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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-rats-epoch-markers-09" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="Epoch Markers">Epoch Markers</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-rats-epoch-markers-09"/>
    <author initials="H." surname="Birkholz" fullname="Henk Birkholz">
      <organization abbrev="Fraunhofer SIT">Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>Rheinstrasse 75</street>
          <city>Darmstadt</city>
          <code>64295</code>
          <country>Germany</country>
        </postal>
        <email>henk.birkholz@ietf.contact</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="T." surname="Fossati" fullname="Thomas Fossati">
      <organization>NVIDIA</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <country>Switzerland</country>
        </postal>
        <email>tfossati@nvidia.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="W." surname="Pan" fullname="Wei Pan">
      <organization>Huawei Technologies</organization>
      <address>
        <email>william.panwei@huawei.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="I." surname="Mihalcea" fullname="Ionuț Mihalcea">
      <organization>Arm</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <country>United Kingdom</country>
        </postal>
        <email>ionut.mihalcea@arm.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="C." surname="Bormann" fullname="Carsten Bormann">
      <organization>Universität Bremen TZI</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>Bibliothekstr. 1</street>
          <city>Bremen</city>
          <code>D-28359</code>
          <country>Germany</country>
        </postal>
        <phone>+49-421-218-63921</phone>
        <email>cabo@tzi.org</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="16"/>
    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>RATS Working Group</workgroup>
    <keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 96?>

<t>This document defines Epoch Markers as a means to establish a notion of freshness among actors in a distributed system.
Epoch Markers are similar to "time ticks" and are produced and distributed by a dedicated system known as the Epoch Bell.
Systems receiving Epoch Markers do not need to track freshness using their own understanding of time (e.g., via a local real-time clock).
Instead, the reception of a specific Epoch Marker establishes a new epoch that is shared among all recipients.
This document defines Epoch Marker types, including CBOR time tags, RFC 3161 TimeStampToken, and nonce-like structures.
It also defines a CWT Claim to embed Epoch Markers in RFC 8392 CBOR Web Tokens, which serve as vehicles for signed protocol messages.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-rats-epoch-markers/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        rats Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:rats@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/rats/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/ietf-rats-wg/draft-birkholz-rats-epoch-marker"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 105?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>Systems that need to interact securely often require a shared understanding of the freshness of conveyed information.
This is certainly the case in the domain of remote attestation procedures.
In general, securely establishing a shared notion of freshness of the exchanged information among entities in a distributed system is not a simple task.</t>
      <t>The entire <xref section="A" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9334"/> deals solely with the topic of freshness, which is in itself an indication of how relevant, and complex, it is to establish a trusted and shared understanding of freshness in a RATS system.</t>
      <t>This document defines Epoch Markers as a way to establish a notion of freshness among actors in distributed systems.
Epoch Markers are similar to "time ticks" and are produced and distributed by a dedicated system, the Epoch Bell.
Actors in a system that receive Epoch Markers do not have to track freshness using their own understanding of time (e.g., via a local real-time clock).
Instead, the reception of a certain Epoch Marker establishes a new epoch that is shared between all recipients.
In essence, the emissions and corresponding receptions of Epoch Markers are like the ticks of a clock, with these ticks being conveyed over the Internet.</t>
      <t>In general (barring highly symmetrical topologies), epoch ticking incurs differential latency due to the non-uniform distribution of receivers with respect to the Epoch Bell.
This introduces skew that needs to be taken into consideration when Epoch Markers are used.</t>
      <t>While all Epoch Markers share the same core property of behaving like clock ticks in a shared domain, various "Epoch ID" values are defined as Epoch Marker types in this document to accommodate different use cases and diverse kinds of Epoch Bells.</t>
      <t>While most Epoch Markers types are encoded in CBOR <xref target="STD94"/>, and many of the Epoch ID types are themselves encoded in CBOR, a prominent format in this space is the TimeStampToken (TST) defined by <xref target="RFC3161"/>, a DER-encoded TSTInfo value wrapped in a CMS envelope <xref target="RFC5652"/>.
TSTs are produced by Time-Stamp Authorities (TSA) and exchanged via the Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP).
At the time of writing, TSAs are the most common providers of secure time-stamping services.
Therefore, reusing the core TSTInfo structure as an Epoch ID type for Epoch Markers is instrumental for enabling smooth migration paths and promote interoperability.
There are, however, several other ways to represent a signed timestamp or the start of a new freshness epoch, respectively, and therefore other Epoch Marker types.</t>
      <t>To inform the design, this document discusses a number of interaction models in which Epoch Markers are expected to be exchanged.
The default container for Epoch Bell-signed Epoch Markers described in this document is CBOR Web Tokens (CWT) <xref target="RFC8392"/>.
The present document specifies an extensible set of Epoch Marker types, along with the <tt>em</tt> CWT claim to include them in CWTs.
CWTs are signed using COSE <xref target="STD96"/> and benefit from wide tool support.
However, CWTs are not the only containers in which Epoch Markers can be embedded.
Epoch Markers can be included in any type of message that allows for the embedding of opaque bytes or CBOR data items.
Examples include the Collection CMW in <xref target="I-D.ietf-lamps-csr-attestation"/>, Evidence formats such as <xref target="TCG-CoEvidence"/> or <xref target="RFC9711"/>, Attestation Results formats such as <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-ar4si"/>, or the CWT Claims Header Parameter of <xref target="RFC9943"/>.</t>
      <t>Epoch markers can be used in the following ways:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>as embeddings in other data formats</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>as information elements in protocols</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>in systems that integrate the aforementioned protocols or data formats</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>in the deployment of such systems</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>All of these can be considered "users" of Epoch Markers and will be referred to as entities "using Epoch Markers” throughout the document.</t>
      <section anchor="terminology">
        <name>Terminology</name>
        <t>This document makes use of the following terms from other documents:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>"conceptual messages" as defined in <xref section="8" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9334"/></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>"freshness" and "epoch" as defined in <xref section="10" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9334"/></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>"handle" as defined in <xref section="6" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models"/></t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>"Time-Stamp Authority" as defined by <xref target="RFC3161"/></t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
        <?line -18?>

<t>In this document, CDDL <xref target="RFC8610"/> is used to describe the data formats.  The examples in <xref target="examples"/> use the Diagnostic Notation described in Section <xref target="RFC8949" section="8" sectionFormat="bare"/> of RFC 8949 <xref target="STD94"/> and <xref section="G" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8610"/>.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="epoch-id">
      <name>Epoch IDs</name>
      <t>The RATS architecture introduces the concept of Epoch IDs that mark certain events during remote attestation procedures ranging from simple handshakes to rather complex interactions including elaborate freshness proofs.
The Epoch Markers defined in this document are a solution that includes the lessons learned from TSAs, the concept of Epoch IDs defined in the RATS architecture, and provides several means to identify a new freshness epoch.
Some of these methods are introduced and discussed in <xref section="10.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9334"/>.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="interaction-models">
      <name>Interaction Models</name>
      <t>The interaction models illustrated in this section are derived from the RATS Reference Interaction Models <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models"/>.
In general, there are three major interaction models used in remote attestation:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>ad-hoc requests (e.g., via challenge-response requests addressed at Epoch Bells), corresponding to <xref section="7.1" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models"/></t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>unsolicited distribution (e.g., via uni-directional methods, such as broad- or multicasting from Epoch Bells), corresponding to <xref section="7.2" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models"/></t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>solicited distribution (e.g., via a subscription to Epoch Bells), corresponding to <xref section="7.3" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models"/></t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>In all three interaction models, Epoch Markers can be used as content for the generic information element <tt>handle</tt> as introduced by <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models"/>.
Handles are used to establish freshness in ad-hoc, unsolicited, and solicited distribution mechanisms of an Epoch Bell.
For example, an Epoch Marker can be used as a nonce in challenge-response remote attestation (e.g., for limiting the number of ad-hoc requests by a Verifier).
If embedded in a CWT, an Epoch Marker can be used as a <tt>handle</tt> by extracting the value of the <tt>em</tt> Claim or by using the complete Epoch Bell-signed CWT including an <tt>em</tt> Claim (e.g., functioning as a signed time-stamp token).
Using an Epoch Marker requires the challenger to acquire an Epoch Marker beforehand, which may introduce a sensible overhead compared to using a simple nonce.</t>
      <t>When an Epoch Marker is used as the <tt>handle</tt> in the Passport or Background-Check challenge-response flows defined by <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models"/>, the Verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> follow the relevant Epoch Marker validation and acceptance policy.
That policy <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> fulfil the applicable requirements presented in this document, such as accepted epoch windows, replay or rollback detection state, and deployment-specific skew introduced by the Evidence path.</t>
      <t>For Background-Check, the policy <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> account for the additional path through the Relying Party before Evidence reaches the Verifier.
For Passport, any Attestation Result derived from such Evidence <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> remain bound to the Epoch Marker, or to the <tt>handle</tt> containing it, so that subsequent freshness decisions can be made according to Relying Party policy.</t>
      <t>Note that <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models"/> registers the Conceptual Message Wrapper (CMW) Indicator for Handle, which can be used to identify Epoch Markers transported in CMWs <xref target="RFC9999"/>.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-epoch-markers">
      <name>Epoch Marker Structure</name>
      <t>This section specifies the structure of Epoch Marker types using CDDL <xref target="RFC8610"/> and illustrates their usage and relationship with other IETF work (e.g, <xref target="RFC3161"/>) where applicable.
In general, Epoch Markers are intended to be conveyed securely, e.g., by being included in a signed data structure, such as a CBOR Web Token (CWT), or by being sent via a secure channel.
The specification of such "outer" structures and protocols and the means how to secure them is beyond the scope of this document.
This document defines the different types of Epoch Markers in <xref target="sec-iana-cbor-tags"/>.
When the media type <tt>application/epoch-marker+cbor</tt> is used to label content as an Epoch Marker, the <tt>em-type</tt> media type parameter can optionally specify the Epoch Marker type by referencing its CBOR tag number.
For example, an Epoch Marker can be used to construct a CBOR-based trusted time stamp token, similar in function to a <xref target="RFC3161"/> TimeStampToken, using CWT and the <tt>em</tt> Claim defined in this document (see <xref target="fig-ex-2"/> for an illustration).
The value(s) that an Epoch Marker represents are intended to demonstrate freshness of messages and protocols.
Epoch Bell-signed Epoch Markers can also serve other purposes in cases where trusted timestamps or time intervals are required.
Taken as an opaque value, it is possible to use Epoch Markers as values for a nonce field in existing data structures or protocols that already support extra data fields, such as <tt>extraData</tt> in TPMS_ATTEST <xref target="TCG-TPM2"/>.
Similarities in the usage of nonces and Epoch Markers can sometimes lead to applications where both are used in the same interaction, albeit in different places and for different purposes.
One example of such an application scenario is the "nested" use of classical nonces and Epoch Markers, whereby an Epoch Marker is requested to be used as a nonce value for a specific data structure, while a locally generated nonce is used to retrieve that Epoch Marker via an "outer" ad hoc interaction (e.g., nonce retrieval protocols that interact with an Epoch Bell to fetch an Epoch Marker to be used as a nonce).
As some Epoch Marker types represent certain timestamp variants, these Epoch Markers or the secure conveyance method they are used in do not necessarily have a hard-coded message imprint, as is always the case with <xref target="RFC3161"/> TimeStampTokens.
This means that not all Epoch Marker types support binding a message to an Epoch Marker (unlike the example in <xref target="fig-ex-2"/>.</t>
      <t>The following Epoch Marker types are defined in this document:</t>
      <figure anchor="fig-epoch-marker-cddl">
        <name>Epoch Marker types (tag numbers 2698x are suggested, not yet allocated)</name>
        <sourcecode type="cddl"><![CDATA[
epoch-marker = $tagged-epoch-id

; epoch-id types independent of interaction model
$tagged-epoch-id /= cbor-time
$tagged-epoch-id /= #6.26980(classical-rfc3161-TST-info)
$tagged-epoch-id /= #6.26981(TST-info-based-on-CBOR-time-tag)
$tagged-epoch-id /= #6.26982(epoch-tick)
$tagged-epoch-id /= #6.26983(epoch-tick-list)
$tagged-epoch-id /= #6.26984(strictly-monotonic-counter)
$tagged-epoch-id /= #6.26985(epoclet)
]]></sourcecode>
      </figure>
      <figure anchor="fig-epoch-marker-cwt">
        <name>Epoch Marker as a CWT Claim (CWT claim number 2000 is suggested, not yet allocated)</name>
        <sourcecode type="cddl"><![CDATA[
$$Claims-Set-Claims //= (&(em: 2000) => epoch-marker)
]]></sourcecode>
      </figure>
      <section anchor="epoch-payloads">
        <name>Epoch Marker Types</name>
        <t>This section specifies the Epoch Marker types listed in <xref target="fig-epoch-marker-cddl"/>.</t>
        <section anchor="sec-cbor-time">
          <name>CBOR Time Tags</name>
          <t>CBOR Time Tags are CBOR time representations choosing from CBOR tag 0 (<tt>tdate</tt>, RFC3339 time as a string), tag 1 (<tt>time</tt>, POSIX time as int or float), or tag 1001 (extended time data item).</t>
          <sourcecode type="cddl"><![CDATA[
cbor-time = tdate / time / etime

;# import etime from rfc9581
]]></sourcecode>
          <t>The CBOR Time Tag represents a freshly sourced timestamp represented as either <tt>time</tt> or <tt>tdate</tt>
(Sections <xref target="RFC8949" section="3.4.2" sectionFormat="bare"/> and <xref target="RFC8949" section="3.4.1" sectionFormat="bare"/> of RFC 8949 <xref target="STD94"/>, <xref section="D" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8610"/>), or <tt>etime</tt> (<xref section="3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9581"/>).
The <tt>etime</tt> rule shown in the CDDL above is imported from <xref section="6" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9581"/>; RFC 9581 remains the authoritative specification of CBOR tag 1001, and this document neither updates nor redefines it.
This document merely profiles <tt>etime</tt> for use with Epoch Markers.</t>
          <t>No dedicated CBOR tag is allocated for the CBOR Time Tags type: the existing tags 0, 1 and 1001 are reused as-is.
The context (e.g., the <tt>em</tt> Claim or the <tt>application/epoch-marker+cbor</tt> media type) identifies the item as an Epoch Marker.</t>
          <section anchor="creation">
            <name>Creation</name>
            <t>To generate the cbor-time value, the emitter <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> follow the requirements in <xref target="sec-time-reqs"/>.</t>
          </section>
        </section>
        <section anchor="sec-rfc3161-classic">
          <name>Classical RFC 3161 TST Info</name>
          <t>DER-encoded <xref target="X.690"/> TSTInfo <xref target="RFC3161"/>.  See <xref target="classic-tstinfo"/> for the layout.</t>
          <sourcecode type="cddl"><![CDATA[
classical-rfc3161-TST-info = bytes
]]></sourcecode>
          <t>The following describes the classical-rfc3161-TST-info type.</t>
          <dl newline="true">
            <dt>classical-rfc3161-TST-info:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>The DER-encoded TSTInfo generated by a <xref target="RFC3161"/> Time Stamping Authority.</t>
            </dd>
          </dl>
          <section anchor="creation-1">
            <name>Creation</name>
            <t>The Epoch Bell <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use the following value as MessageImprint in its request to the TSA:</t>
            <sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[
SEQUENCE {
  SEQUENCE {
    OBJECT      2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1 (sha256)
    NULL
  }
  OCTET STRING
    BF4EE9143EF2329B1B778974AAD445064940B9CAE373C9E35A7B23361282698F
}
]]></sourcecode>
            <t>This is the sha-256 hash of the string "EPOCH_BELL".</t>
            <t>The TimeStampToken obtained from the TSA <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be stripped of the TSA signature.
Only the TSTInfo is to be kept the rest <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be discarded.
A TSTInfo structure is conveyed in an Epoch Bell-signed Epoch Marker.
The COSE signature supplies the protection formerly supplied by the discarded TSA envelope.</t>
          </section>
        </section>
        <section anchor="sec-rfc3161-fancy">
          <name>CBOR-encoded RFC3161 TST Info</name>
          <t>The TST-info-based-on-CBOR-time-tag is semantically equivalent to classical <xref target="RFC3161"/> TSTInfo, rewritten using the CBOR type system.</t>
          <sourcecode type="cddl"><![CDATA[
TST-info-based-on-CBOR-time-tag = {
  &(version : 0) => v1
  &(policy : 1) => oid
  &(messageImprint : 2) => MessageImprint
  &(serialNumber : 3) => integer
  &(eTime : 4) => profiled-etime
  ? &(ordering : 5) => bool .default false
  ? &(nonce : 6) => integer
  ? &(tsa : 7) => GeneralName
  * $$TSTInfoExtensions
}

v1 = 1

oid = #6.111(bstr) / #6.112(bstr)

MessageImprint = [
  hashAlg : int
  hashValue : bstr
]

profiled-etime = #6.1001(timeMap)
timeMap = {
  1 => ~time
  ? -8 => profiled-duration
  * int => any
}
profiled-duration = {* int => any}

GeneralName = [ GeneralNameType : int, GeneralNameValue : any ]
; See Section 4.2.1.6 of RFC 5280 for type/value
]]></sourcecode>
          <t>The following describes each member of the TST-info-based-on-CBOR-time-tag map.</t>
          <dl newline="true">
            <dt>version:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>The integer value 1.  Cf. version, <xref section="2.4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC3161"/>.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>policy:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>A <xref target="RFC9090"/> object identifier tag (111 or 112) representing the TSA's policy under which the tst-info was produced.
Cf. policy, <xref section="2.4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC3161"/>.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>messageImprint:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>A <xref target="RFC9054"/> COSE_Hash_Find array carrying the hash algorithm
identifier and the hash value of the time-stamped datum.
Cf. messageImprint, <xref section="2.4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC3161"/>.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>serialNumber:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>A unique integer value assigned by the TSA to each issued tst-info.
Cf. serialNumber, <xref section="2.4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC3161"/>.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>eTime:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>The time at which the tst-info has been created by the TSA.
Cf. genTime, <xref section="2.4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC3161"/>.
Encoded as extended time <xref target="RFC9581"/>, indicated by CBOR tag 1001.
A separate tag is unnecessary because the profiled form remains an <tt>etime</tt> item carried with tag 1001.
RFC 9581 defines tag 1001 and its semantics; this document constrains one valid <tt>etime</tt> shape for Epoch Markers but does not introduce a new CBOR tag or alter the definition of <tt>etime</tt>.
The resulting <tt>profiled-etime</tt> remains a subset/profile of <tt>etime</tt> encoded with tag 1001 and is defined as follows:</t>
            </dd>
          </dl>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>
              <t>The "base time" is encoded using key 1, indicating POSIX time as int or float, to align the profile with the baseline representation defined in <xref target="RFC9581"/>.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>The stated "accuracy" is encoded using key -8, which indicates the maximum
allowed deviation from the value indicated by "base time". The duration map
is profiled to disallow string keys. This is an optional field specialized to the needs of this profile.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>The map <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include key 1 and <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> include additional negative integer keys, which can be used to encode supplementary information.
Unsigned integer keys, including 4, 5, and the keys in the $$ETIME-CRITICAL group choice, <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be used, unless the emitter wants to ensure that only implementations that understand the critical key interoperate.</t>
            </li>
          </ul>
          <t>Fixing key 1 for the base time and profiling key -8 provide a consistent shape for the profiled <tt>etime</tt> maps consumed by Epoch Markers without changing the meaning of the corresponding keys in <xref target="RFC9581"/>.
Key 1 is pinned so all profiled <tt>etime</tt> values share the same base-time representation, and key -8 is specialized to carry the accuracy bound expected by the TSA-style timestamps used here.
The permissive <tt>* int =&gt; any</tt> entry remains to allow other members defined by <xref target="RFC9581"/> and future extensions; implementations still rely on <xref target="RFC9581"/> for the full semantics and validation of <tt>etime</tt> beyond the constraints listed here.</t>
          <dl newline="true">
            <dt>ordering:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>boolean indicating whether tst-info issued by the TSA can be ordered solely based on the "base time".
This is an optional field, whose default value is "false".
Cf. ordering, <xref section="2.4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC3161"/>.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>nonce:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>int value echoing the nonce supplied by the requestor.
Cf. nonce, <xref section="2.4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC3161"/>.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>tsa:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>a single-entry GeneralNames array <xref section="11.8" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert"/> providing a hint in identifying the name of the TSA.
Cf. tsa, <xref section="2.4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC3161"/>.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>$$TSTInfoExtensions:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>A CDDL socket (<xref section="3.9" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8610"/>) to allow extensibility of the data format.
Note that any extensions appearing here <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> match an extension in the
corresponding request.
Cf. extensions, <xref section="2.4.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC3161"/>.</t>
            </dd>
          </dl>
          <section anchor="creation-2">
            <name>Creation</name>
            <t>The Epoch Bell <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use the following value as messageImprint in its request to the TSA:</t>
            <sourcecode type="cbor-diag"><![CDATA[
[
    / hashAlg   / -16, / sha-256 /
    / hashValue / h'BF4EE9143EF2329B1B778974AAD44506
                    4940B9CAE373C9E35A7B23361282698F'
]
]]></sourcecode>
            <t>This is the sha-256 hash of the string "EPOCH_BELL".</t>
          </section>
        </section>
        <section anchor="sec-epoch-tick">
          <name>Epoch Tick</name>
          <t>An Epoch Tick is a single opaque blob sent to multiple consumers.</t>
          <sourcecode type="cddl"><![CDATA[
; Epoch-Tick

epoch-tick = tstr / bstr / int
]]></sourcecode>
          <t>The following describes the epoch-tick type.</t>
          <dl newline="true">
            <dt>epoch-tick:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>Either a string, a byte string, or an integer used by RATS roles within a trust domain as extra data (<tt>handle</tt>) included in conceptual messages <xref target="RFC9334"/>. Similarly to the use of nonces, this allows the conceptual messages to be associated with a certain epoch. However, unlike nonces (which require uniqueness), Epoch Markers can be used in multiple interactions by every consumer involved.</t>
            </dd>
          </dl>
          <section anchor="creation-3">
            <name>Creation</name>
            <t>The emitter <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> follow the requirements in <xref target="sec-nonce-reqs"/>.</t>
          </section>
        </section>
        <section anchor="sec-epoch-tick-list">
          <name>Epoch Tick List</name>
          <t>A list of Epoch Ticks sent to multiple consumers.
The consumers use each Epoch Tick in the list sequentially.
Similarly to the use of nonces, this allows each interaction to be associated with a certain epoch. However, unlike nonces (which require uniqueness), Epoch Markers can be used in multiple interactions by every consumer involved.</t>
          <sourcecode type="cddl"><![CDATA[
; Epoch-Tick-List

epoch-tick-list = [ + epoch-tick ]
]]></sourcecode>
          <t>The following describes the Epoch Tick List type.</t>
          <dl newline="true">
            <dt>epoch-tick-list:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>A sequence of byte strings used by RATS roles in trust domain as extra data (<tt>handle</tt>) in the generation of conceptual messages as specified by the RATS architecture <xref target="RFC9334"/> to associate them with a certain epoch.
Each Epoch Tick in the list is used in a consecutive generation of a conceptual message.
Asserting freshness of a conceptual message including an Epoch Tick from the epoch-tick-list requires some state on the receiver side to assess if that Epoch Tick is the appropriate next unused Epoch Tick from the epoch-tick-list.</t>
            </dd>
          </dl>
          <t>The Epoch Bell <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> provide the entire epoch-tick-list as an Epoch Bell-signed Epoch Marker.
Once a receiver has verified and retained that list, it can use each extracted Epoch Tick value independently, with no attached Epoch Bell signature.
Epoch Tick List cannot be used in cases where the issuer needs to be verified for each Epoch Tick individually during use.</t>
          <section anchor="creation-4">
            <name>Creation</name>
            <t>The emitter <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> follow the requirements in <xref target="sec-nonce-reqs"/>.</t>
          </section>
          <section anchor="usage">
            <name>Usage</name>
            <t>Proving freshness requires receiver-side state to identify the “next unused” tick.
Systems using Epoch Tick lists <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> define how missing/out-of-order ticks are handled and how resynchronization occurs, as per <xref target="sec-state-seq-mgmt"/>.</t>
          </section>
        </section>
        <section anchor="sec-strictly-monotonic">
          <name>Strictly Monotonically Increasing Counter</name>
          <t>A strictly monotonically increasing counter.</t>
          <t>The counter context is defined by the Epoch Bell.</t>
          <sourcecode type="cddl"><![CDATA[
strictly-monotonic-counter = uint
]]></sourcecode>
          <t>The following describes the strictly-monotonic-counter type.</t>
          <dl newline="true">
            <dt>strictly-monotonic-counter:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>An unsigned integer used by RATS roles in a trust domain as extra data in the production of conceptual messages as specified by the RATS architecture <xref target="RFC9334"/> to associate them with a certain epoch. Each new strictly-monotonic-counter value must be higher than the last one.</t>
            </dd>
          </dl>
          <section anchor="creation-5">
            <name>Creation</name>
            <t>The Epoch Bell <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> emit a counter value lower than or equal to one it has already emitted in the same counter context, including after a crash or restart.
To this end, the Epoch Bell <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> persist its counter state, or otherwise resume from a value that is guaranteed to exceed the last one emitted before the failure.
For example, the Epoch Bell can write the counter to non-volatile storage every K increments and, after restart, resume from the stored value plus K plus a margin F that accounts for failed or delayed writes, as described in <xref section="B.1.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC8613"/>.
If such a margin cannot be guaranteed, the Epoch Bell <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> start a new counter context, e.g., by switching to a new signing key or Epoch Bell identity, so that receivers do not mistake the new values for rollback.</t>
            <t>The Epoch Bell <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> wrap the counter on overflow.
When the counter space is about to be exhausted, the Epoch Bell <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> start a new counter context.</t>
          </section>
          <section anchor="usage-1">
            <name>Usage</name>
            <t>Systems that use Epoch Markers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> follow the guidance in <xref target="sec-state-seq-mgmt"/> in establishing an Epoch Marker acceptance policy for receivers.
To prove freshness, receivers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> track the highest accepted counter and ensure it fulfills the acceptance policy.</t>
          </section>
        </section>
        <section anchor="sec-epoclet">
          <name>Epoclet</name>
          <t>In a highly available service (e.g., a cloud attestation Verifier), maintaining per-session nonce state can cause scalability issues.
One alternative is to use time-synchronized servers that share a symmetric key and produce and consume nonces based on epoch ticks signed using the shared secret.
This means that a nonce minted by one server can be processed by any other server, avoiding the need for session "stickiness".</t>
          <t>An <tt>epoclet</tt> is an Epoch ID variant that supports the above use case by encoding a POSIX time (i.e., the epoch identifier) alongside a minimal set of metadata.
This is all data-origin-authenticated with a symmetric key in a self-contained and compact token that fits within 64 bytes.
This makes it easy to use with common Evidence retrieval ABIs, which tend to limit the size of the challenge parameter to 64 bytes.</t>
          <sourcecode type="cddl"><![CDATA[
epoclet = [
  TimeToken
  AuthTag: bytes .size 32
]

TimeToken = [
  KeyID: bytes .size 1
  Timestamp: ~posix-time
  Pad: bytes .size (0..20)
]

posix-time = #6.1(int)
]]></sourcecode>
          <t>The following describes the <tt>epoclet</tt> type.</t>
          <dl newline="true">
            <dt>KeyID:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>A one-byte opaque identifier that is shared across the server pool.
It is used to identify the key used to compute the AuthTag.
Its interpretation is deployment-specific.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>Timestamp:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>The time associated with the current epoch encoded as the CBOR tag for POSIX time.
It <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use the int format.
The CBOR tag <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be removed.
Note that this encoding restricts the granularity of this Epoch ID to one second.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>Pad:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>Zero or more (up to 20) bytes of padding.
This field is used to adjust the overall size of the <tt>epoclet</tt>, ranging from a minimum of 44 bytes (0 bytes of padding) to a maximum of 64 bytes (20 bytes of padding).
The padding bytes can assume any value.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>AuthTag:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>32 bytes string which is the result of applying HMAC <xref target="RFC2104"/> with SHA-256 over the CBOR serialization of the TimeToken array.
The serialization <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use the CBOR deterministic encoding as specified in Section <xref target="RFC8949" section="4.2" sectionFormat="bare"/> of RFC 8949 <xref target="STD94"/>.</t>
            </dd>
          </dl>
          <section anchor="creation-6">
            <name>Creation</name>
            <t>The emitter <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> follow the requirements in <xref target="sec-time-reqs"/>.
Furthermore, when used in a server farm, the clocks of the servers that participate in the protocol <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be synchronized.</t>
            <t>The emitter builds the <tt>TimeToken</tt> array from the identifier of the current key, the current time and, optionally, padding, and computes the <tt>AuthTag</tt> over it as described above.</t>
            <t>It is <bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14> that the handling (i.e., storage, replication and rotation) of the symmetric key used to generate the authentication tag follows the recommendations and best practices described in <xref target="NIST-SP-800-pt2"/>.</t>
          </section>
          <section anchor="usage-2">
            <name>Usage</name>
            <t>The same size limit defined in <xref target="sec-nonce-reqs"/> applies: the encoded <tt>epoclet</tt> array <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be no more than 64 bytes in length.
The limit applies to the size of the <tt>epoclet</tt> value only, i.e., it does not include the Epoch Marker CBOR tag (26985).</t>
          </section>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sec-time-reqs">
        <name>Time Requirements</name>
        <t>Time <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be sourced from a trusted clock (see <xref section="10.1" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9334"/>).</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sec-nonce-reqs">
        <name>Nonce Requirements</name>
        <t>A nonce value used in a protocol or message to retrieve an Epoch Marker <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be freshly generated.
The generated value <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> have at least 64 bits of entropy (before encoding).
The generated value <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be generated via a cryptographically secure random number generator.</t>
        <t>A maximum nonce size of 512 bits is set to limit the memory requirements.
All receivers <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be able to accommodate the maximum size.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sec-state-seq-mgmt">
        <name>State and Sequencing Management</name>
        <t>Data structures containing Epoch Markers could be reordered in-flight even without malicious intent, leading to perceived sequencing issues.
Some Epoch Marker types thus require receiver state to detect replay/rollback or establish sequencing.
Systems that use Epoch Markers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> define an explicit acceptance policy (e.g., bounded acceptance window) that accounts for reordering of markers.</t>
        <t>Usage of variable emission timings or counter increments when emitting Epoch Markers (see <xref target="priv-cons"/>) <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be coupled with an assessment of acceptance window sizes.
The maximum timing variability used by the Epoch Bell, marker distribution latency, expected in-flight reordering, and conceptual message delivery latency <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> all be considered when determining the minimum practical acceptance window.
Excessive timing variability reduces the effective lifetime of epochs, and so can cause freshness failures for distant participants.</t>
        <t>There is a trade-off between keeping a single “global” epoch view versus per-Attester state at the Verifier: global-only policies can exacerbate latency-induced false replay rejections, while per-Attester tracking can be costly.
Systems that use Epoch Markers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> document whether they use global epoch tracking or per-Attester state and, if necessary, the associated window.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-signature-reqs">
      <name>Signature Requirements</name>
      <t>An Epoch Marker does not intrinsically include a signature.
An Epoch Bell-signed Epoch Marker is an Epoch Marker conveyed in a signed data structure whose signature was generated by an Epoch Bell.
When a recipient needs to establish that an Epoch Marker was issued by an authorized Epoch Bell, the Epoch Marker <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be an Epoch Bell-signed Epoch Marker and its Epoch Bell signature <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be validated.
This is an alternative Epoch Marker distribution mechanism to the one described in <xref target="sec-epoclet"/>.</t>
      <t>An Epoch ID value is often intended to be extracted from an Epoch Bell-signed Epoch Marker and included in another protected message, or conveyed via a secure channel.
Protection of that other message does not by itself make the extracted value an Epoch Bell-signed Epoch Marker, nor does it make its signer an Epoch Bell.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-epoch-bell-cert">
      <name>Epoch Bell Certification</name>
      <t>Relying Parties that receive Epoch Bell-signed Epoch Markers directly or as part of other RATS conceptual messages need a way to determine whether the Bell signing key was authorized to do so.
This section defines a mechanism for conveying that authorization when the Epoch Bell is certified using an X.509 public-key certificate <xref target="RFC5280"/>.
Authorization of Epoch Bells that are not certified using X.509 (e.g., ecosystems that convey authorization semantics via CBOR-native structures) is out of scope of this document.</t>
      <t>An X.509 certificate for an Epoch Bell signing key <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> assert this specific purpose using the <tt>id-kp-epochBell</tt> extended key purpose identifier, defined below, in the certificate's Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension <xref section="4.2.1.12" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC5280"/>.</t>
      <t>Certificates conforming to this specification:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t><bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include the EKU extension, marked critical, containing <tt>id-kp-epochBell</tt>;</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> include the anyExtendedKeyUsage value in the EKU extension; and</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t><bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> include EKU values other than <tt>id-kp-epochBell</tt>, so that the key is not authorized for any purpose besides generating Epoch Markers.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>Relying parties that require X.509-certified Epoch Bells <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject Epoch Bell-signed Epoch Markers whose signing certificate does not satisfy these constraints.</t>
      <t>The following module adheres to ASN.1 specifications <xref target="X.680"/> and <xref target="X.690"/>.</t>
      <figure anchor="fig-epoch-bell-eku">
        <name>Epoch Bell Extended Key Usage ASN.1 Module</name>
        <sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[
EpochBell-EKU
    { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
      security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
      id-mod-epoch-bell(TBD11) }

DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN

id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
  { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
    security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) }

-- Epoch Bell extended key purpose

id-kp-epochBell OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp TBD12 }

END
]]></sourcecode>
      </figure>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-seccons">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>In distributed systems that rely on Epoch Markers for conveyance of freshness, the Epoch Bell plays a significant role in the assumed trust model.
Freshness decisions derived from Epoch Bell-signed Epoch Markers depend on the Epoch Bell’s key(s) and correct behavior.
If the Epoch Bell key is compromised, or the Bell is malicious/misconfigured, an attacker can emit valid-looking “fresh” Epoch Bell-signed Epoch Markers.
System deployments using Epoch Markers generally need to protect Bell signing keys (secure storage, rotation, revocation) and scope acceptance to the intended trust domain (e.g., expected issuer/trust anchor).
Similarly, the Bell's clock needs to be securely sourced and managed, to prevent attacks that skew the Bell's perception of time.</t>
      <section anchor="epoch-bell-authorization">
        <name>Epoch Bell Authorization</name>
        <t>Because Epoch Bell-signed Epoch Markers are only as trustworthy as the process that authorizes an entity to act as an Epoch Bell, relying parties need means to verify that a signing key was actually authorized for that purpose, and that the key is not shared with, or reused for, unrelated duties.</t>
        <t>Deployments that certify Epoch Bells via X.509 <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> rely on the <tt>id-kp-epochBell</tt> Extended Key Usage defined in <xref target="sec-epoch-bell-cert"/> to authorize and constrain Epoch Bell signing keys.
Extended Key Usage is checked by conforming path-validation implementations and, when a single-purpose EKU is asserted critical (as mandated in <xref target="sec-epoch-bell-cert"/>), provides an explicit, enforceable signal that a key's use is restricted to signing Epoch Markers.</t>
        <t>This mechanism only addresses X.509-certified Epoch Bells; it is an intermediate approach pending broader work on expressing authorization semantics for CBOR-native trust structures, which is out of scope of this document.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="epoch-signalling-issues">
        <name>Epoch Signalling Issues</name>
        <t><xref section="12.3" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC9334"/> provides a good introduction to attacks on conveyance of Epoch Markers.
A network adversary can replay valid Epoch Bell-signed Epoch Markers or delay distribution, and differential latency can lead to different parties having different views of the “current” epoch.</t>
        <t>The epoch (acceptable window) duration is an operational security parameter: if too long, an Attester can create “good” Evidence in a good state and release it later while the epoch is still acceptable (notably for epoch-tick, epoch-tick-list, and strictly-monotonic-counter); if too short, distant Attesters may be rejected as stale due to latency.
Epoch Markers are also designed to be reusable by multiple consumers, unlike nonces.
Where per-session uniqueness is required, protocols typically need to bind Epoch Markers to an explicit nonce (e.g., see <xref target="sec-epoch-markers"/>).
Finally, system deployments using Epoch Markers are normally required to pin which Epoch Marker types are acceptable for a given trust domain to avoid downgrade.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="operational-examples">
        <name>Operational Examples</name>
        <t>The following illustrative cases highlight “reasonable best practice” choices for balancing freshness, replay protection, and scalability.</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t><em>Nonce-bound Bell interaction</em>: When a Verifier uses a nonce challenge to trigger Evidence creation, the Attester can forward that nonce to the Epoch Bell to request an Epoch Bell-signed Epoch Marker with the nonce echoed inside.
For reuse and caching, the typical pattern is to keep the marker generic and embed the Verifier nonce alongside the marker in the Evidence: if the Bell signs a nonce-echoed marker, that marker is not reusable across sessions.
The nonce and marker are thus either bound by the Bell's signature, or by the attester's signature on the Evidence.
The Verifier checks that (1) the nonce matches its challenge, (2) the Epoch Marker signature chains to the expected signing key (either the Bell's signing key, or the attester's Attesting Key), and (3) the marker satisfies the acceptance policy (e.g., highest-seen counter or time window).
This pairing gives per-session uniqueness while still allowing Epoch Marker reuse by multiple consumers.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><em>Long-latency paths (e.g., LoRaWAN or DTN profiles)</em>: High propagation and queuing delays make tight epoch windows brittle.
In system deployments using Epoch Markers, epoch-tick-list can be pre-provisioned to Attesters so that each interaction consumes the next tick, with the Verifier keeping per-Attester sequencing state (<xref target="sec-state-seq-mgmt"/>).
Epoch duration should cover worst-case delivery plus clock skew of the Bell, and acceptance policies should allow an overlap (e.g., current and immediately previous epoch) to absorb in-flight drift while still rejecting replays beyond that window.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t><em>Large fleets sharing a Bell</em>: When many Attesters reuse the same Epoch Marker value, per-Attester state at the Verifier may be impractical.
One approach is to accept a global highest-seen epoch (with a bounded replay window) while requiring each Evidence record to bind the Epoch Marker to the Attester identity and, when feasible, a Verifier-provided nonce.
This limits cross-attester replay of a single Epoch Marker while keeping the Bell stateless, which allows Epoch Markers to be cached and enables their broadcast distribution at scale.</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="priv-cons">
      <name>Privacy Considerations</name>
      <t>When issued at predictable time intervals or with predictably sequential values, Epoch Markers can act as system-wide synchronization signals.
Observers may be able to infer epoch boundaries, correlate messages produced within the same epoch, identify entities using the same Epoch Bell, and learn the cadence of specific operations.
This linking may be performed even when the conceptual messages are otherwise protected.</t>
      <t>System deployments using Epoch Markers where traffic analysis is a concern should make Epoch Marker values and issuance patterns less predictable.
Epoch Bells can make their Epoch Marker emission timing variable.
When monotonic-counter-based markers are used, the increments between successive marker values can be made variable.
As an additional step, the scoping of markers (per trust domain, audience, or protocol context) should be considered.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-iana-cons">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t><cref anchor="rfced-replace">RFC Editor: please replace RFCthis with the RFC
number of this RFC and remove this note.</cref></t>
      <section anchor="sec-iana-cbor-tags">
        <name>New CBOR Tags</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to allocate the following tags in the "CBOR Tags" registry
<xref target="IANA.cbor-tags"/>, preferably with the specific CBOR tag value requested:</t>
        <table align="left" anchor="tbl-cbor-tags">
          <name>New CBOR Tags</name>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Tag</th>
              <th align="left">Data Item</th>
              <th align="left">Semantics</th>
              <th align="left">Reference</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">26980</td>
              <td align="left">bytes</td>
              <td align="left">DER-encoded RFC3161 TSTInfo</td>
              <td align="left">
                <xref target="sec-rfc3161-classic"/> of RFCthis</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">26981</td>
              <td align="left">map</td>
              <td align="left">CBOR representation of RFC3161 TSTInfo semantics</td>
              <td align="left">
                <xref target="sec-rfc3161-fancy"/> of RFCthis</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">26982</td>
              <td align="left">tstr / bstr / int</td>
              <td align="left">a nonce that is shared among many participants but that can only be used once by each participant</td>
              <td align="left">
                <xref target="sec-epoch-tick"/> of RFCthis</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">26983</td>
              <td align="left">array</td>
              <td align="left">a list of multi-nonce</td>
              <td align="left">
                <xref target="sec-epoch-tick-list"/> of RFCthis</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">26984</td>
              <td align="left">uint</td>
              <td align="left">strictly monotonically increasing counter</td>
              <td align="left">
                <xref target="sec-strictly-monotonic"/> of RFCthis</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">26985</td>
              <td align="left">array</td>
              <td align="left">an "epoclet"</td>
              <td align="left">
                <xref target="sec-epoclet"/> of RFCthis</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
      </section>
      <section anchor="sec-iana-em-claim">
        <name> New EM CWT Claim</name>
        <t>This specification adds the following value to the "CBOR Web Token Claims" registry <xref target="IANA.cwt"/>.</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>Claim Name: em</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Claim Description: Epoch Marker</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Claim Key: 2000 (IANA: suggested assignment)</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Claim Value Type(s): CBOR-tagged Epoch ID</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Change Controller: IETF</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>Specification Document(s): <xref target="sec-epoch-markers"/> of RFCthis</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
      <section anchor="new-media-type-applicationepoch-markercbor">
        <name>New Media Type <tt>application/epoch-marker+cbor</tt></name>
        <t>IANA is requested to add the <tt>application/epoch-marker+cbor</tt> media types to the "Media Types" registry <xref target="IANA.media-types"/>, using the following template:</t>
        <dl spacing="compact">
          <dt>Type name:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>application</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Subtype name:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>epoch-marker+cbor</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Required parameters:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>no</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Optional parameters:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><tt>em-type</tt>: the CBOR tag number that identifies the specific Epoch Marker.
This value is encoded as an unsigned decimal integer, without leading zeroes, except for the actual number 0.
For example, <tt>em-type=26982</tt> identifies an Epoch Tick.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Encoding considerations:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>binary (CBOR)</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Security considerations:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><xref target="sec-seccons"/> of RFCthis</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Interoperability considerations:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>n/a</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Published specification:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>RFCthis</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Applications that use this media type:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>RATS Attesters, Verifiers, Endorsers and Reference-Value providers, and Relying Parties that need to transfer Epoch Markers payloads over HTTP(S), CoAP(S), and other transports.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Fragment identifier considerations:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The syntax and semantics of fragment identifiers are as specified for "application/cbor". (No fragment identification syntax is currently defined for "application/cbor".)</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Person &amp; email address to contact for further information:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>RATS WG mailing list (rats@ietf.org)</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Intended usage:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>COMMON</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Restrictions on usage:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>none</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Author/Change controller:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>IETF</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Provisional registration:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>no</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="new-coap-content-formats">
        <name>New CoAP Content-Formats</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to register the following Content-Format IDs in the "CoAP Content-Formats" registry, within the "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters" registry group <xref target="IANA.core-parameters"/>:</t>
        <table align="left">
          <name>New CoAP Content Formats</name>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Content-Type</th>
              <th align="left">Content Coding</th>
              <th align="left">ID</th>
              <th align="left">Reference</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">application/epoch-marker+cbor</td>
              <td align="left">-</td>
              <td align="left">TBD1</td>
              <td align="left">RFCthis</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">application/epoch-marker+cbor; em-type=0</td>
              <td align="left">-</td>
              <td align="left">TBD2</td>
              <td align="left">
                <xref target="sec-cbor-time"/> of RFCthis</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">application/epoch-marker+cbor; em-type=1</td>
              <td align="left">-</td>
              <td align="left">TBD3</td>
              <td align="left">
                <xref target="sec-cbor-time"/> of RFCthis</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">application/epoch-marker+cbor; em-type=1001</td>
              <td align="left">-</td>
              <td align="left">TBD4</td>
              <td align="left">
                <xref target="sec-cbor-time"/> of RFCthis</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">application/epoch-marker+cbor; em-type=26980</td>
              <td align="left">-</td>
              <td align="left">TBD5</td>
              <td align="left">
                <xref target="sec-rfc3161-classic"/> of RFCthis</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">application/epoch-marker+cbor; em-type=26981</td>
              <td align="left">-</td>
              <td align="left">TBD6</td>
              <td align="left">
                <xref target="sec-rfc3161-fancy"/> of RFCthis</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">application/epoch-marker+cbor; em-type=26982</td>
              <td align="left">-</td>
              <td align="left">TBD7</td>
              <td align="left">
                <xref target="sec-epoch-tick"/> of RFCthis</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">application/epoch-marker+cbor; em-type=26983</td>
              <td align="left">-</td>
              <td align="left">TBD8</td>
              <td align="left">
                <xref target="sec-epoch-tick-list"/> of RFCthis</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">application/epoch-marker+cbor; em-type=26984</td>
              <td align="left">-</td>
              <td align="left">TBD9</td>
              <td align="left">
                <xref target="sec-strictly-monotonic"/> of RFCthis</td>
            </tr>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">application/epoch-marker+cbor; em-type=26985</td>
              <td align="left">-</td>
              <td align="left">TBD10</td>
              <td align="left">
                <xref target="sec-epoclet"/> of RFCthis</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>If possible, TBD1..TBD10 should be assigned in the 256..9999 range.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="iana-smi">
        <name>New SMI Numbers Registrations</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to assign a new value for the Extended Key Usage defined in <xref target="sec-epoch-bell-cert"/> in the "SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key Purpose" registry of the "SMI Numbers" <xref target="IANA.smi-numbers"/> registry group, as follows:</t>
        <table align="left">
          <name>New PKIX Extended Key Purpose</name>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Decimal</th>
              <th align="left">Description</th>
              <th align="left">References</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">TBD12</td>
              <td align="left">id-kp-epochBell</td>
              <td align="left">
                <xref target="sec-epoch-bell-cert"/> of RFCthis</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
        <t>IANA is requested to assign a new value for the ASN.1 Module defined in <xref target="sec-epoch-bell-cert"/> in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" registry of the "SMI Numbers" <xref target="IANA.smi-numbers"/> registry group:</t>
        <table align="left">
          <name>New ASN.1 Module OID</name>
          <thead>
            <tr>
              <th align="left">Decimal</th>
              <th align="left">Description</th>
              <th align="left">References</th>
            </tr>
          </thead>
          <tbody>
            <tr>
              <td align="left">TBD11</td>
              <td align="left">id-mod-epoch-bell</td>
              <td align="left">
                <xref target="sec-epoch-bell-cert"/> of RFCthis</td>
            </tr>
          </tbody>
        </table>
      </section>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC3161">
          <front>
            <title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP)</title>
            <author fullname="C. Adams" initials="C." surname="Adams"/>
            <author fullname="P. Cain" initials="P." surname="Cain"/>
            <author fullname="D. Pinkas" initials="D." surname="Pinkas"/>
            <author fullname="R. Zuccherato" initials="R." surname="Zuccherato"/>
            <date month="August" year="2001"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes the format of a request sent to a Time Stamping Authority (TSA) and of the response that is returned. It also establishes several security-relevant requirements for TSA operation, with regards to processing requests to generate responses. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3161"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3161"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5280">
          <front>
            <title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile</title>
            <author fullname="D. Cooper" initials="D." surname="Cooper"/>
            <author fullname="S. Santesson" initials="S." surname="Santesson"/>
            <author fullname="S. Farrell" initials="S." surname="Farrell"/>
            <author fullname="S. Boeyen" initials="S." surname="Boeyen"/>
            <author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>
            <author fullname="W. Polk" initials="W." surname="Polk"/>
            <date month="May" year="2008"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5280"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5280"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5652">
          <front>
            <title>Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)</title>
            <author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>
            <date month="September" year="2009"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). This syntax is used to digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message content. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="70"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5652"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5652"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8392">
          <front>
            <title>CBOR Web Token (CWT)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Jones" initials="M." surname="Jones"/>
            <author fullname="E. Wahlstroem" initials="E." surname="Wahlstroem"/>
            <author fullname="S. Erdtman" initials="S." surname="Erdtman"/>
            <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
            <date month="May" year="2018"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>CBOR Web Token (CWT) is a compact means of representing claims to be transferred between two parties. The claims in a CWT are encoded in the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR), and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) is used for added application-layer security protection. A claim is a piece of information asserted about a subject and is represented as a name/value pair consisting of a claim name and a claim value. CWT is derived from JSON Web Token (JWT) but uses CBOR rather than JSON.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8392"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8392"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8610">
          <front>
            <title>Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and JSON Data Structures</title>
            <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
            <author fullname="C. Vigano" initials="C." surname="Vigano"/>
            <author fullname="C. Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann"/>
            <date month="June" year="2019"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document proposes a notational convention to express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) data structures (RFC 7049). Its main goal is to provide an easy and unambiguous way to express structures for protocol messages and data formats that use CBOR or JSON.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8610"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8610"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9090">
          <front>
            <title>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) Tags for Object Identifiers</title>
            <author fullname="C. Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann"/>
            <date month="July" year="2021"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR), defined in RFC 8949, is a data format whose design goals include the possibility of extremely small code size, fairly small message size, and extensibility without the need for version negotiation.</t>
              <t>This document defines CBOR tags for object identifiers (OIDs) and is the reference document for the IANA registration of the CBOR tags so defined.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9090"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9090"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9054">
          <front>
            <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Hash Algorithms</title>
            <author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/>
            <date month="August" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) syntax (see RFC 9052) does not define any direct methods for using hash algorithms. There are, however, circumstances where hash algorithms are used, such as indirect signatures, where the hash of one or more contents are signed, and identification of an X.509 certificate or other object by the use of a fingerprint. This document defines hash algorithms that are identified by COSE algorithm identifiers.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9054"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9054"/>
        </reference>
        <referencegroup anchor="STD94" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/std94">
          <reference anchor="RFC8949" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949">
            <front>
              <title>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)</title>
              <author fullname="C. Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann"/>
              <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
              <date month="December" year="2020"/>
              <abstract>
                <t>The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format whose design goals include the possibility of extremely small code size, fairly small message size, and extensibility without the need for version negotiation. These design goals make it different from earlier binary serializations such as ASN.1 and MessagePack.</t>
                <t>This document obsoletes RFC 7049, providing editorial improvements, new details, and errata fixes while keeping full compatibility with the interchange format of RFC 7049. It does not create a new version of the format.</t>
              </abstract>
            </front>
            <seriesInfo name="STD" value="94"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8949"/>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8949"/>
          </reference>
        </referencegroup>
        <referencegroup anchor="STD96" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/std96">
          <reference anchor="RFC9052" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9052">
            <front>
              <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process</title>
              <author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/>
              <date month="August" year="2022"/>
              <abstract>
                <t>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. There is a need to be able to define basic security services for this data format. This document defines the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) protocol. This specification describes how to create and process signatures, message authentication codes, and encryption using CBOR for serialization. This specification additionally describes how to represent cryptographic keys using CBOR.</t>
                <t>This document, along with RFC 9053, obsoletes RFC 8152.</t>
              </abstract>
            </front>
            <seriesInfo name="STD" value="96"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9052"/>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9052"/>
          </reference>
          <reference anchor="RFC9338" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9338">
            <front>
              <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Countersignatures</title>
              <author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/>
              <date month="December" year="2022"/>
              <abstract>
                <t>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) defines a set of security services for CBOR. This document defines a countersignature algorithm along with the needed header parameters and CBOR tags for COSE. This document updates RFC 9052.</t>
              </abstract>
            </front>
            <seriesInfo name="STD" value="96"/>
            <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9338"/>
            <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9338"/>
          </reference>
        </referencegroup>
        <reference anchor="RFC9581">
          <front>
            <title>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) Tags for Time, Duration, and Period</title>
            <author fullname="C. Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann"/>
            <author fullname="B. Gamari" initials="B." surname="Gamari"/>
            <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
            <date month="August" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR, RFC 8949) is a data format whose design goals include the possibility of extremely small code size, fairly small message size, and extensibility without the need for version negotiation.</t>
              <t>In CBOR, one point of extensibility is the definition of CBOR tags. RFC 8949 defines two tags for time: CBOR tag 0 (RFC 3339 time as a string) and tag 1 (POSIX time as int or float). Since then, additional requirements have become known. The present document defines a CBOR tag for time that allows a more elaborate representation of time, as well as related CBOR tags for duration and time period. This document is intended as the reference document for the IANA registration of the CBOR tags defined.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9581"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9581"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert">
          <front>
            <title>CBOR Encoded X.509 Certificates (C509 Certificates)</title>
            <author fullname="John Preuß Mattsson" initials="J. P." surname="Mattsson">
              <organization>Ericsson AB</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Göran Selander" initials="G." surname="Selander">
              <organization>Ericsson AB</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Shahid Raza" initials="S." surname="Raza">
              <organization>University of Glasgow</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Joel Höglund" initials="J." surname="Höglund">
              <organization>RISE AB</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Martin Furuhed" initials="M." surname="Furuhed">
              <organization>IN Groupe</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Lijun Liao" initials="L." surname="Liao">
              <organization>NIO Inc.</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="24" month="September" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document specifies a CBOR encoding of X.509 certificates.  The
   resulting certificates are called C509 certificates.  The CBOR
   encoding supports a large subset of RFC 5280 and common certificate
   profiles, and it is extensible.

   Two types of C509 certificates are defined.  One type is an
   invertible CBOR re-encoding of DER-encoded X.509 certificates with
   the signature field copied from the DER encoding.  The other type is
   identical except that the signature is computed over the CBOR
   encoding instead of the DER encoding, thereby avoiding the use of
   ASN.1.  Both types of certificates have the same semantics as X.509
   while providing comparable size reduction.

   This document also specifies CBOR-encoded data structures for
   certification requests and certification request templates, new COSE
   headers, as well as a TLS certificate type and a file format for
   C509.  This document updates RFC 6698 by extending the TLSA selectors
   registry to include C509 certificates.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert-21"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="NIST-SP-800-pt2">
          <front>
            <title>Recommendation for key management:: part 2 -- best practices for key management organizations</title>
            <author fullname="Elaine Barker" initials="E." surname="Barker">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="William C Barker" initials="W." surname="Barker">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date month="May" year="2019"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/nist.sp.800-57pt2r1"/>
          <refcontent>National Institute of Standards and Technology</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="X.680">
          <front>
            <title>Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation</title>
            <author>
              <organization>International Telephone and Telegraph
Consultative Committee</organization>
            </author>
            <date month="July" year="2002"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="CCITT" value="Recommendation X.680"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="X.690">
          <front>
            <title>ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of basic encoding Rules (BER), Canonical encoding rules (CER) and Distinguished encoding rules (DER)</title>
            <author>
              <organization>International Telephone and Telegraph
Consultative Committee</organization>
            </author>
            <date month="July" year="2002"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="CCITT" value="Recommendation X.690"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2104">
          <front>
            <title>HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication</title>
            <author fullname="H. Krawczyk" initials="H." surname="Krawczyk"/>
            <author fullname="M. Bellare" initials="M." surname="Bellare"/>
            <author fullname="R. Canetti" initials="R." surname="Canetti"/>
            <date month="February" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes HMAC, a mechanism for message authentication using cryptographic hash functions. HMAC can be used with any iterative cryptographic hash function, e.g., MD5, SHA-1, in combination with a secret shared key. The cryptographic strength of HMAC depends on the properties of the underlying hash function. This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo does not specify an Internet standard of any kind</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2104"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2104"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="IANA.media-types" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types">
          <front>
            <title>Media Types</title>
            <author>
              <organization>IANA</organization>
            </author>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="IANA.core-parameters" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/core-parameters">
          <front>
            <title>Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters</title>
            <author>
              <organization>IANA</organization>
            </author>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="IANA.smi-numbers" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers">
          <front>
            <title>Structure of Management Information (SMI) Numbers (MIB Module Registrations)</title>
            <author>
              <organization>IANA</organization>
            </author>
          </front>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC9334">
          <front>
            <title>Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture</title>
            <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
            <author fullname="D. Thaler" initials="D." surname="Thaler"/>
            <author fullname="M. Richardson" initials="M." surname="Richardson"/>
            <author fullname="N. Smith" initials="N." surname="Smith"/>
            <author fullname="W. Pan" initials="W." surname="Pan"/>
            <date month="January" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In network protocol exchanges, it is often useful for one end of a communication to know whether the other end is in an intended operating state. This document provides an architectural overview of the entities involved that make such tests possible through the process of generating, conveying, and evaluating evidentiary Claims. It provides a model that is neutral toward processor architectures, the content of Claims, and protocols.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9334"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9334"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8613">
          <front>
            <title>Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE)</title>
            <author fullname="G. Selander" initials="G." surname="Selander"/>
            <author fullname="J. Mattsson" initials="J." surname="Mattsson"/>
            <author fullname="F. Palombini" initials="F." surname="Palombini"/>
            <author fullname="L. Seitz" initials="L." surname="Seitz"/>
            <date month="July" year="2019"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE), a method for application-layer protection of the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), using CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE). OSCORE provides end-to-end protection between endpoints communicating using CoAP or CoAP-mappable HTTP. OSCORE is designed for constrained nodes and networks supporting a range of proxy operations, including translation between different transport protocols.</t>
              <t>Although an optional functionality of CoAP, OSCORE alters CoAP options processing and IANA registration. Therefore, this document updates RFC 7252.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8613"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8613"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models">
          <front>
            <title>Reference Interaction Models for Remote Attestation Procedures</title>
            <author fullname="Henk Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz">
              <organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Michael Eckel" initials="M." surname="Eckel">
              <organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Wei Pan" initials="W." surname="Pan">
              <organization>Huawei Technologies</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Eric Voit" initials="E." surname="Voit">
              <organization>Cisco Systems</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="28" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document describes interaction models for remote attestation
   procedures (RATS) [RFC9334].  Three conveying mechanisms --
   Challenge/Response, Uni-Directional, and Streaming Remote Attestation
   -- are illustrated and defined.  Analogously, a general overview
   about the information elements typically used by corresponding
   conveyance protocols are highlighted.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models-20"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9943">
          <front>
            <title>An Architecture for Trustworthy and Transparent Digital Supply Chains</title>
            <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
            <author fullname="A. Delignat-Lavaud" initials="A." surname="Delignat-Lavaud"/>
            <author fullname="C. Fournet" initials="C." surname="Fournet"/>
            <author fullname="Y. Deshpande" initials="Y." surname="Deshpande"/>
            <author fullname="S. Lasker" initials="S." surname="Lasker"/>
            <date month="June" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Traceability in supply chains is a growing security concern. While Verifiable Data Structures (VDSs) have addressed specific issues, such as equivocation over digital certificates, they lack a universal architecture for all supply chains. This document defines such an architecture for single-issuer signed statement transparency. It ensures extensibility and interoperability between different transparency services as well as compliance with various auditing procedures and regulatory requirements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9943"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9943"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9711">
          <front>
            <title>The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)</title>
            <author fullname="L. Lundblade" initials="L." surname="Lundblade"/>
            <author fullname="G. Mandyam" initials="G." surname="Mandyam"/>
            <author fullname="J. O'Donoghue" initials="J." surname="O'Donoghue"/>
            <author fullname="C. Wallace" initials="C." surname="Wallace"/>
            <date month="April" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>An Entity Attestation Token (EAT) provides an attested claims set that describes the state and characteristics of an entity, a device such as a smartphone, an Internet of Things (IoT) device, network equipment, or such. This claims set is used by a relying party, server, or service to determine the type and degree of trust placed in the entity.</t>
              <t>An EAT is either a CBOR Web Token (CWT) or a JSON Web Token (JWT) with attestation-oriented claims.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9711"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9711"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-lamps-csr-attestation">
          <front>
            <title>Use of Remote Attestation with Certification Signing Requests</title>
            <author fullname="Mike Ounsworth" initials="M." surname="Ounsworth">
              <organization>Cryptic Forest Software</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Hannes Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig">
              <organization>Siemens</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Henk Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz">
              <organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Monty Wiseman" initials="M." surname="Wiseman">
              <organization>Independent</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Ned Smith" initials="N." surname="Smith">
         </author>
            <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   Certification Authorities (CAs) issuing certificates to Public Key
   Infrastructure (PKI) end entities may require a certificate signing
   request (CSR) to include additional verifiable information to confirm
   policy compliance.  For example, a CA may require an end entity to
   demonstrate that the private key corresponding to a CSR's public key
   is secured by a hardware security module (HSM), is not exportable,
   etc.  The process of generating, transmitting, and verifying
   additional information required by the CA is called remote
   attestation.  While work is currently underway to standardize various
   aspects of remote attestation, a variety of proprietary mechanisms
   have been in use for years, particularly regarding protection of
   private keys.

   This specification defines ASN.1 structures which may carry
   attestation data for PKCS#10 and Certificate Request Message Format
   (CRMF) messages.  Both standardized and proprietary attestation
   formats are supported by this specification.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-lamps-csr-attestation-33"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9999">
          <front>
            <title>Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Conceptual Message Wrapper (CMW)</title>
            <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
            <author fullname="N. Smith" initials="N." surname="Smith"/>
            <author fullname="T. Fossati" initials="T." surname="Fossati"/>
            <author fullname="H. Tschofenig" initials="H." surname="Tschofenig"/>
            <date month="July" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The conceptual messages introduced by the Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) architecture (RFC 9334) are protocol-agnostic data units that are conveyed between RATS roles during RATS interactions. Conceptual messages describe the meaning and function of such data units within RATS data flows without specifying a wire format, encoding, transport mechanism, or processing details. The initial set of conceptual messages is defined in Section 8 of RFC 9334 and includes Evidence, Attestation Results, Endorsements, Reference Values, and Appraisal Policies.</t>
              <t>This document introduces the Conceptual Message Wrapper (CMW) that provides a common structure to encapsulate these messages. It defines a dedicated Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) tag, corresponding JSON Web Token (JWT) and CBOR Web Token (CWT) claims, and an X.509 extension.</t>
              <t>Together, these mechanisms allow CMWs to be used in CBOR-based protocols, web APIs using JWTs and CWTs, and PKIX artifacts such as X.509 certificates. Additionally, this document defines media types and CoAP Content-Formats that may be used to identify CMWs when transported over protocols such as HTTP, MIME, and CoAP.</t>
              <t>The goal is to improve the interoperability and flexibility of remote attestation protocols. Introducing a shared message format such as CMW enables consistent support for different attestation message types, enables the evolution of message serialization formats without breaking compatibility, and avoids the need to redefine how messages are handled within each protocol.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9999"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9999"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="TCG-CoEvidence" target="https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG-DICE-Concise-Evidence-Binding-for-SPDM-Version-1.0-Revision-53_1August2023.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>TCG DICE Concise Evidence Binding for SPDM</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Trusted Computing Group</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2023" month="June"/>
          </front>
          <refcontent>Version 1.00</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-rats-ar4si">
          <front>
            <title>Attestation Results for Secure Interactions</title>
            <author fullname="Eric Voit" initials="E." surname="Voit">
              <organization>Cisco Systems</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Henk Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz">
              <organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Thomas Hardjono" initials="T." surname="Hardjono">
              <organization>MIT</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Thomas Fossati" initials="T." surname="Fossati">
              <organization>NVIDIA</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Vincent Scarlata" initials="V." surname="Scarlata">
              <organization>Intel</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="30" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines reusable Attestation Result information
   elements.  When these elements are offered to Relying Parties as
   Evidence, different aspects of Attester trustworthiness can be
   evaluated.  Additionally, where the Relying Party is interfacing with
   a heterogeneous mix of Attesting Environment and Verifier types,
   consistent policies can be applied to subsequent information exchange
   between each Attester and the Relying Party.

   This document also defines two serialisations of the proposed
   information model, utilising CBOR and JSON.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-rats-ar4si-11"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="IANA.cwt" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt">
          <front>
            <title>CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims</title>
            <author>
              <organization>IANA</organization>
            </author>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="IANA.cbor-tags" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/cbor-tags">
          <front>
            <title>Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) Tags</title>
            <author>
              <organization>IANA</organization>
            </author>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="TCG-TPM2" target="https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/Trusted-Platform-Module-2.0-Library-Part-2-Version-184_pub.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>Trusted Platform Module 2.0 Library Part 2: Structures</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Trusted Computing Group</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2025" month="March"/>
          </front>
          <refcontent>Version 184</refcontent>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 822?>

<section anchor="examples">
      <name>Examples</name>
      <t>The example in <xref target="fig-ex-1"/> shows an Epoch Marker with an <tt>etime</tt> as the Epoch Marker type.</t>
      <figure anchor="fig-ex-1">
        <name>CBOR Epoch Marker based on `etime`)</name>
        <sourcecode type="cbor-diag"><![CDATA[
/ epoch-marker for
  1996-12-19T16:39:57-08:00[America//Los_Angeles][u-ca=hebrew] /
/ etime / 1001({
    1: 851042397,
  -10: "America/Los_Angeles",
  -11: { "u-ca": "hebrew" }
})
]]></sourcecode>
      </figure>
      <t>The encoded data item in CBOR pretty-printed form (hex with comments) is shown in <xref target="fig-ex-1-pretty"/>.</t>
      <figure anchor="fig-ex-1-pretty">
        <name>CBOR Epoch Marker based on `etime` (pretty hex)</name>
        <sourcecode type="cbor-pretty"><![CDATA[
d9 03e9                                 # tag(1001)
   a3                                   # map(3)
      01                                # unsigned(1)
      1a 32b9e05d                       # unsigned(851042397)
      29                                # negative(9)
      73                                # text(19)
         416d65726963612f4c6f735f416e67656c6573 # "America/Los_Angeles"
      2a                                # negative(10)
      a1                                # map(1)
         64                             # text(4)
            752d6361                    # "u-ca"
         66                             # text(6)
            686562726577                # "hebrew"
]]></sourcecode>
      </figure>
      <t>The example in <xref target="fig-ex-2"/> shows an Epoch Marker with an <tt>etime</tt> as the Epoch Marker type carried within a CWT.</t>
      <figure anchor="fig-ex-2">
        <name>CBOR Epoch Marker based on `etime` carried within a CWT</name>
        <sourcecode type="cbor-diag"><![CDATA[
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

18([
  / protected / << {
    / alg / 1: -7 / ECDSA 256 /
  } >>,
  / unprotected / {},
  / payload / << {
    / epoch marker / 2000: / etime / 1001({
      1: 851042397,
      -10: "America/Los_Angeles",
      -11: { "u-ca": "hebrew" }
    }),
    / eat_nonce /  10: h'\
   c53a8c924f5a27877951ace250709aa64a45311840ca1c55da09af026a7a9c1c',
    / iss / 1 : "ACME epoch bell",
    / aud / 3 : "ACME protocol clients",
    / nbf / 5 : 1757929800,
    / exp / 4 : 1757929860
  } >>,
  / signature / h'737461747574617279'
])
]]></sourcecode>
      </figure>
      <t>The encoded data item in CBOR pretty-printed form (hex with comments) is shown in <xref target="fig-ex-2-pretty"/>.</t>
      <figure anchor="fig-ex-2-pretty">
        <name>CBOR Epoch Marker based on `etime` carried within a CWT (pretty hex)</name>
        <sourcecode type="cbor-pretty"><![CDATA[
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

d2                                      # tag(18)
   84                                   # array(4)
      43                                # bytes(3)
         a10126                         # "\xA1\u0001&"
      a0                                # map(0)
      58 88                             # bytes(136)
         \
a61907d0d903e9a3011a32b9e05d2973416d65726963612f4c6f735f416e67656c65\
732aa164752d6361666865627265770a5820c53a8c924f5a27877951ace250709aa6\
4a45311840ca1c55da09af026a7a9c1c016f41434d452065706f63682062656c6c03\
7541434d452070726f746f636f6c20636c69656e7473051a68c7e148041a68c7e18\
4 # "\xA6\u0019\a\xD0\xD9\u0003\xE9\xA3\u0001\u001A2\xB9\xE0])\
sAmerica/Los_Angeles*\xA1du-cafhebrew\nX \xC5:\x8C\x92OZ'\x87yQ\xAC\\
xE2Pp\x9A\xA6JE1\u0018@\xCA\u001CU\xDA\t\xAF\u0002jz\x9C\u001C\\
u0001oACME epoch bell\u0003uACME protocol clients\u0005\u001Ah\xC7\\
                                       xE1H\u0004\u001Ah\xC7\xE1\x84"
      49                                # bytes(9)
         737461747574617279             # "statutary"
]]></sourcecode>
      </figure>
      <section anchor="classic-tstinfo">
        <name>RFC 3161 TSTInfo</name>
        <t>As a reference for the definition of TST-info-based-on-CBOR-time-tag the code block below depicts the original layout of the TSTInfo structure from <xref target="RFC3161"/>.</t>
        <sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[
TSTInfo ::= SEQUENCE  {
   version                      INTEGER  { v1(1) },
   policy                       TSAPolicyId,
   messageImprint               MessageImprint,
     -- MUST have the same value as the similar field in
     -- TimeStampReq
   serialNumber                 INTEGER,
    -- Time-Stamping users MUST be ready to accommodate integers
    -- up to 160 bits.
   genTime                      GeneralizedTime,
   accuracy                     Accuracy                 OPTIONAL,
   ordering                     BOOLEAN             DEFAULT FALSE,
   nonce                        INTEGER                  OPTIONAL,
     -- MUST be present if the similar field was present
     -- in TimeStampReq.  In that case it MUST have the same value.
   tsa                          [0] GeneralName          OPTIONAL,
   extensions                   [1] IMPLICIT Extensions   OPTIONAL  }
]]></sourcecode>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgements">
      <name>Acknowledgements</name>
      <t>The authors would like to thank
Carl Wallace,
Jeremy O'Donoghue,
Jun Zhang,
and Antoine Fressancourt
for their reviews, suggestions and comments.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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