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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-dtn-bibe-02" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="BIBE">Bundle-in-Bundle Encapsulation</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-dtn-bibe-02"/>
    <author fullname="Rick Taylor" role="editor">
      <organization>Aalyria Technologies</organization>
      <address>
        <email>rtaylor@aalyria.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Alberto Montilla" role="editor">
      <organization>Spatiam Corporation</organization>
      <address>
        <email>a.montilla@spatiam.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="15"/>
    <area>INT</area>
    <workgroup>Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networking</workgroup>
    <keyword>DTN</keyword>
    <keyword>BPv7</keyword>
    <keyword>Bundle Protocol</keyword>
    <keyword>Encapsulation</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 103?>

<t>This document describes Bundle-in-Bundle Encapsulation (BIBE), a Delay-Tolerant Networking (DTN) Bundle Protocol (BP) tunneling mechanism by which a bundle is carried as the payload of one or more encapsulating bundles, allowing security measures and routing policy to be applied to the encapsulating bundle without modification of the encapsulated bundle. The protocol includes an optional segmentation mechanism, allowing a large encapsulated bundle to be carried in multiple encapsulating bundles.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        The latest revision of this draft can be found at <eref target="https://ricktaylor.github.io/bibe/draft-ietf-dtn-bibe.html"/>.
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dtn-bibe/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        Delay/Disruption Tolerant Networking Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:dtn@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/dtn/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dtn/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/ricktaylor/bibe"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 107?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>Bundle Protocol version 7 (BPv7) <xref target="RFC9171"/> defines a layered architecture in which a Bundle Protocol Agent (BPA) relies on convergence-layer adapters (CLAs) to transfer bundles between nodes. This document defines Bundle-in-Bundle Encapsulation (BIBE), in which the transfer between two nodes is performed by a BP network itself: an outbound bundle (the "encapsulated bundle") is carried as the payload of one or more bundles (the "encapsulating bundles") which traverse the BP network between the encapsulating node and the decapsulating node in the normal manner. <cref anchor="editorial">This document is an editorial consolidation of prior work: the architecture and concepts originate in draft-ietf-dtn-bibect and the CCSDS Bundle-in-Bundle Encapsulation effort, and the design contributions of others are recorded in the Contributors and Acknowledgments sections. The editors claim no design novelty; the contribution of this document is to restate that body of work as a single self-contained specification.</cref></t>
      <t>BIBE thus occupies the architectural position of a convergence layer — the "link layer" beneath it is itself a BP network — but this document deliberately does not require that it be implemented as a convergence-layer adapter; it specifies observable behavior only, in terms of the encapsulation function and decapsulation element defined in <xref target="model"/>.</t>
      <t>Conformance to this specification is <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14> for BP nodes. A conforming node may implement the encapsulation function, the decapsulation element, or both; a unidirectional tunnel requires only one at each end.</t>
      <section anchor="use-cases">
        <name>Use Cases</name>
        <t>BIBE has broad utility; motivating use cases include:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Security encapsulation. BPSec <xref target="RFC9172"/> requires that the primary block of a bundle remain in plaintext so that it can be routed. Encapsulating a bundle allows a Bundle Confidentiality Block on the encapsulating bundle's payload to encrypt the entire encapsulated bundle, including its source and destination, providing a defense against traffic analysis that BPSec alone cannot offer.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Cross-domain and service-provider encapsulation. A bundle arriving at the edge of a network domain can be encapsulated so that domain-specific policies (forwarding, quality of service, security) are applied to the encapsulating bundle, leaving the encapsulated bundle unmodified. The encapsulating bundle egresses the domain at a designated decapsulating node.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Segmentation. BPv7 bundle fragmentation (<xref section="5.8" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/>) interacts poorly with BPSec: no BIB or BCB may be added to a bundle that is a fragment (<xref section="5.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9172"/>), and because each fragment bears its own primary block, a security operation whose security context binds its target to the primary block of the original bundle cannot be processed until the fragments have been reassembled. <xref section="5.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9172"/> accordingly suggests applying BPSec in coordination with an encapsulation mechanism. The segmentation mechanism defined in this document (<xref target="segmentation"/>) is such a mechanism: a large bundle is carried opaquely as chunks in multiple smaller encapsulating bundles, each of which is a complete bundle rather than a fragment, which is of particular utility when a downstream convergence-layer adapter cannot carry large bundles.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Traffic differentiation. Decapsulation endpoints are ordinary endpoints established by policy (<xref target="model"/>), so a decapsulating node may establish several — per tunnel, per peer, or per traffic class — at no protocol cost. The destination EID of each encapsulating bundle then acts as a flow identifier visible along the encapsulating path: nodes on the tunnel path can apply forwarding, queueing, and quality-of-service policy to tunnel traffic by destination EID alone, without inspecting the payload — including when the payload is encrypted. The same visibility necessarily reveals that class structure to on-path observers (<xref target="security-considerations"/>).</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The encapsulated bundle is a BPv7 bundle. As in <xref target="BTPU"/>, however, it is treated throughout the tunnel as an opaque sequence of octets: no field of this protocol describes its content, and neither the encapsulation function nor the decapsulation element parses it. Its validity as a bundle is assessed only once it has been presented to the BPA of the decapsulating node (<xref target="reception"/>).</t>
        <t>Encapsulating bundles are themselves bundles and may in turn be encapsulated, enabling nested encapsulation to arbitrary depth as required by policy. One application is the recursive layering of DTN networks, each layer free to use its own routing approach (<xref target="RECURSIVE-DTN"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="similarity-to-ip-tunneling">
        <name>Similarity to IP Tunneling</name>
        <t>BIBE shares a pattern with generic IP tunneling, and this document deliberately follows the same architectural conventions where the analogy holds:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Like GRE <xref target="GRE"/> and IP-in-IP <xref target="IPIP"/>, BIBE is a stateless encapsulation: there is no tunnel session, no negotiation, and no convergence-layer acknowledgement. The tunnel is defined entirely by configuration at its two endpoints.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Encapsulation is a tunnel ingress operation: routing or forwarding policy directs an encapsulated bundle "into" the tunnel exactly as an IP route directs a packet to a tunnel interface. An implementation that realizes the encapsulation function as a virtual interface (a convergence-layer adapter) selected by a forwarding table entry mirrors a multipoint GRE interface; an implementation that applies it as egress policy mirrors policy-based tunnel selection. Either way, a single encapsulation function may serve multiple decapsulation endpoints — and, conversely, several decapsulation endpoints at one node give the encapsulating node a per-class tunnel selector, in the manner of the GRE Key field <xref target="GREKEY"/> (<xref target="use-cases"/>).</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Applying a Bundle Confidentiality Block to the encapsulating bundle's payload is the analog of IPsec tunnel mode: the entire inner datagram, including its addressing, is protected, whereas BPSec applied directly to a bundle (like transport mode) must leave the primary block in plaintext for routing.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The segmentation mechanism of <xref target="segmentation"/> is the analog of "outer fragmentation" in IP tunnels (<xref target="TUNMTU"/>): the tunneled payload is divided by and reassembled at the tunnel endpoints, transparently to the encapsulated bundle, rather than fragmenting the encapsulated bundle itself ("inner fragmentation", i.e. BPv7 bundle fragmentation) which alters the tunneled data unit and interacts poorly with BPSec (<xref target="use-cases"/>).</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>IP tunneling experience also carries over its known hazards: recursive encapsulation loops (see <xref target="deployment"/>) and the security concerns cataloged in <xref target="TUNSEC"/> (see <xref target="security-considerations"/>).</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conventions-and-definitions">
      <name>Conventions and Definitions</name>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      <?line -18?>

<section anchor="terminology">
        <name>Terminology</name>
        <t>In this document, the source EID of a bundle is the EID carried in the Source node ID field of its primary block, and its destination EID is the EID carried in its Destination EID field (<xref section="4.3.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/>).</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>Encapsulated bundle:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A BPv7 bundle forwarded by encapsulation and carried opaquely as (part of) the payload of one or more encapsulating bundles.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Encapsulating bundle:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A BPv7 bundle whose payload encapsulates all or part of another bundle, formatted as described in <xref target="payload-format"/>. The payload takes one of two forms: a "whole-bundle payload" carrying an entire encapsulated bundle, or a "segment payload" carrying part of one.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Encapsulation function:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The function of an encapsulating node that generates encapsulation payloads from a bundle being forwarded and sources the encapsulating bundles that carry them. See <xref target="model"/>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Decapsulation element:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The element of the application agent of a decapsulating node that takes delivery of encapsulation payloads, performs reassembly when required, and presents encapsulated bundles to the BPA. See <xref target="model"/>.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Decapsulation endpoint:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>An endpoint in which a decapsulation element is registered; the destination endpoint of encapsulating bundles.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Transfer:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The context in which the segments of a single encapsulated bundle are transmitted, identified by a Transfer ID.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="model">
      <name>Functional Model</name>
      <t>BIBE is specified as observable behavior, not as a component architecture, in terms of two entities:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>An "encapsulation function", invoked by the BPA of the encapsulating node in the course of forwarding a bundle: it generates one or more payloads, each encapsulating all or part of the bundle being forwarded, and, acting in the capacity of a bundle source, sources the encapsulating bundles that carry them (<xref target="transmission"/>). Each encapsulating bundle is a new bundle, originated at the encapsulating node; see <xref target="encap-bundle"/>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>A "decapsulation element", registered in one or more endpoints of the decapsulating node: it takes delivery of the payloads of encapsulating bundles, performs reassembly when required, and, acting in the capacity of a convergence-layer adapter, presents encapsulated bundles to the BPA for forwarding and/or delivery in the standard manner (<xref target="reception"/>).</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t><xref target="fig-model"/> illustrates the asymmetry of the model: the encapsulation function operates on the forwarding path of the encapsulating node, while the decapsulation element is an element of the application agent of the decapsulating node; the encapsulated bundle experiences the entire tunnel as a single hop.</t>
      <figure anchor="fig-model">
        <name>Functional model: encapsulation of bundle B in bundle E</name>
        <artset>
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                <text x="96" y="36">Encapsulating</text>
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                <text x="28" y="68">bundle</text>
                <text x="64" y="68">B</text>
                <text x="100" y="68">...(to</text>
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                <text x="184" y="308">--CLA</text>
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                <text x="352" y="308">BPA</text>
                <text x="124" y="324">ordinary</text>
                <text x="180" y="324">BPv7</text>
                <text x="244" y="324">forwarding</text>
                <text x="300" y="324">of</text>
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            </svg>
          </artwork>
          <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
      Encapsulating Node                    Decapsulating Node

 bundle B ...(to bundle B, the tunnel is one hop)... bundle B
    |                                                    ^
    |                                                    |
 (forwarding path)                          (application agent)
    v                                                    |
 +--------------+                                +--------------+
 | encapsulation|                                | decapsulation|
 |   function   |                                |    element   |
 +--------------+                                +--------------+
    |                                                    ^
    | sources bundle E                     payload of E  |
    | (payload carries B,                  delivered to  |
    |  destined for the                    the decap     |
    |  decap endpoint)                     endpoint      |
    v                                                    |
   BPA --CLA--> node --CLA--> ... --CLA--> BPA ----------+
            ordinary BPv7 forwarding of bundle E
]]></artwork>
        </artset>
      </figure>
      <t>How a BPA selects the encapsulation function is an implementation matter: it might be realized as a convergence-layer adapter selected by a forwarding table entry, applied as a filter or transform on the egress forwarding path, or integrated in some other way. Nothing in this document depends on the choice.</t>
      <t>The decapsulation element, by contrast, cannot be realized solely as a convergence-layer adapter: it takes delivery of the payloads of bundles addressed to it, and it therefore <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be registered in one or more endpoints — in the terms of <xref section="3.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/>, it acts in the capacity of an element of the node's application agent. When it presents an encapsulated bundle to the BPA, however, it presents a received bundle for the reception processing of <xref section="5.6" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/> (<xref target="reception"/>), and in doing so acts in the capacity of a convergence-layer adapter. Nothing in this document prevents a single component from acting in both capacities — indeed, taking delivery of encapsulation payloads in the capacity of an application-agent element and presenting encapsulated bundles in the capacity of a convergence-layer adapter is the natural realization.</t>
      <t>The choice of endpoints in which a decapsulation element is registered is a matter of administrative policy at the decapsulating node. A BIBE tunnel is a deliberate, bilaterally configured arrangement — an encapsulating node must in any case hold per-peer configuration (<xref target="deployment"/>), of which the decapsulation endpoint ID is simply one element — so there is no unsolicited-contact scenario for which a "well-known service" convention would be required, and the absence of one denies adversaries a predictable target for unsolicited traffic (<xref target="security-considerations"/>). A decapsulation endpoint <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be an endpoint formed in a URI scheme whose procedures define which member or members of the endpoint take delivery of a bundle destined for it. A singleton endpoint satisfies this trivially; so would an endpoint in a scheme with defined multicast delivery semantics — delivery to every member — which would realize multicast BIBE: encapsulated forwarding to every member of the decapsulation endpoint at once. An endpoint in a scheme with anycast semantics — delivery to any one member — likewise defines delivery for each bundle, but not that successive bundles reach the same member; the conditions under which a segmented transfer may be directed to such an endpoint are set out in <xref target="segmentation"/>. What is to be avoided is an endpoint with more than one member for which the choice of delivering member is left unspecified, as the Bundle Protocol leaves it for multi-member endpoints in the dtn scheme; the consequences of that indeterminacy for BIBE — unpredictable duplication of whole-bundle payloads, and segmented transfers that may never be reassembled — are set out in <xref target="segmentation"/>.</t>
      <t>Note that BIBE encapsulation is a forwarding operation, not a delivery operation: policy (including BPSec) applicable to the forwarding path of the encapsulating bundle applies to it in the normal way. The payloads generated by the encapsulation function are plaintext; any confidentiality protection is applied by the BPA in the course of transmitting the encapsulating bundle, exactly as for any other bundle payload.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="procedures">
      <name>Procedures</name>
      <section anchor="transmission">
        <name>Transmission</name>
        <t>When the BPA of the encapsulating node determines — by forwarding table entry, forwarding policy, or other configuration — that a bundle is to be forwarded by encapsulation toward a specified decapsulation endpoint, the bundle is presented to the encapsulation function.</t>
        <t>The bundle so presented is the bundle as the encapsulating node forwards it. The forwarding-time processing that precedes conveyance over any convergence-layer adapter (Step 4 of <xref section="5.4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/>) — removal of any Previous Node block and, subject to the encapsulating node's policy, insertion of a new one (<xref section="4.4.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/>), and advancement of the bundle age in any Bundle Age block (<xref section="4.4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/>) — is performed by the BPA in the normal manner, exactly as when forwarding via any other convergence-layer protocol; it is not a function of the encapsulation function. Because this document does not require that the encapsulation function be realized as a convergence-layer adapter (<xref target="model"/>), however, the capture point must be pinned explicitly: the octets captured for encapsulation <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be those of the bundle after that forwarding-time processing, captured once, before any segmentation. Capture is thus the "last possible moment" before conveyance at which that processing advances the bundle age, and a Previous Node block, if present in the captured octets, identifies the encapsulating node. The consequences for the blocks of the encapsulated bundle are set out in <xref target="encap-bundle"/>.</t>
        <t>The encapsulation function then generates the payload or payloads:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>If the length of the bundle does not exceed the segmentation threshold for that endpoint (<xref target="segmentation"/>), the encapsulation function <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> generate a single whole-bundle payload encapsulating the entire bundle, and <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> request transmission of an encapsulating bundle, destined for that endpoint, carrying that payload.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Otherwise the bundle <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be segmented as described in <xref target="segmentation"/>. If the bundle cannot be segmented — the encapsulation function does not support segmentation, or the decapsulation element is not known to support reassembly (<xref target="reception"/>) — then forwarding by encapsulation has failed, and the forwarding contraindication procedures of <xref section="5.4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/> apply at the encapsulating node as for a failure of any convergence layer.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The fields and blocks of each encapsulating bundle are populated as described in <xref target="encap-bundle"/>.</t>
        <t>Upon requesting transmission of the encapsulating bundle(s), forwarding of the encapsulated bundle at the encapsulating node is complete; no further state regarding it need be retained. BIBE provides no acknowledgement of its own, so "complete" means successful hand-off to the underlying network, as with any unreliable convergence layer (<xref target="deployment"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="segmentation">
        <name>Segmentation</name>
        <t>For each decapsulation endpoint to which encapsulating bundles will be sent, a maximum segment size — the endpoint's "segmentation threshold" — <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be established by a-priori configuration (<xref target="deployment"/>). The segmentation threshold accommodates, for example, size limits of convergence-layer adapters on the path of the encapsulating bundles. Note that the threshold bounds encapsulated-bundle octets per encapsulating bundle: an implementation sizing encapsulating bundles for a downstream limit must also account for the encapsulating bundle's own overhead (primary block, extension blocks, payload CBOR framing, and any BPSec blocks).</t>
        <t>The segmentation mechanism is aligned with the transfer/segment model of <xref target="BTPU"/>, but requires none of BTPU's padding, message framing, or transfer-window machinery: BPv7 itself provides the "framing layer", guaranteeing that the payload of each encapsulating bundle is delivered whole or not at all, so only segment identification and reassembly rules are needed.</t>
        <t>When a bundle is to be segmented:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>The encapsulation function <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> assign the transfer a Transfer ID as described in <xref target="transfer-ids"/>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The encapsulation function <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> partition the octets of the bundle into two or more non-empty segments, each no larger than the segmentation threshold, covering every octet of the bundle exactly once, in order, without alteration.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>For each segment the encapsulation function <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> generate a segment payload with the common transfer-id, the total length of the bundle, the segment's offset, and the segment's octets, and <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> request transmission of an encapsulating bundle, destined for the indicated endpoint, carrying that payload.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Segmentation is not BPv7 bundle fragmentation (<xref section="5.8" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/>), and the rules governing fragments do not apply to it: the encapsulated bundle is not fragmented, and each encapsulating bundle carrying a segment payload is a complete bundle, not a fragment, to which BPSec applies as to any other bundle.</t>
        <t>Requesting transmission of the first encapsulating bundle of a transfer commits the encapsulation function to the remainder: this protocol provides no abort or cancellation signal, so a transfer abandoned partway is indistinguishable, at the decapsulating node, from loss of the remaining encapsulating bundles in transit (<xref target="deployment"/>). An abandoned transfer occupies reassembly state at the decapsulation element until the transfer's expiry (<xref target="resources"/>), and its Transfer ID remains unavailable for reuse until that same time (<xref target="transfer-ids"/>).</t>
        <t>Segmentation requires that any decapsulation element taking delivery of a segment of a transfer take delivery of every segment of that transfer: reassembly state is held by the element that takes delivery (<xref target="reassembly"/>), and an element holding only some of a transfer's segments can never complete it. The requirement extends only to the transfer's expiry (<xref target="primary-block"/>), after which no encapsulating bundle of the transfer can be delivered. A singleton endpoint satisfies it trivially. An endpoint in a scheme whose delivery procedures deliver every bundle to every member (<xref target="model"/>) also satisfies it: each member takes delivery of the complete set of segments and reassembles independently. An endpoint whose members may take delivery of distinct bundles — one with anycast semantics, or a multi-member endpoint for which the choice of delivering member is unspecified — does not satisfy it in general: distinct encapsulating bundles of one transfer may be delivered to different members, each member accumulates a disjoint, incomplete set of segments, and the transfer fails silently at its expiry, having occupied reassembly state at each of those members until then.</t>
        <t>Accordingly, an encapsulating node <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> segment a bundle toward a decapsulation endpoint unless it is known that, until the transfer's expiry, every encapsulating bundle of the transfer that is delivered will be delivered to the same member, or to every member. This is known by the rules of the EID's scheme (every non-null 'ipn' scheme EID identifies a singleton endpoint, <xref section="5.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9758"/>), or by configuration. It is also known where the encapsulating node sets the transfer's expiry, as <xref target="primary-block"/> permits, no later than the end of an interval during which only one member can take delivery: for example, a single contact during which that member, as the encapsulating node's next hop, is the only member that can take delivery. Such an interval ends no later than the earliest time at which an encapsulating bundle of the transfer might be delivered to another member. Overlapping coverage does not by itself end the interval: it continues for as long as delivery remains confined to that member, for example because the encapsulating node's convergence-layer adapter addresses only that member. Whole-bundle payloads are not subject to this constraint: any member taking delivery holds the entire encapsulated bundle, although delivery to more than one member duplicates the encapsulated bundle at each.</t>
        <t>A transfer bounded in this way fails if the interval closes before all of its encapsulating bundles have been transmitted: those not yet transmitted expire at the encapsulating node. An encapsulating node that retains the encapsulated bundle until every encapsulating bundle of the transfer has been transmitted (<xref target="transmission"/> permits, but does not require, this) can detect that failure locally, and can encapsulate the bundle afresh, as a new transfer, in a later interval, subject as always to the encapsulated bundle's remaining lifetime (<xref target="primary-block"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="transfer-ids">
        <name>Transfer IDs</name>
        <t>Transfer IDs are unsigned integers that identify a transfer uniquely within the scope of the pair (source EID, destination EID) borne by the primary blocks of the transfer's encapsulating bundles (<xref target="primary-block"/>). Both elements of the scope are explicit in every encapsulating bundle and are compared as EIDs at the decapsulating node (<xref target="reassembly"/>), so neither peer requires any context beyond the bundle itself — in particular, no knowledge of which EIDs identify the same node, of how many encapsulation functions operate at a node, or of how many endpoints a decapsulation element is registered in. A node registered in several singleton endpoints (<xref section="4.2.5.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/>) consequently has an independent Transfer ID space for each (source EID, destination EID) pair it uses. A Transfer ID carries no ordering semantics: a decapsulation element <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> infer transmission order, recency, or loss from the numeric values of Transfer IDs. There is no analog of the transfer window of <xref target="BTPU"/>: the temporal bound on a transfer is provided by bundle expiry, since the Bundle Protocol guarantees that no bundle is delivered after the end of its lifetime.</t>
        <t>An encapsulating node <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> assign a Transfer ID that identifies another transfer with the same (source EID, destination EID), any of whose encapsulating bundles have yet to expire. A Transfer ID therefore becomes reusable only once every encapsulating bundle of the transfer has expired (<xref section="5.5" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/>): nominally at the transfer's expiry (<xref target="primary-block"/>), although where bundle age is obtained from Bundle Age blocks, the expiry of an encapsulating bundle in the network depends on the age accounting of the nodes it traverses. Discard of reassembly state at the decapsulating node (<xref target="resources"/>) has no bearing on reuse. Subject to this rule, the assignment strategy is an implementation matter, and uniqueness in any wider scope implies uniqueness in this one: a sequential counter per (source EID, destination EID) pair, a counter per destination EID, and a single counter for the whole node are all valid disciplines, as is random assignment. To satisfy the rule across restarts of the encapsulating node, an implementation <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> either persist sufficient assignment state or select Transfer IDs after restart in a manner unlikely to collide with transfers still in flight (e.g. derived from a timestamp).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="reception">
        <name>Reception</name>
        <t>Upon delivery of the payload of an encapsulating bundle to a decapsulation element:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>If the payload is a whole-bundle payload, the encapsulated bundle <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be presented to the BPA as a received bundle — the decapsulation element here acting in the capacity of a convergence-layer adapter (<xref target="model"/>) — whereupon reception proceeds as defined in <xref section="5.6" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/>: the encapsulated bundle may be forwarded, delivered, etc. Decapsulated octets that do not constitute a well-formed BPv7 bundle (<xref section="4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/>) are disposed of by that processing in the same way as a malformed bundle received via any convergence layer.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>If the payload is a segment payload and the decapsulation element does not support reassembly, the element <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> discard the payload. Support for reassembly is <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>; support for generating segments is likewise <bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>If the payload is a segment payload and the decapsulation element supports reassembly, the payload <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be processed as described in <xref target="reassembly"/>.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="reassembly">
        <name>Reassembly</name>
        <t>A decapsulation element maintains a reassembly structure per active transfer, keyed by the triple (source EID, destination EID, transfer-id) of the encapsulating bundle. Every component of the key is taken from the encapsulating bundle itself, so the key is unambiguous even when one decapsulation element is registered in several endpoints. Source EIDs and destination EIDs are compared as EIDs, under the EID matching rules of their URI schemes (e.g., <xref section="6.4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9758"/>), not as encoded octets: a decapsulation element is not required to determine whether two distinct EIDs name the same node or endpoint, and the consistency rules of <xref target="primary-block"/> ensure that such comparison suffices. The nature of the reassembly structure is an implementation matter.</t>
        <t>Upon processing a segment payload:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>If segment-offset exceeds total-length, or the length of encapsulated-data exceeds total-length minus segment-offset, the payload is malformed: the decapsulation element <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> discard it and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> discard the reassembly structure for the transfer, if any.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>If a reassembly structure for the transfer exists and the payload's total-length differs from the transfer's previously recorded total-length, the transfer is corrupt: the decapsulation element <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> discard the payload and the reassembly structure.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>The BP network may duplicate encapsulating bundles (multi-path forwarding, repetition at lower layers), so identical duplicates are normal and benign: if the octets of the segment duplicate octet ranges already received with identical content, the duplicate octets <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be ignored. If they overlap previously received ranges with differing content, the transfer is corrupt: the decapsulation element <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> discard the payload and the reassembly structure.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Otherwise the decapsulation element <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> insert the segment into the reassembly structure.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>If, after insertion, every octet in the range zero to total-length has been received, reassembly is complete: the reassembled encapsulated bundle <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be presented to the BPA as a received bundle (<xref target="model"/>), whereupon reception proceeds as defined in <xref section="5.6" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/>, and the reassembly structure <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be discarded.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="resources">
        <name>Reassembly State</name>
        <t>A decapsulation element retains reassembly state for a transfer only while the transfer can still complete. An incomplete transfer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be discarded no later than the expiry (<xref section="5.5" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/>) of the earliest-expiring of its encapsulating bundles that have been delivered. This is nominally the transfer's expiry, which all of them share (<xref target="primary-block"/>), although where bundle age is obtained from Bundle Age blocks, the encapsulating bundles of one transfer may present differing expiry. The deadline exists both because no further segment of the transfer can be expected after it, and because the Transfer ID may thereafter be reused for a new transfer (<xref target="transfer-ids"/>): reassembly state retained beyond expiry could wrongly absorb segments of the new transfer.</t>
        <t>Before that deadline, retention of reassembly state is a matter for the same local resource management policies that govern any other storage the node commits. A transfer whose state is discarded under such policy has simply failed: the encapsulated bundle is never presented to the BPA. A configured upper bound on the interval for which an incomplete transfer is retained, and a configured upper bound on the total-length of a transfer for which any reassembly state will be committed, are two such policies; both, together with a bound on the reassembly state committed across all transfers, are specifically recommended in <xref target="resource-exhaustion"/>.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="encap-bundle">
      <name>The Encapsulating Bundle</name>
      <t>An encapsulating bundle is a new bundle, originated by the encapsulating node acting in the capacity of a bundle source; it is not a modified copy of the encapsulated bundle, nor a forwarding of it. No field of the encapsulated bundle's primary block, and no extension block of the encapsulated bundle, is copied to the encapsulating bundle by any rule of this document: the encapsulated bundle contributes octets to the payload, and nothing else.</t>
      <t>The converse also holds: the tunnel contributes nothing to the encapsulated bundle. The encapsulated bundle is immutable while encapsulated — the octets presented to the BPA of the decapsulating node (<xref target="reception"/>, <xref target="reassembly"/>) <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be exactly the octets captured by the encapsulation function (<xref target="transmission"/>); neither the encapsulation function nor the decapsulation element modifies them in any way, and any divergence is corruption (<xref target="reassembly"/>) or an attack (<xref target="security-considerations"/>), not processing. This invariance is what allows integrity protection applied to the encapsulated bundle itself to survive the tunnel intact.</t>
      <t>An encapsulating bundle is an ordinary bundle, and its payload is not an administrative record; a decapsulation endpoint <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be the administrative endpoint of the node. Carrying the payload as ordinary application data at a dedicated endpoint, rather than as an administrative record, requires no administrative record type, permits a node to establish multiple decapsulation endpoints (e.g. per tunnel, <xref target="use-cases"/>), and keeps high-volume tunnel traffic away from the administrative endpoint. The destination endpoint of an encapsulating bundle is a decapsulation endpoint, which is distinct from the destination of the encapsulated bundle.</t>
      <section anchor="primary-block">
        <name>Primary Block</name>
        <t>The fields of the encapsulating bundle's primary block (<xref section="4.3.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/>) are populated as for any newly created bundle, subject to the following:</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>Destination EID:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be the decapsulation endpoint ID toward which the encapsulated bundle is being forwarded. When the payload is a segment payload, every encapsulating bundle of the transfer <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> bear the same destination EID: the destination is one element of the scope that identifies the transfer (<xref target="transfer-ids"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Source node ID:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Set as for any newly created bundle (<xref section="4.2.5.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/>), except that the source EID <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> identify the null endpoint (dtn:none, ipn:0.0, or ipn:0.0.0; <xref section="5.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9758"/>): anonymous sourcing defeats the peer authorization measures described in <xref target="security-considerations"/>, and disables the status reporting described in <xref target="diagnostics"/> (<xref section="4.2.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/>); <xref target="anonymity"/> describes an alternative for deployments requiring sender anonymity. When the payload is a segment payload, every encapsulating bundle of the transfer <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> bear the same source EID, which is one element of the scope that identifies the transfer (<xref target="transfer-ids"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Report-to EID:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Set according to the policy of the encapsulating node.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Bundle processing control flags:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Set according to the policy of the encapsulating node; the flags of the encapsulated bundle have no bearing on them. The "bundle's payload is an administrative record" flag <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be set.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Creation timestamp:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Set as for any newly created bundle (<xref section="4.2.7" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/>); it is unrelated to the creation timestamp of the encapsulated bundle.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Lifetime:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><bcp14>SHALL NOT</bcp14> exceed the remaining lifetime of the encapsulated bundle — its lifetime less its age, determined as specified in <xref section="5.5" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/> — at the creation of the encapsulating bundle, so that the encapsulating bundle expires no later than the encapsulated bundle. An encapsulating bundle that outlived the encapsulated bundle would waste network resources carrying a bundle already expired at decapsulation, and this bound underpins the transfer machinery of <xref target="transfer-ids"/> and <xref target="resources"/>. If the remaining lifetime of the encapsulated bundle cannot be determined, forwarding by encapsulation has failed (<xref target="transmission"/>). Where the age of the encapsulated bundle is determined from its creation timestamp, the tunnel thus cannot extend its transmission opportunity; where it is carried in a Bundle Age block, the same holds only if the decapsulating BPA accounts for the tunnel transit time in that block (<xref target="extension-blocks"/>). The lifetime <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be shorter, deliberately curtailing the tunnel transit: for example, where it is known that a bundle failing to complete the tunnel sub-path within a certain duration cannot achieve onward delivery within its own lifetime.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>For a segmented transfer, the encapsulating node <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> set the lifetimes of the transfer's encapsulating bundles such that all of them expire at a single time — the transfer's expiry — regardless of when each is created: each encapsulating bundle is created with its natural creation timestamp, and its lifetime is set to the interval remaining between its creation and the transfer's expiry. A node without an accurate clock measures that interval against locally elapsed time, and carries a Bundle Age block as usual (<xref section="4.4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/>). At the decapsulating node, the expiry of each encapsulating bundle is determined as for any other bundle (<xref section="5.5" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/>); where it is determined from Bundle Age blocks, the encapsulating bundles of one transfer may present differing expiry, and the earliest governs (<xref target="resources"/>).</t>
        <t>Assigning every encapsulating bundle of a transfer an identical creation timestamp, and hence an identical lifetime, is not an alternative. The creation timestamp is a property of the BPA's timestamp mechanism (<xref section="4.2.7" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/>), not a per-transfer parameter, and together with the source EID it identifies a bundle: bundle status reports identify their subject bundle by exactly that pair (<xref section="6.1.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/>), so encapsulating bundles sharing a creation timestamp would render the per-segment delivery reports of <xref target="diagnostics"/> indistinguishable.</t>
        <t>Selection of all other parameters governing the forwarding of encapsulating bundles (priority, security policy, etc.) is likewise a matter for the encapsulating node; the corresponding parameters of the encapsulated bundle <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be consulted where they are known.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="extension-blocks">
        <name>Extension Blocks</name>
        <t>The encapsulating bundle carries only extension blocks pertaining to its own conveyance, inserted according to the policy of the encapsulating node and processed on the encapsulating path exactly as for any other bundle. In particular:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>A Hop Count block (<xref section="4.4.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/>), if present, is new: its count starts at zero at the encapsulating node. The hop count of the encapsulated bundle, if any, does not advance while the bundle is encapsulated — the entire tunnel transit appears to the encapsulated bundle as a single hop. This is both a feature (tunnel transparency) and a hazard; see the loop considerations in <xref target="deployment"/>.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>A Bundle Age block (<xref section="4.4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/>), if present, reflects the age of the encapsulating bundle only.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>A Previous Node block (<xref section="4.4.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/>) is inserted and replaced hop by hop on the encapsulating path in the normal manner, identifying nodes of the tunnel path, not of the encapsulated bundle's path.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>Note that, symmetrically, the extension blocks of the encapsulated bundle are not processed while it is encapsulated. In particular, the Bundle Age block of an encapsulated bundle is not updated during tunnel transit, so the age of an encapsulated bundle originated by a node without an accurate clock is under-counted by the tunnel transit time. This is an unavoidable consequence of carrying the encapsulated bundle opaquely; the lifetime rule of <xref target="primary-block"/> bounds the error to at most the remaining lifetime of the encapsulated bundle at encapsulation. The decapsulation element cannot correct the encapsulated bundle's Bundle Age block: doing so would modify the encapsulated bundle, violating the opacity of the tunnel and invalidating any integrity protection covering it. Once the encapsulated bundle has been presented to the BPA of the decapsulating node, however, tunnel opacity is no longer at stake: the bundle is processed as any received bundle, and the BPA <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> account for the tunnel transit time in the Bundle Age block in the manner of <xref section="4.4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/>, exactly as a receiving node may account for known transmission time over any other convergence layer. The tunnel transit time may be known a priori (e.g. from a contact plan) or measured from the encapsulating bundles themselves: for a whole-bundle payload, the age of the encapsulating bundle at delivery — computed from its creation timestamp, or carried in its own Bundle Age block — approximates the tunnel transit time, subject to the implementation-dependent age accounting of <xref section="4.4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/>; for a segmented transfer, the greatest age at completion of reassembly among the transfer's encapsulating bundles serves the same purpose.</t>
        <t>The state in which the encapsulated bundle's blocks are frozen is the state in which the encapsulating node forwards it (<xref target="transmission"/>). A Previous Node block in a decapsulated bundle consequently identifies the encapsulating node: the single hop that the tunnel presents, consistent with <xref target="diagnostics"/>. The decapsulating node takes this block as it finds it — it cannot verify it in general (the encapsulating node may be registered in several singleton endpoints, and the block is optional) and correcting it would modify the encapsulated bundle — but a stale or absent Previous Node block is consulted only during local processing at the decapsulating node and is replaced in the normal manner upon onward forwarding.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="payload-format">
        <name>Payload</name>
        <t>The payload of an encapsulating bundle <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be represented as a CBOR array, encoded with definite length. The array size discriminates the payload form:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>An array of size 1 is a whole-bundle payload. Its sole element is the encapsulated-data field.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>An array of size 4 is a segment payload: the three segmentation fields, in the order defined below, followed by the encapsulated-data field.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>All other array sizes are reserved for future use; a payload with a reserved array size <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be discarded by a receiving decapsulation element.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The fields are defined as follows:</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>transfer-id:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>An unsigned integer identifying the transfer to which this segment belongs (<xref target="transfer-ids"/>).</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>total-length:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>An unsigned integer giving the total length in octets of the encapsulated bundle. It <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be zero.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>segment-offset:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>An unsigned integer giving the offset in octets, from zero, of the first octet of encapsulated-data within the encapsulated bundle.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>encapsulated-data:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A byte string, encoded with definite length. In a whole-bundle payload, its content is the entire encapsulated bundle; in a segment payload, its content is a contiguous, non-empty sequence of octets of the encapsulated bundle.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
        <t>A receiving decapsulation element <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> discard any payload that does not conform to this section: one that is not a single well-formed CBOR array with no octets following it, that uses indefinite-length encoding for the array or for encapsulated-data, that has an element of other than the type defined above, or that is a segment payload with a total-length of zero or an empty encapsulated-data. A payload so discarded, like a segment payload discarded under <xref target="reassembly"/> or <xref target="resource-exhaustion"/>, creates no reassembly state.</t>
        <t>An informative CDDL expression of this structure is provided in <xref target="cddl"/>.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="deployment">
      <name>Deployment Considerations</name>
      <t>The following characteristics of BIBE are to be considered before deployment:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>It is unreliable: there is no BIBE-layer acknowledgement or retransmission. Where reliability is required it is expected to be provided by the convergence layers carrying the encapsulating bundles, by replication/repetition strategies at lower layers (see, e.g., <xref target="BTPU"/>), by custody or other acknowledgement signalling operating at a higher layer over the encapsulated bundles, or end to end by the communicating applications.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>It fails silently: no condition at or beyond the decapsulation endpoint is signalled to the encapsulating node. A segment payload discarded because the decapsulation element does not support reassembly (<xref target="reception"/>), a transfer that expires or is discarded incomplete (<xref target="resources"/>), and a payload discarded for a reserved array size (<xref target="payload-format"/>) are, to the encapsulating node, indistinguishable from loss of the encapsulating bundles in transit — so a misconfigured tunnel, such as a segmentation threshold set toward a peer that does not support reassembly, presents as persistent silent loss. This document deliberately defines no signal reporting the disposition of a payload after delivery: such a signal would make every decapsulation element a bundle source and would amount to the acknowledgement layer that this protocol does not have (item 1 above), and the conditions it could report are configuration errors of a bilaterally configured tunnel, which are for its operators to detect rather than for the protocol to correct. The visibility available from existing status report machinery is set out in <xref target="diagnostics"/>.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>Encapsulating and decapsulating nodes require compatible configuration (the decapsulation endpoint, the segmentation threshold, and whether reassembly is supported), established in advance.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>The encapsulated bundle is opaque for the whole of the tunnel: none of its extension blocks are processed, and none of its status report requests are acted on, until it is decapsulated (<xref target="extension-blocks"/>). Where a tunnel exists only to carry bundles across a particular sub-path, such as a link whose convergence layer cannot carry the bundles whole, the decapsulation endpoint is therefore best placed at the end of that sub-path, so that the encapsulated bundle is again processed hop by hop as soon as possible.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>An encapsulating bundle whose destination endpoint has no registered decapsulation element at the destination node will be delivered to whatever application is registered there, or abandoned; nothing distinguishes an encapsulating bundle from any other bundle in transit.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>As with IP tunnels, recursive encapsulation loops are possible: if the route toward a decapsulation endpoint itself resolves to BIBE encapsulation (at this node or a mutually recursive one), each encapsulation produces a new bundle that is encapsulated again, without limit. Unlike IP, a bundle has no hop-limit field that survives encapsulation: each encapsulating bundle starts a new hop count (<xref target="extension-blocks"/>), so no hop limit, at any layer, terminates the loop. The lifetime rule of <xref target="primary-block"/> bounds every layer by the remaining lifetime of the original bundle (subject, where its age is carried in a Bundle Age block, to the accounting of tunnel transit described in <xref target="extension-blocks"/>), but places no bound on the number of bundles generated before then. An implementation <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> protect against this, for example by refusing to encapsulate a bundle it recognizes as one of its own encapsulating bundles, by bounding nesting depth (compare the tunnel encapsulation limit of <xref target="TUNLIMIT"/>), or by configuration validation ensuring the route to a decapsulation endpoint does not traverse the tunnel it serves.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <section anchor="diagnostics">
        <name>Diagnostics</name>
        <t>BIBE requires no diagnostic machinery of its own: because encapsulating bundles are ordinary bundles and decapsulation ends in ordinary reception (<xref section="5.6" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/>), the bundle status report mechanism of <xref section="6.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/> already observes every stage of the encapsulation chain. Status reports are requested per bundle and honoured subject to node policy; they are a diagnostic instrument, and the report flags of encapsulating bundles <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> be set in normal operation — a stream of status reports directed at the encapsulating node both amplifies traffic and identifies tunnel traffic to on-path observers (<xref target="security-considerations"/>).</t>
        <t>When enabled for diagnosis, the observation points are:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Tunnel ingress: encapsulation is a forwarding operation (<xref target="model"/>), so an encapsulated bundle that requests forwarding reports causes a "bundle forwarded" status report from the encapsulating node in the normal way.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Tunnel transit: the encapsulating node sets the report flags and report-to EID of the encapsulating bundles it sources (<xref target="primary-block"/>). Reception and forwarding reports trace the tunnel path; a deletion report identifies where and why an encapsulating bundle was lost, using the existing reason codes (e.g. "Lifetime expired", "Depleted storage", "No known route to destination from here", "No timely contact with next node on route", "Block unintelligible", "Hop limit exceeded"). On the tunnel path, "Hop limit exceeded" signals a routing loop among the nodes forwarding the encapsulating bundle, and is available only if the encapsulating node included a Hop Count block. It is not a signature of the recursive encapsulation loops cautioned against in <xref target="deployment"/>: each encapsulation sources a new bundle whose hop count starts at zero (<xref target="extension-blocks"/>), so no hop limit is ever reached, and such loops are detectable only by the local protections required there.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Transfer completion: delivery reports requested on the encapsulating bundles of a transfer confirm, chunk by chunk, that its payloads were delivered to the decapsulation endpoint — that is, presented to the application agent (<xref section="5.7" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/>), not that the decapsulation element processed them successfully. The absence of a delivery report at the transfer's expiry (<xref target="primary-block"/>) points to the segment(s) that may have been lost, but does not prove their loss: the generation of status reports is subject to node policy, and a status report may itself be lost.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Tunnel egress: the reassembled or whole encapsulated bundle is presented to the BPA per <xref section="5.6" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/>, so its own reception, deletion, and onward forwarding reports resume in the normal way; to the encapsulated bundle's reporting, the entire tunnel transit appears as a single hop.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>These observation points compose, with the caveat that received reports are positive evidence while absent ones are not: delivery reports confirming that every encapsulating bundle of a transfer reached the decapsulation endpoint, while no reception report for the encapsulated bundle arrives from the decapsulating node, point toward the decapsulation element — a configuration mismatch (<xref target="deployment"/>), for example, rather than transit loss — though the absent report might equally not have been requested by the encapsulated bundle, not have been generated under node policy, or have been lost. This is nonetheless the distinction an administrator most needs to investigate when a tunnel fails silently.</t>
        <t>The dispositions internal to the decapsulation element (<xref target="reception"/>, <xref target="reassembly"/>, <xref target="resources"/>) occur after delivery of the encapsulating bundle and concern data that is not (or not yet) a bundle; they are not expressible as status reports about either bundle, and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> instead be surfaced by local means (logs, counters) at the decapsulating node.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>Security considerations largely follow those of BPv7 <xref target="RFC9171"/> and BPSec <xref target="RFC9172"/>. In addition, because BIBE is a tunneling protocol, the security concerns cataloged for IP tunneling in <xref target="TUNSEC"/> apply, translated to the BP layer, and are addressed in the following subsections.</t>
      <section anchor="composition-with-bpsec">
        <name>Composition with BPSec</name>
        <t>BIBE composes constructively with BPSec: a BCB on the payload of the encapsulating bundle encrypts the entire encapsulated bundle, including its primary block, concealing the encapsulated source and destination from observers on the encapsulating path.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="anonymity">
        <name>Sender Anonymity</name>
        <t>Encapsulation conceals the source of the encapsulated bundle, but the source EID of each encapsulating bundle is visible on the encapsulating path and to the decapsulating node. The null endpoint is not available to conceal it (<xref target="primary-block"/>). A deployment requiring sender anonymity can instead source encapsulating bundles from ephemeral singleton endpoints, established for the purpose and not otherwise associated with the encapsulating node: a distinct ephemeral source EID per tunnel or transfer prevents a decapsulating node from linking them to one another or to the node, while preserving the bundle identity and transfer scope (<xref target="transfer-ids"/>) that the null endpoint would destroy. How such EIDs are allocated is outside the scope of this document; note, however, that the EID scheme and allocation chosen may themselves reveal information, and that some allocations are valid only within a single administrative domain (e.g. <xref section="5.5" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9758"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="circumvention-of-policy-enforcement">
        <name>Circumvention of Policy Enforcement</name>
        <t>As <xref target="TUNSEC"/> observes for IP, tunneled traffic is opaque to inspection and filtering points along the tunnel path: a node on the encapsulating path that would, by policy, have refused to forward or store the encapsulated bundle (by destination, source, block content, size, or any other criterion) cannot apply that policy, particularly when the encapsulating payload is encrypted. BIBE therefore permits bundles to cross policy boundaries that they could not cross natively — which is precisely its cross-domain use case when authorized, and a policy-evasion channel when not.</t>
        <t>Consequently the decapsulating node is a policy enforcement point: a decapsulated bundle <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be subjected to the node's normal inbound bundle admission policy, exactly as if it had arrived via any convergence layer, before it is forwarded or delivered. A node <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> afford decapsulated bundles any trust derived from the encapsulating bundle's security verification unless policy explicitly says so. Network operators <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> restrict, by policy, where decapsulation elements may be registered and from which peers each will accept encapsulating bundles, just as prudent IP networks control where tunnels may terminate.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="spoofing-of-the-encapsulated-bundle">
        <name>Spoofing of the Encapsulated Bundle</name>
        <t>Nothing in this protocol authenticates the contents of an encapsulated bundle: the source of the encapsulated bundle is whatever its primary block claims, and an authorized (or compromised) encapsulating peer can inject bundles claiming any source. Authentication of the encapsulating bundle (e.g. a Block Integrity Block (BIB) whose security target is the payload) attributes the payload, under the deployment's key distribution and security policy, to an authorized security source — a tunnel peer — and says nothing of the encapsulated bundle's provenance; end-to-end assurance of the encapsulated bundle requires BPSec applied to the encapsulated bundle itself.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="injection">
        <name>Injection Against Transfers</name>
        <t>An adversary able to cause a fabricated bundle to be delivered at a decapsulation endpoint, bearing the (source EID, destination EID) pair and Transfer ID of a transfer in progress, can attack that transfer. An inconsistent forged segment — one with a mismatched total-length, or content overlapping previously received ranges — causes the reassembly rules of <xref target="reassembly"/> to discard the transfer; this is a targeted denial of service against a single transfer. Note, however, that the discard rules are not the vulnerability: the same adversary can instead inject a consistent forged segment — matching total-length, at an offset not yet received — and thereby corrupt the reassembled bundle silently, which no reassembly rule can detect. Injection of forged segments is fatal to a transfer whatever the discard rules do; the rules of <xref target="reassembly"/> merely convert the detectable subset of such corruptions into prompt failure, releasing reassembly state rather than expending further resources on a transfer that can no longer complete correctly.</t>
        <t>The mitigation is the same as for resource exhaustion (<xref target="resource-exhaustion"/>): authenticate encapsulating bundles, so that forged payloads are discarded before they reach the reassembly procedures. A deployment relying on authentication for this purpose <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> configure the security policy of the decapsulating node to require a BIB whose security target is the payload, to accept that BIB only from a security source authorized as a tunnel peer for the source EID and destination EID of the encapsulating bundle, and to require a security context that binds the payload to the primary block, so that the (source EID, destination EID) scope of the transfer (<xref target="transfer-ids"/>) cannot be altered undetected. Whether a BIB binds its security target to the primary block, or to any other block, depends on the security context and its parameters; BPSec itself does not imply it. Integrity protection applied to the encapsulated bundle itself, surviving the tunnel intact (<xref target="encap-bundle"/>), additionally detects any corrupt reassembly after decapsulation.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="replay">
        <name>Replay</name>
        <t>Authentication of an encapsulating bundle establishes neither its freshness nor its uniqueness: a captured encapsulating bundle bearing a valid BIB remains valid when replayed (<xref section="8.2.4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9172"/>). A replayed segment payload whose transfer is still in progress is a duplicate, handled by <xref target="reassembly"/>; one arriving after its transfer has completed or been discarded begins a new transfer, with the consequences set out in <xref target="resource-exhaustion"/>; and a replay of a whole-bundle payload, or of every segment payload of a transfer, presents the encapsulated bundle to the BPA again, as would the replay of any bundle.</t>
        <t>Replay of an encapsulating bundle after its expiry is defeated only if the decapsulating node can determine that expiry reliably. Where the security context binds the payload to the primary block, the creation timestamp and lifetime are protected; but where the creation time is zero, the age of the bundle is obtained from its Bundle Age block (<xref section="5.5" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9171"/>), which is updated at every hop and so cannot be protected end to end by a BIB added at the encapsulating node. An adversary able to reduce the bundle age can then cause an expired encapsulating bundle to be accepted, and a segment payload so accepted could be absorbed into a later transfer to which the same Transfer ID has been assigned (<xref target="transfer-ids"/>). A deployment relying on authentication to protect transfers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> therefore source encapsulating bundles with a non-zero creation time, under a security context that binds the payload to the primary block; any anti-replay mechanism provided by the chosen security context (<xref section="8.2.4" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9172"/>) offers further protection. The local bounds of <xref target="resource-exhaustion"/> limit the resources that replay can consume, but do not establish freshness.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="resource-exhaustion">
        <name>Resource Exhaustion</name>
        <t>A decapsulating node is exposed to resource-exhaustion attack by an adversary transmitting incomplete transfers, or segment payloads with large total-length values. Although <xref target="resources"/> bounds the retention of reassembly state by the expiry of the encapsulating bundles, that expiry is claimed by the sender: an adversary can assign its encapsulating bundles distant expiry times and simply decline to send one or more segments. A decapsulating node <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> therefore be configurable with an upper bound of its own on the retention of reassembly state — a maximum interval for which an incomplete transfer may be held, or equivalently a maximum acceptable remaining lifetime for encapsulating bundles carrying segment payloads — and discard, as <xref target="resources"/> permits, any transfer exceeding it: the sender-claimed expiry then bounds well-behaved transfers, while the configured bound caps the exposure to hostile or broken ones.</t>
        <t>Total-length is likewise claimed by the sender: a single segment payload claiming a very large total-length can induce a decapsulation element that commits storage for the whole transfer upon receipt of its first segment to commit far more storage than the adversary has sent. A decapsulating node <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> therefore also be configurable with a maximum acceptable total-length, and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> discard any segment payload whose total-length exceeds it before committing any reassembly state. A natural choice is the largest bundle the node would accept via any convergence layer: the reassembled bundle is in any case subject to the node's normal inbound admission policy, and nothing is gained by reassembling a bundle that will then be refused. Independently of any such bound, an implementation <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> commit storage in proportion to a claimed total-length in advance of receiving the corresponding octets.</t>
        <t>Per-transfer bounds do not limit the aggregate: many incomplete transfers, each within every per-transfer bound, can together exhaust the node. A decapsulating node <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> therefore also bound the total reassembly state it commits across all transfers, discarding, as <xref target="resources"/> permits, whatever would exceed it; how that state is measured is an implementation matter.</t>
        <t>Reassembly state is also created by a segment payload that arrives after its transfer has completed or been discarded, whether a late duplicate or a replay (<xref target="replay"/>): having no transfer in progress to join, it begins a new transfer, which will ordinarily never complete, and whose state persists until discarded under <xref target="resources"/>; repeated replay can renew such state indefinitely. This affects only the consumption of resources, not the correctness of any transfer, and it is bounded by the same local policies.</t>
        <t>Because decapsulation endpoints are established by administrative policy rather than at a well-known service identifier (<xref target="model"/>), an off-path adversary has no predictable target for such traffic, and operators <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> disclose decapsulation endpoint IDs beyond their authorized tunnel peers. This is not a means of authorization: the destination EID of every encapsulating bundle is visible to on-path observers (<xref target="use-cases"/>). The expiry deadline and local resource management policies of <xref target="resources"/> mitigate this; deployments <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> additionally authenticate encapsulating bundles, under security policy such as that described in <xref target="injection"/>, so that payloads from unauthorized sources can be discarded before reassembly state is committed. Authentication narrows the exposure to authorized peers but does not eliminate it: a compromised or misbehaving authorized peer can still commit reassembly storage up to whatever bound local policy enforces, and that policy is therefore the mitigation of last resort.</t>
        <t>Recursive encapsulation is a related amplification hazard; see <xref target="deployment"/> for the required loop protections.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document has no IANA actions: decapsulation endpoints are established by administrative policy (<xref target="model"/>), so no well-known service identifier is defined, and the payload of an encapsulating bundle is not an administrative record, so no administrative record type is allocated.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC9171">
          <front>
            <title>Bundle Protocol Version 7</title>
            <author fullname="S. Burleigh" initials="S." surname="Burleigh"/>
            <author fullname="K. Fall" initials="K." surname="Fall"/>
            <author fullname="E. Birrane, III" initials="E." surname="Birrane, III"/>
            <date month="January" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document presents a specification for the Bundle Protocol, adapted from the experimental Bundle Protocol specification developed by the Delay-Tolerant Networking Research Group of the Internet Research Task Force and documented in RFC 5050.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9171"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9171"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="BTPU">
          <front>
            <title>Bundle Transfer Protocol - Unidirectional</title>
            <author fullname="Rick Taylor" initials="R." surname="Taylor">
              <organization>Aalyria Technologies</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="15" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines a protocol for the unidirectional transfer of
   large binary objects, typically Bundle Protocol version 7 bundles,
   between two nodes connected by a unidirectional, unreliable, frame-
   based link-layer protocol, without requiring IP services.

   The protocol does not require a return path for acknowledgements, but
   instead supports data repetition as a mechanism to protect against
   data loss.  It fully supports the disaggregation of flows of binary
   objects of different priority, preventing head-of-line blocking
   impacting performance.

   The wire format of the protocol is designed to enable performant
   implementation in hardware or software, with the aim of enabling
   protocol implementations to run at the line-rate of the underlying
   link-layer protocol.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-dtn-btpu-05"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="GRE">
          <front>
            <title>Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)</title>
            <author fullname="D. Farinacci" initials="D." surname="Farinacci"/>
            <author fullname="T. Li" initials="T." surname="Li"/>
            <author fullname="S. Hanks" initials="S." surname="Hanks"/>
            <author fullname="D. Meyer" initials="D." surname="Meyer"/>
            <author fullname="P. Traina" initials="P." surname="Traina"/>
            <date month="March" year="2000"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies a protocol for encapsulation of an arbitrary network layer protocol over another arbitrary network layer protocol. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2784"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2784"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="GREKEY">
          <front>
            <title>Key and Sequence Number Extensions to GRE</title>
            <author fullname="G. Dommety" initials="G." surname="Dommety"/>
            <date month="September" year="2000"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes extensions by which two fields, Key and Sequence Number, can be optionally carried in the GRE Header. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2890"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2890"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="IPIP">
          <front>
            <title>IP Encapsulation within IP</title>
            <author fullname="C. Perkins" initials="C." surname="Perkins"/>
            <date month="October" year="1996"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies a method by which an IP datagram may be encapsulated (carried as payload) within an IP datagram. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2003"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2003"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="TUNMTU">
          <front>
            <title>MTU and Fragmentation Issues with In-the-Network Tunneling</title>
            <author fullname="P. Savola" initials="P." surname="Savola"/>
            <date month="April" year="2006"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Tunneling techniques such as IP-in-IP when deployed in the middle of the network, typically between routers, have certain issues regarding how large packets can be handled: whether such packets would be fragmented and reassembled (and how), whether Path MTU Discovery would be used, or how this scenario could be operationally avoided. This memo justifies why this is a common, non-trivial problem, and goes on to describe the different solutions and their characteristics at some length. This memo provides information for the Internet community.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4459"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4459"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="TUNLIMIT">
          <front>
            <title>Generic Packet Tunneling in IPv6 Specification</title>
            <author fullname="A. Conta" initials="A." surname="Conta"/>
            <author fullname="S. Deering" initials="S." surname="Deering"/>
            <date month="December" year="1998"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines the model and generic mechanisms for IPv6 encapsulation of Internet packets, such as IPv6 and IPv4. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2473"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2473"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="TUNSEC">
          <front>
            <title>Security Concerns with IP Tunneling</title>
            <author fullname="S. Krishnan" initials="S." surname="Krishnan"/>
            <author fullname="D. Thaler" initials="D." surname="Thaler"/>
            <author fullname="J. Hoagland" initials="J." surname="Hoagland"/>
            <date month="April" year="2011"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>A number of security concerns with IP tunnels are documented in this memo. The intended audience of this document includes network administrators and future protocol developers. The primary intent of this document is to raise the awareness level regarding the security issues with IP tunnels as deployed and propose strategies for the mitigation of those issues. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6169"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6169"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RECURSIVE-DTN" target="https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.27325">
          <front>
            <title>Recursive Delay-Tolerant Networking using Bundle-in-Bundle Encapsulation</title>
            <author initials="M." surname="Feldmann" fullname="Marius Feldmann">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="T." surname="Nöthlich" fullname="Tobias Nöthlich">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="F." surname="Walter" fullname="Felix Walter">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="M." surname="Nitsch" fullname="Maximilian Nitsch">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="J. A." surname="Fraire" fullname="Juan A. Fraire">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="G. A." surname="Murzik" fullname="Georg A. Murzik">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author initials="F." surname="Fuchs" fullname="Fiona Fuchs">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date year="2025" month="October"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.48550/arXiv.2510.27325"/>
          <seriesInfo name="arXiv" value="2510.27325"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9172">
          <front>
            <title>Bundle Protocol Security (BPSec)</title>
            <author fullname="E. Birrane, III" initials="E." surname="Birrane, III"/>
            <author fullname="K. McKeever" initials="K." surname="McKeever"/>
            <date month="January" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines a security protocol providing data integrity and confidentiality services for the Bundle Protocol (BP).</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9172"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9172"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9758">
          <front>
            <title>Updates to the 'ipn' URI Scheme</title>
            <author fullname="R. Taylor" initials="R." surname="Taylor"/>
            <author fullname="E. Birrane III" initials="E." surname="Birrane III"/>
            <date month="May" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document updates the specification of the 'ipn' URI scheme previously defined in RFC 6260 and the IANA registries established in RFC 7116. It also updates the rules for the encoding and decoding of these URIs when used as an Endpoint Identifier (EID) in the Bundle Protocol version 7 (BPv7) as defined in RFC 9171. These updates clarify the structure and behavior of the 'ipn' URI scheme, define new encodings of 'ipn' scheme URIs, and establish the registries necessary to manage this scheme.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9758"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9758"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8610">
          <front>
            <title>Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and JSON Data Structures</title>
            <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
            <author fullname="C. Vigano" initials="C." surname="Vigano"/>
            <author fullname="C. Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann"/>
            <date month="June" year="2019"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document proposes a notational convention to express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) data structures (RFC 7049). Its main goal is to provide an easy and unambiguous way to express structures for protocol messages and data formats that use CBOR or JSON.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8610"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8610"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 450?>

<section anchor="cddl">
      <name>CDDL Expression</name>
      <t>For informational purposes, <xref target="fig-cddl"/> restates the structure defined in <xref target="payload-format"/> in CDDL <xref target="RFC8610"/>, extending the <tt>$payload-block-data</tt> socket defined in Appendix B of <xref target="RFC9171"/>: the payload block content is an encoded CBOR array in which the three segmentation fields are optional as a group — either all present (a segment payload) or all absent (a whole-bundle payload) — and the final field is always a byte string. If this CDDL and the text definitions of <xref target="payload-format"/> disagree, the text governs.</t>
      <figure anchor="fig-cddl">
        <name>CDDL definition of the encapsulating bundle payload</name>
        <sourcecode type="cddl"><![CDATA[
$payload-block-data /= bstr .cbor encapsulation-payload

encapsulation-payload = [
  ? (
    transfer-id: uint,
    total-length: uint,
    segment-offset: uint
  ),
  encapsulated-data: bstr
]
]]></sourcecode>
      </figure>
      <t>Note that encoding constraints (definite-length encoding) are matters for the text definitions of <xref target="payload-format"/>; CDDL does not express encoding options. Note also that encapsulated-data is deliberately a plain bstr rather than <tt>bstr .cbor bundle</tt>: in a segment payload it is an arbitrary slice of octets that need not be well-formed CBOR at all, and in either form the content is opaque to the decapsulation element and is validated as a bundle only by the BPA upon reception (<xref target="reception"/>).</t>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>This document is directly derived from draft-ietf-dtn-bibect, authored by Scott Burleigh, Alberto Montilla, Joshua Deaton, and Carlo Caini; its architecture and concepts originate with them. The central insight — that a BP network can itself serve as the "link layer" beneath a further layer of bundle protocol — is Scott Burleigh's, and the encapsulation-only scope of this document is a return to that of his original 2013 formulation, draft-irtf-burleigh-bibe.</t>
      <t>The segmentation mechanism was designed within the CCSDS Bundle-in-Bundle Encapsulation effort of the Space Internetworking Services (SIS-DTN) working group, which identified bundle segmentation, rather than BPv7 fragmentation, as the appropriate tool for carrying large bundles over size-limited paths, and defined the representation this document adopts; the initial design was the work of Lars Baumgärtner and Giacomo Maldarella. Joshua Deaton contributed to both the IETF and CCSDS strands of the segmentation work. The mechanism was demonstrated in a prototype implementation within DTNME at NASA, and in a proof-of-concept implementation by Lukas Holst. The segmentation model is aligned with the transfer/segment design of <xref target="BTPU"/>.</t>
      <t>Brian Sipos contributed the CDDL formulation in <xref target="cddl"/>, the discipline of keeping normative text definitions strictly separate from CDDL, and the review that led to the PDU-derived Transfer ID scope of <xref target="transfer-ids"/>. Felix Flentge's review led to the restriction of encapsulation to BPv7 bundles and to the provision for segmentation toward anycast endpoints in <xref target="segmentation"/>.</t>
      <t>The original bundle-in-bundle encapsulation concept derives from draft-irtf-dtnrg-bundle-encapsulation (2009) by Susan Symington, Bob Durst, and Keith Scott of The MITRE Corporation, whose influence is gratefully acknowledged.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="contributors" numbered="false" toc="include" removeInRFC="false">
      <name>Contributors</name>
      <contact fullname="Scott Burleigh">
        <organization>IPNSIG Inc.</organization>
        <address>
          <email>sburleig.sb@gmail.com</email>
        </address>
      </contact>
      <t>Author of the successive BIBE Internet-Drafts, from draft-irtf-burleigh-bibe (2013) through draft-ietf-dtn-bibect, from which this document is directly derived; the BIBE architecture is his.</t>
      <contact fullname="Joshua Deaton">
        <organization>SAIC</organization>
        <address>
          <email>joshua.e.deaton@nasa.gov</email>
        </address>
      </contact>
      <t>Co-author of draft-ietf-dtn-bibect, and contributor to the CCSDS Orange Book segmentation work on which the segmentation mechanism of this document builds.</t>
      <contact fullname="Carlo Caini">
        <organization>University of Bologna</organization>
        <address>
          <email>carlo.caini@unibo.it</email>
        </address>
      </contact>
      <t>Co-author of draft-ietf-dtn-bibect.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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