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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-rats-geographic-results-01" category="std" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="geoAR">Geographic Attestation Results</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-rats-geographic-results-01"/>
    <author initials="M." surname="Richardson" fullname="Michael Richardson">
      <organization>Sandelman Software Works</organization>
      <address>
        <email>mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="S." surname="Nikolaichuk" fullname="Serhii Nikolaichuk">
      <organization>The Capital Index LLC</organization>
      <address>
        <email>nikolaichuk.s.f@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2026" month="November" day="16"/>
    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>Remote ATtestation ProcedureS</workgroup>
    <keyword>geofence</keyword>
    <keyword>workload</keyword>
    <keyword>sovereign computing</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 94?>

<t>Many workloads have limitations on what geography they are allowed to operate in.
This is often due to a regulation that requires that the computation occur in a particular jurisdiction.</t>
      <t>There are many mechanisms by which Evidence of location may be created and then evaluated by a Verifier.
No matter which mechanism is appropriate for a given situation, the result of the Verification can be expressed in a similarly defined EAT Attestation Result.</t>
      <t>This document is about encoding a variety of geographical conclusions in an Attestation Result.
In addition, one mechanism of directly creating a geographic result in the form of an Endorsement is described in an appendix.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-rats-geographic-results/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        Remote ATtestation ProcedureS Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:rats@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/rats/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rats/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/ietf-rats-wg/geographicresult"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 105?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>Resolving the question of where certain computations are done can be critical to assessing how much trust to put into the result.</t>
      <!-- MORE USE CASES HERE. -->

<t><xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-ear"/> provides a framework that allows an <xref target="RFC9334"/> Verifier to return a conclusion as to geographic region for a Target Environment.</t>
      <t><xref target="fig-dataflow"/> places the geographic result in the data flow of <xref target="RFC9334"/>: the Verifier appraises Evidence or Endorsements about location by a method outside this document and returns one format to the Relying Party.</t>
      <figure anchor="fig-dataflow">
        <name>Geographic Attestation Result in the RATS data flow</name>
        <artset>
          <artwork type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1" height="272" width="560" viewBox="0 0 560 272" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round">
              <path d="M 8,48 L 8,80" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 8,112 L 8,144" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 96,48 L 96,80" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 96,112 L 96,144" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
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              <path d="M 312,64 L 312,104" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 376,112 L 376,208" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 424,112 L 424,208" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 488,80 L 488,104" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 552,112 L 552,208" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
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              <path d="M 248,208 L 376,208" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 424,208 L 552,208" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <polygon class="arrowhead" points="496,104 484,98.4 484,109.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(90,488,104)"/>
              <polygon class="arrowhead" points="424,160 412,154.4 412,165.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,416,160)"/>
              <polygon class="arrowhead" points="320,104 308,98.4 308,109.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(90,312,104)"/>
              <polygon class="arrowhead" points="248,128 236,122.4 236,133.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,240,128)"/>
              <g class="text">
                <text x="200" y="36">Endorsement</text>
                <text x="272" y="36">about</text>
                <text x="332" y="36">location</text>
                <text x="464" y="36">Appraisal</text>
                <text x="532" y="36">Policy</text>
                <text x="168" y="52">(an</text>
                <text x="220" y="52">auditor,</text>
                <text x="292" y="52">Appendix</text>
                <text x="340" y="52">A)</text>
                <text x="440" y="52">for</text>
                <text x="504" y="52">Attestation</text>
                <text x="52" y="68">Endorser</text>
                <text x="456" y="68">Results</text>
                <text x="148" y="116">Evidence</text>
                <text x="196" y="116">of</text>
                <text x="52" y="132">Attester</text>
                <text x="308" y="132">Verifier</text>
                <text x="464" y="132">Relying</text>
                <text x="520" y="132">Party</text>
                <text x="152" y="148">location:</text>
                <text x="296" y="148">appraises</text>
                <text x="348" y="148">by</text>
                <text x="404" y="148">AR</text>
                <text x="456" y="148">reads</text>
                <text x="496" y="148">one</text>
                <text x="136" y="164">GNSS,</text>
                <text x="180" y="164">PTP,</text>
                <text x="264" y="164">a</text>
                <text x="300" y="164">method</text>
                <text x="348" y="164">this</text>
                <text x="464" y="164">format,</text>
                <text x="136" y="180">TRIP,</text>
                <text x="184" y="180">V-PEA</text>
                <text x="292" y="180">document</text>
                <text x="348" y="180">does</text>
                <text x="468" y="180">whatever</text>
                <text x="520" y="180">the</text>
                <text x="272" y="196">not</text>
                <text x="316" y="196">define</text>
                <text x="460" y="196">method</text>
                <text x="12" y="244">AR</text>
                <text x="32" y="244">=</text>
                <text x="88" y="244">Attestation</text>
                <text x="164" y="244">Result</text>
                <text x="228" y="244">carrying</text>
                <text x="368" y="244">geographic-result-claims:</text>
                <text x="56" y="260">the</text>
                <text x="124" y="260">jurisdiction</text>
                <text x="208" y="260">claims,</text>
                <text x="284" y="260">claim-uuid</text>
                <text x="344" y="260">and</text>
                <text x="384" y="260">basis</text>
              </g>
            </svg>
          </artwork>
          <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
                   Endorsement about location        Appraisal Policy
.----------.       (an auditor, Appendix A)          for Attestation
| Endorser +--------------------------.              Results
'----------'                          |                     |
                                      v                     v
.----------.  Evidence of     .---------------.     .---------------.
| Attester +----------------->|   Verifier    |     | Relying Party |
'----------'  location:       | appraises by  |  AR | reads one     |
              GNSS, PTP,      | a method this +---->| format,       |
              TRIP, V-PEA     | document does |     | whatever the  |
                              | not define    |     | method        |
                              '---------------'     '---------------'

AR = Attestation Result carrying geographic-result-claims:
     the jurisdiction claims, claim-uuid and basis
]]></artwork>
        </artset>
      </figure>
      <t>While <xref section="4.2.10" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC9711"/> provides a very good WGS84 based location claim, often very suitable as Evidence, it is not ideal for the use by Relying Parties.</t>
      <t>There are a few reasons:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>
          <t>the latitude and longitude describe a location on the Earth. The Relying Party is seldom interested in that level of detail.  It needs to know if it's in an acceptable place.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>the geographic position can leak significant amount of private information that is not necessary for the Relying Party to know.   Information not collected/stored can not be inadvertently disclosed.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>for many activities, it is the Legal Jurisdiction that matters, not the actual location.
Jurisdictions often do not have well defined concentric boundaries.
For instance, the South Korean Consulate in Los Angeles is usually for Legal purposes, in Korea.
Yet, only a few meters away, possibly below the level of WGS84 accuracy, the jurisdiction would be different.</t>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>This document offers a new set of structured abstract claims that provides an evaluated view of where a Target Environment is.
The mechanism to do this appraisal may depend upon a number of factors which may be related to physical geographic position, but also include other considerations.</t>
      <t>There are many different ways in which a Verifier might generate this result from Evidence and/or Endorsements that are provided to it.
The exact method can be important for a small number of uses, but more often, if the Verifier is trusted, then the details are not important.
The exact method may be of interest only during forensic audits.
This document does <em>not</em> standardize any mechanism for a Verifier to appraise location data.</t>
      <t>The most obvious way is through various Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS): the United States Global Positioning System (GPS), Russia's Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), China's BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS) and the European Union's Galileo.
These signals can be spoofed, manipulated and suppressed, however that does not render these signals useless, just that the level of trust must be carefully evaluated.
There are also many environments, such as inside a (Faraday) cage in a Data Center, where GNSS signals do not reach.</t>
      <t>There are also other radio methods, such as time of travel calculations from a mobile (LTE) tower.</t>
      <t><xref target="I-D.lkspa-rats-verifiable-geo-fence"/> provides a more general architecture for such evaluations.</t>
      <t>As an example of another method, described in <xref target="I-D.ramki-ptp-hardware-rooted-attestation"/>,  there could be Evidence that a Target Environment is less than 1ns (as light travels in a fiber optic cable) away from another Target Environment whose location is known.
Given a typical fiber optic cable has a speed of 200,000 kilometers per second (slower than light in a vacuum due to the index of refraction of the glass involved), so if the round trip time between environments is 1ns, then the distance between Target Environments can be appraised to be within 1m of each other.</t>
      <t>Whether or not any of these methods are a good enough measure of location is not the subject of this document.
Rather, if a Verifier believes that information trustworthy for the purpose intended, then it may use the format described here to document its conclusion.</t>
      <t>In addition to detailing the Attestation Result (EAR) format for the results, this document also addresses the case of an Endorsement created as to a device's location.
<xref target="presence"/> details a process by which this Endorsement could be generated by a human auditor equipped with a smartphone, tablet, or dedicated auditing device.
<xref target="presence"/> is not a normative part of the Attestation Result defined below, but it is considered a normative process defined by this document.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conventions-and-definitions">
      <name>Conventions and Definitions</name>
      <t>The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
"<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      <?line -18?>

</section>
    <section anchor="claim-definition">
      <name>Claim definition</name>
      <t>This claim definition goes into the EAR submods map.
Mumble mumble. AR4SI + $ear CDDL TBD.</t>
      <t>Geographic Results can contain one or more of the following claims.</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>jurisdiction-country = ISO3166 country code.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>jurisdiction-country-exclave = boolean</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>jurisdiction-subdivision   = ISO3166-2 subdivision code (country-specific)</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>jurisdiction-subdivision-exclave = boolean</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>jurisdiction-city    = subdivision-specific list (not standardized)</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>jurisdiction-city-exclave = state-specific-list</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>enclosing-exclave-country = ISO3166 country code</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>near-to = another entity+distance</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>rack-U-number = ordinal, numbered from bottom RU as 1.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>cabinet-number = ordinal, DC specific ordering, might ignore hallway, room and floor</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>hallway-number = ordinal</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>room-number = string</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>floor-number = string, usually representing an integer.</t>
        </li>
        <li>
          <t>zone-membership = membership in an operator-defined zone.</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>There are some additional things which may be received as Evidence, but which is sometimes important to convert to  Results,  having verified some aspects. (TBD)</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
          <t>range-to-tower = designation of tower, distance-readings</t>
        </li>
      </ol>
      <t>(NOTE: There are apparently exclaves that are inside other countries' exclaves, like Nahwa. It is unclear if exclave information is even relevant, or if second order matters at all)</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="cddl-definition">
      <name>CDDL Definition</name>
      <artwork><![CDATA[
; # import rfc9711 as eat
; # import rfcXXXX as corim

$$ear-appraisal-extension //= (
    ear.geographic-result-label => geographic-result-claims
)

geographic-result-claims = non-empty<{
  ? grc.claim-uuid-label => grc.claim-uuid
  ? grc.basis-label => grc.basis-class
  ? grc.basis-ref-label => corim.uuid-type
  ? grc.provence   => grc.provence-values
  ? grc.observed-from-label => time
  ? grc.observed-until-label => time
  ? grc.jurisdiction-country-label => iso-3166-alpha-2-country-code
  ? grc.jurisdiction-country-exclave-label => bool
  ? grc.jurisdiction-subdivision-label => tstr .size (2..16)
  ? grc.jurisdiction-subdivision-exclave-label => bool
  ? grc.jurisdiction-city-label => tstr .size(2..16)
  ? grc.jurisdiction-city-exclave-label => bool
  ? grc.enclosing-exclave-country-label => iso-3166-alpha-2-country-code
  ? grc.near-to-label => corim.uuid-type
  ? grc.rack-U-number-label => uint .gt 0
  ? grc.cabinet-number => uint .gt 0
  ? grc.hallway-number => uint
  ? grc.room-number => tstr .size (2..64)
  ? grc.floor-number => int
  ? grc.zone-membership-label => grc.zone-membership
}>

ear.geographic-result-label = eat.JC<"TBD02", TBD01>

grc.jurisdiction-country-label = eat.JC<"grc.jurisdiction-country", 0>
grc.jurisdiction-country-exclave-label =
        eat.JC<"grc.jurisdiction-country-exclave", 1>
grc.jurisdiction-subdivision-label = eat.JC<"grc.jurisdiction-state", 2>
grc.jurisdiction-subdivision-exclave-label =
        eat.JC<"grc.jurisdiction-subdivision-exclave", 3>
grc.jurisdiction-city-label = eat.JC<"grc.jurisdiction-city", 4>
grc.jurisdiction-city-exclave-label =
        eat.JC<"grc.jurisdiction-city-exclave", 5>
grc.enclosing-exclave-country-label =
        eat.JC<"grc.enclosing-exclave-country", 6>
grc.near-to-label  = eat.JC<"grc.near-to", 7>
grc.rack-U-number-label = eat.JC<"grc.rack-U-number", 8>
grc.cabinet-number = eat.JC<"grc.cabinet-number", 9>
grc.hallway-number = eat.JC<"grc.hallway-number", 10>
grc.room-number = eat.JC<"grc.room-number", 12>
grc.floor-number = eat.JC<"grc.floor-number", 11>

grc.claim-uuid-label = eat.JC<"grc.claim-uuid", 13>
grc.claim-uuid = corim.uuid-type

grc.basis-label = eat.JC<"grc.basis", 14>
; the class of artifact a geographic result
;     rests on (RFC 9334, Section 4.2)
grc.basis-class = &(
  evidence: 0,
  endorsement: 1,
  attestation-result: 2,
)

grc.provence = eat.JC<"grc.provence", 15>
grc.provence-values = tstr / uint

grc.basis-ref-label = eat.JC<"grc.basis-ref", 16>
grc.observed-from-label = eat.JC<"grc.observed-from", 17>
grc.observed-until-label = eat.JC<"grc.observed-until", 18>

grc.zone-membership-label = eat.JC<"grc.zone-membership", 19>
grc.zone-membership = [
  zone-id: tstr .size (1..255),
  boundary-digest: eat.JC<grc.zone-digest-json, grc.zone-digest-cbor>
]
grc.zone-digest-json = eat.base64-url-text .size 43
grc.zone-digest-cbor = bstr .size 32

iso-3166-alpha-2-country-code = tstr .size 2
]]></artwork>
      <t>There are a number of different fields in this claim, and all of them are marked optional.
But, at least some result <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be provided.
Which one will be needed is subject to the target usage and the needs of the Relying Party.</t>
      <t>The <tt>claim-uuid</tt> field allows this claim/endorsement to be labelled, which can be used in the <tt>near-to-label</tt> attribute of another claim.</t>
      <t>The <tt>basis</tt> field names the class of artifact the geographic result rests on, using the three artifact classes of <xref target="RFC9334"/>, Section 4.2: the result was computed from Evidence, it was accepted from an Endorsement, or it is an Attestation Result produced by another Verifier.
It does not name the method.
Which sensor, protocol or audit produced a location is a separate question, answered by a provenance value when a standardized method exists; the class can always be populated, a method only sometimes.
A Verifier producing a geographic result <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include <tt>basis</tt>.</t>
      <t>When a geographic result is intended to be consumed as an Endorsement by another Verifier, it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> carry <tt>claim-uuid</tt>.
The consuming Verifier's own result then names the class of what it consumed (<tt>endorsement</tt>), and the original class remains reachable one hop away through the uuid.
A Relying Party that does not need the distinction stops at the first class it sees; an auditor follows the uuid.
Nothing about the method travels on the wire unless it is asked for.</t>
      <t>The <tt>basis-ref</tt> field carries the <tt>claim-uuid</tt> of the geographic result this one rests on.
When <tt>basis</tt> is <tt>attestation-result</tt> and the result consumed carried a <tt>claim-uuid</tt>, the consuming Verifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include <tt>basis-ref</tt>; without it the class is a dead end for an auditor, who can see that the result rests on another Verifier's conclusion but cannot reach it.
A Relying Party whose appraisal policy accepts only results that bottom out in Evidence or an Endorsement follows <tt>basis-ref</tt> hop by hop; one whose policy trusts the signing Verifier stops at the first result.
<tt>basis-ref</tt> differs from <tt>near-to</tt>: <tt>near-to</tt> says the result is spatially close to another result, <tt>basis-ref</tt> says the result was derived from it.</t>
      <t>The <tt>observed-from</tt> and <tt>observed-until</tt> fields carry the interval over which the observations behind the result were made.
A conclusion drawn from Evidence collected over time, such as a trajectory of quantised positions, is a statement about a period rather than an instant, and the EAR's issue time does not convey that period.
A Verifier deriving a geographic result from longitudinal Evidence <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include both fields; a Verifier consuming such a result and deriving its own from it <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> carry them forward unchanged.</t>
      <t>Two results carrying identical jurisdiction claims may rest on different classes.
<xref target="examples"/> shows two such results produced by the same Verifier from public cloud attestation artifacts.</t>
      <t>The explicitly geographic based jurisdiction fields are arranged in a hierarchy of values.
The outermost values are <bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14> when any inner value is also present.
This includes the claims: country, subdivision, and city, or the equivalent exclave claims (country-exclave, subdivision-exclave, and city-exclave).</t>
      <t>Note that the ISO 3166 term for a part of a country is called a "subdivision".
This should be understood to mean "state" (e.g., in the USA, Australia), "province" and "territory" (e.g., Canada, France).
There are no IANA maintained values for "subdivision", but the ISO 3166-2 has codes for many subdivisions, which can be seen in the ISO's Online Browsing Platform <xref target="obp"/>.</t>
      <t>In general, subdivision lists are maintained by countries.
It is usually the case that city lists are maintained by subdivisions, and there are no lists of these in any hierarchical databases, such as the ISO might maintain for countries.
It is therefore not unusual for there to be a Paris, Texas, USA, and a Paris, France, and a London, Ontario, Canada, as well as a London, England, UK.
Equally, there are many cities called Springfield in different states of the USA.</t>
      <t>Exclaves can exist at all levels: one part of a city might be within another city, but both are in the same country and subdivision.</t>
      <t>Even when in an exclave, it is acceptable for a Verifier to only return the non-exclave version, hiding that an exclave is involved.
In that case, the Relying Party will receive the country, subdivision and city of where the computation is.</t>
      <t>In general, only one of (country, country-exclave), (subdivision, subdivision-exclave), and (city, city-exclave) will be present.
When the exclave versions are present, if the Relying Party needs to indicate where the exclave is located, it may use the enclosing-exclave-country label.</t>
      <t>The near-to-label is an arbitrary relative reference, and it refers to some other claim that the Relying Party is assumed to already know about.
It is a uuid value, and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> refer to another claim by its <tt>claim-uuid</tt>.
The definition of "near" is up to the Verifier, but in general, it is expected that it is close enough that it is in the same jurisdiction as the other entity.</t>
      <t>The series of claims, Data-Center, Floor-Number, Room-Number, Hallway-Number, Cabinet-Number and Rack-U-Number form a partial hierarchy designed to identify where a piece of equipment is.
This set of claims is more useful when a location Endorsement is created by an auditor, such as through the process described in <xref target="presence"/>.</t>
      <t>Not all data centers are numbered in the same way.
For some, the Room-Number implies the Floor-Number.
For others, the Hallway-Number implies both room and floor, and for still others, the Cabinet-Number is unique per building.</t>
      <t>Rack-U numbers refer to the system within a cabinet, with the bottommost position labelled as 1.  This accommodates cabinets of varying heights and capacities.</t>
      <t>Without <tt>basis</tt>, a Relying Party has no way to tell a hardware-rooted
result from an operator-typed label, even though both may appear in the
same claims map above.</t>
      <section anchor="zone-membership">
        <name>Zone Membership</name>
        <t>The optional <tt>grc.zone-membership</tt> claim asserts that the Verifier established
that the Target Environment was inside the identified zone. Omission conveys
no conclusion about membership. A zone can be defined by a geographic
boundary, such as a polygon, or by a set of physical placements, such as rooms
or cabinets. The claim can appear alone or alongside the placement and
jurisdiction claims. For example, a Verifier could report membership in an
approved zone spanning several rooms and also report the cabinet number.</t>
        <t>The <tt>zone-id</tt> is assigned by the operator and interpreted in a namespace known
to the Verifier and Relying Party. The <tt>boundary-digest</tt> is the SHA-256 digest
<xref target="FIPS180-4"/> of the exact octets of the zone definition used for appraisal.
The zone definition's format and encoding are agreed out of band. The digest
is a byte string in CBOR and unpadded base64url text in JSON. A Relying Party
using the claim for a policy decision <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> match both the identifier and the
digest to the expected values in its appraisal policy. Any jurisdiction claim
requires its own appraisal.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>These considerations do not cover the protocol described in <xref target="presence"/>.</t>
      <t>This document describes attributes that would go into an EAT format Attestation Result (EAR).
This is an artifact that is communicated from a Verifier to a Relying Party.
The threat model for this artifact is governed by a typical "CIA" list: Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability.</t>
      <section anchor="confidentiality-threats">
        <name>Confidentiality Threats</name>
        <t>This artifact contains abstracted information about a location.
The location could include where a person operating the computation is, such as if this describes the location of a person's smartphone, in which case the location, even abstracted would be PII.
It is almost always preferable for this artifact to remain private, however the integrity of the artifact is not compromised if that is not the case.</t>
        <t>When precise coordinates should be withheld from the Verifier, the Attester
can supply Evidence containing or referencing a zero-knowledge membership
proof, as in the V-PEA <tt>privacy-technique = "zkp"</tt> mode
<xref target="I-D.lkspa-rats-verifiable-geo-fence"/>. The Verifier can appraise the
proof without collecting the coordinates and report only membership in
the zone definition used to verify the proof. Zone identifiers, boundary
digests, and accompanying placement claims can still reveal location.
Verifiers <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> disclose only the geographic detail the Relying Party needs.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="integrity-threats">
        <name>Integrity Threats</name>
        <t>The most important threat is that claims could be corrupted or intentionally changed as they are transferred from Verifier to Relying Party.
EAR are signed objects, and the signature from the Verifier maintains the integrity of that object.
The claims present in this document will most often be combined with other claims in the same artifact.</t>
        <t>When an EAT format Endorsement is created by an auditor, the auditor signs the artifact.
The Endorsement may be provided to a Verifier through out of band means, or it can be stored by the Attesting Environment, and carried through another protocol from Attester to Verifier.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="relayed-results">
        <name>Relayed Results</name>
        <t>A geographic Attestation Result states where the Attester's platform was found to be, not where the Relying Party's peer is.
An Attester elsewhere can present a genuine Result that a platform in the attested place obtained, and nothing in the Result itself shows the substitution.</t>
        <figure anchor="fig-relay">
          <name>A relayed Result, and the binding that defeats it</name>
          <artset>
            <artwork type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1" height="208" width="560" viewBox="0 0 560 208" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round">
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                <path d="M 112,48 L 112,80" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
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                <path d="M 304,64 L 376,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 8,80 L 112,80" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 216,80 L 304,80" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
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                <path d="M 376,160 L 504,160" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 376,192 L 504,192" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <polygon class="arrowhead" points="440,152 428,146.4 428,157.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(90,432,152)"/>
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                <g class="text">
                  <text x="36" y="36">in</text>
                  <text x="72" y="36">place</text>
                  <text x="104" y="36">P</text>
                  <text x="424" y="36">elsewhere</text>
                  <text x="164" y="52">Evidence</text>
                  <text x="332" y="52">AR</text>
                  <text x="52" y="68">Attester</text>
                  <text x="96" y="68">X</text>
                  <text x="260" y="68">Verifier</text>
                  <text x="428" y="68">Attester</text>
                  <text x="472" y="68">Y</text>
                  <text x="152" y="84">bound</text>
                  <text x="188" y="84">to</text>
                  <text x="336" y="84">for</text>
                  <text x="360" y="84">P</text>
                  <text x="160" y="100">session</text>
                  <text x="200" y="100">S</text>
                  <text x="476" y="100">presents</text>
                  <text x="528" y="100">the</text>
                  <text x="472" y="116">genuine</text>
                  <text x="516" y="116">AR</text>
                  <text x="540" y="116">in</text>
                  <text x="456" y="132">its</text>
                  <text x="504" y="132">session</text>
                  <text x="548" y="132">S'</text>
                  <text x="416" y="180">Relying</text>
                  <text x="472" y="180">Party</text>
                </g>
              </svg>
            </artwork>
            <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
   in place P                                   elsewhere
.------------.  Evidence  .----------.  AR     .------------.
| Attester X +----------->| Verifier +-------->| Attester Y |
'------------'  bound to  '----------'  for P  '-----+------'
                session S                            | presents the
                                                     | genuine AR in
                                                     | its session S'
                                                     v
                                              .---------------.
                                              | Relying Party |
                                              '---------------'
]]></artwork>
          </artset>
        </figure>
        <t>A Relying Party that uses a geographic Result to make a decision about its peer therefore needs the Result to be associated with the peer endpoint and with the connection in which it is used, and to be fresh for that exchange.
<xref section="5" sectionFormat="of" target="I-D.ietf-seat-use-cases"/> gives the requirements on an attested secure channel that provide this, in particular those on endpoint association and on freshness, and they apply whether the Attester conveys Evidence or an Attestation Result.
A Verifier that supports this use <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> carry the binding established in the Evidence into the Result.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="masked-platform-identities">
        <name>Masked Platform Identities</name>
        <t>Some platforms hide the hardware identity from the guest by policy.
Under AMD SEV-SNP the host may set MaskChipId, in which case CHIP_ID is zero in every guest report, and may disable the per-chip key for a guest (VCEK_DIS), in which case the report is signed by a key that every machine the provider enrolled in one key domain shares <xref target="SNP-ABI"/>.
The two are independent choices of the host and neither is visible in the report except by its effect: a report can carry the per-chip signature with a zero CHIP_ID, and then only a party that learns the chip identity from the host side can obtain the certificate that verifies it, so the certificate is itself a statement by the operator.
The two key domains also tell a Verifier different things: the shared key is issued by the manufacturer to an enrolled provider and wrapped to each chip (<xref target="SNP-ABI"/>, Section 3.7), so a report under it shows which provider's fleet the chip was enrolled in without naming the chip, while the per-chip key names the chip without the provider.
A zeroed or shared identity is an input to appraisal policy, not an error.
It means that the Verifier's location conclusion cannot rest on the identity of the chip, and therefore rests on a statement by the provider or on another Verifier's Result; the provenance information in this document exists so that the Relying Party can see which.
A Relying Party whose policy requires a per-machine identity <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> treat such a Result as resting on the provider.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="basis-of-a-result">
        <name>Basis of a Result</name>
        <t>A signed Attestation Result whose location was taken from an unsigned operator label carries exactly the same integrity protection as one derived from Evidence.
The signature says who produced the result; it says nothing about what the result rests on.
Without <tt>basis</tt>, a Relying Party cannot separate "this Verifier is trusted" from "this Verifier had something to work with", and those are different questions with different consequences when a regulator asks the second one.
The <tt>basis</tt> class discloses no more than which of the three artifact classes was involved: it names neither a receiver, nor an endorser, nor a method, and therefore leaks less than the region string already present in the certificate chains of some attestation formats.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="availability-threats">
        <name>Availability Threats</name>
        <t>This artifact is the result of a calculation or audit that establishes a result.
Once created, it can be valid for a period of time from seconds (GNSS result on a smartphone) to months (human audit of a data center).</t>
        <t>Disruptions to the mechanism of location calculation do not make the result of the previous calculation invalid.
However, it is possible that such an attack could make subsequent calculations infeasible.  For instance, the GNSS signals can easily be jammed.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>IANA is asked to allocate TBD01 from the "CBOR Web Token Claims" registry <xref target="IANA.cwt"/> (from a Specification Required Integer range), and TBD02 (suggestion: "ear.geographic-result-claims") from the "JSON Web Token Claims" registry <xref target="IANA.jwt"/>.</t>
      <section anchor="provenance-values">
        <name>Provenance Values</name>
        <t>IANA is asked to create a new registry, "Geographic Results Provenance Values".
This registry contains the following columns:</t>
        <ul spacing="normal">
          <li>
            <t>a string/label of up to 12 characters</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>one unsigned integer.</t>
          </li>
          <li>
            <t>a reference to the RFC</t>
          </li>
        </ul>
        <t>New values may be added by RFC Required.
The string <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be the name of the RFC in the form "RFC123456" (for an RFC of that number) and the integer <bcp14>SHALL</bcp14> be the number 123456.</t>
        <t>Note that only documents that actually standardize ways to calculate geographic results, are to be included.
Implementers <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> use a string of the form "I-D.something" for both JSON and CBOR
encoded results as Private Use values prior to publication of an RFC.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC9711">
          <front>
            <title>The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)</title>
            <author fullname="L. Lundblade" initials="L." surname="Lundblade"/>
            <author fullname="G. Mandyam" initials="G." surname="Mandyam"/>
            <author fullname="J. O'Donoghue" initials="J." surname="O'Donoghue"/>
            <author fullname="C. Wallace" initials="C." surname="Wallace"/>
            <date month="April" year="2025"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>An Entity Attestation Token (EAT) provides an attested claims set that describes the state and characteristics of an entity, a device such as a smartphone, an Internet of Things (IoT) device, network equipment, or such. This claims set is used by a relying party, server, or service to determine the type and degree of trust placed in the entity.</t>
              <t>An EAT is either a CBOR Web Token (CWT) or a JSON Web Token (JWT) with attestation-oriented claims.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9711"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9711"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-rats-ear">
          <front>
            <title>EAT Attestation Results</title>
            <author fullname="Thomas Fossati" initials="T." surname="Fossati">
              <organization>NVIDIA</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Eric Voit" initials="E." surname="Voit">
              <organization>Cisco</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Sergei Trofimov" initials="S." surname="Trofimov">
              <organization>Arm Limited</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Henk Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz">
              <organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines the EAT Attestation Result (EAR) message
   format.

   EAR is used by a verifier to encode the result of the appraisal over
   an attester's evidence.  It embeds an AR4SI's "trustworthiness
   vector" to present a normalized view of the evaluation results, thus
   easing the task of defining and computing authorization policies by
   relying parties.  Alongside the trustworthiness vector, EAR provides
   contextual information bound to the appraisal process.  This allows a
   relying party (or an auditor) to reconstruct the frame of reference
   in which the trustworthiness vector was originally computed.  EAR
   supports simple devices with one attester as well as composite
   devices that are made of multiple attesters, allowing the state of
   each attester to be separately examined.  EAR can also accommodate
   registered and unregistered extensions.  It can be serialized and
   protected using either CWT or JWT.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-rats-ear-05"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9334">
          <front>
            <title>Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture</title>
            <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
            <author fullname="D. Thaler" initials="D." surname="Thaler"/>
            <author fullname="M. Richardson" initials="M." surname="Richardson"/>
            <author fullname="N. Smith" initials="N." surname="Smith"/>
            <author fullname="W. Pan" initials="W." surname="Pan"/>
            <date month="January" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In network protocol exchanges, it is often useful for one end of a communication to know whether the other end is in an intended operating state. This document provides an architectural overview of the entities involved that make such tests possible through the process of generating, conveying, and evaluating evidentiary Claims. It provides a model that is neutral toward processor architectures, the content of Claims, and protocols.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9334"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9334"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="FIPS180-4" target="https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4">
          <front>
            <title>Secure Hash Standard (SHS)</title>
            <author>
              <organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2015" month="August"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-rats-endorsements">
          <front>
            <title>Remote Attestation Procedures (RATS) Endorsements</title>
            <author fullname="Dave Thaler" initials="D." surname="Thaler">
              <organization>Armidale Consulting</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Henk Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz">
              <organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Thomas Fossati" initials="T." surname="Fossati">
              <organization>NVIDIA</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="14" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   In the IETF Remote Attestation Procedures (RATS) architecture (RFC
   9334), a Verifier accepts Evidence and uses Appraisal Policy for
   Evidence, typically with additional input from Endorsements and
   Reference Values, to generate Attestation Results in formats that are
   useful for Relying Parties.  This document illustrates the purpose
   and role of Endorsements and discusses some considerations in the
   choice of message format for Endorsements in the scope of the RATS
   architecture.

   This document does not aim to define a conceptual message format for
   Endorsements and Reference Values.  Instead, it updates RFC 9334 by
   refining the description of Endorsements and Reference Values.
   Specifically, this document classifies the RATS conceptual messages
   as actual state, reference state, or appraisal policy, and adds
   considerations on conditionally endorsed values, endorsing
   verification keys, timeliness, and multiple Endorsements.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-rats-endorsements-13"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7468">
          <front>
            <title>Textual Encodings of PKIX, PKCS, and CMS Structures</title>
            <author fullname="S. Josefsson" initials="S." surname="Josefsson"/>
            <author fullname="S. Leonard" initials="S." surname="Leonard"/>
            <date month="April" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes and discusses the textual encodings of the Public-Key Infrastructure X.509 (PKIX), Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS), and Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). The textual encodings are well-known, are implemented by several applications and libraries, and are widely deployed. This document articulates the de facto rules by which existing implementations operate and defines them so that future implementations can interoperate.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7468"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7468"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-seat-use-cases">
          <front>
            <title>Security Goals and Use Cases for Integrating Remote Attestation with Secure Channel Protocols</title>
            <author fullname="Ionuț Mihalcea" initials="I." surname="Mihalcea">
              <organization>Arm</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="2" month="November" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document describes use cases for integrating remote attestation
   (RA) with secure channel protocols, initially TLS and DTLS.  Peer
   authentication establishes a peer's identity; RA supplies Evidence
   for appraisal of its state.  The document identifies protected
   decisions and required assurance, describes the attacks and failure
   modes that threaten them, and derives properties to guide protocol
   designs in the SEAT working group.  These properties address
   association of attested state with a peer and connection, freshness,
   re-evaluation, negotiation, and disclosure of attestation material.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-seat-use-cases-02"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9360">
          <front>
            <title>CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Header Parameters for Carrying and Referencing X.509 Certificates</title>
            <author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/>
            <date month="February" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) message structure uses references to keys in general. For some algorithms, additional properties are defined that carry parameters relating to keys as needed. The COSE Key structure is used for transporting keys outside of COSE messages. This document extends the way that keys can be identified and transported by providing attributes that refer to or contain X.509 certificates.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9360"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9360"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="SNP-ABI" target="https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/developer/56860.pdf">
          <front>
            <title>SEV Secure Nested Paging Firmware ABI Specification, Revision 1.58</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Advanced Micro Devices</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2025" month="May"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="IDevID" target="https://1.ieee802.org/security/802-1ar/">
          <front>
            <title>IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier</title>
            <author>
              <organization>IEEE Standard</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2018"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="LLDP" target="https://www.ieee802.org/1/pages/802.1AB-rev.html">
          <front>
            <title>802.1AB-REV - Station and Media Access Control Connectivity Discovery</title>
            <author>
              <organization>IEEE Standard</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2009" month="June" day="19"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="rollover" target="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rollover_cable">
          <front>
            <title>Console Rollover Cable</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Wikipedia</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2025" month="April" day="26"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="IANA.cwt" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt">
          <front>
            <title>CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims</title>
            <author>
              <organization>IANA</organization>
            </author>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="IANA.jwt" target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt">
          <front>
            <title>JSON Web Token (JWT)</title>
            <author>
              <organization>IANA</organization>
            </author>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="speed" target="https://www.genuinemodules.com/how-fast-does-fiber-optics-travel_a6553">
          <front>
            <title>How fast does fiber optics travel?</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Genuine Modules</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2025" month="October" day="07"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ptp" target="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Precision_Time_Protocol">
          <front>
            <title>Precision Time Protocol</title>
            <author>
              <organization>Wikipedia</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2025" month="October" day="07"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="obp" target="https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#search">
          <front>
            <title>ISO Online Browsing Platform</title>
            <author>
              <organization>International Organization for Standardization</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2026" month="March" day="01"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.lkspa-rats-verifiable-geo-fence">
          <front>
            <title>Verifiable Proof of Environment Attestation Profile</title>
            <author fullname="Ramki Krishnan" initials="R." surname="Krishnan">
              <organization>JPMorgan Chase &amp; Co.</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Ned Smith" initials="N." surname="Smith">
              <organization>Independent</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Diego Lopez" initials="D." surname="Lopez">
              <organization>Telefonica</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="A Prasad" initials="A." surname="Prasad">
              <organization>Oracle</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Srinivasa Addepalli" initials="S." surname="Addepalli">
              <organization>Aryaka</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Henk Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz">
              <organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="31" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   Operators of regulated, sovereign, and high-assurance deployments
   require hardware-rooted, machine-verifiable proof that a workload
   executes in its approved environment.  Current remote attestation
   mechanisms address two relevant properties in isolation: platform
   integrity — that the hardware and software stack are in an approved,
   untampered state — and physical residency — that the hardware resides
   within an approved geographic boundary.  Neither property alone is
   sufficient: integrity without residency permits a valid platform to
   operate outside approved boundaries; residency without integrity
   permits a compromised platform to claim valid placement.

   This document defines the *Verifiable Proof of Environment
   Attestation Profile (V-PEA)*, a profile of the RATS Architecture (RFC
   9334) in which a platform binds location Claims to its own integrity
   Evidence in a single TPM-sealed Evidence structure (lah-bundle).
   V-PEA does not generate location Claims: they are produced by
   location sources, such as GNSS receivers, mobile network operators,
   or timing-based anchors, and V-PEA binds them to the particular
   platform that will receive a credential or key.  V-PEA defines two
   Evidence dimensions: *WHAT* — hardware provenance (TPM Attestation
   Key registered and manufacturer-endorsed), platform integrity
   (firmware and OS state matching reference values), and workload agent
   software integrity (binary digest matching an approved value); and
   *WHERE* — physical residency within an approved geographic boundary,
   as reported by one or more location sources.  A TPM quote seal binds
   WHAT and WHERE into a single unforgeable statement: neither dimension
   can be forged or transplanted without invalidating the other.

   For the WHERE dimension, V-PEA supports Transparent Zero-Knowledge
   Proofs (ZKPs), enabling an Attester to prove geographic compliance
   without disclosing precise coordinates.  A positive V-PEA Attestation
   Result enables a Relying Party to issue hardware-rooted credentials
   or authorize operations — combining verified execution environment
   (WHAT) with verified physical placement (WHERE) — before releasing
   sensitive assets or granting access.  Integration with workload
   identity systems is described in the WIMSE Integration appendix.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-lkspa-rats-verifiable-geo-fence-04"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ramki-ptp-hardware-rooted-attestation">
          <front>
            <title>Hardware-Rooted Attestation for Precision Time Protocol: Scalable Workload Identity and Phased PQC Readiness</title>
            <author fullname="Ramki Krishnan" initials="R." surname="Krishnan">
              <organization>JPMorgan Chase</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Michael Richardson" initials="M." surname="Richardson">
              <organization>Sandelman Software Works Inc</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Diego Lopez" initials="D." surname="Lopez">
              <organization>Telefonica</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="A Prasad" initials="A." surname="Prasad">
              <organization>Oracle</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Srinivasa Addepalli" initials="S." surname="Addepalli">
              <organization>Aryaka</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="18" month="October" year="2026"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines a scalable framework for hardware-rooted
   cryptographic attestation in the Precision Time Protocol (PTP).
   Standard PTP security mechanisms rely on symmetric keys, which suffer
   from identity ambiguity and source non-repudiation failures.  These
   vulnerabilities allow any node possessing the shared secret to
   impersonate a Grandmaster.  To resolve these issues while overcoming
   the silicon throughput limits of traditional TPMs and the overhead of
   Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), this draft specifies a tiered trust
   model.  A Hardware Root (e.g., TPM) establishes a long-term PQC
   identity, while a workload identity management plane (e.g., SPIFFE/
   SPIRE) manages the frequent rotation of short-lived operational keys.
   These keys perform amortized signing of PTP message batches via
   Merkle Trees, ensuring wire-speed synchronization and irrefutable
   provenance for regulated environments.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ramki-ptp-hardware-rooted-attestation-02"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <?line 495?>

<section anchor="examples">
      <name>Worked Examples</name>
      <t>The two results below were produced by a minimal Verifier written against the CDDL in this document and run over hardware-signed attestation artifacts captured from a single workload in public clouds.
Both verify against public roots; both yield <tt>jurisdiction-country</tt> "NL"; they rest on different classes.</t>
      <section anchor="microsoft-azure-west-europe-basis-endorsement">
        <name>Microsoft Azure, West Europe (basis: endorsement)</name>
        <t>The only locational signal in a Microsoft Azure Attestation token is the issuer hostname: a region-scoped service identity asserted by the issuer and covered by its signature.
The Verifier accepted it as an Endorsement and records that class.</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
{
  / grc.jurisdiction-country / 0: "NL",
  / grc.claim-uuid /          13: h'814f1a077ed25b798641788ef6dab3a1',
  / grc.basis /               14: 1  / endorsement /
}
]]></artwork>
        <t>Encoded (25 bytes):</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
a300624e4c0d50814f1a077ed25b798641788ef6dab3a10e01
]]></artwork>
      </section>
      <section anchor="google-cloud-europe-west4-basis-attestation-result">
        <name>Google Cloud, europe-west4 (basis: attestation-result)</name>
        <t>An AMD SEV-SNP ATTESTATION_REPORT contains no locational field by definition of its ABI.
The zone came from capture metadata stored next to the report, unsigned.
The Verifier appraised it on its own authority and records <tt>attestation-result</tt>.
Because a zone is more specific than a region-scoped hostname, this result also carries a city: the result with less behind it is the more detailed one.</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
{
  / grc.jurisdiction-country / 0: "NL",
  / grc.jurisdiction-city /    4: "Eemshaven",
  / grc.claim-uuid /          13: h'5e1a26c009cb5e8489c4f9efa68f78ad',
  / grc.basis /               14: 2  / attestation-result /
}
]]></artwork>
        <t>Encoded (36 bytes):</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
a400624e4c046945656d73686176656e0d505e1a26c009cb5e8489c4f9efa6
8f78ad0e02
]]></artwork>
        <figure anchor="fig-wire">
          <name>The two results, annotated</name>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
Microsoft Azure, West Europe: basis endorsement, 25 bytes

a3                                      # map(3)
   00                                   #  key 0 jurisdiction-country
   62 4e4c                              #  text(2) "NL"
   0d                                   #  key 13 claim-uuid
   50 814f1a077ed25b798641788ef6dab3a1  #  bytes(16)
   0e                                   #  key 14 basis
   01                                   #  1 = endorsement

Google Cloud, europe-west4: basis attestation-result, 36 bytes

a4                                      # map(4)
   00                                   #  key 0 jurisdiction-country
   62 4e4c                              #  text(2) "NL"
   04                                   #  key 4 jurisdiction-city
   69 45656d73686176656e                #  text(9) "Eemshaven"
   0d                                   #  key 13 claim-uuid
   50 5e1a26c009cb5e8489c4f9efa68f78ad  #  bytes(16)
   0e                                   #  key 14 basis
   02                                   #  2 = attestation-result
]]></artwork>
        </figure>
        <t>The jurisdiction claim is the same four bytes, 00 62 4e 4c, in each.
Both maps validate against the CDDL in this document; a map carrying <tt>basis</tt> 3, <tt>basis</tt> as a text string, or a 15-byte <tt>claim-uuid</tt> is rejected.
The Verifier used is a minimal implementation of this document written by one of the authors.
Across the 26 artifacts of the capture (twelve AWS Nitro documents, ten SEV-SNP reports, four Azure tokens) every signature verified against its public root.
The Verifier emitted a geographic result for the 19 artifacts that carried any locational input and none for the seven SEV-SNP reports that carried none at all; all 19 results validate.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="a-result-resting-on-another-result-basis-attestation-result-with-basis-ref-and-an-observation-window">
        <name>A result resting on another result (basis: attestation-result, with basis-ref and an observation window)</name>
        <t>A Verifier consumed a geographic result that another Verifier had derived from a device-signed trajectory (sixty-four H3 cells collected fifteen minutes apart; the set was supplied by the author of draft-ayerbe-trip-protocol and is labelled synthetic), and emitted its own:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
{
  / grc.jurisdiction-country / 0: "NL",
  / grc.claim-uuid /          13: h'2bfa42bce6e45c2ab556b6a0862d11f7',
  / grc.basis /               14: 2  / attestation-result /,
  / grc.basis-ref /           16: h'9c413213e4ad5396b1413d7e1c37c4f6',
  / grc.observed-from /       17: 1(1767226500),
  / grc.observed-until /      18: 1(1767283200)
}
]]></artwork>
        <t>Encoded (57 bytes):</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
a600624e4c0d502bfa42bce6e45c2ab556b6a0862d11f70e0210509c413213
e4ad5396b1413d7e1c37c4f611c11a6955bc8412c11a69569a00
]]></artwork>
        <t><xref target="fig-chain"/> shows the two Verifiers and what each result carries.</t>
        <figure anchor="fig-chain">
          <name>A result that rests on another result</name>
          <artset>
            <artwork type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1" height="352" width="528" viewBox="0 0 528 352" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round">
                <path d="M 8,32 L 8,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 96,32 L 96,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 216,304 L 216,336" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 224,32 L 224,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 224,160 L 224,192" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 272,64 L 272,152" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 272,192 L 272,296" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 328,32 L 328,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 328,160 L 328,192" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 344,304 L 344,336" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 8,32 L 96,32" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 224,32 L 328,32" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 96,48 L 216,48" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 8,64 L 96,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 224,64 L 328,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 224,160 L 328,160" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 224,192 L 328,192" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 216,304 L 344,304" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 216,336 L 344,336" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <polygon class="arrowhead" points="280,296 268,290.4 268,301.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(90,272,296)"/>
                <polygon class="arrowhead" points="280,152 268,146.4 268,157.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(90,272,152)"/>
                <polygon class="arrowhead" points="224,48 212,42.4 212,53.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,216,48)"/>
                <g class="text">
                  <text x="148" y="36">Evidence</text>
                  <text x="52" y="52">Attester</text>
                  <text x="268" y="52">Verifier</text>
                  <text x="312" y="52">A</text>
                  <text x="124" y="68">64</text>
                  <text x="164" y="68">signed</text>
                  <text x="124" y="84">H3</text>
                  <text x="160" y="84">cells</text>
                  <text x="292" y="84">AR</text>
                  <text x="320" y="84">U1:</text>
                  <text x="372" y="100">jurisdiction-country</text>
                  <text x="476" y="100">"NL"</text>
                  <text x="312" y="116">basis</text>
                  <text x="348" y="116">0,</text>
                  <text x="396" y="116">evidence</text>
                  <text x="332" y="132">claim-uuid</text>
                  <text x="388" y="132">U1</text>
                  <text x="268" y="180">Verifier</text>
                  <text x="312" y="180">B</text>
                  <text x="292" y="212">AR</text>
                  <text x="320" y="212">U2:</text>
                  <text x="372" y="228">jurisdiction-country</text>
                  <text x="476" y="228">"NL"</text>
                  <text x="312" y="244">basis</text>
                  <text x="348" y="244">2,</text>
                  <text x="436" y="244">attestation-result</text>
                  <text x="328" y="260">basis-ref</text>
                  <text x="380" y="260">U1</text>
                  <text x="348" y="276">observed-from,</text>
                  <text x="468" y="276">observed-until</text>
                  <text x="256" y="324">Relying</text>
                  <text x="312" y="324">Party</text>
                </g>
              </svg>
            </artwork>
            <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
.----------.  Evidence     .------------.
| Attester +-------------->| Verifier A |
'----------'  64 signed    '-----+------'
              H3 cells           | AR U1:
                                 |  jurisdiction-country "NL"
                                 |  basis 0, evidence
                                 |  claim-uuid U1
                                 v
                           .------------.
                           | Verifier B |
                           '-----+------'
                                 | AR U2:
                                 |  jurisdiction-country "NL"
                                 |  basis 2, attestation-result
                                 |  basis-ref U1
                                 |  observed-from, observed-until
                                 v
                          .---------------.
                          | Relying Party |
                          '---------------'
]]></artwork>
          </artset>
        </figure>
        <t><tt>basis-ref</tt> is the <tt>claim-uuid</tt> of the first Verifier's result, which carried <tt>basis</tt> 0 (evidence) and the same jurisdiction; <tt>observed-from</tt> and <tt>observed-until</tt> are the first and last collection times of the trajectory, carried forward unchanged.
A Relying Party whose policy accepts only results that bottom out in Evidence or an Endorsement follows <tt>basis-ref</tt> and accepts; the same result without <tt>basis-ref</tt> is rejected by that policy and accepted by a policy that trusts the signing Verifier.
The Verifier chain that produced these bytes, with the signed EARs in diagnostic notation, is published separately by one of the authors.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="presence">
      <name>Proof of Placement</name>
      <t>Some aspects of a device can not be intuited by the device itself.
For instance, a router platform may have no way to know what color the case is, where in a cabinet it is located, or which electrical circuit it is connected to.
This kind of information must be provided through an Endorsement: a statement from a third party.</t>
      <t>These statements may require human auditors to inspect the device physically.
But, which device is really in front of an auditor?  This document describes a mechanism by which an auditor can make physical contact with a device and collect information to identify the
device in a cryptographically strong manner.</t>
      <t>The Proof of Presence protocol is intended to provide a mechanism by which device identity can be established via non-networked, physical cabling such as a USB cable, or a serial (craft) console.</t>
      <section anchor="introduction-1">
        <name>Introduction</name>
        <t>In the RATS Architecture <xref target="RFC9334"/>, an important input to the Verifier function is the Endorsement.
Endorsements <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-endorsements"/> provide information that the Attester can not inherently know.
This includes a statement that a particular (Attester) keypair belongs  to a device of a particular type.
Some of this information might be placed into device identity certificate (such as an IDevID <xref target="IDevID"/>), but many other kinds of claims would not belong.</t>
        <t>For instance, the physical location or connectivity of a device would be subject to change.
In some cases a GPS coordinate might make sense, but in other cases GPS might not be trustworthy, or might be inadequate.
The physical location of a router, as being in "Building 4, Aisle 37, Cabinet 9, Rack Unit 2-3"
would be a level of precision that GPS would be unable to provide.
Other claims might involve knowledge of the color of a device ("the red car"), or the connectivity of the device ("the device plugged into the blue cable").
A relative claim might also be relevant: The house on top of the person with Ruby Slippers.</t>
        <t>In these cases an endorsement will need to be created, often by a human inspector/auditor that will have to physically visit the device and ascertain the state of the device.
There are some challenges for such an auditor: they could be led astray by malicious intent to inspect the wrong device, or they could simply not locate the device they intended to audit.
This results in an endorsement linked to the wrong device.</t>
        <section anchor="overview-of-mechanism">
          <name>Overview of mechanism</name>
          <t>The auditor is equipped with a portable device (e.g., a tablet computer) containing an endorsement  signing key.
This is the audit device.
(This could be an actual key, or it could just be a secure/tamperproof container in which endorsements will be stored until a long-term/more-secure endorsement key can be employed)</t>
          <t>The auditor finds the device in question and then collects whatever information is relevant.
For instance, the location in whatever form makes sense for the endorsement.
That might include taking pictures of the device in-situ, scans of serial numbers on the outside of the case, and which cables are connected to which physical ports.</t>
          <t>The auditor then plugs a physical cable between their audit device and the device under audit.
This cable is envisioned to be either a USB console "rollover" cable <xref target="rollover"/>.
The audit device then initiates some commands over this cable that will result in a proof of the identity of connected device.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="terminology">
        <name>Terminology</name>
        <dl>
          <dt>Audit Device:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The device that is used to collect information that will go into endorsements.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Device Under Audit:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Abbreviated to DUA. The device for which endorsements are being made.</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Auditor:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The human who inspects the Device Under Audit.</t>
          </dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="presence-protocol">
        <name>Presence Protocol</name>
        <t>It is assumed that the console port has been designed for use by humans.
This protocol is designed to interact as if it's a human.
Note that more sophisticated mechanisms such as SLIP or PPP would be more vulnerable to spoofing.</t>
        <section anchor="loginhandshake">
          <name>Initial Handshake</name>
          <t>The audit device sends carriage returns (octet 13) until it sees a response with a colon (":") in it.
This is usually a "login:" or "username:" prompt of some kind.
The audit device then sends the word "endorsementaudit" with a carriage return.
This represents a user login, and for some systems this can be set as a real login with limited permissions.
It could run a special audit shell that only can perform system audits.
On other systems, this might just be an unprivileged account with the normal prompts and commands.</t>
          <t>The handshake is over when the word "endorsement" is seen.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="proof-of-presence">
          <name>Proof of Presence</name>
          <t>(Proof of Presence, or POP, is not a great TLA, as it often refers to proof that a private key is used.  A better name is sought)</t>
          <t>All commands are prefixed with "rfcXXXX" (with a trailing space, where XXXX is the number of this document).
A second word indicates the command.
This allows the device under audit to collect all operations under a single command or command sub-system.</t>
          <t>The audit device then sends the word/command "position-proof", followed by a 33 byte nonce, base64URL encoded into a 45 byte string.
(33 bytes are recommended because being divisible by three, they encode evenly in base64, leaving  no trailing =)</t>
          <t>The device under audit then responds with a CBOR format EAT object, encoded in base64URL, and wrapped in the strings "--- BEGIN COSE OBJECT ---" and "--- END COSE OBJECT ---"</t>
          <t>The EAT payload should be constructed as follows.
Shown are a few attributes that would make sense to include.
The above provided nonce becomes the eat_nonce.</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
{
    / eat_nonce /       10: h'948f8860d13a463e8e',
    / ueid /           256: h'0198f50a4ff6c05861c8860d13a638ea',
    / oemid /          258: h'894823', / IEEE OUI format OEM ID /
    / hwmodel /        259: h'549dcecc8b987c737b44e40f7c635ce8'
                              / Hash of chip model name /,
    / hwversion /      260: ["1.3.4", 1], / Multipartnumeric version /
    / swname /         271: "Acme OS",
    / swversion /      272: ["3.5.5", 1],
}
]]></artwork>
          <t>The EAT payload is signed using the device under audit's Attestation Key.
(A TPM's Endorsement Key can not sign things)
The hash of the Attestation Key is provided in the unprotected headers.</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
   61( 18( [
       h'A10126',                           / protected headers  /
       {
       / x5t / 34: [16, h'1234456781234567812344567812345678'],
       },                                   / unprotected headers /
       h'A20B46024A6B0978DE0A49000102030405060708',    / payload /
       h'9B9B2F5E470000F6A20C8A4157B5763FC45BE759
         9A5334028517768C21AFFB845A56AB557E0C8973
         A07417391243A79C478562D285612E292C622162
         AB233787'                                   / signature /
   ] ) )
]]></artwork>
          <t>x5t is from <xref target="RFC9360"/>.
The hash algorithm <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be SHA256, or newer.
(Example to be updated.)</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="collection-of-endorsement-claims">
          <name>Collection of Endorsement Claims</name>
          <t>The audit device then validates the received EAT object from the device.
The audit device locates the public part of the device's Attestation Key.
This will in most cases be part of the "work order" that the auditor has been provided, but in some cases, the auditor will have to collect it from the device.</t>
          <t>For instance, a device might have been replaced since the audit was requested, or there might be additional devices that the auditor thinks might be relevant.
An example might be when a switching device has many cables connected into an adjacent optical media converter that puts multiple signals through a single multi-frequency optical cable.
Such a layer of indirection might affect the audit's ability to indicate which port is physically connected to which cable.</t>
          <t>Some key physical information that an auditor might need to collect is which fibre patches are connected to which ports of the switch.
This information would be ideally collected by scanning (and checking) labels on the fibre patches.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="additional-commands">
          <name>Additional Commands</name>
          <t>Some additional commands can be provided by the device under audit:</t>
          <dl>
            <dt>"attestation-key":</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>This command returns the public certificate for the device's Attestation Key in <xref target="RFC7468"/> Certificate format.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>"port-flash":</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>This command takes an interface number/name (e.g., "GigabitEthernet 3/014"), and causes the LEDs adjacent to a particular port to flash in a distinct pattern.  This is to help identify which physical port is which.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>"port-down":</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>This command takes an interface number/name (as above), and causes the switch to mark the physical port as down, but not turn off the laser.  Traffic <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be re-routed as if the fibre has failed.  This is a disruptive test!  The auditor may then physically unplug the fibre as part of an audit of the fibre paths.  This command might not perform the action immediately, but could signal to the network operations center that such a test is desired, and allow them to approve it.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>"port-up":</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>Indicates the end of a path-audit started by "port-down".</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>"endorsements":</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>This command is followed by a base64URL encoded CBOR Sequence of Endorsements, wrapped in the same BEGIN COSE header and footer as before.  To guard against failure during, the device under audit <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> time out this command after 120s if no END COSE OBJECT framing is seen.
This command allows the auditor to load any resulting endorsements directly into the device to be passed up along with Evidence to a Verifier.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>"exit":</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>This command indicates that the audit is over, and the device under audit can return the console interface to the normal state.</t>
            </dd>
          </dl>
        </section>
        <section anchor="generation-of-endorsement">
          <name>Generation of Endorsement</name>
          <t>The auditor, having collected one or more proofs, then transmits them to the endorsement agency.
This may be via physical transfer, secured email, or some secured online API.</t>
          <t>The endorsement agency then needs to do the following:</t>
          <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>
              <t>locate the Endorsement Certificate, if it was not collected from the device.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>validate that the provided EAT is signed by the associated Endorsement Key.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>validate that the claims in the EAT are consistent with that which is expected from the device.</t>
            </li>
            <li>
              <t>validate the format of the additional information collected by the auditor.  Location, type and number of connections, (colour of device even).</t>
            </li>
          </ol>
          <t>From this, one or more Endorsements are then created and signed by the endorsing agency.</t>
          <t>In some cases the auditor might be entirely self-contained, producing the endorsements directly on their audit device.
In that case, they would use the "endorsements" to load the resulting Endorsements directly into the device.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="alternatives-to-usbserial-cables">
        <name>Alternatives to USB/serial cables</name>
        <t>There are a number of cases where a USB or serial console cable might be unavailable, or it might be undesirable.
Many smaller IoT devices, home routers and consumer items do not have any kind of console available.
The console access might require removal of the case, which might be impossible to do while the device is operational, or while the device is physically installed.
Console access might provide access to a privileged prompt; that access might either be unsafe to give to the auditor, or might require a password to access that should not be shared.</t>
        <t>One alternative is to use Ethernet.
Most routing platforms have many ethernet ports, and usually have at least one empty ethernet port.
It is also common for there to be a dedicated copper ethernet port for management even on routing platforms that otherwise only have fiber-optic ports running at multiple hundred gigabits.
The use of ethernet has problems because ethernet can easily be switched; transmitting the signal to another device elsewhere.
This is often the whole point of the routing platform: to switch traffic elsewhere.
This would result in a false audit if the auditor is diverted.</t>
        <t>The LLDP protocol <xref target="LLDP"/> is a one-hop protocol which is usually not forwarded.
It can do things like tell a connected device which port of client device is connected to.
While trustworthy devices will not forward LLDP frames, an untrustworthy device that has been programmed to participate in a subterfuge might well forward frames.
It might be possible to construct a challenge/response system that has the auditor plug cables in some non-deterministic order in order to defeat the subterfuge.</t>
        <t>This process would probably need to be augmented with some other forms of feedback; perhaps flashing of status LEDs on the device in a pattern.</t>
        <t>Note: the console/USB cable could also be redirected to another host!</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="privacy-considerations">
        <name>Privacy Considerations</name>
        <t>The ability to walk up to a device and interrogate it as to its identity is potentially privacy violating if the device is associated with a person.
This would include all kinds of small devices: phones, laptops, electric bicycles, automobiles.</t>
        <t>One countermeasure is that the device needs to be put into an audit mode before it can be interrogated.
This is reasonable for some devices and some audit processes, but for other processes, the need to do random audits may countermand this need.
For devices such as large routing platforms, they are often located in data centers with multiple layers of physical access control: locked buildings, locked machine rooms, and locked cabinets.
For such devices, there are perhaps few privacy concerns, and the auditor needs credentials in order to access the device at all.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="security-considerations-1">
        <name>Security Considerations</name>
        <t>There are three concerns with this protocol.</t>
        <t>The first is the potential for unauthorized people to collect information about devices to which they have no authority to interrogate.
In industrial settings, this is mitigated by physical access controls.
In those settings the ability to identify devices which may be physically misbehaving or are damaged and connect them to their digital identity significantly outweighs any concerns about device identity.</t>
        <t>In consumer and retail settings, the device <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> not respond to this protocol unless an operator/owner has put the device into device identification mode.</t>
        <t>The second concern with this protocol is that it might be spoofed or confuzzled.
The auditor could be misled as to whether the device in front of them is really the device that is responding to their queries.
The auditor <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> have the device identity with them already as part of the work order.
They should therefore not be misled as to which device they intend to audit,  the issue is that it might not be the device that is physically in front of them.
The device might be a mock-up designed to look right, but really it is wired secretly to the real device which is elsewhere, and is differently configured.
This attack is called the "Sock-Puppet" attack.</t>
        <t>Such attacks require physical examination to detect.
Some attacks may be mitigated through careful use of the "port-flash" commands to cause signals visible to the auditor that would ideally be difficult to fake.
Efforts this way are the subject of further work.</t>
        <t>The third concern with this protocol is that it might open up the device to attacks via this console port.
The Initial Handshake <xref target="loginhandshake"/> mechanism is designed so that it can be easily implemented by typical router and operating system login mechanisms.
A very limited account would be created, or even a mode within the login mechanism itself, and so no additional inquiries would be possible.
Some operators prefer to never have a login process on the console/craft ports of their devices.
This is usually done so that maintenance people do not need to have passwords that can then be  re-used over a network, weakening the security of the device.
They depend upon physical security for the console ports to provide security.
Such operators might wish to rethink this policy for devices which will be subject to audit.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>TODO acknowledge.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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