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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" version="3" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-jose-json-proof-algorithms-15" submissionType="IETF" category="std" xml:lang="en" indexInclude="true" consensus="true" tocDepth="4">

<front>
<title abbrev="json-proof-algorithms">JSON Proof Algorithms</title><seriesInfo value="draft-ietf-jose-json-proof-algorithms-15" stream="IETF" status="standard" name="Internet-Draft"/>
<author initials="M." surname="Jones" fullname="Michael B. Jones"><organization>Self-Issued Consulting</organization><address><postal><street/>
</postal><email>michael_b_jones@hotmail.com</email>
<uri>https://self-issued.info/</uri>
</address></author><author initials="D." surname="Waite" fullname="David Waite"><organization>Ping Identity</organization><address><postal><street/>
</postal><email>dwaite+jwp@pingidentity.com</email>
</address></author><author initials="J." surname="Miller" fullname="Jeremie Miller"><organization>Ping Identity</organization><address><postal><street/>
</postal><email>jmiller@pingidentity.com</email>
</address></author><date/>
<area>Internet</area>
<workgroup>jose</workgroup>
<keyword>json</keyword>
<keyword>jose</keyword>
<keyword>zkp</keyword>
<keyword>jwp</keyword>
<keyword>jws</keyword>
<keyword>jpa</keyword>
<keyword>cbor</keyword>
<keyword>cose</keyword>

<abstract>
<t>The JSON Proof Algorithms (JPA) specification registers cryptographic
algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Proof, JSON Web
Key (JWK), and COSE specifications.  It defines IANA registries for
these identifiers.</t>
</abstract>

</front>

<middle>

<section anchor="introduction"><name>Introduction</name>
<t>The JSON Web Proof (JWP) <xref target="I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-proof"/> draft
establishes a new secure container format that supports selective
disclosure and unlinkability using Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) or other
cryptographic algorithms.</t>
<blockquote><t>Editor's Note: This draft is still early and incomplete.  There will
be significant changes to the algorithms as currently defined here.
Please do not use any of these definitions or examples for anything
except personal experimentation and learning.  Contributions and
feedback are welcomed at
<eref target="https://github.com/ietf-wg-jose/json-web-proof">https://github.com/ietf-wg-jose/json-web-proof</eref>.</t>
</blockquote></section>

<section anchor="conventions-and-definitions"><name>Conventions and Definitions</name>
<t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14
<xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.</t>
<t>The roles of "issuer", "holder", and "verifier" are used as defined by
the VC Data Model <xref target="VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0"/>.  The term "presentation" is also
used as defined by this source, but the term "credential" is avoided in
this specification to minimize confusion with other definitions.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="terminology"><name>Terminology</name>
<t>The terms "JSON Web Signature (JWS)", "Base64url Encoding", "Header
Parameter", "JOSE Header", "JWS Payload", "JWS Signature", and "JWS
Protected Header" are defined by <xref target="RFC7515" sectionFormat="of" section="2"/>.</t>
<t>The terms "JSON Web Proof (JWP)", "JWP Payload", "JWP Proof", and "JWP
 Header" are defined by <xref target="I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-proof"/>.</t>
<t>These terms are defined by this specification:</t>

<dl spacing="compact">
<dt>Stable Key:</dt>
<dd>An asymmetric key-pair used by an issuer that is also shared via an
out-of-band mechanism to a verifier to validate the signature.</dd>
<dt>Issuer Ephemeral Key:</dt>
<dd>An asymmetric key-pair that is generated for one-time use by an issuer
and never stored or used again outside of the creation of a single
JWP.</dd>
<dt>Holder Presentation Key:</dt>
<dd>An asymmetric key-pair that is generated by a holder and used to
ensure that a presentation is not able to be replayed by any other
party.</dd>
</dl>
</section>

<section anchor="background"><name>Background</name>
<t>JWP defines a container binding together a Header, one or more
payloads, and a cryptographic proof.  It does not define any details
about the interactions between an application and the cryptographic
libraries that implement proof-supporting algorithms.</t>
<t>Due to the nature of ZKPs, this specification also documents the subtle
but important differences in proof algorithms versus those defined by
the JSON Web Algorithms <xref target="RFC7518"/>.  These differences help support more
advanced capabilities such as blinded signatures and predicate proofs.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="algorithm-basics"><name>Algorithm Basics</name>
<t>The four principal interactions that every proof algorithm MUST support
are <eref target="#issue">issue</eref>, <eref target="#confirm">confirm</eref>, <eref target="#present">present</eref>, and
<eref target="#verify">verify</eref>.</t>

<section anchor="issue"><name>Issue</name>
<t>The JWP is first created as the output of a JPA's <tt>issue</tt> operation.</t>
<t>Every algorithm MUST support a JSON issuer Header along with
one or more octet string payloads.  The algorithm MAY support using
additional items provided by the holder for issuance such as blinded
payloads, keys for replay prevention, etc.</t>
<t>All algorithms MUST provide integrity protection for the Issuer Header
and all payloads and MUST specify all digest and/or hash2curve methods
used.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="confirm"><name>Confirm</name>
<t>Performed by the holder to validate that the issued JWP is correctly
formed and protected.</t>
<t>Each algorithm MAY support using additional input items options, such as
those sent to the issuer for issuance.  After confirmation, an algorithm
MAY return a modified JWP for serialized storage without the local state
(such as with blinded payloads now unblinded).</t>
<t>The algorithm MUST fully verify the issued proof value against the
Issuer Header and all payloads.  If given a presented JWP
instead of an issued one, the confirm process MUST return an error.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="present"><name>Present</name>
<t>Used to apply any selective disclosure choices and perform any
unlinkability transformations, as well as to show binding.</t>
<t>An algorithm MAY support additional input options from the requesting
party, such as for predicate proofs and verifiable computation requests.</t>
<t>Every algorithm MUST support the ability to hide any or all payloads.
It MUST always include the Issuer Header unmodified in the
presentation.</t>
<t>The algorithm MUST replace the issued proof value and generate a new
presented proof value.  It also MUST include a new Presentation
Header that provides replay protection.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="verify"><name>Verify</name>
<t>Performed by the verifier to verify the Headers along with any
disclosed payloads and/or assertions about them from the proving party,
while also verifying they are the same payloads and ordering as
witnessed by the issuer.</t>
<t>The algorithm MUST verify the integrity of all disclosed payloads and
MUST also verify the integrity of both the Issuer and Presentation
Headers.</t>
<t>If the presented proof contains any assertions about the hidden
payloads, the algorithm MUST also verify all of those assertions.  It
MAY support additional options, such as those sent to the holder to
generate the presentation.</t>
<t>If given an issued JWP for verification, the algorithm MUST return an
error.</t>
</section>
</section>

<section anchor="jwk-and-cose-key-parameters"><name>JWK and COSE_Key Parameters</name>
<t>For JSON Web Keys, the optional <tt>alg</tt> (algorithm) parameter identifies
the algorithm intended for use. This can reference the IANA "JSON Web
Signature and Encryption Algorithms" registry <xref target="IANA.JOSE"/>, or be a
collision-resistant name.</t>
<t>To avoid the risk of collision with algorithms registered in
the "JSON Web Proof Algorithms" registry, this specification
defines the <tt>proof_alg</tt> key parameter.</t>
<t>For COSE_Key values, a <tt>proof_alg</tt> key parameter is likewise defined to
avoid collisions with the IANA "COSE Algorithms" registry <xref target="IANA.COSE"/>.</t>
<t>Implementations SHOULD NOT specify proof algorithms using the <tt>alg</tt>
key parameter.</t>

<section anchor="proof_algDef"><name>The "proof_alg" JWK/COSE_Key Parameter</name>
<t>The <tt>proof_alg</tt> (Proof Algorithm) key parameter is used to restrict the
algorithm that is used with the key. If this parameter is present in the
key structure, the application MUST verify that this algorithm matches
the algorithm for which the key is being used. If the algorithms do not
match, then this key object MUST NOT be used to perform the
cryptographic operation.</t>
<t>As a JWK parameter, the <tt>proof_alg</tt> value is a case-sensitive ASCII
string containing a StringOrURI value.  The value MUST be a name
registered in the IANA "JSON Web Proof Algorithms" registry established
by this specification, or be a collision-resistant name for a JSON Web
Proof Algorithm.</t>
<t>As a CWK parameter, this value may also be an integer value.
The integer CBOR Label from the "JSON Web Proof Algorithms" registry
SHOULD be used when one is available.</t>
<t>When <tt>proof_alg</tt> is present, the <tt>alg</tt> key parameter SHOULD NOT be used.</t>
<t>Use of this key parameter is OPTIONAL.</t>
</section>
</section>

<section anchor="algorithm-specifications"><name>Algorithm Specifications</name>
<t>This section defines how to use specific algorithms for JWPs.</t>

<section anchor="single-use"><name>Single Use</name>
<t>The Single Use (SU) algorithm is based on composing multiple traditional
asymmetric signatures into a single JWP proof.  It enables a very simple
form of selective disclosure without requiring any advanced
cryptographic techniques.</t>
<t>It does not support unlinkability if the same JWP is presented multiple
times, therefore when privacy is required the holder will need to
interact with the issuer again to receive new single-use JWPs
(dynamically or in batches).</t>

<section anchor="jws-algorithm"><name>JWS Algorithm</name>
<t>The Single Use algorithm uses multiple signing keys to protect the
Header as well as individual payloads of an Issued JWP.  The
issuer uses a stable public key to sign each Header, and a
per-JWP ephemeral key (conveyed within the Header) to protect
the individual payloads.  These signatures are all created using the
same Asymmetric Algorithm, with the JOSE and COSE name/label of this
algorithm being part of registration for a fully-specified Single Use
algorithm identifier.</t>
<t>The Issuer Header also conveys a holder presentation key, an
ephemeral asymmetric key meant to only be used for presenting a single
JWP.  The fully-specified algorithm the holder must use for
presentations is also included.  This algorithm MAY be different from
the algorithm used by the issuer.</t>
<t>Issuers and holders MUST choose asymmetric signing algorithms, so each
signature can be verified without sharing secrets between the parties.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="holder-setup"><name>Holder Setup</name>
<t>To support the protection of a presentation by a holder to a
verifier, the holder MUST use a Holder Presentation Key during the
issuance and the presentation of every Single Use JWP.  This Holder
Presentation Key MUST be generated and used for only one JWP if
unlinkability is desired.</t>
<t>The issuer MUST verify that the holder has possession of this key.  The
holder-issuer communication to exchange this information is out of scope
of this specification, but can be accomplished by the holder using this
key to generate a JWS that signs a value the issuer can verify as
unique.</t>
<t>The issuer MUST determine an appropriate holder presentation algorithm
corresponding to the holder presentation key.  If the holder and
verifier cannot be assumed to know this algorithm is the appropriate
choice for a given holder presentation key, this value MUST be conveyed
in the <tt>hpa</tt> Issuer Header Parameter.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="issuer-setup"><name>Issuer Setup</name>
<t>To create a Single Use JWP, the issuer first generates a unique
Ephemeral Key using the selected internal algorithm.  This key-pair will
be used to sign each of the payloads of a single JWP and then discarded.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="signing-payloads"><name>Signing Payloads</name>
<t>Each individual payload is signed using the selected internal algorithm
using the Ephemeral Key.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="issuer-header"><name>Issuer Header</name>
<t>The Issuer's Ephemeral Key MUST be included via the Issuer Ephemeral Key
Header Parameter.</t>
<t>The Holder's Presentation Key MUST be included via the Holder
Presentation Key Header Parameter.</t>
<t>The Holder's Presentation Algorithm MUST be included via the Holder
Presentation Algorithm Header Parameter unless there is another way for
the holder and verifier to unambiguously determine the appropriate
algorithm to use.</t>
<t>The Issuer Header is signed using the appropriate internal
signing algorithm for the given fully-specified single use algorithm,
using the issuer's Stable Key.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="payloads"><name>Payloads</name>
<t>Each JWP payload is processed in order and signed using the given JWA
using the issuer's Ephemeral Key.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="proof"><name>Proof</name>
<t>The proof value is an octet string array.  The first entry is the octet
string of the Issuer Header signature, with an additional
entry for each payload signature.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="presentation-header"><name>Presentation Header</name>
<t>To generate a new presentation, the holder first creates a Presentation
Header that is specific to the verifier being presented to.
This Header MUST contain a parameter that both the holder and verifier
trust as being unique and non-replayable.  Use of the <tt>nonce</tt> Header
Parameter is RECOMMENDED for this purpose.</t>
<t>This specification registers the <tt>nonce</tt> Header Parameter for the
Presentation Header that contains a string value either
generated by the verifier or derived from values provided by the
verifier.  When present, the verifier MUST ensure the nonce value
matches during verification.</t>
<t>The Presentation Header MAY contain other Header Parameters
that are either provided by the verifier or by the holder.  These
Presentation Header Parameters SHOULD NOT contain values that are common
across multiple presentations and SHOULD be unique to a single
presentation and verifier.</t>
<t>The Presentation Header MUST contain the same <tt>alg</tt> Header Parameter
value as the Issuer Header.  It MUST NOT contain the <tt>hpa</tt> Header
Parameter.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="presentation"><name>Presentation</name>
<t>The holder derives a new proof as part of presentation.  The holder will
also use these components to generate a <eref target="#presentation-internal-representation">presentation internal
representation</eref>.  The number of
components depends on the number of payloads which are being disclosed
in the presented JWP.</t>
<t>The first proof component will be the signature over the Issuer
Header made by the issuer's Stable Key.</t>
<t>For each payload which is to be disclosed, the corresponding payload
signature (from the issued JWP) is included as a subsequent proof
component.  If the payload is being omitted, the corresponding payload
signature is omitted from the proof components.</t>
<t>The Presentation Header, Issuer Header, payload slots
(distinguishing which are being disclosed) and these proof components
are inputs to determine the presentation internal representation.</t>
<t>The holder's signature over the presentation internal representation
(using the holder's private key and the holder presentation algorithm)
is then included as one additional proof component in the final
presentation.</t>
<t>For example, if only the second and fifth of five payloads are being
disclosed, then the proof at this stage will consist of three values:</t>

<ol spacing="compact">
<li>The issuer's signature over the Issuer Header</li>
<li>The payload signature corresponding to the second payload</li>
<li>The payload signature corresponding to the fifth payload.</li>
</ol>
<t>The presentation internal representation would be calculated with these
three proof components, while the final presentation would have an
additional fourth component containing the signature using the holder's
private key.</t>
<t>Since the individual signatures in the proof value are unique and remain
unchanged across multiple presentations, a Single Use JWP SHOULD only be
presented a single time to each verifier in order for the holder to
remain unlinkable across multiple presentations.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="verification-of-presentation"><name>Verification of Presentation</name>
<t>Verification is performed using the following steps.</t>

<ol spacing="compact">
<li>Check that the number of proof components is appropriate for the number of
disclosed payloads.  There MUST be two more proof components than
disclosed payloads.</li>
<li>Verify the first proof component is a valid signature over Issuer
Header octets, using the issuer's stable key.</li>
<li>Extract the holder presentation key and holder presentation algorithm
(if present) from the Issuer Header.</li>
<li>Omitting the final payload component, calculate the <eref target="#presentation-internal-representation">presentation
internal representation</eref>.</li>
<li>Verify the final proof component is a valid signature over the
presentation internal binary form, using the holder's presentation
key and the extracted (or otherwise determined) holder presentation
algorithm.</li>
<li>For each remaining proof component, verify they form a valid
signature over each disclosed payload in sequence, using the issuer's
ephemeral key.</li>
</ol>
</section>

<section anchor="SU-registration"><name>JPA Registration</name>
<t>The proposed JWP <tt>alg</tt> value is of the format <tt>SU-</tt> appended with the
JWS <tt>alg</tt> name of a fully-specified algorithm <xref target="RFC9864"/>.  Note that
the corresponding COSE fully-specified algorithm name and integer label
may differ from the JWS name.  Below are the initial registrations:</t>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li><tt>SU-ES256</tt> uses ECDSA with P-256 and SHA-256 (JWS <tt>ES256</tt>, COSE
<tt>ESP256</tt> / <tt>-9</tt>)</li>
<li><tt>SU-ES384</tt> uses ECDSA with P-384 and SHA-384 (JWS <tt>ES384</tt>, COSE
<tt>ESP384</tt> / <tt>-51</tt>)</li>
<li><tt>SU-ES512</tt> uses ECDSA with P-521 and SHA-512 (JWS <tt>ES512</tt>, COSE
<tt>ESP512</tt> / <tt>-52</tt>)</li>
</ul>
</section>
</section>

<section anchor="presentation-internal-representation"><name>Presentation Internal Representation</name>
<t>Some algorithms (such as Single use and MAC) use a holder key to provide
integrity over the presentation.  For these algorithms, an internal
binary form of the presentation must be generated both for signing by
the holder, and for verification by the verifier.  Other algorithms MAY
use this same form for consistency.</t>
<t>The instructions for creating this binary representation will also
create well-formed CBOR, although this data is not meant to be shared
outside the implementing algorithm.  Instead, it focuses on simplicity
of generation by the holder and verifier implementations.  Although CBOR
has multiple representations of the same underlying information, this
same octet string MUST be generated by an implementation.</t>
<t>When a length or count is added by the steps below, it is added as its
8-byte, network-ordered representation.  For example, the length of a
1,234 byte payload would have a length representation of
<tt>0x00 00 00 00 00 00 04 D2</tt>.</t>
<t>The binary representation is created by appending data into a single
octet string in the following order:</t>

<ol>
<li><tt>0x84 5B</tt></li>
<li>The length and octets of the Presentation Header</li>
<li><tt>0x5B</tt></li>
<li>The length and octets of the Issuer Header</li>
<li><tt>0x9B</tt></li>
<li>The number of payload slots in the issued message</li>
<li><t>For each payload representation:</t>

<ul>
<li>If the payload is being omitted, the value <tt>0xF6</tt></li>
<li><t>Otherwise:</t>

<ol spacing="compact">
<li><tt>0x5B</tt></li>
<li>The length and octets of the payload</li>
</ol></li>
</ul></li>
<li><t><tt>0x9B</tt></t>
</li>
<li><t>The number of proof components as specified by the algorithm</t>
</li>
<li><t>For each proof component, append:</t>

<ol spacing="compact">
<li><tt>0x5B</tt></li>
<li>The length and octets of the proof component</li>
</ol></li>
</ol>
</section>

<section anchor="bbs"><name>BBS</name>
<t>The BBS Signature Scheme <xref target="I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures"/> is under
active development within the CFRG.</t>
<t>This algorithm supports both selective disclosure and unlinkability,
enabling the holder to generate multiple presentations from one issued
JWP without a verifier being able to correlate those presentations
together based on the proof.</t>

<section anchor="BBS-registration"><name>JPA Algorithms</name>
<t>The <tt>BBS</tt> algorithm corresponds to a cipher suite identifier of
<tt>BBS_BLS12381G1_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_</tt>.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="key-format"><name>Key Format</name>
<t>The key used for the <tt>BBS</tt> algorithm is an elliptic curve-based key
pair, specifically against the G_2 subgroup of a pairing friendly curve.
Additional details on key generation can be found in
<xref target="I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures" sectionFormat="of" section="3.4"/>.  The JWK and COSE Key
Object representations of the key are detailed in
<xref target="I-D.ietf-cose-bls-key-representations"/>.</t>
<t>There is no additional holder presentation key necessary for
presentation proofs.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="issuance"><name>Issuance</name>
<t>Issuance is performed using the <tt>Sign</tt> operation from
<xref target="I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures" sectionFormat="of" section="3.5.1"/>.  This operation
utilizes the issuer's BLS12-381 G2 key pair as <tt>SK</tt> and <tt>PK</tt>, along with
desired Header octets as <tt>header</tt>, and the array of payload
octet string as <tt>messages</tt>.</t>
<t>The octets resulting from this operation form a single octet string in
the issuance proof array, to be used along with the Header and
payloads to serialize the JWP.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="issuance-proof-verification"><name>Issuance Proof Verification</name>
<t>Holder verification of the signature on issuance form is performed using
the <tt>Verify</tt> operation from
<xref target="I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures" sectionFormat="of" section="3.5.2"/>.</t>
<t>This operation utilizes the issuer's public key as <tt>PK</tt>, the proof as
<tt>signature</tt>, the Header octets as <tt>header</tt> and the array of
payload octets as <tt>messages</tt>.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="presentation-1"><name>Presentation</name>
<t>Derivation of a presentation is done by the holder using the <tt>ProofGen</tt>
operation from <xref target="I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures" sectionFormat="of" section="3.5.3"/>.</t>
<t>This operation utilizes the issuer's public key as <tt>PK</tt>, the Issuer
Header as <tt>header</tt>, the issuance proof as <tt>signature</tt>, the
issuance payloads as <tt>messages</tt>, and the holder's Presentation Header
as <tt>ph</tt>.</t>
<t>The operation also takes a vector of indexes into <tt>messages</tt>, describing
which payloads the holder wishes to disclose.  All payloads are required
for proof generation, but only these indicated payloads will be required
to be disclosed for later proof verification.</t>
<t>The output of this operation is the presentation proof, as a single
octet string.</t>
<t>Presentation serialization leverages the two Headers and presentation
proof, along with the disclosed payloads.  Encoding of disclosed and
omitted payload slots follows the JWP serialization rules defined in
<xref target="I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-proof"/>.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="presentation-verification"><name>Presentation Verification</name>
<t>Verification of a presentation is done by the verifier using the
<tt>ProofVerify</tt> operation from
<xref target="I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures" sectionFormat="of" section="3.5.4"/>.</t>
<t>This operation utilizes the issuer's public key as <tt>PK</tt>, the Issuer
Header as <tt>header</tt>, the presentation proof as <tt>proof</tt>, the
holder's Presentation Header as <tt>ph</tt>, and the payloads as
<tt>disclosed_messages</tt>.</t>
<t>In addition, the <tt>disclosed_indexes</tt> scalar array is calculated from the
payloads provided.  Values disclosed in the presented payloads have a
zero-based index in this array, while the indices of absent payloads are
omitted.</t>
<t>If <tt>ProofVerify</tt> returns false, the presented JWP is invalid and the
verifier rejects it.</t>
</section>
</section>

<section anchor="message-authentication-code"><name>Message Authentication Code</name>
<t>The Message Authentication Code (MAC) JPA uses a MAC to both generate
ephemeral secrets and to authenticate payloads, along with an
asymmetric signature to provide integrity to the issued JWP.</t>
<t>The holder can manipulate which payloads are disclosed from the issued
JWP, and uses the Holder Presentation Key to create a presentation.  The
signature created from the Holder Presentation Key MAY use a different
algorithm than the Issuer used to sign the issued form.</t>
<t>Like the Single Use algorithm family, it also does not support
unlinkability if the same JWP is presented multiple times and requires
an individually issued JWP for each presentation to fully
protect privacy.  When compared to the JWS approach, using a MAC
requires less computation but can result in potentially larger
presentation proof values.</t>
<t>The design is intentionally minimal and only involves using a single
standardized MAC method instead of a mix of MAC/hash methods or a custom
hash-based construct.  It is able to use any published cryptographic MAC
method such as HMAC <xref target="RFC2104"/> or
<eref target="https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-185.pdf">KMAC</eref>.
It uses traditional public key-based signatures to verify the
authenticity of the issuer and holder.</t>

<section anchor="holder-setup-1"><name>Holder Setup</name>
<t>To support the protection of a presentation by a holder to a
verifier, the holder MUST use a Holder Presentation Key during the
issuance and the presentation of every MAC JWP.  This Holder
Presentation Key MUST be generated and used for only one JWP if
unlinkability is desired.</t>
<t>The issuer MUST verify that the holder has possession of this key.  The
holder-issuer communication to exchange this information is out of scope
of this specification, but can be accomplished by the holder using this
key to generate a JWS that signs a value the issuer can verify as
unique.</t>
<t>The holder's presentation key MUST be included in the Issuer Header
using the Holder Presentation Key Header Parameter.</t>
<t>The issuer MUST determine an appropriate holder presentation algorithm
corresponding to the holder presentation key.  If the holder and
verifier cannot be assumed to know this algorithm is the appropriate
choice for a given holder presentation key, this value MUST be conveyed
in the <tt>hpa</tt> Issuer Header Parameter.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="issuer-setup-1"><name>Issuer Setup</name>
<t>To use the MAC algorithm, the issuer must have a stable public key pair
to perform signing.  To start the issuance process, a single 32-byte
random Shared Secret must first be generated.  This value will be shared
privately with the holder as part of the issuer's JWP proof value.</t>
<t>The Shared Secret is used by both the issuer and holder as the MAC
method's key to generate a new set of unique ephemeral keys.  These keys
are then used as the input to generate a MAC that protects each payload.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="combined-mac-representation"><name>Combined MAC Representation</name>
<t>The combined MAC representation is a single octet string representing
the MAC values of the Issuer Header, along with each payload
provided by the issuer.  This representation is signed by the issuer, but
not shared - parties will recreate this octet string and verify the
signature to verify the integrity of supplied Issuer Header
and the integrity of any disclosed payloads.</t>
<t>The steps below describe a sequential concatenation of binary values to
generate the Combined MAC Representation.  The instructions for
generating this octet string will also generate well-formed CBOR,
although this data is not meant to be shared outside the implementing
algorithm.  Instead, it focuses on simplicity of generation by the
issuer, holder, and verifier implementations.  Although CBOR has multiple
representations of the same underlying information, this same octet
string MUST be generated by an implementation.</t>
<t>When a length or count is added by steps in this section, it is added as
its 8-byte, network-ordered representation.  For example, the length of
a 1,234-byte payload would have a length representation of
<tt>0x00 00 00 00 00 00 04 D2</tt>.</t>
<t>The holder will derive a unique key per payload value using a MAC, with
the Shared Secret as the key and a generated binary value.  This binary
value is constructed by appending data into a single octet string:</t>

<ol spacing="compact">
<li><tt>0x82 67 70 61 79 6C 6F 61 64 1B</tt></li>
<li>The zero-indexed count of the payload slot</li>
</ol>
<t>The holder will also compute a corresponding MAC of each payload.  This
MAC uses the unique key above and the payload octet string as the value.</t>
<t>When verifying a presentation, the shared secret will be unavailable so
the unique key cannot be calculated.  The payload octet string may also
be omitted in the presentation.  The following instructions describe how
to get the corresponding MAC of each payload:</t>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>If the payload is disclosed, the corresponding proof component (as
described in <eref target="#mac-presentation-proof">MAC Presentation Proof</eref>)
will contain the generated unique key.  The payload MAC will be
calculated using this key and the payload octets as the value.</li>
<li>If the payload is not disclosed, the corresponding proof component
will be the payload MAC.</li>
</ul>
<t>The binary representation is created by appending data into a single
octet string in the following order:</t>

<ol spacing="compact">
<li><tt>0x82 5B</tt></li>
<li>The length and octets of the Issuer Header</li>
<li><tt>0x9B</tt></li>
<li>The number of payload slots in the issued JWP</li>
<li><t>For each payload representation:</t>

<ol spacing="compact">
<li><tt>0x5B</tt></li>
<li>The length and value of the per payload MAC</li>
</ol></li>
</ol>
</section>

<section anchor="issuer-header-1"><name>Issuer Header</name>
<t>The Holder's Presentation Key MUST be included via the Holder
Presentation Key Header Parameter.</t>
<t>The Holder's Presentation Algorithm MUST be included via the Holder
Presentation Algorithm Header Parameter unless there is another way for
the holder and verifier to unambiguously determine the appropriate
algorithm to use.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="issuer-proof"><name>Issuer Proof</name>
<t>The issuer proof consists of two octet strings.</t>
<t>The first octet string is the issuer signature over the combined MAC
representation.  The issuer signs the combined MAC representation using
its stable public key, and the internal signing algorithm for the given
fully-specified MAC algorithm variant.</t>
<t>The second octet string is the Shared Secret used to generate the
per-payload keys for the combined representation.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="presentation-header-1"><name>Presentation Header</name>
<t>See the <eref target="#presentation-header">Presentation Header</eref>
section given for Single Use algorithms.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="mac-presentation-proof"><name>Presentation Proof</name>
<t>The presentation proof is made of multiple components.</t>
<t>The first proof component is the issuer signature over the Combined MAC
Representation, which is provided as the first proof component from the
issued form.</t>
<t>There will now be one proof component per payload slot in the issued
JWP.  These are used by the verifier to reconstruct the combined MAC
representation without access to the Shared Secret.  The proof
components are calculated per the instructions used to generate the
<eref target="#combined-mac-representation">Combined MAC Representation</eref></t>
<t>If a payload is disclosed, the corresponding proof component will be the
unique key.</t>
<t>If a payload is not disclosed, the corresponding proof component will be
the payload's MAC (using the unique key.)</t>
<t>The Presentation Header, Issuer Header, payload slots
(distinguishing which are being disclosed) and above proof components
are inputs to determine the <eref target="#presentation-internal-representation">presentation internal
representation</eref>.</t>
<t>The holder's signature over the presentation internal representation
(using the holder's private key and the holder presentation algorithm)
is then included as one additional proof component in the final
presentation.</t>
<t>The presented form should have two more proof components than payload
slots in the issued JWP.</t>
<t>Note that the second component of the issued JWP is a shared secret for
use by the holder to generate the unique keys used in the Combined MAC
Representation.  This MUST NOT be included in the presentation.</t>
</section>

<section anchor="verification-of-the-presentation-proof"><name>Verification of the Presentation Proof</name>
<t>Verification is performed using the following steps.</t>

<ol spacing="compact">
<li>Check the number of proof components is appropriate for the number of
disclosed payloads.  There MUST be two more proof components than
disclosed payloads.</li>
<li>Using the fully-specified MAC algorithm in use, use the Issuer
Header, disclosed payloads, and the proof components
corresponding to the payloads to regenerate the Combined MAC
Representation.</li>
<li>Verify the first proof component is a valid signature over the Issuer
Header octets, using the issuer's stable key.</li>
<li>Extract the holder presentation key and holder presentation algorithm
(if present) from the Issuer Header.</li>
<li>Omitting the final payload component, calculate the <eref target="#presentation-internal-representation">presentation
internal representation</eref>.</li>
<li>Verify the final proof component is a valid signature over the
presentation internal binary form, using the holder's presentation
key and the extracted (or otherwise determined) holder presentation
algorithm.</li>
</ol>
</section>

<section anchor="MAC-registration"><name>JPA Registration</name>
<t>Proposed JWP <tt>alg</tt> value is of the format "MAC-" appended with a unique
identifier for the set of MAC and signing algorithms used.  Below are
the initial registrations, referencing the corresponding fully-specified
JWS and COSE algorithm identifiers <xref target="RFC9864"/> <xref target="RFC8812"/>:</t>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li><tt>MAC-H256</tt> uses <tt>HMAC SHA-256</tt> (JWS <tt>HS256</tt>, COSE <tt>HMAC 256/256</tt> /
<tt>5</tt>) as the MAC and <tt>ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256</tt> (JWS <tt>ES256</tt>, COSE
<tt>ESP256</tt> / <tt>-9</tt>) for the signatures</li>
<li><tt>MAC-H384</tt> uses <tt>HMAC SHA-384</tt> (JWS <tt>HS384</tt>, COSE <tt>HMAC 384/384</tt> /
<tt>6</tt>) as the MAC and <tt>ECDSA using P-384 and SHA-384</tt> (JWS <tt>ES384</tt>, COSE
<tt>ESP384</tt> / <tt>-51</tt>) for the signatures</li>
<li><tt>MAC-H512</tt> uses <tt>HMAC SHA-512</tt> (JWS <tt>HS512</tt>, COSE <tt>HMAC 512/512</tt> /
<tt>7</tt>) as the MAC and <tt>ECDSA using P-521 and SHA-512</tt> (JWS <tt>ES512</tt>, COSE
<tt>ESP512</tt> / <tt>-52</tt>) for the signatures</li>
<li><tt>MAC-K25519</tt> uses <tt>KMAC SHAKE128</tt> as the MAC and <tt>Ed25519</tt> (JWS
<tt>Ed25519</tt>, COSE <tt>Ed25519</tt> / <tt>-19</tt>) for the signatures</li>
<li><tt>MAC-K448</tt> uses <tt>KMAC SHAKE256</tt> as the MAC and <tt>Ed448</tt> (JWS <tt>Ed448</tt>,
COSE <tt>Ed448</tt> / <tt>-53</tt>) for the signatures</li>
<li><tt>MAC-H256K</tt> uses <tt>HMAC SHA-256</tt> (JWS <tt>HS256</tt>, COSE <tt>HMAC 256/256</tt> /
<tt>5</tt>) as the MAC and <tt>ECDSA using secp256k1 and SHA-256</tt> (JWS <tt>ES256K</tt>,
COSE <tt>ES256K</tt> / <tt>-47</tt>) for the signatures</li>
</ul>
</section>
</section>
</section>

<section anchor="security-considerations"><name>Security Considerations</name>
<blockquote><t>Editor's Note: This will follow once the algorithms defined here have
become more stable.</t>
</blockquote>
<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Data minimization of the proof value</li>
<li>Unlinkability of the Header contents</li>
</ul>
</section>

<section anchor="iana-considerations"><name>IANA Considerations</name>
<t>The following registration procedure is used for all the registries
established by this specification.</t>
<t>Values are registered on a Specification Required <xref target="RFC8126"/> basis after
a three-week review period on the <eref target="mailto:jose-reg-review@ietf.org">jose-reg-review@ietf.org</eref> mailing
list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts.  However, to
allow for the allocation of values prior to publication, the Designated
Experts may approve registration once they are satisfied that such a
specification will be published.</t>
<t>Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review should use an
appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to register JWP algorithm:
example").</t>
<t>Within the review period, the Designated Experts will either approve or
deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the review
list and IANA.  Denials should include an explanation and, if
applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful.
Registration requests that are undetermined for a period longer than 21
days can be brought to the IESG's attention (using the <eref target="mailto:iesg@ietf.org">iesg@ietf.org</eref>
mailing list) for resolution.</t>
<t>Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Experts include
determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing
functionality, whether it is likely to be of general applicability or
useful only for a single application, and whether the registration
description is clear.</t>
<t>IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Experts and
should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing list.</t>
<t>It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are
able to represent the perspectives of different applications using this
specification, to enable broadly informed review of
registration decisions.  In cases where a registration decision could be
perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular Expert,
that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other Experts.</t>

<section anchor="AlgsReg"><name>JSON Web Proof Algorithms Registry</name>
<t>This specification establishes the IANA "JSON Web Proof Algorithms"
registry, under the "JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)" registry
group. The registry records values of the JWP <tt>alg</tt> (algorithm)
Header Parameter.  The registry records the algorithm name, the
algorithm description, the algorithm usage locations, the implementation
requirements, the change controller, and a reference to the
specification that defines it.  The same algorithm name can be
registered multiple times, provided that the sets of usage locations are
disjoint.</t>
<t>It is suggested that the length of the key be included in the algorithm
name when multiple variations of algorithms are being registered that
use keys of different lengths and the key lengths for each need to be
fixed (for instance, because they will be created by key derivation
functions).  This allows readers of the JSON text to more easily make
security decisions.</t>
<t>The Designated Experts should perform reasonable due diligence that
algorithms being registered either are currently considered
cryptographically credible or are being registered as Deprecated or
Prohibited.  Registered algorithms must be fully-specified <xref target="RFC9864"/>
rather than polymorphic.  As guidance, if a registered algorithm
leverages underlying algorithms defined by JOSE or COSE, the
registering specification should identify the corresponding JWS
algorithm name and COSE algorithm name and label.</t>
<t>The implementation requirements of an algorithm may be changed over time
as the cryptographic landscape evolves, for instance, to change the
status of an algorithm to Deprecated or to change the status of an
algorithm from Optional to Recommended+ or Required.  Changes of
implementation requirements are only permitted on a Specification
Required basis after review by the Designated Experts, with the new
specification defining the revised implementation requirements level.</t>

<section anchor="AlgsTemplate"><name>Registration Template</name>

<dl spacing="compact">
<dt>Algorithm Name:</dt>
<dd>Brief descriptive name of the algorithm
(e.g., <tt>Single-Use JWP using ES256</tt>.)
Descriptive names may not match other registered names unless the
Designated Experts state that there is a compelling reason to
allow an exception.</dd>
<dt>Algorithm JSON Label:</dt>
<dd>The string label requested (e.g., <tt>SU-ES256</tt>).  This label is a
case-sensitive ASCII string.  JSON Labels may not match other
registered labels in a case-insensitive manner unless the
Designated Experts state that there is a compelling reason to allow
an exception.</dd>
<dt>Algorithm CBOR Label:</dt>
<dd>The integer label requested (e.g., <tt>1</tt>).  CBOR Labels may not match
other registered labels unless the Designated Experts state that there
is a compelling reason to allow an exception.</dd>
<dt>Algorithm Description:</dt>
<dd>Optional additional information clarifying the algorithm.  This may be
used for example to document additional chosen parameters.</dd>
<dt>Algorithm Usage Location(s):</dt>
<dd>The algorithm usage locations, which should be one or more of the
values <tt>Issued</tt> or <tt>Presented</tt>.  Other values may be used with the
approval of a Designated Expert.</dd>
<dt>JWP Implementation Requirements:</dt>
<dd>The algorithm implementation requirements for JWP, which must be one of
the words <tt>Required</tt>, <tt>Recommended</tt>, <tt>Optional</tt>, <tt>Deprecated</tt>, or
<tt>Prohibited</tt>.  Optionally, the word can be followed by a <tt>+</tt> or <tt>-</tt>.
The use of <tt>+</tt> indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be
increased in a future version of the specification.  The use of <tt>-</tt>
indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be decreased in a
future version of the specification.  Any identifiers registered for
algorithms that are otherwise unsuitable for direct use as JWP
algorithms must be registered as <tt>Prohibited</tt>.</dd>
<dt>Change Controller:</dt>
<dd>For IETF Stream RFCs, list the IETF.  For others, give the name
of the responsible party.  Other details (e.g., postal address, email
address, home page URI) may also be included.</dd>
<dt>Specification Document(s):</dt>
<dd>Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter,
preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of the
documents.  An indication of the relevant sections may also be
included but is not required.</dd>
<dt>Algorithm Analysis Documents(s):</dt>
<dd>References to a publication or publications in well-known
cryptographic conferences, by national standards bodies, or by other
authoritative sources analyzing the cryptographic soundness of the
algorithm to be registered.  The Designated Experts may require
convincing evidence of the cryptographic soundness of a new algorithm
to be provided with the registration request unless the algorithm is
being registered as Deprecated or Prohibited.  Having gone through
working group and IETF review, the initial registrations made by this
document are exempt from the need to provide this information.</dd>
</dl>
</section>

<section anchor="AlgsContents"><name>Initial Registry Contents</name>

<section anchor="single-use-jwp-using-es256-algorithm"><name>Single-Use JWP using ES256 Algorithm</name>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Algorithm Name: Single-Use JWP using ES256</li>
<li>Algorithm JSON Label: <tt>SU-ES256</tt></li>
<li>Algorithm CBOR Label: 1</li>
<li>Algorithm Description: Single-Use JWP using ECDSA with P-256 and
SHA-256</li>
<li>Algorithm Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented</li>
<li>JWP Implementation Requirements: Recommended</li>
<li>Change Controller: IETF</li>
<li>Specification Document(s): <xref target="SU-registration"/> of this specification</li>
<li>Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a</li>
</ul>
</section>

<section anchor="single-use-jwp-using-es384-algorithm"><name>Single-Use JWP using ES384 Algorithm</name>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Algorithm Name: Single-Use JWP using ES384</li>
<li>Algorithm JSON Label: <tt>SU-ES384</tt></li>
<li>Algorithm CBOR Label: 2</li>
<li>Algorithm Description: Single-Use JWP using ECDSA with P-384 and
SHA-384</li>
<li>Algorithm Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented</li>
<li>JWP Implementation Requirements: Optional</li>
<li>Change Controller: IETF</li>
<li>Specification Document(s): <xref target="SU-registration"/> of this specification</li>
<li>Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a</li>
</ul>
</section>

<section anchor="single-use-jwp-using-es512-algorithm"><name>Single-Use JWP using ES512 Algorithm</name>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Algorithm Name: Single-Use JWP using ES512</li>
<li>Algorithm JSON Label: <tt>SU-ES512</tt></li>
<li>Algorithm CBOR Label: 3</li>
<li>Algorithm Description: Single-Use JWP using ECDSA with P-521 and
SHA-512</li>
<li>Algorithm Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented</li>
<li>JWP Implementation Requirements: Optional</li>
<li>Change Controller: IETF</li>
<li>Specification Document(s): <xref target="SU-registration"/> of this specification</li>
<li>Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a</li>
</ul>
</section>

<section anchor="bbs-using-sha-256-algorithm"><name>BBS using SHA-256 Algorithm</name>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Algorithm Name: BBS using SHA-256</li>
<li>Algorithm JSON Label: <tt>BBS</tt></li>
<li>Algorithm CBOR Label: 4</li>
<li>Algorithm Description: Corresponds to a cipher suite identifier of
<tt>BBS_BLS12381G1_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_H2G_HM2S_</tt></li>
<li>Algorithm Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented</li>
<li>JWP Implementation Requirements: Required</li>
<li>Change Controller: IETF</li>
<li>Specification Document(s): <xref target="BBS-registration"/> of this specification</li>
<li>Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a</li>
</ul>
</section>

<section anchor="mac-h256-algorithm"><name>MAC-H256 Algorithm</name>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Algorithm Name: MAC-H256</li>
<li>Algorithm JSON Label: <tt>MAC-H256</tt></li>
<li>Algorithm CBOR Label: 5</li>
<li>Algorithm Description: <tt>MAC-H256</tt> uses HMAC SHA-256 as the MAC, and
ECDSA with P-256 and SHA-256 for the signatures</li>
<li>Algorithm Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented</li>
<li>JWP Implementation Requirements: Optional</li>
<li>Change Controller: IETF</li>
<li>Specification Document(s): <xref target="MAC-registration"/> of this specification</li>
<li>Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a</li>
</ul>
</section>

<section anchor="mac-h384-algorithm"><name>MAC-H384 Algorithm</name>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Algorithm Name: MAC-H384</li>
<li>Algorithm JSON Label: <tt>MAC-H384</tt></li>
<li>Algorithm CBOR Label: 6</li>
<li>Algorithm Description: <tt>MAC-H384</tt> uses HMAC SHA-384 as the MAC, and
ECDSA with P-384 and SHA-384 for the signatures</li>
<li>Algorithm Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented</li>
<li>JWP Implementation Requirements: Optional</li>
<li>Change Controller: IETF</li>
<li>Specification Document(s): <xref target="MAC-registration"/> of this specification</li>
<li>Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a</li>
</ul>
</section>

<section anchor="mac-h512-algorithm"><name>MAC-H512 Algorithm</name>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Algorithm Name: MAC-H512</li>
<li>Algorithm JSON Label: <tt>MAC-H512</tt></li>
<li>Algorithm CBOR Label: 7</li>
<li>Algorithm Description: <tt>MAC-H512</tt> uses HMAC SHA-512 as the MAC, and
ECDSA with P-521 and SHA-512 for the signatures</li>
<li>Algorithm Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented</li>
<li>JWP Implementation Requirements: Optional</li>
<li>Change Controller: IETF</li>
<li>Specification Document(s): <xref target="MAC-registration"/> of this specification</li>
<li>Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a</li>
</ul>
</section>

<section anchor="mac-k25519-algorithm"><name>MAC-K25519 Algorithm</name>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Algorithm Name: MAC-K25519</li>
<li>Algorithm JSON Label: <tt>MAC-K25519</tt></li>
<li>Algorithm CBOR Label: 8</li>
<li>Algorithm Description: <tt>MAC-K25519</tt> uses KMAC SHAKE128 as the MAC,
and EdDSA using Ed25519 for the signatures</li>
<li>Algorithm Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented</li>
<li>JWP Implementation Requirements: Optional</li>
<li>Change Controller: IETF</li>
<li>Specification Document(s): <xref target="MAC-registration"/> of this specification</li>
<li>Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a</li>
</ul>
</section>

<section anchor="mac-k448-algorithm"><name>MAC-K448 Algorithm</name>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Algorithm Name: MAC-K448</li>
<li>Algorithm JSON Label: <tt>MAC-K448</tt></li>
<li>Algorithm CBOR Label: 9</li>
<li>Algorithm Description: <tt>MAC-K448</tt> uses KMAC SHAKE256 as the MAC, and
EdDSA using Ed448 for the signatures</li>
<li>Algorithm Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented</li>
<li>JWP Implementation Requirements: Optional</li>
<li>Change Controller: IETF</li>
<li>Specification Document(s): <xref target="MAC-registration"/> of this specification</li>
<li>Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a</li>
</ul>
</section>

<section anchor="mac-h256k-algorithm"><name>MAC-H256K Algorithm</name>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Algorithm Name: MAC-H256K</li>
<li>Algorithm JSON Label: <tt>MAC-H256K</tt></li>
<li>Algorithm CBOR Label: 10</li>
<li>Algorithm Description: <tt>MAC-H256K</tt> uses HMAC SHA-256 as the MAC, and
ECDSA with secp256k1 and SHA-256 for the signatures</li>
<li>Algorithm Usage Location(s): Issued, Presented</li>
<li>JWP Implementation Requirements: Optional</li>
<li>Change Controller: IETF</li>
<li>Specification Document(s): <xref target="MAC-registration"/> of this specification</li>
<li>Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): n/a</li>
</ul>
</section>
</section>
</section>

<section anchor="JWKParamReg"><name>JSON Web Key Parameters Registry</name>
<t>This section registers the following JWK parameter in the IANA "JSON Web
Key Parameters" registry <xref target="IANA.JOSE"/> established by
<xref target="RFC7517" sectionFormat="of" section="8.1"/>.</t>

<section anchor="JWKParamContents"><name>Registry Contents</name>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Parameter Name: proof_alg</li>
<li>Parameter Description: JSON Web Proof algorithm associated with the key</li>
<li>Used with "kty" Value(s): *</li>
<li>Parameter Information Class: Public</li>
<li>Change Controller: IESG</li>
<li>Specification Document(s): <xref target="proof_algDef"/> of this specification</li>
</ul>
</section>
</section>

<section anchor="COSEKeyParamReg"><name>COSE Key Common Parameters Registry</name>
<t>This section registers the following COSE_Key parameter in the IANA
"COSE Key Common Parameters" registry <xref target="IANA.COSE"/> established by
<xref target="RFC9052" sectionFormat="of" section="11.2"/>.</t>

<section anchor="COSEKeyParamContents"><name>Registry Contents</name>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Name: proof_alg</li>
<li>Label: TBD (requested assignment 7)</li>
<li>CBOR Type: int / tstr</li>
<li>Value Registry: JSON Web Proof Algorithms</li>
<li>Description: JSON Web Proof algorithm associated with the key</li>
<li>Reference: <xref target="proof_algDef"/> of this specification</li>
</ul>
<t>[RFC-EDITOR: The temporary development label for this COSE_Key parameter
is 7CPA, following <xref target="I-D.bormann-cbor-draft-numbers"/>. Please replace 7CPA with
the final assigned value and remove this note before publication.]</t>
</section>
</section>
</section>

</middle>

<back>
<references><name>References</name>
<references><name>Normative References</name>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-cose-bls-key-representations.xml"/>
<reference anchor="I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-proof" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-proof">
  <front>
    <title>JSON Web Proof</title>
    <author fullname="David Waite" initials="D." surname="Waite">
      <organization>Ping Identity</organization>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Michael B. Jones" initials="M. B." surname="Jones">
      <organization>Self-Issued Consulting</organization>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Jeremie Miller" initials="J." surname="Miller">
      <organization>Ping Identity</organization>
    </author>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-jose-json-web-proof-latest"/>
</reference>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7515.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7517.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8126.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8812.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9052.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9864.xml"/>
<reference anchor="VC-DATA-MODEL-2.0" target="https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model-2.0">
  <front>
    <title>Verifiable Credentials Data Model v2.0</title>
    <author fullname="Manu Sporny">
      <organization>Digital Bazaar</organization>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Ted Thibodeau Jr">
      <organization>OpenLink Software</organization>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Ivan Herman">
      <organization>W3C</organization>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Gabe Cohen">
      <organization>Block</organization>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Michael B. Jones">
      <organization>Invited Expert</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2025" month="May" day="15"/>
  </front>
</reference>
</references>
<references><name>Informative References</name>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.bormann-cbor-draft-numbers.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-cbor-edn-literals.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-spice-oidc-cwt.xml"/>
<reference anchor="IANA.COSE" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/cose">
  <front>
    <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption</title>
    <author>
      <organization>IANA</organization>
    </author>
    <date/>
  </front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="IANA.JOSE" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/jose">
  <front>
    <title>JSON Object Signing and Encryption</title>
    <author>
      <organization>IANA</organization>
    </author>
    <date/>
  </front>
</reference>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2104.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7518.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8392.xml"/>
</references>
</references>

<section anchor="jwp-examples"><name>JWP Examples</name>
<t>This section provides several sample JWPs, using algorithms defined
above. The private keys are also included so that implementations can
validate these samples.</t>

<section anchor="example-json-serialized-single-use-jwp"><name>Example JSON-Serialized Single-Use JWP</name>
<t>This example uses the Single-Use Algorithm as defined in JSON Proof
Algorithms to create a JSON Proof Token.  It demonstrates how to apply
selective disclosure using an array of traditional JWS-based signatures.
Unlinkability is only achieved by using each JWP one time, as multiple
uses are inherently linkable via the traditional ECDSA signature
embedded in the proof.</t>
<t>To begin, we need two asymmetric keys for Single Use: one that
represents the JPT Issuer's stable key and the other is an ephemeral key
generated by the Issuer just for this JWP.</t>
<t>This is the Issuer's stable private key used in this example in the JWK
format:</t>
<t>Figure: Issuer Private Key (ES256 in JWK)</t>
<t>This is the ephemeral private key used in this example in the JWK
format:</t>
<t>Figure: Issuer Ephemeral Private Key (ES256 in JWK)</t>
<t>This is the Holder's presentation private key used in this example in
the JWK format:</t>
<t>Figure: Holder Presentation Private Key (ES256 in JWK)</t>
<t>The Header declares that the data structure is a JPT and
the JWP Proof Input is secured using the Single-Use ECDSA algorithm with
the P-256 curve and SHA-256 digest.  It also includes the ephemeral
public key, the Holder's presentation public key and list of claims used
for this JPT.</t>
<t>Figure: Issuer Header (SU-ES256, JSON)</t>
<t>Figure: Encoded Issuer Header (SU-ES256, JSON, encoded)</t>
<t>The Single Use algorithm utilizes multiple individual JWS Signatures.
Each signature value is generated by creating a JWS with a single
Header with the associated <tt>alg</tt> value.  In this example, the
fixed Header used for each JWS is the serialized JSON Object
<tt>{"alg":"ES256"}</tt>.  This Header will be used to generate a
signature over each corresponding payload in the JWP.  The corresponding
octet value in the proof is the octet string (base64url-decoded) value
of the signature.</t>
<t>The final proof value from the Issuer is an array with the octets of the
Header signature, followed by entries for each payload signature.</t>
<figure><name>Issuer payloads (JSON, as array)
</name>
<sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[[
  1714521600,
  1717199999,
  "Doe",
  "Jay",
  "jaydoe@example.org",
  {
    "country": "USA",
    "formatted": "1234 Main St.\nAnytown, CA 12345\nUSA",
    "locality": "Anytown",
    "postal_code": 12345,
    "region": "CA",
    "street_address": "1234 Main St."
  },
  true
]
]]>
</sourcecode>
</figure>
<t>The compact serialization of the same JPT is:</t>
<t>Figure: Issued JWP (SU-ES256, JSON, Compact Serialization)</t>
<t>To present this JPT, we first use the following Presentation Header with
a nonce (provided by the Verifier):</t>
<t>Figure: Presentation Header (SU-ES256, JSON)</t>
<t>Figure: Presentation Header (SU-ES256, JSON, Base64url-Encoded)</t>
<t>We apply selective disclosure of only the given name and age_over_21 claims
(family name, email, and address hidden), and remove the proof components
corresponding to these entries.</t>
<t>Using the selectively disclosed information, we generate the
presentation internal representation.  Using that and the selectively
disclosed payloads, we get the following presented JPT in compact
serialization:</t>
<blockquote><t>Figure: Presentation (SU-ES256, JSON, Compact Serialization)</t>
</blockquote></section>

<section anchor="example-cbor-serialized-single-use-cpt"><name>Example CBOR-Serialized Single-Use CPT</name>
<t>This example is meant to mirror the prior compact serialization, using
<xref target="RFC8392"/> (CWT) and claims from <xref target="I-D.ietf-spice-oidc-cwt"/>,
illustrated using <xref target="I-D.ietf-cbor-edn-literals"/> (CDN).</t>
<t>To simplify this example, the same information is represented as the JPT
example above, including the same public and private keys.</t>
<blockquote><t>Figure: Issuer Header (SU-ES256, CBOR)</t>
</blockquote><t>The payload values below are the same logical claims as in the JSON JPT
example above, represented in CDN for the CBOR-based form.</t>

<sourcecode type="edn"><![CDATA[[ / payloads    /
  / iat         / 171452160,
  / exp         / 171719999,
  / given_name  / "Jay",
  / family_name / "Doe",
  / email       / "jaydoe@example.org",
  / address     / {
    / formatted / 1: "1234 Main St.\nAnytown, CA 12345\nUSA",
    / street    / 2: "1234 Main St.",
    / locality  / 3: "Anytown",
    / region    / 4: "CA",
    / post code / 5: "90210",
    / country   / 6: "USA"
  },
  / age_over_21 / true
]
]]>
</sourcecode>
<blockquote><t>Figure: Issuer Payloads (as CBOR array)</t>
</blockquote><t>When signed and serialized, the CPT is represented by the following CBOR
(in hex):</t>
<blockquote><t>Figure: Issued Form (SU-ES256, CBOR)</t>
</blockquote><t>The presented form, similarly to the issued form above, is made with the
holder conveying the same parameters and the same set of selectively
disclosed payloads as the JPT above:</t>
<blockquote><t>Figure: Presentation Header (SU-ES256, CBOR)</t>
</blockquote><t>When the appropriate proof is generated, the CPT is serialized into the
following CBOR (in hex):</t>
<blockquote><t>Figure: Presented Form (SU-ES256, CBOR)</t>
</blockquote></section>

<section anchor="example-bbs-jwp"><name>Example BBS JWP</name>
<t>The following example uses the <tt>BBS</tt> algorithm.</t>
<t>This is the Issuer's stable private key in the JWK format:</t>
<t>Figure: BBS private key in JWK format</t>
<t>There is no additional holder key necessary for presentation proofs.</t>
<t>For the following Issuer Header and array of payloads:</t>
<figure><name>Example Issuer Header
</name>
<sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[{
  "alg": "BBS",
  "kid": "HjfcpyjuZQ-O8Ye2hQnNbT9RbbnrobptdnExR0DUjU8"
}
]]>
</sourcecode>
</figure>
<t>These components are signed using the private issuer key previously
given, which is then representable in the following serialization:</t>
<t>Figure: Issued JWP (BBS, JSON, Compact Serialization)</t>
<t>For a presentation with the following Presentation Header:</t>
<figure><name>Presentation Header
</name>
<sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[{
  "alg": "BBS",
  "aud": "https://recipient.example.com",
  "nonce": "wrmBRkKtXjQ"
}
]]>
</sourcecode>
</figure>
<t>The holder decides to share all information other than the email
address, and generates a proof.  That proof is represented in the
following serialization:</t>
<t>Figure: Presentation JWP (BBS, JSON, Compact Serialization)</t>
</section>

<section anchor="example-mac-jwp"><name>Example MAC JWP</name>
<t>The following example uses the <tt>MAC-H256</tt> algorithm.</t>
<t>This is the Issuer's stable private key in the JWK format:</t>
<t>Figure: Issuer private key</t>
<t>This is the shared secret carried in the issued proof:</t>
<t>Figure: Shared Secret</t>
<t>This is the Holder's presentation private key in the JWK format:</t>
<t>Figure: Holder private key</t>
<t>For the following Header and array of payloads:</t>
<t>Figure: Example Issuer Header</t>
<figure><name>Example issuer payloads (as members of a JSON array)
</name>
<sourcecode type="json"><![CDATA[[
  1714521600,
  1717199999,
  "Doe",
  "Jay",
  "jaydoe@example.org",
  {
    "country": "USA",
    "formatted": "1234 Main St.\nAnytown, CA 12345\nUSA",
    "locality": "Anytown",
    "postal_code": 12345,
    "region": "CA",
    "street_address": "1234 Main St."
  },
  true
]
]]>
</sourcecode>
</figure>
<t>The issuer generates an array of derived keys, one per payload slot.
This is done using the shared secret as the key and a binary value based
on the payload slot index (from zero) as input to the HMAC operation.</t>
<t>This results in the following set of derived keys:</t>
<t>Figure: Derived payload keys (Base64url-Encoded)</t>
<t>A MAC is generated for each payload using the corresponding derived
payload key.  This results in the following set of MAC values:</t>
<t>Figure: Payload MAC values (Base64url-Encoded)</t>
<t>The Issuer Header and payload MAC values are combined into a
binary representation known as the Compact MAC Representation.  This
representation is signed with the issuer's private key.</t>
<t>The proof consists of two octet string values: the signature over the
combined MAC representation, and the shared secret.</t>
<t>Figure: Issued Proof (Base64url-Encoded)</t>
<t>The final issued JWP in compact serialization is:</t>
<t>Figure: Issued JWP (MAC-H256, JSON, Compact Serialization)</t>
<t>Next, we show the presentation of the JWP with selective disclosure.</t>
<t>For presentation with the following Presentation Header:</t>
<t>Figure: Presentation Header</t>
<t>The holder will take the issuer proof (including shared secret) and
derive the same individual payload MAC values (above).</t>
<t>In this case, the holder has decided not to disclose the last three
claims provided by the issuer (corresponding to <tt>email</tt>, <tt>address</tt>, and
<tt>age_over_21</tt>)</t>
<t>For each payload slot, the holder will provide one of two values as part
of the proof value.  For a disclosed payload, the holder will provide
the corresponding derived key.  For a non-disclosed payload, the holder
will provide the corresponding MAC value.</t>
<t>The final presented proof value is an array of octet strings.  The
contents are Presentation Header signature, followed by the issuer
signature, then the value disclosed by the holder for each payload.
This results in the following proof:</t>
<t>Figure: Presentation proof (Base64url-Encoded)</t>
<t>The final presented JWP in compact serialization is:</t>
<t>Figure: Presented JWP (MAC-H256, JSON, Compact Serialization)</t>
</section>
</section>

<section anchor="acknowledgements"><name>Acknowledgements</name>
<t>This work was incubated in the DIF <eref target="https://identity.foundation/working-groups/crypto.html">Applied Cryptography Working
Group</eref>.</t>
<t>We would like to thank
Alberto Solavagione
for his valuable contributions to this specification.</t>
<t>The BBS examples were generated using the library at
<eref target="https://github.com/mattrglobal/pairing_crypto">https://github.com/mattrglobal/pairing_crypto</eref> .</t>
</section>

<section anchor="document-history"><name>Document History</name>
<t>[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]</t>
<t>-15</t>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Updated CPT example <tt>family_name</tt> claim key to <tt>172</tt> (TBD3) per
<tt>I-D.ietf-spice-oidc-cwt</tt> and ordered example claims numerically.</li>
<li>Updated CBOR diagnostic notation references from EDN to CDN.</li>
<li>Clarification of fully-specified algorithm requirements. Update
registrations of single use and MAC algorithms to be fully
specified, and to reference the fully-specified JWS/COSE algorithms
they leverage, where appropriate.</li>
<li>Fixed <tt>ProofVerify</tt> parameter description (<tt>proof</tt>) and <tt>CFRG</tt> typo.</li>
</ul>
<t>-14</t>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li><tt>MAC-H256</tt> example now includes the correct secret in the issuer
proof</li>
<li><tt>MAC-H256</tt> example no longer omits some components in signed inputs.</li>
<li>Align <tt>SU-ES256</tt> prose and fixtures for compact and CPT example
payloads and disclosures</li>
<li>Clarified <tt>alg</tt> Header Parameter terminology.</li>
<li>Applied editorial corrections.</li>
<li>Normalized references and section citations.</li>
<li>Clarified BBS presentation serialization and example prose.</li>
</ul>
<t>-13</t>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Examples are now built deterministically (using RFC 6979 deterministic
ECDSA and seeded random number generation for BBS)</li>
<li>Add <tt>proof_alg</tt> to JWK and CWK to prevent potential collisions between
the JWS/JWE algorithm registry, COSE algorithms registry, and JWP
algorithms registry</li>
</ul>
<t>-12</t>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>IANA Considerations section changes from IANA Early Review</li>
<li>Updated BLS keys to match BLS Key Representations draft 8</li>
</ul>
<t>-11</t>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Change Issuer Protected Header to Issuer Header</li>
<li>Change Presentation Protected Header and Holder Presentation Header to
Presentation Header</li>
</ul>
<t>-10</t>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Clarify MAC issuance and presentation using new "payload slot"
nomenclature.</li>
<li>Define a new binary "Presentation Internal Representation" so that the
holder signature protects the entire presentation</li>
<li>Leverage the new "Holder Presentation Algorithm" to allow the holder
algorithm to be independent from the signature algorithm used by the
issuer</li>
<li>Redefine computation of the "Combined MAC Representation" to more
closely match the new Presentation Internal Representation.</li>
<li>Change the MAC algorithm to directly sign the binary Combined MAC
Representation rather than convert it to a JWS.</li>
<li>Do not unnecessarily hash the issuer protected header inside the
Combined MAC Representation, so that it can provide some manner of
domain separation.</li>
<li>Clarify how verifiers are to generate the Combined MAC Representation
from available information.</li>
<li>Provide step-by-step instructions for verification of a presentation</li>
<li>Change Proof Key to Issuer Ephemeral Key and Presentation Key to
Holder Presentation Key</li>
</ul>
<t>-09</t>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Remove JSON serialization</li>
<li>Added CBOR (CPT) example to the appendix using SU-ES256</li>
</ul>
<t>-08</t>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Made some additional references normative.</li>
<li>Corrected SU-ES256 issuer protected header including private keys</li>
</ul>
<t>-07</t>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Changing primary editor</li>
<li>Update registry template for algorithms to account for integer CBOR
labels</li>
<li>Restylize initial registry entries for readability</li>
<li>Defer BBS key definition to <xref target="I-D.ietf-cose-bls-key-representations"/></li>
<li>Modify example generation to use <tt>proof_key</tt> and <tt>presentation_key</tt>
names</li>
<li>Change <tt>proof_jwk</tt> to <tt>proof_key</tt> and <tt>presentation_jwk</tt> to
<tt>presentation_key</tt> to better represent that the key may be JSON or
CBOR-formatted.</li>
<li>Moved the registry for <tt>proof_key</tt> and <tt>presentation_key</tt> to JWP where
they are defined.  Consolidated usage, purpose, and requirements from
algorithm usage under these definitions.</li>
<li>Combined <tt>BBS-PROOF</tt> into <tt>BBS</tt></li>
</ul>
<t>-06</t>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Update reference to new repository home</li>
<li>Fixed #77: Removed vestigial use of <tt>presentation_header</tt>.</li>
<li>Correct <tt>pjwk</tt> to <tt>presentation_jwk</tt></li>
</ul>
<t>-05</t>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Update of appendix describing MAC-H256 to now also be generated by the
build system from a common set of code and templates.</li>
<li>Update single use algorithm to use an array of octet values rather
than requiring splitting an octet buffer into parts during generation
of a presentation and during verification.</li>
<li>Update BBS algorithm description and examples to clarify the proof is
an array with a single octet string.</li>
<li>Update MAC algorithm to use an array of octet values for the proof,
rather than requiring splitting an octet buffer into parts.</li>
<li>Add new section on the Combined MAC Representation to clarify
operations are serving to recreate this octet string value.</li>
<li>Correct reference to the latest BBS draft.</li>
<li>SU and MAC families now use raw JWA rather than JWS and synthesized
headers</li>
<li>Change algorithms to not use base64url-encoding internally.
Algorithms are meant to operate on octets, while base64url-encoding is
used to represent those octets in JSON and compact serializations.</li>
</ul>
<t>-04</t>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Refactoring figures and examples to be built from a common set across
all three documents</li>
<li>Move single-use example appendix from JWP to JPA</li>
<li>Change algorithm from <tt>BBS-DRAFT-5</tt> to <tt>BBS</tt>, and from
<tt>BBS-PROOF-DRAFT-5</tt> to <tt>BBS-PROOF</tt></li>
<li>Update BBS ciphersuite ID to <tt>BBS_BLS12381G1_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_</tt></li>
<li>Update to draft 5 BLS key representations</li>
</ul>
<t>-03</t>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Improvements resulting from a full proofreading.</li>
<li>Populated IANA Considerations section.</li>
<li>Updated to use BBS draft -05.</li>
<li>Updated examples.</li>
</ul>
<t>-02</t>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Add new <tt>BBS-DRAFT-3</tt> and <tt>BBS-PROOF-DRAFT-3</tt> algorithms based on
draft-irtf-cfrg-bbs-signatures-03.</li>
<li>Remove prior <tt>BBS-X</tt> algorithm based on a particular implementation of
earlier drafts.</li>
</ul>
<t>-01</t>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Correct cross-references within group</li>
<li>Describe <tt>issuer_header</tt> and <tt>presentation_header</tt></li>
<li>Update BBS references to CFRG drafts</li>
<li>Rework reference to HMAC ( RFC2104 )</li>
<li>Remove ZKSnark placeholder</li>
</ul>
<t>-00</t>

<ul spacing="compact">
<li>Created initial working group draft based on
draft-jmiller-jose-json-proof-algorithms-01</li>
</ul>
</section>

</back>

</rfc>
