Internet-Draft ASPA-based AS_PATH Verification November 2026
Azimov, et al. Expires 21 May 2027 [Page]
Workgroup:
Network Working Group
Internet-Draft:
draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification-31
Published:
Intended Status:
Standards Track
Expires:
Authors:
A. Azimov
Yandex
E. Bogomazov
Qrator Labs
R. Bush
IIJ & Arrcus
K. Patel
Arrcus
J. Snijders
BSD
K. Sriram
USA NIST

BGP AS_PATH Verification Based on Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) Objects

Abstract

This document describes procedures that make use of Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) objects in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to verify the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) AS_PATH attribute of advertised routes. This AS_PATH verification enhances routing security by adding means to detect and mitigate route leaks and AS_PATH manipulations.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 21 May 2027.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [RFC4271] as originally designed is known to be vulnerable to prefix (or route) hijacks and BGP route leaks [RFC7908]. Some existing BGP extensions can partially solve these problems. For example, Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) based route origin validation (RPKI-ROV) [RFC6480] [RFC9582] [RFC6811] [RFC9319] can be used to detect and filter accidental mis-originations. [RFC9234] can be used to detect and mitigate accidental route leaks. While RPKI-ROV can prevent accidental prefix hijacks, malicious forged-origin prefix hijacks can still occur. [RFC9319] includes some recommendations for reducing the attack surface for forged-origin prefix hijacks.

This document describes procedures that make use of Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) objects [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile] in the RPKI to verify properties of the BGP AS_PATH attribute of advertised routes. ASPA-based AS_PATH verification provides detection and mitigation of route leaks. It also provides protection, to some degree, against prefix hijacks with forged-origin or forged-path-segment (see Section 7, Appendix C). These new ASPA-based procedures automatically detect such anomalous AS_PATHs in BGP UPDATEs that are advertised between ASes.

Both route leaks and hijacks have similar effects on ISP operations. They redirect traffic and can result in denial of service (DoS), eavesdropping, increased latency, and packet loss. The level of risk, however, depends significantly on the extent of propagation of the anomalies. For example, a route leak or hijack that is propagated only to customers may cause bottlenecking within an ISP's customer cone, but if the anomaly propagates through lateral (i.e., non-transit) peers or transit providers, then the ill effects will likely be amplified and may be experienced worldwide.

The ability to constrain the propagation of BGP anomalies to transit providers and lateral peers -- without requiring support from the source of the anomaly (which is critical if the source has malicious intent) -- should significantly improve the robustness of the global inter-domain routing system.

Other technologies that are relevant or complementary to ASPA for BGP security are briefly described in Appendix B.

2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

3. Terminology and List of Acronyms

The following terms are used with special meanings.

Route is ineligible:
The term has the same meaning as in Section 9.1 of [RFC4271], i.e., "route is ineligible to be installed in Loc-RIB and will be excluded from the next phase of route selection."
CAS:
Customer AS (see Section 1 of [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile]).
PAS:
Provider AS (see Section 1 of [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile]).
SPAS:
Set of Provider ASes (see Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile]).

For path verification purposes in this document, the peering relationships an AS can have in relation to a neighbor AS are Customer, Provider, Peer, Route Server (RS), RS-client, and Complex. These peering relationships are defined in [RFC9234]. All peering relationships are defined locally.

4. ASPA Registration Recommendations

ASPA registration improves the accuracy of ASPA-based AS_PATH verification in routing systems. An ASPA registration MUST list the union of all non-transparent RS ASes at which the CAS is an RS-client and all Provider ASes for the CAS. An AS MUST include a Provider AS in its SPAS regardless of whether it provides connectivity for only IPv4 or only IPv6 or both. Note that the common case for RS ASes at IXPs is to operate transparently (see Section 2.2.2.1 of [RFC7947]), and transparent IXP Route Servers do not need to be listed as Provider ASes in ASPAs.

In the Complex relationship case (Section 3 and [RFC9234]), an AS MUST include the neighbor AS in its SPAS if the neighbor plays the Provider role for all or a subset of received or sent prefixes. Thus, if two ASes are exporting both customer and non-customer routes to each other, each AS registers its ASPA including the other AS in its SPAS.

The ASes on the boundary of an AS Confederation MUST register ASPAs using the Confederation's global AS number (ASN) as the CAS.

An ASPA object showing only AS 0 as a provider AS is referred to as an AS0 ASPA. A non-transparent Route Server AS (RS AS) is one that includes its AS number in the AS_PATH. Registering an AS0 ASPA is a statement by the registering AS that it has no transit providers, and it is also not an RS-client at a non-transparent RS AS.

Resource holders SHOULD register all provider authorizations for a given CAS in a single ASPA object. While the registration of multiple ASPA objects for a CAS is not technically restricted, the use of a single ASPA object is advisable because multiple objects for the same CAS can introduce race conditions during updates, which may affect route propagation. It is recommended that implementers of Certification Authority (CA) software for ASPA registration reinforce the practice of using a single ASPA object.

An AS may maintain standby providers for specific operational scenarios. For example, an AS might temporarily route traffic through a DDoS mitigation provider. Another use case involves bridging isolated segments, where an AS might use an emergency provider to receive routes with its own ASN in the AS_PATH. It is RECOMMENDED to add such standby or emergency providers in the ASPA object in advance to prevent race conditions between global ASPA distribution and route propagation.

During a transition process between different certification authority registries, the ASPA records SHOULD be kept identical in all relevant registries.

5. AS_PATH Verification

The procedures described in this document are applicable only to four-octet AS number compatible BGP speakers [RFC6793]. If such a BGP speaker receives both AS_PATH and AS4_PATH attributes in an UPDATE, then the procedures are applied on the reconstructed AS_PATH (Section 4.2.3 of [RFC6793]). So, the term AS_PATH is used in this document to refer to the usual AS_PATH [RFC4271] as well as the reconstructed AS_PATH.

5.1. Interaction with Other AS_PATH Checks

The following AS_PATH checks and error handling are complementary to the ASPA-based AS_PATH verification. If they are implemented, they MUST be applied prior to the ASPA-based AS_PATH verification.

  1. Section 3 of [RFC9774] specifies: "MUST use the 'treat-as-withdraw' error handling behavior per [RFC7606] upon reception of BGP UPDATE messages containing AS_SETs or AS_CONFED_SETs in the AS_PATH or AS4_PATH [RFC6793]".

  2. Section 6.3 of [RFC4271] specifies: "If the UPDATE message is received from an external peer, the local system MAY check whether the leftmost (with respect to the position of octets in the protocol message) AS in the AS_PATH attribute is equal to the autonomous system number of the peer that sent the message." A standard exception to this check is made for routes received from a transparent Internet Exchange (IX) route server (see Section 2.2.2.1 of [RFC7947]). The error handling associated with this check is specified in Section 3e of [RFC7606].

If a BGP speaker applies ASPA procedures to an AS_PATH without first enforcing the above checks, any route that fails either condition (i.e., it contains an AS_SET or has a mismatched neighbor ASN) is evaluated as Invalid by the ASPA verification procedures (Section 5.5 and Section 5.6).

5.2. Principles of ASPA Verification

Let the sequence COMPRESSED_AS_PATH {AS(N), AS(N-1),..., AS(2), AS(1)} represent the AS_PATH after removing consecutive duplicate ASNs, where AS(1) is the origin AS, and AS(N) is the most recently added neighbor AS of the receiving/verifying AS. AS(N+1) represents the local (receiving/verifying) AS; it does not explicitly appear in the description of the AS_PATH verification procedures.



                      AS(L) ............. AS(K)
                      /                      \
                     .                         .
      (down-ramp)   .                           .   (up-ramp)
                   .                             .
                  /                               \
               AS(N)                              AS(1)
                /                               (Origin AS)
      Receiving & verifying AS (AS(N+1))
             (Customer)

          Each ramp has consecutive customer-to-provider hops
          in the bottom-to-top direction

Figure 1: Illustration of up-ramp and down-ramp.

The COMPRESSED_AS_PATH may in general have both an up-ramp (on the right starting at AS(1)) and a down-ramp (on the left starting at AS(N)). The up-ramp runs from AS(1) to AS(K). In this ramp, each hop AS(i) to AS(i+1) represents a customer-to-provider peering relationship. The down-ramp runs backward from AS(N) to AS(L). In the down-ramp, each pair AS(j) to AS(j-1) represents a customer-to-provider peering relationship. AS(K) is the apex of the up-ramp, and AS(L) is the apex of the down-ramp. If the COMPRESSED_AS_PATH has no up-ramp, it results in K = 1. If the COMPRESSED_AS_PATH has no down-ramp, it results in L = N.

The AS_PATH is invalid if the apexes of the up-ramp and down-ramp (AS(K) and AS(L), respectively) of the COMPRESSED_AS_PATH are apart by more than one hop; else, it is valid. In other words, if the combined length of the up-ramp and down-ramp of the COMPRESSED_AS_PATH is equal to or greater than N, the AS_PATH is valid (route leak free). If the combined length is less than N, the route was leaked or the AS_PATH was malformed (i.e., the AS_PATH is invalid).

5.3. Provider Authorization Function

This section defines the provider authorization function that uses ASPA to check, for a given pair (AS x, AS y), if AS y is an attested provider of AS x. The function can be used to calculate the bounds on the up-ramp and down-ramp lengths (Section 5.2).

A CAS is expected to register a single ASPA listing all its Provider ASes (see Section 4). If a CAS has a single cryptographically valid ASPA, then the Union SPAS (U-SPAS) (defined in [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile]) for the CAS is equal to the SPAS of that ASPA. In case a CAS has multiple cryptographically valid ASPAs, then the U-SPAS for the CAS is the union of ASes listed in all the SPAS corresponding to these ASPAs. If a U-SPAS includes an AS 0 and one or more other AS numbers, then the AS 0 is removed from the U-SPAS (see Section 5.2 of [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile]).

Let AS x and AS y represent two distinct ASes. A provider authorization function, authorized(AS x, AS y), checks if the ordered pair of ASNs, (AS x, AS y), has the property that AS y is an attested provider of AS x per U-SPAS of AS x. By the term "Provider+", the function signals that AS y plays the role of Provider or non-transparent RS. This function is specified as follows:



                           /
                           | "No Attestation" if there is no entry
                           |   in U-SPAS table for CAS = AS x
                           |
authorized(AS x, AS y) =   / Else, "Provider+" if the U-SPAS entry
                           \   for CAS = AS x includes AS y
                           |
                           | Else, "Not Provider+"
                           \

Figure 2: Provider authorization function.

The "No Attestation" result is returned only when no ASPA is retrieved for the CAS or none of its ASPAs are cryptographically valid.

The "Not Provider+" outcome of the provider authorization function can be used to calculate the upper bound of the ramp (up-ramp/down-ramp) length (Section 5.2) and the 'No Attestation' outcome can be used to calculate its lower bound.

5.4. Bounds on Up-Ramp and Down-Ramp Lengths

Determine the maximum up-ramp length as I, where I is the minimum index for which authorized(AS(I), AS(I+1)) returns "Not Provider+". If there is no such I, the maximum up-ramp length is set equal to the COMPRESSED_AS_PATH length N. This parameter is abbreviated as max_up_ramp. The minimum up-ramp length can be determined as I, where I is the minimum index for which authorized(AS(I), AS(I+1)) returns "No Attestation" or "Not Provider+". If there is no such I, the COMPRESSED_AS_PATH consists of only "Provider+" pairs; so the minimum up-ramp length is set equal to the COMPRESSED_AS_PATH length N. This parameter is abbreviated as min_up_ramp.

Similarly, the maximum down-ramp length can be determined as N - J + 1 where J is the maximum index for which authorized(AS(J), AS(J-1)) returns "Not Provider+". If there is no such J, the maximum down-ramp length is set equal to the COMPRESSED_AS_PATH length N. This parameter is abbreviated as max_down_ramp. The minimum down-ramp length can be determined as N - J + 1 where J is the maximum index for which authorized(AS(J), AS(J-1)) returns "No Attestation" or "Not Provider+". If there is no such J, the minimum down-ramp length is set equal to the COMPRESSED_AS_PATH length N. This parameter is abbreviated as min_down_ramp.

If the sum of max_up_ramp and max_down_ramp is less than N, the AS_PATH is Invalid. Else, if the sum of min_up_ramp and min_down_ramp is less than N, enough information is not available to perform full AS_PATH verification, and the outcome is set to Unknown. Else, the AS_PATH is Valid.

Below are formal procedures for path verification depending on the peering relationship between the receiving AS and its neighbor. These procedures use the COMPRESSED_AS_PATH and the above-defined parameters max_up_ramp, min_up_ramp, max_down_ramp, and min_down_ramp.

5.5. Algorithm for Upstream Paths

The upstream verification algorithm described here is applied when a route is received from a Customer or Peer, or is received by an RS from an RS-client, or is received by an RS-client from an RS. In all these cases, the receiving/validating eBGP router expects the COMPRESSED_AS_PATH to have only an up-ramp (no down-ramp) for it to be Valid. Therefore, max_down_ramp and min_down_ramp are set to 0.

The upstream path verification procedure is specified as follows:

  1. If the AS_PATH is empty, then the procedure halts with the outcome "Invalid".

  2. If the receiving AS is not an RS-client and the most recently added AS in the AS_PATH does not match the neighbor AS, then the procedure halts with the outcome "Invalid".

  3. If the AS_PATH has an AS_SET, then the procedure halts with the outcome "Invalid".

  4. If max_up_ramp < N, the procedure halts with the outcome "Invalid".

  5. If min_up_ramp < N, the procedure halts with the outcome "Unknown".

  6. Else, the procedure halts with the outcome "Valid".

5.6. Algorithm for Downstream Paths

The downstream verification algorithm described here is applied when a route is received from a Provider.

  1. If the AS_PATH is empty, then the procedure halts with the outcome "Invalid".

  2. If the most recently added AS in the AS_PATH does not match the neighbor AS, then the procedure halts with the outcome "Invalid".

  3. If the AS_PATH has an AS_SET, then the procedure halts with the outcome "Invalid".

  4. If max_up_ramp + max_down_ramp < N, the procedure halts with the outcome "Invalid".

  5. If min_up_ramp + min_down_ramp < N, the procedure halts with the outcome "Unknown".

  6. Else, the procedure halts with the outcome "Valid".

5.7. Mitigation Policy

The specific configuration of a mitigation policy based on AS_PATH verification using ASPA is at the discretion of the network operator. The following policy is RECOMMENDED unless overridden by local operational requirements.

Invalid: If the AS_PATH is determined to be Invalid, then the route SHOULD be considered ineligible for route selection (see Section 3) and MUST be kept in the Adj-RIB-In for potential future re-evaluation (see [RFC9324]).

Valid or Unknown: When a route is evaluated as Unknown (using ASPA-based AS_PATH verification), it SHOULD be treated at the same preference level as a route evaluated as Valid.

6. Deployment Recommendations

This section describes practical deployment recommendations for applying verification procedures.

6.1. ASPA Verification Examples

A set of examples of AS_PATH verification using the above procedures (Sections 5.2, 5.5, and 5.6) for illustrative network topologies are provided online (see [aspa-examples]).

6.2. Application of Verification Procedures

When ASPA-based AS_PATH verification is deployed, the verification procedures described in this document MUST be applied to BGP routes with {AFI, SAFI} combinations {AFI 1 (IPv4), SAFI 1} and {AFI 2 (IPv6), SAFI 1} [IANA-AF] [IANA-SAF]. The procedures MUST NOT be applied to other address families by default.

The procedures for ASPA-based AS_PATH verification are intended for implementation on edge routers on the ingress side. This includes edge routers on the boundary of an AS Confederation facing external ASes. However, the specified procedures are not applicable for use on internal BGP (iBGP) sessions or eBGP sessions internal to an AS Confederation.

6.3. BGP Roles

When ASPA-based AS_PATH verification is deployed, the BGP Role configuration parameter and its cross-check in a BGP OPEN message as specified in [RFC9234] are RECOMMENDED. The BGP Roles facilitate automating the use of the above-described AS_PATH verification procedures, helping to distinguish whether upstream or downstream procedures should be applied. The automatic BGP Role cross-check [RFC9234] should facilitate more accurate and effective deployment of ASPA.

6.4. Complex Peering Relationships

If multiple eBGP sessions can segregate the Complex peering relationship into eBGP sessions with normal peering relationships, the receiving/verifying AS MUST select the algorithm (per Section 5.5 or Section 5.6) for each of the normal sessions based on its peering relation type.

If a Complex peering relation cannot be segregated (i.e., when a Complex BGP relationship occurs within one single BGP session), an operator may want to achieve an equivalent outcome by applying an appropriate algorithm (Section 5.5 or Section 5.6) on a per-prefix basis corresponding to the peering relation for the prefix. If this option is not feasible, then an operator MAY apply the algorithm for downstream paths (Section 5.6) to avoid false positive outcomes.

6.5. AS Migration

During AS migration, an AS is in a transition phase when it may be configured at eBGP neighbor ASes with its globally configured ASN (i.e., migrated ASN) or a legacy ASN [RFC7705]. The AS operator MUST provide out-of-band notification to its customer ASes and advise them to update ASPA records to include both the globally configured ASN and the legacy ASN in their SPAS. The exact means used to notify peers is deployment-specific and thus out of scope for this document.

7. Security Considerations

7.1. Incongruence in IPv4 and IPv6 Connectivity

The U-SPAS contains the union of Providers for a CAS for both IPv4 and IPv6 unicast connectivity. This design choice consequently means that if a customer-provider relationship exists for one address family but does not exist for the other address family, AS_PATH verification outcomes for the latter AFI will be as permissive as verification outcomes for the former AFI. That is believed to be a reasonable compromise as both the ASPA registration and verification processes are simplified, and no false positive outcomes are yielded (e.g., inadvertent Invalid evaluation).

7.2. Correctness of the ASPA

Network operators must keep their ASPA objects correct and up to date (Section 4). If a provider is included erroneously in the ASPA, route leak detection capabilities are reduced. If a provider is missing from the ASPA, routes may become falsely ASPA Invalid later on.

Providers should monitor that their AS number is included in the SPAS of their customers' ASPA objects.

7.3. Manipulation of AS_PATH by Provider

A Provider may hijack prefixes of its direct or indirect customers by using a forged-origin/forged-path-segment AS_PATH. It may also manipulate the AS_PATH of routes that are sent to its customers. Such attacks may not be detectable with ASPA.

While such attacks may happen in theory, it does not seem to be a realistic scenario. Normally a customer and their transit provider would have a signed agreement, and a policy violation (of the above kind) should have legal consequences or the customer can just drop the relationship with such a provider and remove the corresponding ASPA record.

7.4. Manipulating AS_PATH Prepends

The ASPA verification procedures cannot detect the removal (or addition) of repeats of AS numbers in the AS_PATH. However, this attack by itself does not affect ASPA's route leak detection capability.

8. IANA Considerations

This document includes no request to IANA.

9. Implementation Status

This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

This section records the status of known implementations of the protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this Internet-Draft. The inclusion of this section here follows the process described in [RFC7942]. The description of implementations in this section is intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort has been spent to independently verify the information presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors. Most contributors have reported that they verified their implementations using the test cases provided in [aspa-examples]. This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may exist.

According to [RFC7942], "this will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature. It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as they see fit".

10. References

10.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile]
Snijders, J., Azimov, A., Uskov, E., Bush, R., Housley, R., and B. Maddison, "A Profile for Autonomous System Provider Authorization", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-31, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-31>.
[IANA-AF]
IANA, "Address Family Numbers", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/address-family-numbers/address-family-numbers.xhtml>.
[IANA-SAF]
IANA, "Subsequent Address Family Identifiers (SAFI) Parameters", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/safi-namespace/safi-namespace.xhtml>.
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4271]
Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
[RFC6480]
Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC6793]
Vohra, Q. and E. Chen, "BGP Support for Four-Octet Autonomous System (AS) Number Space", RFC 6793, DOI 10.17487/RFC6793, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6793>.
[RFC6811]
Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
[RFC7606]
Chen, E., Ed., Scudder, J., Ed., Mohapatra, P., and K. Patel, "Revised Error Handling for BGP UPDATE Messages", RFC 7606, DOI 10.17487/RFC7606, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7606>.
[RFC7705]
George, W. and S. Amante, "Autonomous System Migration Mechanisms and Their Effects on the BGP AS_PATH Attribute", RFC 7705, DOI 10.17487/RFC7705, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7705>.
[RFC7947]
Jasinska, E., Hilliard, N., Raszuk, R., and N. Bakker, "Internet Exchange BGP Route Server", RFC 7947, DOI 10.17487/RFC7947, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7947>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC9234]
Azimov, A., Bogomazov, E., Bush, R., Patel, K., and K. Sriram, "Route Leak Prevention and Detection Using Roles in UPDATE and OPEN Messages", RFC 9234, DOI 10.17487/RFC9234, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9234>.
[RFC9774]
Kumari, W., Sriram, K., Hannachi, L., and J. Haas, "Deprecation of AS_SET and AS_CONFED_SET in BGP", RFC 9774, DOI 10.17487/RFC9774, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9774>.

10.2. Informative References

[aspa-examples]
"ASPA-based AS Path Verification Examples", <https://github.com/ksriram25/IETF/blob/main/ASPA_path_verification_examples.pdf>.
[bgp-cycling]
Azimov, A., "BGP Route Security Cycling to the Future!", NANOG-76, North American Network Operator Group Meeting, Slides archives from NANOG, , <https://nanog.org/events/nanog-76/content/1900/>.
[BGP-SRx]
Lee, K. and O. Borchert, et al., "BGP Secure Routing Extension (BGP-SRx) Software Suite", NIST Open-Source Software , <https://www.nist.gov/services-resources/software/bgp-secure-routing-extension-bgp-srx-software-suite>.
[bgpd]
Jeker, C., "OpenBGPD", <http://www.openbgpd.org/>.
[BIRD]
Kubecova, K. and M. Matejka, "BIRD Internet Routing Daemon; branch mq-aspa", CZ.NIC BIRD Open-Source Software , <https://bird.nic.cz/en/>.
[Flexsealing]
McDaniel, T., Smith, J., and M. Schuchard, "Flexsealing BGP Against Route Leaks: Peerlock Active Measurement and Analysis", , <https://arxiv.org/pdf/2006.06576.pdf>.
[FreeRTR]
Mate, C., "FreeRTR", <http://www.freertr.org/>.
[FRRouting]
FRR Team, "FRRouting", <https://frrouting.org/>.
[nanog-aspa]
Sriram, K., "ASPA-based BGP AS_PATH Verification and Route Leaks Solution", NANOG-89, North American Network Operator Group Meeting, Slides/video archives from NANOG, , <https://nanog.org/events/nanog-89/content/4809/>.
[Peerlock]
Snijders, J., "Peerlock", , <https://www.nanog.org/sites/default/files/Snijders_Everyday_Practical_Bgp.pdf>.
[RFC6483]
Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, "Validation of Route Origination Using the Resource Certificate Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6483, DOI 10.17487/RFC6483, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6483>.
[RFC7908]
Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., McPherson, D., Osterweil, E., and B. Dickson, "Problem Definition and Classification of BGP Route Leaks", RFC 7908, DOI 10.17487/RFC7908, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7908>.
[RFC7942]
Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205, RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942>.
[RFC8205]
Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.
[RFC9319]
Gilad, Y., Goldberg, S., Sriram, K., Snijders, J., and B. Maddison, "The Use of maxLength in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 185, RFC 9319, DOI 10.17487/RFC9319, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9319>.
[RFC9324]
Bush, R., Patel, K., Smith, P., and M. Tinka, "Policy Based on the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) without Route Refresh", RFC 9324, DOI 10.17487/RFC9324, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9324>.
[RFC9582]
Snijders, J., Maddison, B., Lepinski, M., Kong, D., and S. Kent, "A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 9582, DOI 10.17487/RFC9582, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9582>.
[RTRlib]
Braeuer, M., Holler, F., Seifert, C., Schmidt, T., Schulz, M., Tanneberger, T., and M. Waehlisch, "RTRlib - The RPKI RTR Client C Library.", <https://rtrlib.realmv6.org/>.
[RustBGP]
Tuller, L., "Rustbgpd", <https://www.rbgp.rs/>.

Appendix A. Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank Maria Matejka, Claudio Jeker, Jakob Heitz, Amir Herzberg, Igor Lubashev, Ben Maddison, Russ Housley, Jeff Haas, Nan Geng, Mingqing Huang, Jia Zhang, Nick Hilliard, Shunwan Zhuang, Yangyang Wang, Martin Hoffmann, Jay Borkenhagen, Amreesh Phokeer, Aftab Siddiqui, Dai Zhibin, Doug Montgomery, Padma Krishnaswamy, Rich Compton, Andrei Robachevsky, Rudiger Volk, Iljitsch van Beijnum, Tassilo Tanneberger, Matthias Waehlisch, Moritz Schulz, and Carl Seifert for comments, suggestions, and discussion on the path verification procedures or the text in the document. For the implementation and testing of the procedures in the document, the authors wish to thank Claudio Jeker and Theo Buehler [bgpd]; Kyehwan Lee and Oliver Borchert [BGP-SRx]; Katerina Kubecova and Maria Matejka [BIRD]; Tassilo Tanneberger, Carl Seifert, Moritz Schulz, and Matthias Braeuer [RTRlib]; and Csaba Mate [FreeRTR].

Appendix C. Properties and Early Adoption Benefits

The ASPA method has the properties (i.e., anomaly detection capabilities) listed below. Partial deployment scenarios and early adoption benefits are considered. In the case of Property 1, it is assumed that the attacks involve route leaks but not malicious removal of ASes with ASPA records from the AS_PATH.

The above properties show that ASPA-based path verification offers significant benefits to early adopters (also see [nanog-aspa]). Limitations of the method regarding some forms of malicious AS path manipulations are discussed in Section 7.

Authors' Addresses

Alexander Azimov
Yandex
Ulitsa Lva Tolstogo 16
Moscow
119021
Russian Federation
Eugene Bogomazov
Qrator Labs
1-y Magistralnyy tupik 5A
Moscow
123290
Russian Federation
Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus, Inc.
5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
United States of America
Keyur Patel
Arrcus
2077 Gateway Place
Suite #400
San Jose, CA 95119
United States of America
Job Snijders
BSD Software Development
Amsterdam
Netherlands
Kotikalapudi Sriram
USA National Institute of Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
United States of America