t><strong>SAV for Customer-facing ASes under FRR Scenario</strong>: Inter-domain Fast Reroute (FRR) mechanisms, such as BGP Prefix Independent Convergence (PIC) or MPLS-based FRR, allow rapid failover between ASes after a link or node failure. These events may temporarily desynchronize routing information and SAV rules.</t>
          <t>The <strong>procedure</strong> for testing SAV under FRR scenario is as follows:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>Configure FRR or BGP PIC on the DUT for inter-AS links to AS3 (primary) and AS2 (backup).</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Continuously send legitimate and spoofed traffic from AS1 toward DUT.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Trigger a failure on the AS3 and DUT link to activate the FRR path via AS2.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Measure false positive and false negative rates during and after switchover.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Restore the AS3 link and verify SAV table consistency.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
          <t>The test records false positive and false negative rates during and after the FRR switchover, together with SAV convergence time. Any transient improper permits or improper blocks are reported rather than treated as a pass/fail criterion.</t>
          <figure anchor="inter-domain-pbr-topo">
            <name>Inter-domain SAV under a routing-policy-change scenario.</name>
            <artwork><![CDATA[
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
|               Test Network Environment           |
|     +-----------+            +-----------+       |
|     |   AS3     |------------|   AS2     |       |
|     +-----------+            +-----------+       |
|          /\                       /\             |
|           |                        |             |
|           | preferred path         | default path|
|           | (C2P)                  | (C2P)       |
|    +-----------------------------------------+   |
|    |                  DUT                    |   |
|    +-----------------------------------------+   |
|                        /\                        |
|                         | Legitimate and         |
|                         | Spoofed Traffic        |
|                         |                        |
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~+
                          | (C2P) 
                   +-------------+
                   |    Tester   |
                   +-------------+
]]></artwork>
          </figure>
          <t><strong>SAV for Customer-facing ASes under a Routing Policy Change Scenario</strong>: In inter-domain environments, routing policies such as local preference, route maps, or communities may alter path selection independently of shortest-path routing. Such policy-driven forwarding can affect how the SAV rules are derived and applied.</t>
          <t>The <strong>procedure</strong> for testing SAV under PBR scenario is as follows:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>Configure a routing policy on the DUT (e.g., set local preference) to prefer AS3 for specific prefixes while maintaining AS2 as an alternative path.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Generate legitimate and spoofed traffic from AS1 matching both policy-affected and unaffected prefixes.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Observe SAV filtering behavior before and after policy changes.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>Modify the routing policy dynamically and measure false positive and false negative rates.</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
          <t>The test records false positive and false negative rates before, during, and after the routing-policy change, together with SAV convergence time. Any transient improper permits or improper blocks are reported.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="control-plane-performance">
          <name>Control Plane Performance</name>
          <t>The test setup, procedure, and metrics for evaluating SAV convergence and protocol message processing performance can refer to <xref target="intra-control-plane-sec"/>. SAV convergence testing applies to dynamic SAV mechanisms whenever a relevant input-state change can cause the SAV table to be recomputed or updated. SAV protocol message processing throughput is <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> and applies when the mechanism receives explicit control-plane messages carrying SAV-related or SAV-specific information.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="data-plane-performance">
          <name>Data Plane Performance</name>
          <t>The test setup, procedure, and metrics for evaluating data-plane SAV table refresh performance and data-plane forwarding performance can refer to <xref target="intra-data-plane-sec"/>.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="resource-utilization-1">
        <name>Resource Utilization</name>
        <t>When evaluating the DUT for both intra-domain (<xref target="intra_domain_sav"/>) and inter-domain SAV (<xref target="inter_domain_sav"/>) functionality, CPU utilization (for both control and data planes) and memory utilization (for both control and data planes) <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be recorded. These metrics should be recorded continuously and be collected separately per plane to facilitate granular performance analysis.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="reporting-format">
      <name>Reporting Format</name>
      <t>Each test report must include both global parameters and test-specific parameters. The following parameters for test configuration and SAV mechanism settings must be documented in the test report.</t>
      <t>Test configuration parameters consist of:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>Test device hardware and software versions.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>DUT deployment type, such as hardware router, software router, VM, or container.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Network topology, including the location of the DUT and the interface on which SAV is evaluated.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Intra-domain interface type, if applicable: single host, set of hosts, or customer network with no AS.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Inter-domain interface relationship, if applicable: customer, provider, or lateral peer. For route-server-assisted peering, identify the RS/RS-client sessions separately from the tested data-plane interface.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Routing configuration, including IGP, BGP, route-policy, NO_EXPORT/NO_ADVERTISE, selective export, and any other policy configuration relevant to the test.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>SAV mechanism and configuration, including whether the DUT uses SAV-related information, SAV-specific information, configurat</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>SAV table size and update characteristics.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Test traffic attributes, including packet size, traffic rate, source prefix distribution, destination prefix distribution, and the ratio of spoofed to legitimate traffic.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>System configuration, including CPU, memory, caches, operating system, interface capacity, and hardware offload features when applicable.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Measurement method, including DUT logs, counters, telemetry, Tester observations, and timestamp sources.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Number of repeated runs and statistical treatment of the results.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Source-address authorization ground truth for each tested ingress interface, including the origin of the authorization information and how legitimate and spoofed test packets are labeled.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>SAV deployment scope within the emulated topology, including which ASes and interfaces enforce SAV and which do not, when relevant to the scenario.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Timestamp resolution, clock synchronization, trigger timestamp definition, and the method used to determine SAV table stabilization for convergence tests.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The method used to distinguish SAV-induced blocking from other packet loss, including routing changes and interface errors.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>For each accuracy test, the report must identify which packets are legitimate and which packets are spoofed, and why. If the test traffic contains only legitimate or only spoofed packets, the unavailable FNR or FPR metric, respectively, <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be reported as not applicable rather than as zero. For each SAV convergence test, the report must identify the triggering event, the timestamping method, and, where observable, the distinction between underlying information convergence and SAV-table computation or installation. For each performance test, the report must identify whether SAV was enabled or disabled and whether the DUT was operating in steady state or during SAV table update.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="IANA">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document has no IANA actions.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>The benchmarking tests outlined in this document are confined to evaluating the performance of SAV devices within a controlled laboratory environment using isolated networks.</t>
      <t>The network topology employed for benchmarking <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> constitute an independent test setup. It <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> remain disconnected from devices that could relay test traffic into an operational production network. Spoofed traffic generated for the benchmarking tests <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be leaked outside the controlled test environment.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC2827">
          <front>
            <title>Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Address Spoofing</title>
            <author fullname="P. Ferguson" initials="P." surname="Ferguson"/>
            <author fullname="D. Senie" initials="D." surname="Senie"/>
            <date month="May" year="2000"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This paper discusses a simple, effective, and straightforward method for using ingress traffic filtering to prohibit DoS (Denial of Service) attacks which use forged IP addresses to be propagated from 'behind' an Internet Service Provider's (ISP) aggregation point. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="38"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2827"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2827"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC3704">
          <front>
            <title>Ingress Filtering for Multihomed Networks</title>
            <author fullname="F. Baker" initials="F." surname="Baker"/>
            <author fullname="P. Savola" initials="P." surname="Savola"/>
            <date month="March" year="2004"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>BCP 38, RFC 2827, is designed to limit the impact of distributed denial of service attacks, by denying traffic with spoofed addresses access to the network, and to help ensure that traffic is traceable to its correct source network. As a side effect of protecting the Internet against such attacks, the network implementing the solution also protects itself from this and other attacks, such as spoofed management access to networking equipment. There are cases when this may create problems, e.g., with multihoming. This document describes the current ingress filtering operational mechanisms, examines generic issues related to ingress filtering, and delves into the effects on multihoming in particular. This memo updates RFC 2827. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="84"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3704"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3704"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4061">
          <front>
            <title>Benchmarking Basic OSPF Single Router Control Plane Convergence</title>
            <author fullname="V. Manral" initials="V." surname="Manral"/>
            <author fullname="R. White" initials="R." surname="White"/>
            <author fullname="A. Shaikh" initials="A." surname="Shaikh"/>
            <date month="April" year="2005"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document provides suggestions for measuring OSPF single router control plane convergence. Its initial emphasis is on the control plane of a single OSPF router. We do not address forwarding plane performance.</t>
              <t>NOTE: In this document, the word "convergence" relates to single router control plane convergence only. This memo provides information for the Internet community.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4061"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4061"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5210">
          <front>
            <title>A Source Address Validation Architecture (SAVA) Testbed and Deployment Experience</title>
            <author fullname="J. Wu" initials="J." surname="Wu"/>
            <author fullname="J. Bi" initials="J." surname="Bi"/>
            <author fullname="X. Li" initials="X." surname="Li"/>
            <author fullname="G. Ren" initials="G." surname="Ren"/>
            <author fullname="K. Xu" initials="K." surname="Xu"/>
            <author fullname="M. Williams" initials="M." surname="Williams"/>
            <date month="June" year="2008"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Because the Internet forwards packets according to the IP destination address, packet forwarding typically takes place without inspection of the source address and malicious attacks have been launched using spoofed source addresses. In an effort to enhance the Internet with IP source address validation, a prototype implementation of the IP Source Address Validation Architecture (SAVA) was created and an evaluation was conducted on an IPv6 network. This document reports on the prototype implementation and the test results, as well as the lessons and insights gained from experimentation. This memo defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet community.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5210"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5210"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8704">
          <front>
            <title>Enhanced Feasible-Path Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding</title>
            <author fullname="K. Sriram" initials="K." surname="Sriram"/>
            <author fullname="D. Montgomery" initials="D." surname="Montgomery"/>
            <author fullname="J. Haas" initials="J." surname="Haas"/>
            <date month="February" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document identifies a need for and proposes improvement of the unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF) techniques (see RFC 3704) for detection and mitigation of source address spoofing (see BCP 38). Strict uRPF is inflexible about directionality, the loose uRPF is oblivious to directionality, and the current feasible-path uRPF attempts to strike a balance between the two (see RFC 3704). However, as shown in this document, the existing feasible-path uRPF still has shortcomings. This document describes enhanced feasible-path uRPF (EFP-uRPF) techniques that are more flexible (in a meaningful way) about directionality than the feasible-path uRPF (RFC 3704). The proposed EFP-uRPF methods aim to significantly reduce false positives regarding invalid detection in source address validation (SAV). Hence, they can potentially alleviate ISPs' concerns about the possibility of disrupting service for their customers and encourage greater deployment of uRPF techniques. This document updates RFC 3704.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="84"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8704"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8704"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2544">
          <front>
            <title>Benchmarking Methodology for Network Interconnect Devices</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <author fullname="J. McQuaid" initials="J." surname="McQuaid"/>
            <date month="March" year="1999"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document is a republication of RFC 1944 correcting the values for the IP addresses which were assigned to be used as the default addresses for networking test equipment. This memo provides information for the Internet community.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2544"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2544"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC10078">
          <front>
            <title>Problem Statement, Gap Analysis, and Requirements for Intra-Domain Source Address Validation</title>
            <author fullname="L. Qin" initials="L." surname="Qin"/>
            <author fullname="D. Li" initials="D." surname="Li"/>
            <author fullname="J. Wu" initials="J." surname="Wu"/>
            <author fullname="M. Huang" initials="M." surname="Huang"/>
            <author fullname="N. Geng" initials="N." surname="Geng"/>
            <date month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Source Address Validation (SAV) is an important means to mitigate IP source address spoofing (RFC 2827). This document analyzes the gaps in current operational mechanisms for intra-domain SAV. It also identifies the properties that new intra-domain SAV mechanisms are expected to provide.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="10078"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC10078"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-savnet-inter-domain-problem-statement">
          <front>
            <title>Problem Statement, Gap Analysis, and Requirements for Inter-domain Source Address Validation</title>
            <author fullname="Dan Li" initials="D." surname="Li">
              <organization>Tsinghua University</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Lancheng Qin" initials="L." surname="Qin">
              <organization>Zhongguancun Laboratory</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Libin Liu" initials="L." surname="Liu">
              <organization>Zhongguancun Laboratory</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Mingqing(Michael) Huang" initials="M." surname="Huang">
              <organization>Huawei</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Kotikalapudi Sriram" initials="K." surname="Sriram">
              <organization>USA NIST</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="6" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document analyzes the problem space and provides a gap analysis
   of existing inter-domain source address validation (SAV) mechanisms.
   Based on these findings, it outlines the technical requirements for
   future improvements.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-savnet-inter-domain-problem-statement-23"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC7947">
          <front>
            <title>Internet Exchange BGP Route Server</title>
            <author fullname="E. Jasinska" initials="E." surname="Jasinska"/>
            <author fullname="N. Hilliard" initials="N." surname="Hilliard"/>
            <author fullname="R. Raszuk" initials="R." surname="Raszuk"/>
            <author fullname="N. Bakker" initials="N." surname="Bakker"/>
            <date month="September" year="2016"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document outlines a specification for multilateral interconnections at Internet Exchange Points (IXPs). Multilateral interconnection is a method of exchanging routing information among three or more External BGP (EBGP) speakers using a single intermediate broker system, referred to as a route server. Route servers are typically used on shared access media networks, such as IXPs, to facilitate simplified interconnection among multiple Internet routers.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7947"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7947"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 956?>

<section numbered="false" anchor="Acknowledgements">
      <name>Acknowledgements</name>
      <t>Many thanks to Aijun Wang, Nan Geng, Susan Hares, Giuseppe Fioccola, Minh-Ngoc Tran, Shengnan Yue, Changwang Lin, Yuanyuan Zhang, Xueyan Song, Yangfei Guo, Shenglin Jiang, Tian Tong, Meng Li, Ron Bonica, and Mohamed Boucadair for their valuable comments and reviews on this document.
Apologies to any others whose names the authors may have missed mentioning.</t>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="appendix">
      <name>Appendix A. Summary of Changes (to be removed by RFC Editor before publication)</name>
      <section numbered="false" anchor="a1-changes-from-bpm-version-00-to-version-01">
        <name>A.1. Changes from BPM Version -00 to Version -01</name>
        <t>The major changes from BPM version -00 to version -01 are as follows:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Updated the intra-domain problem statement reference to <xref target="RFC10078"/> and aligned terminology with the latest inter-domain SAV problem statement.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Clarified accuracy measurement and reporting, including SAV-induced versus unrelated packet loss, source-address authorization ground truth, and the interpretation of FPR and FNR when a test does not include both traffic classes.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Refined the SAV convergence metric and procedures, including transient improper-block and improper-permit measurements, update additions and removals, and the treatment of configured hysteresis.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Clarified the SCC scenarios under partial SAV deployment, including the distinction between same-interface spoofing that is not distinguishable from legitimate traffic using source prefix and ingress interface alone, and cross-interface spoofing.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Clarified that route-server-assisted peering benchmarks must identify the actual IXP data-plane ingress interface.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Updated topology consistency, deployment-scope reporting, configuration-information reporting, and editorial text.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section numbered="false" anchor="a2-transition-from-bmwg-version-04-to-bpm-version-00">
        <name>A.2. Transition from BMWG Version -04 to BPM Version -00</name>
        <t>The draft was transferred from the BMWG Working Group to the BPM Working Group and reissued as draft-ietf-bpm-savnet-sav-benchmarking-00, replacing draft-ietf-bmwg-savnet-sav-benchmarking-04. The technical benchmarking methodology was carried forward without substantive changes in this transition.</t>
      </section>
      <section numbered="false" anchor="a3-changes-from-bmwg-version-03-to-version-04">
        <name>A.3. Changes from BMWG Version -03 to Version -04</name>
        <t>The major changes from version -03 to version -04 are as follows:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Aligned the terminology and scope more closely with the latest intra-domain and inter-domain SAV problem statements, including Proper Block, Proper Permit, SAV Table, SAV-related Information, SAV-specific Information, and Configuration Information.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Reorganized the accuracy-test descriptions around the SAVNET gap scenarios: asymmetric routing and hidden prefix for intra-domain SAV, and LPP, HP, SCC, and spoofing from providers for inter-domain SAV. Clarified the applicability of the tests to peer and RS/RS-client interfaces.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Clarified that accuracy benchmarking records improper blocks and improper permits rather than defining pass/fail conformance requirements, and required SAV-induced drops to be distinguishable from unrelated packet loss.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Refined SAV protocol convergence and control-plane performance measurements by using message/update rates and changed-prefix or object rates rather than percentages of link capacity.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Refined SAV-table refresh benchmarking to vary initial table size and the number or percentage of changed entries, and report refresh rate and installation latency.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Refined data-plane forwarding benchmarking so that intentional blocking of spoofed packets is not counted as forwarding loss, and separated legitimate forwarding performance from supplementary mixed legitimate/spoofed traffic tests.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Classified FRR and routing-policy-change tests as additional operational-dynamics scenarios, and corrected editorial and consistency issues in the figures, terminology, and references.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section numbered="false" anchor="a4-changes-from-bmwg-version-02-to-version-03">
        <name>A.4. Changes from BMWG Version -02 to Version -03</name>
        <t>The major change from version -02 to version -03 is as follows:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Added an appendix summarizing the major changes introduced across document revisions to improve revision traceability. No technical changes to the benchmarking methodology or benchmark procedures were introduced in version -03.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section numbered="false" anchor="a5-changes-from-bmwg-version-01-to-version-02">
        <name>A.5. Changes from BMWG Version -01 to Version -02</name>
        <t>The major changes from version -01 to version -02 are as follows:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Clarified the scope of the document as a black-box laboratory benchmarking methodology for individual SAV devices and refined the generic test methodology.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Expanded and refined the SAV terminology and deployment scope to align with the intra-domain and inter-domain SAV problem statements.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Restructured the intra-domain SAV accuracy tests into symmetric routing, asymmetric routing, and hidden-prefix scenarios, and added an explicit hidden-prefix benchmarking scenario.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Refined the inter-domain SAV accuracy tests according to the relationship of the tested interface with the neighboring AS, and clarified the limited prefix propagation and DSR scenarios.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Refined the SAV performance indicators and clarified the generation and classification of legitimate and spoofed test traffic.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Expanded the reporting requirements and strengthened the security considerations for isolated benchmarking environments.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section numbered="false" anchor="a6-changes-from-bmwg-version-00-to-version-01">
        <name>A.6. Changes from BMWG Version -00 to Version -01</name>
        <t>The major changes from version -00 to version -01 are as follows:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Clarified the computation method of false positive rate and false negative rate.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Updated the example IP prefixes in the intra-domain test scenarios to use IPv6 documentation prefixes.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Revised the DSR test scenario by introducing a dedicated anycast prefix and clarifying the corresponding route propagation and legitimate traffic paths.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Clarified the collection of resource utilization metrics, including continuous measurement and separate control-plane and data-plane measurements where possible.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
  </back>
  <!-- ##markdown-source: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-->

</rfc>
